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This study addresses the question: How do the structural conditions of 
university organisation modulate subject position, social relations and discourse 
and therefore shape individual consciousness and activity? The response is 
informed by an empirical pedagogical problem located at the tertiary level in 
Japan: What makes acquirers attain higher levels of language mastery in foreign 
language (Spanish) settings informed by communicative language teaching? The 
attempted answer is framed within cultural-historical activity theory, the cultural 
theory of Holland et al. (2001), and Basil Bernstein’s code theory. These theories 
have been combined using Marxian-Hegelian notions of culture and subject, which 
allow language development and mastery to be treated as the acquisition by an 
individual of a cultural tool (semiotic mediation) subject to both individual agency 
and historical forces. The organisational and pedagogical contexts of three 
institutions engaged in Spanish language education have been analysed using 
motive-action/educational task as the unit of analysis that situates the observation 
in between micro and macro levels of analysis, in combination with the 
methodologies for ascertaining subject position provided by Bernstein’s code 
theory and the cultural theory of Holland et al. This procedure made it possible to 
determine acquirers’ coding orientations (orientations to meaning) and to establish 
comparisons between organisation and learning settings. The findings indicate that 
acquirers who have a formal trajectory of language learning and who are able to 
recognise grammar instructional discourse – i.e., who possess a representational 
gaze – attain better levels of language mastery (active realisation) than those with 
informal trajectories (e.g. learning languages overseas in a conversational fashion 
without following a formal programme) and who do not recognise grammar 
instructional discourse. Evidence is provided to indicate that there is no way to 
avoid representational-function programmes. The bottom-up move within 
Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development is suggested as a feasible intervention 
without a drastic reshaping of the programmes. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of freedom is central in the dialectical tradition. It provides 
an orienting point for social scientific research, and gives substantive 
content to the idea of full human development. A main aim of research in 
the dialectical tradition is understanding how to create conditions for full 
human development.  
(Chaiklin, 2012, p. 33) 
 
 
But this speech diversity achieves its full creative consciousness only 
under conditions of an active polyglossia. Two myths perish 
simultaneously: the myth of a language that presumes to be the only 
language, and the myth of a language that presumes to be completely 
unified. 





1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
This study arose as a response to an empirical pedagogical problem located at the 
tertiary level in Japan: What makes a relatively small segment of acquirers attain 
higher levels of language mastery in foreign language (Spanish) settings informed 
by communicative language teaching? 
 
The question is informed by my informal observations and research on students’ 
resistance to foreign language education in Japanese universities, although here I 
am trying to phrase the problem in a more positive or constructive way. Simply 
stated, I plan to study the difference between students who succeed and those who 
do not in their communication courses in Spanish as a foreign language at 
Japanese universities. 
 
By addressing the empirical pedagogical problem, I believe I will contribute to 
improving the foreign language teaching and learning conditions of many 
practitioners and students. The Japanese and non-Japanese instructors who teach 
Spanish as a foreign language at tertiary institutions in Japan often have to face 
15 
 
students’ silent resistance every single working day, especially if they are teaching 
at universities that do not specialise in foreign language education. Instructors pay 
a heavy toll for teaching the infamous dainigaikokugo (second foreign language) 
classes, that is, classes in foreign languages other than English. Things are not 
quite right for them. It is as if they teach knowing that something is wrong but they 
are unable to spot exactly what it is. Japanese Spanish grammar instructors often 
complain about their students’ lack of academic skills, and native Spanish 
instructors feel they are wasting their time trying to convey a real picture of what 
Spanish-speaking societies are and the ways they view and act in the world. 
Students face a similar situation. Some of them believe they are studying in an 
honest way, when in fact their instructors are tacitly demanding something 
completely different from them. In other words, this work addresses the problem 
of the different expectations attached to teaching and learning that instructors and 
students have. 
 
Although the study is focused on the oral communication or conversation class, 
usually taught by a native Spanish instructor, the theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings of the study call for a thorough examination of the curriculum as a 
whole, especially the grammar class, which is usually taught by a Japanese 
instructor. Let me introduce now those underpinnings. 
 
In order to deal with the problem theoretically and empirically, this thesis will also 
address a theoretical problem located in the field of the sociology of education: 
How do the structural conditions of university organisation modulate subject 
position, social relations and discourse and therefore shape individual 
consciousness and activity?   
      
The question is formulated by putting together two interconnected theoretical 
frameworks. The first one is the socio-genetic analytical framework and 
explanatory principle that is the trademark of the dialectical tradition. To most 
readers, this tradition is associated with Lev Semenovich Vygotsky, Alexander 
Luria, Alexei Nikolaevich Leont’ev and many other Soviet scholars and 
researchers but, as Chaiklin (2012) and Blunden (2010) point out, the dialectical 
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tradition goes far back to thinkers such as Karl Marx, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel and even Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. The basic principle is that human 
consciousness and activity are predicated on social relations, not on concepts or 
ideas that descend from heaven or are stored in one’s own head waiting to be 
activated by certain stimuli. The central concern of the socio-genetic theoretical 
stance is the issue of human development and freedom. Social relations develop 
human beings in a process of acculturation which is done mainly by semiotic 
means (especially by speech) that transform the subject. The objective is to have 
the individual appropriating the means to liberate him or herself from arbitrary 
social conditions by generating new social relations. A very simple speculative 
extension of this principle would compel us to analyse the problem of success or 
failure in mastering a foreign language by carefully looking at the social relations 
that are constituted in the foreign language pedagogies. The final question is: Do 
these social relations contribute to the students’ emancipation, to their self-control, 
to their knowledge of the world (i.e. their conscious awareness) and to new forms 
of agency? This question deals with the very notion of mastery. I am using the 
term here to convey the idea that students achieve what the pedagogic system is 
explicitly or implicitly compelling them to achieve, not what I would like the 
pedagogic system to encourage them to achieve. Therefore, I am lowering my 
personal expectations and restricting the problem to the official realm of the 
Japanese educational system in my analysis. Mastery shall be understood in that 
dimension. Nevertheless, this thesis seeks to transcend the limitations imposed by 
the pedagogic system in its current form and therefore I believe we will have to 
tackle the problem of what means to master a language beyond the official line or 
the limitations instructors and students encounter in their daily practice. My 
position as a person, a researcher and a foreign language instructor is inscribed 
within the dialectical tradition, even though the present work will not deal with 
direct interventions that seek to transcend the status quo, I hope this thesis will 
open a way to produce interventions that seek to give students the language and 
intellectual tools they need in order to become true agents in the vast array of 
social settings in which Spanish is or can be used, or as a way to access knowledge 




The second theory corpus is sociological and deals with the importance of looking 
at institutions as the intermediate loci that regulate social positions and eventually 
modulate discourse, including the pedagogic discourse deployed by instructors and 
students in the classroom. This corpus has been advanced by A.A. Leont’ev under 
the heading structure of activity, by Basil Bernstein through his code theory and by 
Dorothy Holland, William Lachicotte Jr, Debra Skinner and Carole Cain as 
cultural theory. In the case of this corpus, the semiotic means referred to above 
and activity in general are transformed into discourse, that is, as the use of 
different linguistic and non-linguistic systems in which we take into consideration 
the positioning of subjects. Again, a very simple speculative extension of this 
theoretical stance compels us to analyse the social configuration of institutions and 
learning settings, subject positions and discourse. The basic message of this 
theoretical corpus is that social positions matter. Social relations regulate 
discursive practices but discourse also cements social relations. The key to 
untangle this relation is analysing the positioning of subjects and institutions. 
Eventually, we have to look at how power distributes different forms of 
consciousness through discourse. 
 
The ideas briefly introduced above will be unwrapped and expanded in the 
following chapters. By addressing the theoretical problem I believe I can offer new 
ways to understand and analyse the relationship between intersubjective and 




1.2 PEDAGOGIC CONTEXT 
 
I would like to situate the study in the precise context in which it was born, in 
which the empirical pedagogical question was formulated. In order to do this, I 
prefer to offer my own personal views, based on my personal experience, rather 
than collecting a myriad of papers and references that will objectively advance my 
views. Therefore, the reader must assume that this introduction is biased. I am 
aware that there may be some opposing views about foreign language education in 
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Japan out there, and in fact, during my teaching career I have changed my original 
views many times. Nonetheless, I still believe that the trajectory of my career 
reflects an epoch, an age marked by pedagogic transition and extreme challenges. I 
also think that it constitutes, perhaps, a more interesting, reading. 
 
I have been a Spanish language instructor in Japan since 1993. I started teaching in 
the Department of Spanish in a vocational school in the Kansai region (western 
Japan) as a full-time instructor and a couple of years later I moved onto teaching 
university students as a part-time instructor and lecturer. Curiously, the students at 
the two-year vocational school were very eager to learn Spanish and they reached 
intermediate levels of language mastery almost without fail. However, I could not 
say the same about many of the language students at four-year universities, 
especially those who took Spanish as a second language. This was a perplexing 
problem since society at large seemed to agree that university students were more 
capable and academically more prepared than vocational school students.  
 
The programme at the vocational school was intensive. Students had many 
conversation classes, taught by native Spanish speakers like myself (eight 
chronological hours per week), and also some grammar classes taught by Japanese 
instructors. Classes were kept small, with less than ten students each. There was a 
lack of instructional materials to teach Spanish as a foreign language. Unlike the 
English as a second language (ESL) publishing market, there were not many 
publishing houses producing Spanish texts at the beginning of the 1990s. The first 
commercial textbooks were published by SGEL (Sociedad General Española de 
Librería), a company that manages the distribution of newspapers and magazines 
at the newspaper kiosks in Spain. A few textbooks were also published by Spanish 
universities, especially by the University of Salamanca. The most commonly 
deployed method of instruction in communication classes was the audiolingual 
method, which consisted of practising dialogues and doing structural drills, but 
always combined with conversations about different topics that were not contained 
in textbooks, which were the dominant activity.  
 
At the end of the 1990s we started using newly available teaching material, which 
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was halfway between the notional-functional method and the communicative 
approach. For grammar classes, Japanese instructors always favoured Spanish 
grammars written by Japanese university professors. These books succinctly 
explained in Japanese some grammatical features and presented the grammar using 
schemata, resembling a handbook of Latin grammar. The instructor explained the 
contents and students had to solve structural problems and try to make sense of the 
expressions, usually by translating them. Students also learned how to read 
commercial information and translate business letters. They also were trained in 
business etiquette, to prepare them for the recruitment season. The education was 
somehow linked to the students’ prospects of landing jobs in Japanese 
corporations as clerks, bank tellers or skilled factory workers, but was not 
necessarily connected to places in which they could use their language skills. Most 
of the students were successful in the labour market, but a few had more difficulty. 
Some students had real personal difficulties fitting in to Japanese society and 
required a lot of guidance; a guidance that my Japanese colleagues generously and 
constantly gave. 
 
The vocational school also organised evening courses in Spanish at beginner, 
intermediate and advanced levels for members of the public in general. Those 
courses were attractive to me and I liked teaching them because I could get to 
know mature Japanese people. My impression is that they were not as shy as 
Japanese youth. In fact they were very assertive and opinionated; they were 
knowledgeable about world affairs, read the newspapers, listened to international 
broadcasts and had stories to tell. In fact they helped me to connect with Japan and 
the issues affecting Japanese society in a much more complex way. Most of the 
studies referred to foreign language education do not consider this segment of the 
Japanese population. Getting to know them showed me that most of the 
characteristics of Japanese learners’ learning and communication styles that 
circulated in journals were not accurate.      
 
In those days, vocational schools provided education to those who could not pass 
university entrance examinations, to students whose parents did not have the 
financial resources to pay for four years of university tuition (Japanese tuition fees 
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are among the highest in the world) and living expenses, and to students who 
would inherit their parents’ small business but wanted to spend two years of 
relative leisure before committing their lives to a very demanding schedule. Some 
of them also enrolled in a vocational school because they had already learnt about 
their academic limitations during high school. In other words, the students had 
already been selected by the educational system and some did not even bother to 
take a university entrance examination. In some cases the selection I am talking 
about was literal, for homeroom teachers in Japan issue recommendation letters to 
higher education institutions depending on the academic skills of their students 
enabling each student to enrol in a given programme. In fact, many tertiary 
organisations in Japan offer a number of vacancies to certain high schools. The 
numbers are high if the university and the high school belong to the same 
educational corporate group. The system could be considered to be a fast-track 
admissions scheme. The students knew the vocational school was their place. Yet, 
school life there was good and fulfilling. All problems aside, the students wanted 
to learn and the instructors wanted to teach. The instructors got to know the 
students well and worked together in the production of cultural events such as 
Spanish-language theatre plays, speech and essay writing contests and cultural 
festivals. Whilst one could easily argue that a lot of language was learnt through 
those activities, I believe the actual language learning was achieved by the 
organisation of those activities in Spanish.  
 
Even if students did not land a job that required the use of their Spanish skills, they 
wanted to learn Spanish in order to know more about themselves. They could 
discover a new world of possibilities, perhaps dream about places where they 
wanted to spend their holidays when they settled down: places they did not know 
much about and which seemed warm and charming. Most of what they knew about 
Spain and Latin America at that time was from the 1992 Barcelona Olympic 
Games and a few old songs from the Mexican trio Los Panchos like Bésame 
mucho or La Bamba, which were listed at the karaoke parlours. Television and 
radio hardly broadcast any news concerning Spain or Latin American countries. 
The international news slot was filled with news from Washington DC. We did not 
know much about the United Kingdom or Europe either. I was quite appalled to 
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find out that in Japan there was no cable television and many Japanese students 
had never met or spoken to a native Spanish or English speaker. Compared with 
the great variety of information sources that people in Chile, my home country, 
enjoyed at that time (e.g. cable television, national and international newspapers), 
not to mention that in almost any school’s roster you may find surnames belonging 
to at least ten different national backgrounds, including our own native ethnic 
groups, Japan looked very isolated and boringly homogenous. The internet and 
satellite and cable television would come a few years later and finally put an end 
to the information seclusion of the 1990s.  
 
However, we had a growing problem. The number of students enrolled at the 
vocational school had been decreasing dramatically for the last two years. In fact it 
was an indicator of the circumstances almost every single vocational school was 
facing in Japan after the Ministry of Education liberalised the university 
curriculum in 1991, paving the way for universities to increase their student 
enrolment. Vocational schools were looked down upon and could not compete in 
terms of branding with larger and more prestigious organisations. Employers were 
hunting graduates attached to organisation brands. I had no choice but to start 
teaching at universities. The world of the foreign language vocational school 
would soon be over.  
 
I taught my first university class at a public university in 1997. To my surprise, 
university lessons were much more physically and mentally demanding than the 
ones I taught at the vocational school. Whilst students at universities specialising 
in foreign language education, that is, with foreign studies faculty and departments, 
tended to be more motivated and keen on learning Spanish, students at universities 
that did not specialise in foreign language education did not seem to be interested 
in learning anything at all. After all, they were not majoring in Spanish but in 
something else, and not unlike the situation in the vocational school sector, 
corporations did not care much about what subjects graduates from the humanities 
specialised in at the time of recruiting them.  
 
The classes were packed with students. A colleague of mine boasted he taught a 
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conversation class in one university with about 150 students. Whilst that number 
seems ridiculously high, the usual number of students enrolled in a communication 
course in an organisation not specialised in foreign language education ranges 
from 25 to 45, which is still high for any course on practical skills. The 
organisations specialising in foreign language education cut that number in half in 
oral communication classes but usually would not cut the number of students in 
grammar classes, as they are considered to be theoretical, not practical classes. The 
field is dominated by industrial models and economies of scale. This model is also 
reflected in the full-time part-time instructor ratio at both kinds of institutions. It 
was quite common to have only one or two full-time instructors, usually Japanese 
nationals who would liaise with administration staff such as the office for 
academic affairs, for every ten, fifteen or twenty part-time instructors.  
  
At universities that did not specialise in languages, Spanish lessons were organised 
for different faculties. Thus, instead of putting together Spanish courses for 
students of many faculties, which could have amounted to a sort of melting pot of 
different interests, learning styles and academic aims, separate courses were 
delivered to first- and second-year students of particular faculties. In those 
circumstances the faculty pathos came to light, with instructors talking about from 
which faculty students were best suited to or more interested in learning a foreign 
language than other faculty students. At one particular organisation where I was 
teaching, students from the faculty of Law were considered disciplined, systematic 
but lacking social skills and a bit boring; whereas students of the faculty of Social 
Sciences were considered to be undisciplined but communicative and funny. I 
thought all this labelling of faculties was fascinating, as it created a sort of 
relational universe. In fact, some instructors, Japanese and foreign alike, measured 
their level of happiness by counting the number of hours they taught at different 
faculties.  
 
Yet, the breach between the university specialising in foreign language education 
and those not so specialised was not that wide. Overall, successful students at both 
organisations seemed to learn Spanish despite the educational system, not because 
of it. What I mean is that the great majority of students did not get to master the 
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language, and the segment which did amounted to less than one quarter of the 
student population. As one colleague of mine always points out, if you take away 
all the support from the instructor at the time of talking, all the cueing and 
rephrasing, no one would be able to understand the student and his or her message 
would not come across in an actual Spanish-speaking context overseas.  
 
Communication instructors soon have to learn how to communicate à la Japonaise 
and be very good at inferring what the student wants to say based on minimal cues, 
gestures and silence. I have noticed that even Japanese colleagues have a hard time 
understanding what Japanese students were trying to say, in expressing their ideas 
or desires, even if they shared to a higher degree than I possibly could the implicit 
Japanese cultural context. The exercise of producing simple presentations in 
Spanish about Japanese food and menu choices to the Spanish public with the help 
of PowerPoint may turn to be a very demanding one. Even if the student shows 
pictures of the ingredients and says something like ‘you have to mix this with that’ 
or ‘cut this in … slices’, which is still valid to me, he or she is compelled to use a 
great variety of verbs and verbal forms, and there is no way out of it. Without 
those verbs we may well prescind from the presenter altogether. Silence is not an 
option, when the presenter is being asked a question, unless he or she (explicitly) 
asks the public for help on prompting a word or expression, which is fine with me 
as well. The question is: Are the communication demands on this kind of 
presentation in Spain far removed from the communication demands the Japanese 
culture imposes on his own speakers or presenters in Japan? I do not think so. And 
even if there are differences, there are ways to negotiate and iron them out. But 
those who engage in the Apology of Japanese Silence will clearly realise that in 
the corporate Japanese world one’s minute silence in front of a PowerPoint slide is 
not good enough, neither is it good enough at a job interview. 
 
This has nothing to do with asking students to sound like native speakers; it has to 
do with the problem of going beyond communication contexts in which words 
have a referential role directly connected to the environment, that is, in 
context-dependent situations. Communication is not a fixed notion. It is 
culture-dependent. But the burden of the communication is mostly on the speaker 
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of the foreign language. He or she will have to deal with the coding of the implicit 
elements of his or her culture and needs to be prepared to do so if the 
communication is ever going to happen and not be reduced to insurmountable 
stereotypes, for the whole idea of communicating in a foreign language is about 
transcending the local context or redefining it.  
 
There has appeared a certain theoretical literature that treats the communication 
instructor as a sort of neo-colonialist agent involved at once in Japan bashing and 
Western deification. Those views ignore that communicating in any foreign 
language (in teaching and learning one, for instance) means that student and 
instructor definitely lose any ethnocentric viewpoint they may have assumed. The 
student will start questioning the view of his or her own native language as the 
only possible language and the instructor will struggle to select the most stable 
zone of a language to be taught just to realise that his own native language is in 
fact a non-unified system. Provided that teaching and learning are done in a 
respectful manner, I do not see any problem in producing a clash between the 
dissimilar ideological views carried by national languages, for those national 
languages (and Spanish is a multinational one) are subject of the constant work of 
centrifugal forces. What is unacceptable to me is to treat the teaching of any 
language as something that should be innocuous, for it is not, demanding the 
impossible task of freeing language from its ideological burden and its 
communicative power. Every time I have to teach a particular Spanish expression I 
am choosing one from many different possibilities, representing different social 
contexts and positions, appealing to different sensibilities. Language, any language, 
is the place of ideological struggle, and, in my view, the way to get rid of its 
ideological burden is by examining it through other languages (including the 
centrifugal forces within one’s own language), not by skimming it or presenting it 
in a cage, ignoring the forces that are acting through it. In this regard, teaching 
foreign languages is all about the relativisation of ideological systems and 
therefore it is a tool at the service of human freedom. 
 
Most Japanese universities designed language programmes, and still do, in which 
there was a division between grammar and conversation classes. A Japanese 
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instructor would teach Spanish grammar and a native Spanish instructor would 
teach conversation. Japanese instructors were meant to do the theoretical 
explanations, considered to be the hard part of the teaching. Non-Japanese 
instructors were given the task of motivating students by imprecise means instead. 
Very few programmes introduced other courses that could have reinforced certain 
aspects of language teaching such as laboratory classes, where students could do 
structural drills; reading and writing courses, which would have helped students 
reflect on cultural differences; or introductory history or cross-culture courses 
through which students could have understood the social background of, let us say, 
particular pragmatic features of Spanish or Latin American speakers. 
 
A four-year programme at a university specialising in foreign language education 
is based fundamentally on grammar and communication courses during the first 
two years of study. Some organisations offer short-term intensive courses in a 
Spanish-speaking country lasting up to one month for first- or second-year 
students. Students may be encouraged to spend up to one year overseas in some 
higher education institution and get credits if they take regular courses at an 
accredited university, usually one for which an exchange agreement is in place. At 
the third year, students will have to choose a seminar course leading towards the 
writing of their undergraduate thesis. Practical language courses are then cut by 
half. Seminars may cover a wide range of disciplines; linguistics, history, literature, 
economics and so-called area studies. In contrast, foreign language programmes at 
universities that do not specialise in foreign language education may last up to two 
years and will be almost completely limited to Spanish grammar and 
communication.  
 
Regarding instructional materials, both kinds of organisations continue to use 
grammar manuals written in Japanese for the grammar class. At universities 
specialising in foreign language education, the communication instructor usually 
chooses a textbook informed by the communicative approach or the task-based 
language teaching method, which I consider to be part and parcel of 
communicative language teaching pedagogies. Usually, these textbooks are 
organised following a functional progression rather than a grammatical one and 
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come with audio recordings and an exercise book. They try to develop in a 
balanced way the four basic language skills of reading, writing, listening and 
speaking.  
 
At organisations that do not specialise in foreign language education, both the 
communication and the grammar instructors may share the same textbook. As a 
rule, the text is produced in Japan by a team of Japanese and non-Japanese writers 
and will tend to follow a grammatical progression. Lessons usually contain one 
dialogue, grammatical explanations in Japanese, structural drills and a handful of 
very restrictive communication tasks. In fact, I believe that the kind of task 
contained in these textbooks is closer to a communication exercise. The difference 
between an exercise and a task is that in the former, the learning contents and 
procedures are clearly indicated and a lot of attention is paid to some aspect of the 
language’s grammatico-pragmatical system. Students are to avoid changing either 
the stipulated contents or the instructional sequence. In the latter, only the object 
of the task is given. Students have to figure out what to do and how to do it. More 
recent publications are accompanied by a CD containing audio recordings of 
dialogues and drills, and a few are sold together with video recordings of dialogues 
or communication situations and several briefings on cultural aspects of a given 
Spanish-speaking society. 
 
Even though the instructional materials reveal different philosophical and 
methodological paradigms, the question is how those instructional materials are 
being used. I became very skilful at changing the object of an exercise contained 
in one of those Japanese manuals and transforming it, to a certain degree, into a 
communicative task. However, the instructional material imposes a certain logic 
that is hard to avoid or circumvent. Therefore, textbooks reveal a partial but 
important picture of what is going on inside the foreign language classrooms. 
However, we must understand how the material is actually being used in the 
classroom. 
 




By the end of the 1990s primary and secondary teachers across the country started 
to witness a social phenomenon called gakkyû hôkai, which can be translated as 
classroom collapse. The phenomenon involved the deterioration or total collapse 
of a class in the hands of undisciplined students who committed violent acts, 
undermining the school’s authority. At university level we had our own version of 
the classroom collapse in the form of classroom disruption or education resistance. 
It did not take a violent form, though: the resistance was much more subtle as it 
involved the silent scorning of the system. Students were tired, overworked and 
non-responsive. One could ask a question of a student and get no answer. Not even 
‘I do not know’. Students who knew the answer to a question would not answer 
either, even if asked directly to provide the answer. Many sat at their desks and 
started to sleep. Some pretended or simulated study when in fact they were doing 
something else. Around half of the students came to class intermittently, 
undermining any form of progression through the syllabus. They forgot to bring 
their textbooks or dictionaries. Some of them came to class without a pen to take 
notes or forgot to put in their contact lenses and therefore they could not read the 
whiteboard. At communication classes, students pretended to do the 
conversational tasks but in fact they were chatting with their peers in Japanese 
about something else. They were more focused on texting friends on their mobile 
telephones or doing the homework for other classes. 
 
At the beginning of the 2000s the Spanish department at the vocational school had 
already closed down and I was working part-time in five universities, teaching an 
average of fifteen 90-minute classes per week. Two of those universities were 
specialising in foreign language education and the rest did not have a language 
department. Out of those five, there was only one, a public university specialising 
in foreign language education, where I did not experience students’ education 
resistance. Therefore, of those fifteen classes, I felt relatively fulfilled as an 
educator in only two. The remaining thirteen were a kind of living hell. I spent 
most of my teaching time trying to discipline students. Good students also suffered 
as they were ostracised by their recalcitrant peers. They demanded from instructors 
an impossible mission: the enforcement of disciplinary rules on disruptive students. 
Students who resisted education were aiming at the soft collapse of the classroom 
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by creating an atmosphere that was not conducive to learning, forcing the 
instructor to lower the academic standards. To me, it seemed as if the students 
knew exactly what they were doing and acted in a co-ordinated manner, even 
though I was sure they were not actually conspiring to annihilate the class. It 
seemed to me that they were deploying the same strategies they had cultivated in 
their high-school years against their Japanese teachers. I remember sending one 
student to the academic affairs office for talking to a friend on his mobile phone 
while I was teaching. The device’s battery was gone so the student had plugged 
the phone to the charger and was talking in one of the corners of the classroom. 
Disciplining a clear breach of the rules like that was easy, I thought. It was much 
harder to discipline students who would scorn the class and the educational system 
as a whole. Nonetheless, that night, the head of the Spanish programme telephoned 
me home saying that I created a big problem for him, as he had to apologise on my 
behalf. His message was that the staff at the academic affairs office thought I was 
overreacting and he made me promise him that I would never respond like that 
again in a similar situation. His advice was to let students do what they wanted and 
then not pass them at the end of the course. In other words, I was told to use 
evaluations as a form of enforcing the social order. The message was clear: I was 
to deal with the problem alone and within the classroom walls. No much time 
passed until I developed a kind of nervous breakdown and soon I was feeling so 
depressed that I decided to consult a psychotherapist. I could not understand what I 
was doing with my life. I thought I had been hired to teach Spanish, to introduce 
students to a language that would open up the doors to a good number of 
rewarding possibilities. Students were paying costly tuition fees to attend 
university and yet, nothing seemed to be right. 
 
I was not alone. Many Japanese and non-Japanese colleagues were suffering 
severe mental distress. Perhaps not everyone developed depression, as I did, but 
they were not having a good time either. The talk of the day was how to develop 
strategies to cope with classroom disruption. Thus, instead of focusing on 
preparing lessons, how to develop new instructional material or how to teach 
better classes, we were discussing how to become law enforcement agents. A 
couple of years later, many universities started to include questions that reflected 
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the state of affairs in the course evaluation surveys they gave to students to fill out 
at the end of the semester such as Does the teacher maintain the social order in the 
classroom? Does s/he effectively deal with classroom interruptions such as use of 
mobile phones? What I found particularly galling is that those surveys were 
administered by the office of academic affairs at every university, by the very 
same people who did not support instructors in the disciplining of students. And 
they were asking questions about the management of classroom disruption to the 
very same perpetrators of classroom disruption.  
 
1.2.2 Instruction as a disciplinary tool 
 
One of the major problems we had is that we began disciplining students through 
instruction, not by explaining the moral principles underlying the regulation of 
conduct. Even this attempt was not very effective because some universities 
started applying a policy that did not allow instructors to fail more than 10 per cent 
of the students, and students soon learned about it. Given the fact that resistance 
was rampant, we tried to exert control by applying hierarchical forms of control 
through instruction that ran counter to the instructional paradigm of the 
communicative methods we tried to deploy such as the communicative approach. 
In a nutshell, the communicative approach assumes that language is learned 
through meaningful communication, that is, through real-life situations that 
necessitate communication to be solved. This involves giving students a certain 
degree of freedom and self-control over the task sequence and roles they play. It 
requires their collaboration, for they have to engage themselves in some form of 
experiential learning, which, unfortunately, cannot be regulated from the outside 
unless they conceptually understand what they are doing and agree with its means. 
For instance, if after forming working groups or pairs students started to talk in 
their mother tongue about anything except the contents targeted in the instructional 
task, we could not tolerate the situation and took back control by deploying more 
teacher-centred methods of instruction, controlling speech turns, calling 
participants in, and in general, by involving the class as a whole. Another way to 
exert control and discipline was by checking periodically if students had done their 
homework effectively, or by introducing partial tests or examinations. Again, the 
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problem is that such easy forms of checking homework involved giving tasks 
based on pedagogies that are alien to the communicative approach such as 
structural drills, especially on written form. The proper assessment of 
communication is a lengthy process and in fact I believe it can only be done by 
evaluating the process, not the outcome. Put another way, individual homework is 
based on forms of reflection which are not equivalent to the parameters of oral 
conversation, which requires communicative readiness and automaticity. Any 
examination of communicative processes, furthermore, runs against the very 
principles of communication as they are understood in Spanish-speaking societies, 
for they value spontaneity above anything else. The testing of communication 
mastery is done by setting and controlling the communication context. 
Communication in Spanish-speaking societies is all about pushing the limits of the 
context, not blindly adhering to it. This is done because social relations tend to be 
considered horizontal, even in circumstances in which they are hierarchical, and 
there are higher degrees of criticism and relativisation of social positions than in 
Japan. Jokes are made in those situations precisely to soften and level up 
hierarchical relations. In fact, making jokes is part of a ritualistic form of 
communication that aims to partially undermine social hierarchies. The problem is 
that jokes, to be effective, cannot be rehearsed, and therefore there is no point in 
teaching them in an explicit manner. The way to teach this kind of ritual is 
complex and depends, to a large extent, on imitation. In conclusion, the 
instructional paradigm was the communicative approach and apparent 
student-centred pedagogies, but the quest for disciplining and controlling students 
kept us from applying that paradigm.  
 
The implicit requirement imposed by the communicative approach may be at odds 
with certain social contexts and relations in Japanese social life, but a certain 
degree of freedom to communicate is absolutely necessary to learn anything at all. 
The adult learners at the vocational school’s evening courses did not have any 
problem at all with communicating in a horizontal way. Therefore, I cannot 
subscribe to the idea that Japanese communication styles are completely 
hierarchical and students cannot draw from particular experiences in which they 
had to collaborate and assume more horizontal social positions. Schooling 
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necessarily involves some form of explicit participation. Perhaps students must go 
back to their primary education years, in which their participation seemed more 
chaotic, less structured, and draw from those communication experiences. Or 
communication instructors must excel in orienting students on their instructional 
tasks, diminishing the need for creative approaches. Nevertheless, communication 
instructors did not have many chances to try out some approaches to come to terms 
with different communication styles. Students’ resistance did not allow them to do 
so in the first place.   
 
Japanese colleagues did not suffer the instructional dissonance that non-Japanese 
instructors encountered in communication classes because the pedagogies of 
teaching grammar, which hardly touch any notions of pragmatics except a rather 
simple divide between formal and informal ways of communication, do not require 
the introduction of new social contexts and communication requirements. In fact, 
an additional problem of the made-in-Japan grammar textbooks is that language 
samples are taken out of the blue, created by their authors, that is, they are not 
extracted from any linguistic corpora, and do not correspond to any real 
communication need. They are used to demonstrate the language’s syntactic or 
morphosyntactic features, not its communicative functions. Thus, even though 
grammar instructors encountered students’ resistance to foreign language 
education, they could effectively discipline students through instruction without 
compromising their instructional paradigm. Communication instructors were not 
that lucky.  
 
1.2.3 Dissonance in communication pedagogies 
 
Communication instruction constituted a major contradictory process. The 
dissonance between the objectives set for the pedagogic process and the pedagogic 
means to achieve them by resorting to instruction as a disciplinary tool created an 
impossible situation. After all, communication instructors were mostly hired to 
teach actual communication. At least they were told to do that. In fact, a good 
selling point of a university programme is this idea of having students on campus 
interacting with foreign faculty members and actually learning a foreign language. 
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Some universities go beyond that and picture students abroad communicating in 
Spanish with native speakers. Perhaps all this is part of a collective fantasy. I must 
point out here that a few universities were more honest and did not hire 
communication instructors to teach communication but grammar, instead. 
Instructors were compelled to use Japanese. In those cases, instructors did not 
experience any problem at all except the need to brush up their Japanese skills. 
However, at universities where teaching communication was required, instructors 
had no other choice than to reduce the dissonance by setting different pedagogical 
objectives and betraying the communication and internationalisation prospects of 
the programme, which the organisation was not willing to support in the first place, 
as it was unwilling to discipline students. Not doing so would have meant 
assuming an extreme position always subject to being dubbed as a neo-colonialist 
pedagogy that did not pay respect to the pedagogic ways of the local social context. 
The instructor then would have followed the way of Mr Keating, the English 
teacher in the film The Dead Poets Society, who uncompromisingly taught the true 
stuff and the true ways of poetry, literature and drama but ended up being 
outmanoeuvred by an important segment of his own students, marginalised, and 
expelled from school. Fortunately, Mr Keating did not have to be called a 
neo-colonialist in the film, for he was an American teaching in an American 
school. Communication instructors had to be much more cynical. 
 
Teaching Spanish as a foreign language would play, eventually, a role similar to 
that played by the teaching of Latin – a dead language – the Western world for 
centuries: brain training and accessing old written texts. Communication 
instructors were invited to kill the language (and symbolically kill themselves) and 
teach its dead version. Thus, reading a Spanish dialogue from a textbook amounted 
to the same operation as reading a passage of Livy’s Ab urbe condita, although the 
literary quality of the former was much inferior. Instructors, like zombies, may 
have dressed up the dead text by having students read it aloud or making a drama 
out of it, but its communicative potential as the expression of actual social 
relations taking place hic et nunc in the Spanish speaking and writing worlds, and 
in the classroom, as a bridge between two dissimilar worlds, was aborted, and with 
it the possibility of students connecting with those worlds. However, Spanish is 
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not a dead language, and the communication instructor, even if metamorphosised 
into a zombie, is never absolutely dead. Actual sparks of communication may 
emerge at any time. In fact, even dead languages like Latin produce sparks and 
ignite fires.  
 
I started a new form of cognitive therapy at that time: scientific research. I started 
researching education resistance, trying to answer the questions of what the origins 
of that phenomenon were and what it meant to be a successful student in 
communication learning settings. These two questions summarise the problem. On 
the one hand, resistance was predominant in organisations that did not specialise in 
foreign language education. On the other, in both kinds of organisations only a 
quarter of the students actually achieved language mastery. The present thesis is 
the culmination of a long process that started in 2003. 
  
During all these years teaching Spanish I noticed that not everybody understood 
the problem in its true dimension. On the one hand, there was a big gap between 
specialist and non-specialist organisations. Instructors who worked in the former 
remained pretty much ignorant of the ordeal it was to teach the 
foreign-language-other-than-English courses. On the other hand, as already seen, 
the grammar instructor did not suffer from instructional dissonance disease and 
had not experienced first-hand the same levels of distress that the communication 
instructor had.  
 
There was also a coding problem that was (and still is) reflected in our academic 
conferences: the research carried out on a specialist organisation could not be 
completely applied to the organisation not specialising in foreign language 
teaching. If we wanted to understand the phenomenon, we had to develop a 
language of description and analysis of pedagogies that transcended this gap and 
allowed generalisations to be made. In fact, we had to produce a language of 
description of pedagogies that went beyond actual grammar and communication 
pedagogies at either specialist or non-specialist organisations  
 
I was having another problem as well. The applied linguistics and language 
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teaching literature I had consulted for more than a decade seemed unable to 
provide answers to the problem. After studying the theoretical principles of 
second-language acquisition (SLA) and applying its pedagogies for more than a 
decade, I gave up. It was hard to admit it but the SLA theoretical corpus did not 
constitute a science capable of explaining and analysing mind formation. It did not 
deal with the problem of consciousness, of social consciousness; human 
development and freedom; discourse and power. It seemed as if the SLA field was 
operating with many tiny theories that addressed specific problems, like a 
patchwork, but single, simple principles that could unify theory and research were 
missing. Therefore, if the reader of the present study feels that I have abandoned 
the SLA field, he or she could not be more right. What I have not abandoned, 
though, is my concern with teaching foreign languages. I have not abandoned my 
colleagues who teach foreign languages every day in Japanese universities, and my 
students. Therefore, in this study, communicative language teaching will be 
recontextualised and brought into the realm of the dialectical tradition, not the 
other way around. I am using the term communicative language teaching because I 
want to establish a recognisable link with SLA scholars and practitioners but, as 
already seen, my theoretical and empirical paradigms are quite different. I believe 
a more reasonable approach is to recontextualise SLA theory and practice in the 
light of psychological and sociological sciences, particularly Vygotskian 
psychology and Bernstein’s educational sociology. And this is exactly what this 
thesis is all about. 
 
The teaching conditions may have changed from the 2000s. Perhaps the pedagogic 
settings are no longer dominated by cases of extreme collective resistance to 
learning as I experienced them. Since 2010 I have not taught the 
foreign-language-other-than-English courses but focused on teaching Spanish at 
universities specialising in foreign language education. I have a full-time job now 
at a university specialising in foreign language teaching. But still I hear fellow 
instructors from other universities commenting how difficult is to teach those 
classes. The talk of the day is motivation, how to motivate students. Even grammar 
instructors are concerned about motivating students. Yet, I believe the percentage 
of students that achieves higher levels of mastery is still small, even in university 
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departments specialising in Spanish and Latin-American studies. The present 
thesis will try to address that issue. 
 
In conclusion, I hope the reader will soon understand why I am so concerned with 
providing descriptions that allow us to compare different teaching and learning 
contexts, for I am trying to address at once the problem of attaining mastery in 
dissimilar organisations and learning settings. I believe my experience of nineteen 
years in Japan teaching Spanish as a foreign language in a dozen organisations, 
from introductory to advanced courses, from oral and written communication to 
Spanish and Latin American culture and history, give me a solid base from which I 
can approach this important matter. 
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CHAPTER 2: SUBJECT, AGENCY, DEVELOPMENT AND DISCOURSE 
 
The individual person is a limiting case of a subject, but in general, the 
individual-as-subject can only be the endpoint of a long-drawn-out, 
still-unfinished historical process. 
(Blunden, 2007, p. 257) 
 
 
First, we must show that the learning of a scientific concept differs from 
the learning of an everyday concept in much the same way that foreign 
language learning in school differs from learning a native language. 
Second, we must show that relationship between the development of the 
two types of concepts are much the same as the relationships between the 
processes of foreign and native language development. 
(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 222) 
 
 
I will define pedagogic discourse as a rule which embeds two discourses; 
a discourse of skills of various kinds and their relations to each other, 
and a discourse of social order. Pedagogic discourse embeds rules which 
create skills of one kind or another and rules regulating their 
relationship to each other, and rules which create social order … Often 
people in schools and in classrooms make a distinction between what 
they call the transmission of skills and the transmission of values. These 
are always kept apart as if there were a conspiracy to disguise the fact 
that there is only one discourse. 






This chapter explores the problematic conceptualisation of individual agency in 
relation to social institutions with the aim of providing a conceptual framework 
that overcomes, on the one hand, epistemologically unsustainable dualisms such as 
individual/society, and on the other hand, accounts based on distorted 
determinisms, whether they represent voluntarist political agendas or not. I argue 
that the problem of agency – how to describe, analyse and eventually explain the 
capacity of an agent to act in the world – is deeply rooted in a given conception of 
subject. Without an appropriate working concept of subject, individual agency can 
be perceived, on the one hand, as culturally determined, the product of social 
structures (culturalism), or, on the other hand, as enjoying higher but deceptive 
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degrees of autonomy or self-determinism (constructivism). Furthermore, without 
such a definition, the integration of the sciences that have traditionally studied 
human agency, such as ethics, psychology and sociology, is practically impossible. 
 
Cultural-historical theories based on the work conducted by Lev Semenovich 
Vygotsky, Alexander Romanovich Luria, Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin and 
Alexei Nikolaevich Leont’ev in the former Soviet Union provide a sociogenetic 
framework of analysis of the development of consciousness and behaviour that 
satisfies some of the aforementioned requirements. These theories can be said to 
belong to the dialectical tradition at large. With the exception perhaps of Bakhtin’s 
theoretical corpus, they all draw on Marx’s theory of society and social subject and 
the principles of dialectical materialism, which provide an important ontological 
foundation. This foundation avoids dualistic constructs such as individual/society 
that introduce profound epistemological limitations and distortions.  
 
I argue throughout this chapter that these theories, particularly cultural-historical 
activity theory, and others that draw on them such as Basil Bernstein’s code theory 
and the cultural theory advanced by Dorothy Holland, William Lachicotte Jr, 
Debra Skinner and Carole Cain (Holland et al., 2001), provide a sound account of 
agency. This account will help us to address the theoretical and pedagogic 
problems posed in the present study concerning the mastery of oral Spanish as 
foreign language by Japanese students in communication learning settings at the 
tertiary level. 
 
Drawing on Andy Blunden’s (2007, 2010) critique of activity theory, I attempt to 
set the foundations for a non-conventional definition of subject that allows the 
reconceptualising of deterministic or voluntaristic views of individual agency, 
society and culture, bridging, above all, psychology and sociology.  
 
By taking up the notion of subject, I explore the issue of agency with a twofold 
purpose. The first one is integrating cultural-historical activity theory with 
Bernstein’s code theory, which can be regarded as a model of cultural transmission 
that, unlike other sociological accounts, establishes an inherent relation between 
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social structure and discursive forms. Discourse (in our case pedagogic discourse) 
condenses subject and institutional positions, and therefore obeys at once the logic 
of social or historical forces and individual consciousness or psyche. In other 
words, discourse concentrates the conflict between cultural tools as expression of 
societal needs such as education, the social dynamic of learning as a specific 
intermental process, and as vehicles of the subject’s self-control, mastery or 
development, that is, as an intramental process. In this regard, I argue that 
discourse is eminently a sociological notion, analytically more powerful within 
this dimension than interaction, practice, language or communication. The second 
purpose is to incorporate accounts – not unlike those portrayed in Bakhtin’s 
theories of communication – that view identity as a process taking place in 
multivoiced, socially constructed worlds, such as the work done in cultural theory 
by Holland et al. (2001). Their theory of identity and agency in figured worlds – 
which not only draws on Bakhtin but on Vygotsky, A.N. Leont’ev and Pierre 
Bourdieu – allows incorporation of the individual’s narrative as a discursive 
account of her self-consciousness and identity construction into empirical analysis. 
In other words, the integration of the theoretical bodies of Bernstein, and of 
Holland and colleagues, not only helps in understanding how culture modulates 
and is modulated by the subject’s social position but offers a methodological 
approach to tackle empirical research on this area.  
 
All these theories have different theoretical and empirical strengths and 
weaknesses. For instance, unlike cultural-historical activity theory, Bernstein’s 
code theory lacks an account of subject change or development. Code theory 
represents a powerful sociological account of cultural production and reproduction 
at the structural level, but it is not sensitive to subject development. The strength 
of code theory is that it offers theoretical and methodological instruments to unveil 
cultural and social constraints in pedagogical processes by means of analysing the 
positions subjects take as a result of differentials in the distribution of power and 
principles of control, which are aspects that remain largely undertheorised in 
cultural-historical activity theory. Furthermore, the cultural theory of Holland and 
colleagues (2001) is sensitive to social position but lacks psychological accounts 





Although I believe Bernstein’s code theory provides the theoretical and empirical 
backbone in the present study, I will start this literature review by providing an 
introduction to the problem of subject, agency and discourse along the historical 
development of the cultural-historical tradition, as it provides the basic notions to 
be expanded and the basic problems that need to be addressed throughout the 
present research. I will then introduce Bernstein’s code theory in depth, together 
with Holland and colleagues’ cultural theory. In other words, I will begin 
explaining the socio-genetic principle of cultural-historical psychology and then 




2.2 AGENCY AND THE NOTION OF THE SUBJECT 
 
2.2.1 A materialist socio-genetic, socio-historical model of development 
 
Right up to the first quarter of the twentieth century, psychology was still having 
trouble finding a theory and a language of description that allowed it to account for 
both sensory and rational cognition (i.e., lower and higher psychological 
functions) without falling into, on the one hand, Cartesian body-mind type of 
dualisms and the idealist determinisms of Cartesian thought, and, on the other 
hand, cases of extreme objectivation, such as behaviourism, which studied external 
behaviour while rejecting out of hand the study of human consciousness. 
 
Luria (1985) points out that the central issue of a psychology that could overcome 
these problems is precisely the study of consciousness, especially how humans 
transcend the bounds of sensory experience (lower functions) and are able to 
abstract individual features of things, perceiving their links (higher functions) (p. 
17). The study of consciousness is firmly bound to the study of language, whose 
basic element is the word. Protohistorically, Luria views words as emerging out of 
human labour, particularly out of the division of labour, as a means of organising 
and giving an account of increasingly complex social relations. It is through labour 
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that words started to go beyond their immediate referential role, or sympractical 
character, intertwined with practice, i.e. their meaning arose solely out of concrete 
practical situations and activities, and then became part of a synsemantic structure, 
acquiring independence and becoming meaningful only in the company of other 
words, thus forming part of a system. The study of the emergence of complex 
forms of conscious behaviour thus depends upon the analysis of the social forms 
of human historical existence. This represents a complete departure from the 
teachings of traditional psychology at the time (p.27). 
 
More concretely, Luria is referring to a particular model of description and 
explanatory principle grounded in the socio-genetic and socio-historical model of 
development as set out by Vygotsky (1987, 1997a). In this model, the 
development of higher conscious psychological functions is understood as 
mediated, especially through sign-using, social, collaborative activity. Functions 
such as voluntary attention, logical memory and the formation of concepts appear 
twice, after a long series of developmental events, first on the interpsychological 
level, and later on, on the intrapsychological level (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 56).  
 
Luria explains that the model used constitutes the basic position of a Marxist 
psychology. The approach is grounded in dialectical materialism. The origins of 
human consciousness are not located in the soul or in the brain but in ‘humans’ 
actual relation with reality’ (Luria, 1985, p. 30), especially in their social history, 
which is intimately linked to labour and language.  
 
I would like to stress that, in both Vygotsky’s and Luria’s accounts of the 
socio-genetic and socio-historical model of development, language is not seen as a 
system of logical propositions but is considered social activity itself and therefore 
it should be regarded in their theoretical framework as a form of proto-discourse, 
language in use or practice. In fact, Vygotsky’s (and Bakhtin’s) work on language 
has been rendered sometimes as a theory of verbal communication (see Akhutina, 
2003) to make absolutely clear that by using the term language we are not talking 




Vygotsky (1978) proposed a ‘complex, mediated act’ as a link between stimulus 
and response. He saw in this ‘auxiliary stimulus’ the key to understanding the 
development of higher mental functions rather than a ‘mere additional link’ (p. 40). 
For Vygotsky, the auxiliary stimulus serves the specific role of reverse action, as it 
brings the psychological operation to higher and new forms, allowing humans, by 
the aid of extrinsic stimuli, to regulate their own behaviour from the outside. The 
solution therefore blurs the line between external and internal activity and provides, 
as Wertsch and Stone (1985) assert, ‘a bridge that connects … the social with the 
individual’ (p. 164). Thus, the key concept of mediation, as Daniels (2001a) points 
out, ‘opens the way to a non-deterministic account in which “psychological tools” 
serve as the means by which the individual acts upon and is acted upon by social, 
cultural and historical factors’ (p. 100). 
 
Among many forms of mediation made possible by artefacts, Vygotsky focused on 
language for a number of reasons. This was because, according to Lee (1985, pp. 
76-77), (a) linguistic signs are ‘reversible’, they can be both stimulus and response, 
allowing language to be internalised and then used to regulate behaviour; (b) 
language is multifunctional, it can be used as a means to organise multiple 
goal-oriented activities; (c) language serves the purpose of communication, that is, 
of sustaining social action and, closely linked to this, (d) language allows, on the 
one hand, generalisation, that is, it can depict common characteristics of 
phenomena through various levels of generality, and on the other, self-reflection – 
unlike other sign systems, language can refer to itself with ease. The generalisation 
and self-reflection qualities of language create the possibility of abstract thinking, 
and abstract thinking finds reality and form in language (expression) in a 
dialectical fashion (thinking and speech).  
 
As has been already seen, although language and speech are to a certain extent 
interchangeable terms – compare Kozulin’s (1986) rendition of Vygotsky’s (1987) 
Thinking and speech as Thought and language – speech stresses the fact that 
Vygotsky was concerned with studying speaking acts and their relation to thinking 
processes and not with the grammatical and semantic system, langage in Saussure 
(see Rieber and Carton, 1987). In consequence, within Vygotsky’s framework, 
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language refers to instantiations rather than to a universal. 
 
Nonetheless, this focus on mediation by means of the linguistic sign was 
supplemented by A.N. Leont’ev’s advancing of a full-fledged theory of activity in 
which attention was paid to societal structure, an aspect that, although included in 
Vygotsky’s unit, had been neglected to some extent. In this regard, I do not believe 
that the unit of analysis advanced by Leont’ev constitutes an altogether different 
unit. In the next section I will discuss the problem of the unit of analysis with the 
aim of presenting a unifying approach between the Vygotskian and Leont’evian 
traditions. 
 
2.2.2 Consciousness and the problem of the unit of analysis 
 
Vygotsky advanced the need in psychology for a method of analysis that relied upon 
units instead of elements of analysis. The advantage of working with such a method is 
that the unit reflects the complexity of a whole, eventually eliminating epistemological 
contradictions and deterministic or voluntaristic accounts of social phenomena.  
 
This particular methodology, as Chaiklin (1996) maintains, can be traced back to a 
philosophical tradition of dialectic logic whose more characteristic imprints are the 
developments introduced by Hegel in the first third of the nineteenth century, and 
subsequently by Marx, Ilyenkov and others. In other words, Vygotsky’s concern with 
finding a unit of analysis of human development reflects his interest in ontological and 
epistemological issues, as well as his intention to find an explanatory principle for the 
origin of consciousness. In his own words: 
 
In contrast to the term ‘element,’ the term ‘unit’ designates a product of 
analysis that possesses all the basic characteristics of the whole. The unit 
is a vital and irreducible part of the whole. … A psychology concerned 
with the study of the complex whole must comprehend this. It must 
replace the method of decomposing the whole into its elements with that 
of partitioning the whole into units. Psychology must identify those units 
in which the characteristics of the whole are present, even though they 
may be manifested in altered form. Using this mode of analysis, it must 
attempt to resolve the concrete problems that face us. (Vygotsky, 1987, 




In search of such a unit of analysis, Vygotsky advanced the use of ‘word meaning’ 
(p. 47) as one that could capture both the representational aspect of thought 
(generalisation and abstraction) and the socio-communicative function of speech 
(socio- and self-regulation) (pp. 43-51). Nonetheless, the unit already implies the 
fact that the link between stimulus and response is mediated action. In this regard, 
we have to note again that the sign here is not the Saussurean sign but the 
utterance, that is, sign-as-action or, as Vygotsky puts it, ‘a verbal act of thought’ (p. 
47). Vygotsky is stressing the fact that, among mediated acts, the subject matter of 
psychology is mediation by means of psychological tools, especially speech.  
 
Vygotsky maintained that the sign, especially the one linked to true (scientific or 
theoretical) concepts, mediated mind in a way that other tools (including everyday 
concepts) did not. Mediation by means of true concepts brought about 
generalisation, abstract thought and analytical faculties, and therefore took the 
subject away from the immediacy of everyday contexts and spontaneous learning 
vectors of development (p. 189). As Vygotsky points out, ‘conscious awareness 
enters through the gate opened up by the scientific concept’ (p. 191) leading to the 
mastery of those functions. 
 
In conclusion, Vygotsky was concerned about explaining the origins of 
consciousness as it relates to development and therefore chose not only a unit of 
analysis of mental life but one that could explain the emergence of those higher 
functions. Thus, as Blunden maintains, not unlike Marx when he advanced the 
commodity as the subject matter of capital, Vygotsky advances ‘word meaning’ as 
the unit of consciousness and the subject matter of psychology (2010, p. 114). 
 
Vygotsky’s unit presents some limitations though, as it was addressing not a 
sociological problem but a psychological one. Rodriguez Illera (1995) affirms, for 
instance, that the ineffectiveness of cultural-historical psychology lies in the fact 
that the social and cultural references tend to be nonspecific (p. 200). Even though 
Vygotsky was concerned with socially situating semiosis, his approach did not 
address issues of social structure or class or the differentiation of the subject 




Vygotsky’s (1987) ‘functional method of dual stimulation’ (p. 127) seems to 
support the view that, even if Vygotsky was concerned about socially situating 
semiosis, the analytical tools deployed belonged in fact to a proto-sociological 
stage. In this method, subjects are presented with two sets of stimuli. ‘One set of 
stimuli fulfills the function of the object on which the subject’s activity is directed’ 
(p. 127), that is, the problem from which a true concept can be formed. ‘The 
second function as signs that facilitate the organization of this activity’ (p. 127), 
which comprises the socio-communicative activity that helps to solve the problem 
introduced earlier. This unambiguously shows that Vygotsky’s analysis of 
semiosis paid attention to the social relations from which consciousness emerges. 
However, as already mentioned, the analysis is restricted.  
 
One of the main problems is that the sharing of the object of activity has more or 
less been taken for granted. This induced A.N. Leont’ev (1979, 1981) to analyse 
the structure of activity in order to determine the societal object or motive of 
activity and the goal that directs the individual’s action, for sense emerges from 
that relation, opening a way to expanding Vygotsky’s minimalist approach. 
 
I prefer to define Leont’ev’s analysis of activity as an expansion of Vygotsky’s 
original work and therefore I do not completely agree with theorists who tend to 
see in Leont’ev a maverick departure from Vygotskian principles. In fact, 
presenting Vygotsky’s unit as one that is focused on semiosis, and that of Leont’ev 
as focused on activity (see Kozulin, 1986; Zinchenko, 1985), reflects a very 
narrow interpretation of Vygotsky’s intent. These views, as we will see later, have 
been an enduring part of the basic position of the so-called sociocultural tradition 
and cultural-historical activity theory, respectively.  
 
Yet even if we are inclined to believe A.N. Leont’ev’s approaches to the problem 
of the emergence of mind represent a more orthodox Marxist perspective whereby 
we are going straight back to Marx’s (2000) Theses on Feuerbach, reclaiming the 
foundation of consciousness on ‘real, sensuous activity’ (p. 171), Marx (Marx and 
Engels, 1974) in The German Ideology proves Vygotsky right by considering 
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language as ‘practical consciousness’ (p. 51) and the ‘immediate actuality of 
thought’ (p. 118). The actual problem seems to be that Marxist theorists did not 
tackle the issue of a theory of knowledge, logic and thought until the middle of the 
twentieth century, and therefore the link between social consciousness and 
language remained undertheorised for decades.  
 
A.N. Leont’ev’s (1961, 1977, 1981) works, published three or four decades after 
Vygotsky’s death in 1934, reflect a different set of formulations altogether and a 
terminology that draws on the groundwork of Soviet philosophers on the dialectic 
of subject and object (see Lektorsky, 1977). Thus, Vygotsky’s Marxian notions 
related to the importance of semiosis seem to be not aligned with those of his 
contemporaries. In fact, as Bruner (1987) comments, ‘Vygotsky’s Marxism is 
closer to Althusser, Habermas, and the Frankfurt School than to the Soviet 
Marxism of his times or of ours’ (p. 2).  
 
The final evidence that Leont’ev was not working in opposition to but expanding 
Vygotsky’s unit is the way he deals with the issue of language. Even if Leont’ev 
refers to consciousness as the result and shaper of activity, he does give language 
the key status accorded to it by Vygotsky: 
 
But what is consciousness? ‘Consciousness is co-knowledge,’ as 
Vygotsky loved to say. Individual consciousness can exist only in the 
presence of social consciousness and language, which is its real 
substratum. In the process of material production, people also produce 
language, which serves not only as means of social interaction but also 
as a carrier of the socially elaborated meanings that are embedded 
therein. (A.N. Leont’ev, 1981, p. 56)  
 
For A.N. Leont’ev, the structure of consciousness is in fact the structure of activity. 
The emergence, development and functioning of consciousness is predicated on 
the functions of activity. Moreover activity, in turn, is directed by consciousness. 
Awareness requires a certain degree of reflection on the relation between societal 
and individual motives, something that can only be achieved through mediation by 
means of signs. In fact, Leont’ev points out that the sign as an objective image is 
different from other kind of images that also mediate activity. Thus it is here that 
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the relation between objective and personal meaning (sense), as captured in 
Vygotsky’s (1987) dialectical unity of ‘thinking and speech’ (p. 109), is regarded 
as the formative of consciousness. Sense is concretised in words, that is, in 
ready-made tools that are the product of social relations, but cannot be completely 
expressed in words. As Bakhtin asserts, the word is half one’s and half someone 
else’s, indicating that the sign, as a ready-made tool that is the product of social 
relations, represents a gap between objective and subjective motives. Signs shed a 
light on social relations, but they also obscure them. Ideology is the expression of 
this gap. 
 
I will return to the issue of the structure of activity once I unfold the notion of 
subject that appears more appropriate for the integration of cultural-historical 
activity theory, code theory and culture theory.  
 
Beyond ontological holism and dualism 
 
The problem of the unit of analysis brings other issues to the forefront as well. I 
would like to focus on the analysis of the differences between sociocultural theory 
and cultural-historical activity theory to explore a theoretical bridge between them 
and also to address the problem that arises from the indivisibility of the individual 
and society with the purpose of proposing a unit that is adequate to the research 
aims of the present study. To this effect, I agree with Matusov (2007) when he 
concludes that the appropriate unit of analysis is one that pays attention to the 
goals of the research rather than being a universal fix, but at the same time it is 
necessary to address the nonseparability of individual-society from an ontological 
perspective if we want to introduce both an account of societal structures and at 
the same time differentiate the individual agent.  
 
According to Engeström and Miettinen (1999), the unit of analysis of 
cultural-historical activity theory is ‘object-oriented, collective, and culturally 
mediated human activity, or activity system’ (p. 9). Owing to the collective nature 
of the activity system, activity theory considers activity systems as evolving over 
lengthy periods of time. By collective, Engeström and Miettinen stress the fact that 
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the activity system is not concerned with individual action separated from activity. 
Activity is not reducible to individual actions. To this purpose, they advance a 
methodology in which the researcher must produce a dialectic rendition of both 
systemic and subjective views. Based upon this unit, they make a strong 
distinction between cultural-historical activity theory and the sociocultural theory 
of mediated action (see Wertsch, del Rio, and Alvarez, 1995). 
 
On the one hand, Engeström and Miettinen maintain that the sociocultural theory 
of action does not capture the ideas of historicity, object orientedness and the 
collective make-up of human activity. Since they neglect collective practices, 
context appears as the external envelope of individual action, failing to capture the 
ontological complexity of collective motives, including the irrational aspects of 
actions. Wertsch (1998), on the other hand, maintains that sociocultural analysis 
takes ‘mediated action’ (p. 24) as a unit of analysis. Wertsch (2002) points out that 
in the analysis of mediated action, that is, the analysis of the use of cultural tools, 
or mediational means, an ‘irreducible tension’ (p.11) between active agents on the 
one hand and cultural tools, on the other, is brought to the forefront, referring in a 
more essential way to the contradictions between the collective and the individual.  
 
Daniels (2001a) plays down the differences that Engeström and Miettinen 
ascertain about the treatment of context in the sociocultural tradition by pointing 
out that mediated action, as a unit of analysis, ‘provides a kind of natural link 
between action, including mental action, and the cultural, institutional and 
historical context in which such an action occurs’ (p. 78). Daniels concludes that 
although there is still some purpose in discussing these traditions as if they were 
distinct, in practical terms, the distinction between sociocultural theory and 
activity theory is becoming blurred (p. 85). As is implied by Daniels, the roots of 
the debate can be traced back to the dialectic nature of the unit of analysis or 
notion as it was intended originally by Vygotsky and, shortly afterwards, by A.N. 
Leont’ev. Alongside Daniels, Cole (1996) in a rather Hegelian tone, draws a 
middle line between the two traditions by reminding us that the unit of analysis 
cannot be understood as two different levels of activity but instead, two instances 
of a single process, a position – as already mentioned – shared by Blunden (2010) 
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in his immanent critique of the theory of activity. In fact, it is time to resort to a 
Hegelian notion of subject (as a unit of analysis in its own right) to bridge 
theoretically more adequately both of the units seen so far and to introduce 
Bernstein’s code theory and Holland and colleagues’ cultural theory. 
 
2.2.3 A Marxian-Hegelian notion of subject 
 
Crucial to the understanding of agency within Marxian theory is Marx’s criticism 
of materialism. In the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx (2000, p. 171) criticised the 
materialism of Feuerbach and all its previous forms because, above all, they failed 
to consider human activity within the relationship of subject and object. In contrast, 
Marx’s brand of materialism viewed the emergence of the subject but through the 
subject’s own objective activity. By adopting and developing in the field of 
psychology Marx’s notion of practical activity as a link that contains both the 
subject and the object of activity, activity theory set out on a different theoretical 
footpath. Lektorsky (1977, p. 101) summarises this important theoretical 
development by pointing out that, in Marx, the problem of the subject-object 
relationship starts from the basic question posed by philosophy, because in activity, 
the object is being subjectivised and the subject objectivised. Thus, the subject of 
external and internal activity is not simply a separate corporeal individual but a 
person becomes a subject, doer, knower, only to the extent that she has mastered 
the modes of activity developed by society.  
 
I argue that the distinction between – and the analysis of – the (corporeal) 
individual and the subject is essential to connecting Vygotsky’s unit of analysis 
with the unit in cultural-historical activity theory. In both dialectical materialism 
and Hegelian idealism, the subject is always emerging. The individual controls his 
own body, his own activity, according to the referential frame given by society’s 
rules, which compel him to look at himself. The demands to regulate his activity 
come from the outside, modulated by the use of language. Therefore, as Smolka, 
De Goes and Pino (1995) uphold, the mastery of these modes of activity marked 




Blunden (2007) points out that culture has been for cultural-historical activity 
theory the missing link between the individual psyche and society. By theorising 
the individual psyche in terms of society within a psychological theoretical frame, 
the founders of cultural-historical activity theory left undertheorised social 
formations, ideologies and institutions. In other words, cultural-historical activity 
theory left culture out of the dichotomy of ‘individual psyche-society’ (p. 254). 
Blunden asserts that although orthodox Marxist theory considers it a flagrant 
mistake to theorise society and history subject to the laws of individual behaviour, 
this never discouraged the founders of cultural-historical activity theory’s from 
formulating the individual psyche in terms of society. On the one hand, according 
to Blunden, this shortcoming is the result of the situated practice of the early 
developers of cultural-historical activity theory who were working with 
communitarian ideas of society that did not present the contradictions of current 
postmodern societies. The postmodern individual does not necessarily identify 
with institutions or social movements; her identification cannot be taken for 
granted. On the other hand, part of the problem also lies in psychology uncritically 
appropriating notions from the social sciences. 
 
By the same token, Sawyer (2002) notices a number of critical limitations brought 
about by two important theoretical assumptions of sociocultural theory, which 
apply to cultural-historical activity theory as well: (a) process and methodological 
ontology; and (b) the individual-social inseparability. By these Sawyer refers to 
the assumption that the ‘individual and the social are inseparable, both in reality 
and ontologically (distinct entities do not really exist), or methodologically (the 
analyst cannot meaningfully distinguish between what is internal to the individual 
and what is external context)’ (p. 284-285). He believes that these theoretical 
assumptions lead to a distinctive methodology: ‘a rejection of the individual 
subject as the unit of analysis in favor of an action or event unit of analysis. In 
practice this leads to close empirical study of symbolic interaction in naturally 
occurring microsocial situations using ethnographic and qualitative methods.’ (p. 
285). Sawyer points out that inseparability does not enable sociologists to account 
for the constraining power of external social forces, for macro-sociological 
structures or patterns, for history, or for material conditions. Eventually, Sawyer 
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proposes ‘analytic dualism’ (p. 297) as a way to overcome both process ontology 
and inseparability. In other words, individual and society are to be seen as 
analytically distinct, yet inherently interrelated, levels of analysis. 
 
There is yet another alternative more in line with the original tenets on which 
Vygotsky drew when he outlined his approach to psychology. In contrast to 
Sawyer’s analytic dualism, Blunden proposes to extend cultural-historical activity 
theory by using Hegelian dialectics (Individual-Particular-Universal) and develops 
two trichotomies. The first one consists of adding culture as an intermediate link 
between individual and society. The second one, which I will explore later, deals 
with the notion of subject. The first trichotomy is expressed in the following terms: 
 
In CHAT [(cultural-historical activity theory)] terminology, the 
trichotomy is (a) the individual, that is, the single, mortal human psyche; 
(b) culture, that is the mass of objects or artefacts that are inherited from 
the past and only spring to life when they are used by individuals – 
buildings, languages, crops, laws, libraries, technology, and so on; and 
(c) society, that is the particular, continuing corporate activities in which 
individuals use culture in collaborative activities or conflict and are 
taken up by one individual as another leaves off (Blunden, 2007, pp. 
255-256). 
 
By introducing culture, Blunden is able to break the dichotomy of individual 
psyche-society, bringing in objective constraints such as organisational or 
institutional rules, as well as those imposed on the human body, adding analytical 
complexity. In consequence, the idea that culture is subject not only to human 
agency but also to objective constraints is hard to dismiss. The reason is culture’s 
material make-up. Even if one might reject notions that appeal for the acceptance 
of some kind of determinism outside human agency, such as social or historical 
laws, one would have to acknowledge the fact that cultural tools are made out of 
what is given by nature, that is, a limited diversity and quantity of material 
resources. Likewise language is ultimately supported by human organic conditions, 
by the human body. However, acknowledging the existence of objective 
constraints does not amount to accepting absolute material or organic determinism. 
Hence, one is not required to agree completely with Durkheim’s (1950) defence of 
the sociological method – which maintains that the determining cause of a social 
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fact must be found in the social fact that precedes it, not in the state of the 
individual consciousness – to admit that there is a breach between the logic of the 
socio-historical forces and the logic of human consciousness. To sum up, 
Blunden’s Hegelian unfolding of cultural-historical activity theory’s unit allows 
the introduction of an ecological or social influence approach.   
 
The analysis of the acquisition of the modes of activity evolved by society by 
cultural means, especially through language, brings to the forefront once 
again the problem of the analysis of the functioning of language both in its 
social and individual dimensions. In this regard, I maintain that the theory of 
activity that drew on and contributed to the development of the underpinnings 
of Soviet philosophy from the 1950s offers invaluable insights. I argue that 
the attention paid by Leont’ev to the issue of semiosis as ideology is part of a 
larger endeavour set in motion by a number of scholars who drew on Marx’s 
early works and the German philosophical tradition from Fichte to Hegel to 
elucidate the problem of the relation between the real and the ideal. In other 
words, they were looking at the expressions of the ideal (consciousness) that 
could best explain fundamental collective and individual illusions such as 
fetishism and reification (see Ilyenkov, 1977a, 1977b). Before I approach in 
more depth the issue of the subject and subject position, I believe it is 
necessary to sum up those underpinnings in the light of Blunden’s proposal, 
especially those related to the dialectic of subject and object.  
 
Meanings are ready-made, historically-evolved products, abstract forms that 
obey the logic of their own social development (e.g. the historical 
development of a discipline or science) and the laws of the social order, the 
ideological notions of society – religious, philosophical and political. When 
internalisation occurs, meanings become part of the consciousness of 
individuals. They become both objects and means of comprehension of reality, 
something that A.N. Leont’ev (1977) refers to as the ‘duality’ (p. 195) of 
meanings. Leont’ev illustrates the double life of meanings in the 




… all older schoolchildren know the meaning of an examination mark 
and the consequences it will have. Nonetheless, a mark may appear in the 
consciousness of each individual pupil in essentially different ways; it 
may, for example, appear as a step forward (or obstacle) on the path to 
his chosen profession, or as a means of asserting himself in the eyes of 
the people around him, or perhaps, in some other way. This is what 
compels psychology to distinguish between the conscious objective 
meaning and its meaning for the subject, or what I prefer to call the 
‘personal meaning’. In other words, an examination mark may acquire 
different personal meanings in the consciousness of different pupils. (A.N. 
Leont’ev, 1977, p.197) 
 
Let us analyse the other side of the coin, that is, meaning in its objective 
dimension, subject to the logic of the social relations that produced it, yet always 
in conflict with the logic of its internal development. As Leont’ev asserts:  
 
… consciousness owes its origin to the identification in the course of 
labour of actions whose cognitive results are abstracted from the living 
whole of human activity and idealised in the form of linguistic meanings. 
As they are communicated they become part of the consciousness of 
individuals. This does not deprive them of their abstract qualities because 
they continue to imply the means, objective conditions and results of 
actions regardless of the subjective motivation of the people’s activity in 
which they are formed. (A.N. Leont’ev, 1977, p. 197) 
 
Let me give an example of these two dimensions. The particular kinds of bonds of 
a person to the state that cement his or her civic rights and duties have been 
evolving in the course of history. Many terms have been used to express these 
bonds such as citizenship, subjecthood and nationality. The terms are always 
evolving depending on how the state and the persons define these bonds. Thus, the 
objectivity of the word citizen is contested. 
 
Something similar occurs on the subjective dimension of the term. I remember, for 
instance, how difficult was for film director Scandar Copti, a Palestinian born and 
raised in Jaffa, to talk about his membership of the State of Israel while 
introducing his film Ajami in the 2010 Nara International Film Festival in Japan. 
Copti, a Palestinian citizen of the state of Israel, uses the resources available to 
filmmakers in the country to make films that question the moral legitimacy of the 
Israeli state and the contradictions of people like him who consider themselves 
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Arab nationals. In Chile, my own country, something similar happens with the 
Mapuche indigenous people, who do not consider themselves Chilean but 
Mapuche, although they are for legal purposes Chilean citizens.  
 
Drawing on A.N. Leont’ev’s example above about the meaning of an exam mark 
for a schoolchild, we can have an imaginary glimpse of what a military 
conscription sign containing the word citizens may mean for Arab citizens in Israel 
or for Mapuche people in Chile. Although the former are not required to serve in 
the national army, the latter were until not long ago (conscription is not mandatory 
in Chile nowadays). A concept that belongs to theoretical systems such as Law or 
History soon enters the subjectivity of Arab or Mapuche subjects in ways that are 
very different to the subjectivity of Israeli and Chilean subjects, forming part of 
the core words used not only in the description of their identities but as the very 
formatives of those identities.  
 
It is worth remembering that the problem is not merely semantic or, more broadly, 
grammatical. Words like citizen are part of utterances that obey speech genre 
systems, that is, words form part of codified forms of the whole utterance. For me, 
the French expression Citoyens!, which means ‘Citizens!’, represents a dramatic 
call of imperious attention that I associate back to the films I have seen and the 
books I have read about the French Revolution. In fact, I can still hear in my mind 
the voice of Georges-Jacques Danton, played by Gerard Depardieu in Andrzej 
Wajda’s film Danton, calling the mob on the streets of Paris to beware the 
despotic enforcement of public security carried out by Robespierre’s Committee of 
Public Safety, as this institution inaugurated the Revolution’s Reign of Terror. 
However, I cannot recall any such a desperate call in English or Japanese. The 
closest expression I have learnt in English is contained in the inaugural addresses 
of the United States presidents. Abraham Lincoln addressed the American people 
in 1861 by calling them Fellow-citizens. A similar expression was used by 
President Barack Obama in his inaugural speech in 2009: My fellow citizens. Yet 
these expressions were not as exclamatory as Danton’s call. Remember that 
Danton appealed to the citizens of France to revolt against Robespierre’s methods. 
Eventually, Danton’s life was on the line. He ended up being lawfully guillotined. 
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In the American case, the addresses given by the presidents of the Union seemed 
to reflect a much calmer situation. Nonetheless, the speakers were addressing the 
citizens as their equal, members of the different states of the Union. In contrast, 
when the prime minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, accepted to 
form his government in 2010 he started with Her Majesty, the Queen, has asked 
me to form a new government… A similar formula was used by former Japanese 
prime minister, Naoto Kan, in his inaugural address in 2010. After referring to the 
Emperor, he used the expression kokumin-no mina san, which translates as ‘fellow 
nationals’, to address the people of the nation. Within constitutional monarchies, 
the formation of government is linked to the power of the sovereign, whereas in a 
republican system, the president addresses the citizens of the country directly, as 
there is no power above him or them. This confirms that the idea of citizenship 
carried by the English word citizen is different depending on the subjects. 
Cameron as a citizen (horizontal relationship) was still a subject of the Crown 
(vertical relationship). Obama was only a citizen (horizontal relationship). In 
Spanish, Simón Bolivar addressed the first Colombian congress in 1830 using the 
expression ¡Conciudadanos!, which can be translated as ‘Fellow-citizens!’, a 
much closer expression in stylistic terms to that of Danton. Yet in his inaugural 
address in 2010, the president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, exclaimed 
¡Gracias a Dios! ¡Gracias Colombia!, that is, ‘Thank God! Thank Colombia!’ 
Thus, although Santos kept the exclamation, he departed from a purely Colombian 
republican tradition.  
 
The above examples, which are informal recollections of speeches given by real or 
fictional characters in which a person addresses his compatriots depending on the 
historical circumstances and their social position, remind us not only about the 
analytical complexities of the context of speech acts, and the contexts that speech 
creates as well, but the importance of the institutions in mutually shaping context 
and speech forms. Even the simplest act of addressing people depends upon social 
relations that are mostly mediated by institutions (marriage, family, school, 
corporation, parliament, government, church, market, union, etc.) and closely 




What I believe A.N. Leont’ev does by introducing us to the problem of meaning is 
presenting discourse as a proto-sociological category. Leont’ev is departing from a 
view of the linguistic sign within the rather restricted dimension of the context, 
which in pragmatics or in a theory of communication is expressed as the context of 
the utterance. Instead, Leont’ev is using the notion of language in its discursive 
capacity, as a sociological category. 
 
Language, being an abstract product and having abstract form by expressing 
ready-made, historically evolved meanings, is nonetheless modulated by ideas of 
what are considered legitimate forms of discourse and activity in particular activity 
systems. In other words, discourse could be defined as language use within the 
ideological constraints and affordances of social relations, as an expression of the 
objectivation of the subject and the subjectivation of the object, or, in short, as the 
relationship between language, structure and agency.  
 
Social relations are subject to social rules and social positions. Conceptual 
development not only determines higher forms of consciousness, such as 
categorical thinking, but dispositions such as practical mastery and views about the 
social order. The pedagogical relation takes place in particular activity systems 
where subjects make up their objects according to their historical aggregation of 
activity systems, their subjectivity, and the historically-developed social 
expectations set for the pedagogic activity, that is, the objective conditions of 
cultural production and reproduction.  
 
Drawing on A.N. Leont’ev, Blunden (2007) believes that the disassociation 
between the ideal form of language as meanings and the materiality of the social 
relations that makes meanings possible or affords them, raises three distinct 
contradictions. First, social practices may not coincide with the subjective 
conceptions of the individuals performing them. Second, social practices may be at 
odds with the cultural norms and laws originally and supposedly governing them. 
Third, meanings that become residues or sediments of cultural expressions 
(language and laws) may be in contradiction with the implied meanings of 
ever-unfolding social practices. For Blunden, these contradictions act as forces of 
56 
 
social change and will be manifested as contradictions in the psychology of 
individuals (p. 257).  
 
One does not have to come back to the dramatic examples of the implications of 
the objective notion of citizenship in the subjectivity of Mapuche citizens of Chile 
and Palestinian citizens of Israel to illustrate the point that Blunden is making. In 
our case, Japanese students and instructors have to adapt to the new expectations 
about what it means to be a university student and a foreign language university 
instructor. Some students have never talked to a foreign national in their life and 
do not know their communication style, not to mention that every national has a 
different background and perhaps a communication style. Instructors, whether 
Japanese or foreign nationals, have their own set of expectations about what the 
product of foreign language education is. The study programme may be composed 
of contradictory objectives, with some instructors targeting, for instance, the 
dissolution of the Japanese-self of students, and others targeting the reinforcement 
of their Japanese-self. Some instructors may seek the practical mastery of oral 
Spanish, whilst some others may seek the theoretical mastery of grammar. Some 
Japanese instructors use the grammar class to talk about Spanish culture and 
therefore they are more interested on giving students a glimpse of a foreign world 
than actually demanding from them academic knowledge in relation to that world. 
Instruction is based on anecdotes. Some native Spanish instructors may want to 
reproduce the kind of academic objectives set by the higher education institutions 
in their country of origin, which may or may not have a correlate with the 
objectives set by the Japanese institutions. At the same time, there may be students 
willing to explore a different identity and others that may be afraid of doing so. In 
conclusion, the sociological and psychological aspects of instruction of a subject 
matter or skill are very complex. 
 
A.N. Leont’ev (1977) maintains that the depth of these contradictions is regulated 
ultimately by the division of labour. The emergence of the social division of labour 
and private property brought about the disintegration of the former correspondence 
between meanings as phenomena of social consciousness and as phenomena of 
individual consciousness. Socially-evolved meanings start living a sort of double 
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life in the consciousness of individuals (p. 197). 
 
 
2.3 SUBJECT POSITION, DEVELOPMENT AND DISCOURSE 
 
The contradictions pointed out by Blunden are not only echoed in A.N. Leont’ev’s 
views on activity theory but in Bernstein’s ideas of culture reproduction, 
particularly in code theory and in Holland et al.’s (2001) theories of identity and 
agency. I argue that by centring it on the subject, Blunden’s extension of the 
trichotomy individual-culture-society allows integration of these theories within a 
common ontological framework. I will now explore the issue of subject and 
subject position in the light of Blunden’s Hegelian rendition of subject. 
 
For Blunden, a non-reified notion of society must take charge of individuals’ 
mediated activity as a means of collaborating – or confronting – one another. The 
individual psyche is but one aspect of a larger unit of analysis, that is, the subject. 
In consequence, the subject is understood as a self-conscious system of activity or 
the identity of agency (the capacity of acting in a world but also of moral 
responsibility), ‘cogito’ (knowledge or understanding) and self-consciousness (or 
identity). Blunden points out that these instances are, nonetheless, never in 
absolute identity with one another. In other words, the subject is a process that is 
never complete or absolutely adequate at any given moment. The individual 
person is a mere limiting case of a subject, but as a whole, the 
individual-as-subject is the result of a long but still unfinished historical process (p. 
257). To sum up, the subject emerges as a consequence of objective, mediated 
activity, which is afforded by the use of culturally developed artefacts that are 
subject to social or historical laws. 
 
I will try to demonstrate forthwith how these theories are not only inscribed within 
this framework. I will deal first with the method advanced by A.N. Leont’ev and 
other theorists under the notion of structure of activity, applied to explaining and 
analysing foreign language development, and then I will make a brief summary of 




I should point out right from the outset that by structure A.N. Leont’ev refers here 
to moments of a single formative unit, ‘activity-action’, not to a hierarchical 
structure of determinations. One should avoid seeing one level of the structure as 
higher than the other. The ‘units’ or ‘formations’ refer first to co-constituting 
external and internal aspects and involve complex dynamic transformations, and 
second to the link that exists between the subject and the object, but with the 
particularity that they are being instantiated at once (see A.A. Leont’ev, 2006a). 
 
2.3.1 The structure of activity 
 
One of A.N. Leont’ev’s greatest contributions to the theory of activity is the 
development of the foundations for analysing the structure and function of activity. 
As is the case with the already seen contemporary rendition of activity theory 
given by Engeström and Miettinen (1999) in which activity is the non-divisible 
unit of analysis, A.N. Leont’ev (1977) points out that ‘Activity is a non-additive 
unit of the corporeal, material life of the material subject … it is a unit of life, 
mediated by mental reflection, by an image, whose real function is to orientate the 
subject in the objective world’ (p. 182). Referring to the structure of activity, 
Leont’ev asserts: 
 
Being, the life of each individual is made up of the sum-total or, to be 
more exact, a system, a hierarchy of successive activities. It is in activity 
that the transition or ‘translation’ of the reflected object into the 
subjective image, into the ideal, takes place; at the same time it is also in 
activity that the transition is achieved from the ideal into activity’s 
objective results, its products, into the material (A.N. Leont’ev, 1977, p. 
181). 
 
This hierarchy of successive activities makes a distinction between collective 
activity and individual action based on the principle of division of labour. What 
makes activities different from one another is their object or motive. Furthermore, 
the basic components of human activities are goal-oriented actions, which, when 
carried out in particular instrumental conditions, are called operations. A particular 
action may coincide or not with the objective of the activity, revealing the 
complexity of production based on division of labour. For A.N. Leont’ev (1977), 
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activity and action are ‘non-coincidental realities’ (p. 186). On the one hand, an 
action may have different motives, that is, it may realise completely different 
activities. On the other, one and the same motive may give rise to various goals 
and hence a variety of actions. 
 
To illustrate the functionality of these units, Leont’ev (1977, p. 185) gives the 
example of a person whose motive is to obtain food. His activity is stimulated by 
food; nevertheless he has to perform actions that are not directly aimed at 
obtaining food, such as the making of trapping gear. Whether he uses the gear or 
passes it to other participants in the hunt in exchange for part of the catch or kill, in 
either case, his motive and goal do not directly coincide. 
 
A.N. Leont’ev believes these component units of activity form its macrostructure. 
However, as we have already seen, Leont’ev does not believe these units can be 
used to dissect activity, but rather, they constitute different ‘planes of abstraction’ 
(p. 186). He points out that actions are not separate things included in activity, but 
activity exists as action or a chain of actions. Nonetheless, some actions tend to be 
instrumentalised when they are included within another action, a transformational 
process that A.N. Leont’ev (1978) calls ‘technization’ (p. 66). Leont’ev alerts us, 
however, to the fact that when an operation is apparently removed from the 
activity by means of carrying it automatically, it does not mean that it has been 
separated from the action, as the action is never separated from the activity, since 
the operation is still one of the means to carry out the action of the subject. 
 
As already seen, what makes activities different from one another is their object or 
motive. Nonetheless, as, D.A. Leont’ev (1992) asserts, it is only when that 
objective motive is shared by the subjects who are part of the activity system and a 
concrete plan of action (operational structure) emerges spontaneously or is 
explicitly formulated that the activity can be called a ‘joint activity’ (p. 49). Thus, 
joint activity is regulated by a common store of meanings and purposes. In other 
words, there must be alignment in the mediational activity carried out by 




D.A. Leont’ev (1992) stresses the fact that true joint activity, although similar in 
structure, is not an addition to individual activity, but replaces it. The various 
components of joint activity ‘are distributed among two or more subjects who at 
the particular moment are engaged in non-individual activity different from the 
activity jointly distributed among them, of which they are hence co-subjects’ (p. 
49). Thus, D.A. Leont’ev maintains that in joint activity not only the operation 
structure but also the motivational-sense structure of this activity is shared by its 
co-subjects. Furthermore, that plan requires an evaluation of the resources at hand 
to achieve the object of the activity. As A.N. Leont’ev points out:  
 
…apart from its intentional aspect (what must be done), the action has 
its operational aspect (how it can be done), which is defined not by the 
goal itself, but by the objective circumstances under which is carried out. 
In other words, the performed action is in response to a task. The task is 
the goal given under certain conditions. (A.N. Leont’ev, 1979, p. 63) 
 
Motive-action is not necessarily an action well planned in advance. The ontology 
of activity, in which the different units that form its structure constitute different 
planes of abstraction, allows for an operation eventually to reach the status of 
motive-activity, depending on the particular circumstances of the activity system 
(e.g. the level of awareness of the individuals who are part of it). In contrast, a 
very well-planned motive-action can become a single individual operation or 
action and extinguish itself, because it was never grasped as a joint-activity by the 
individuals who are part of the activity system, because the motive was not 
transmitted in the proper way, the consciousness differentials were irreconcilable, 
or they simply resisted the motive, among other reasons.  
 
I would like to move now onto the issues concerning the development of a foreign 
language. Let us explore how the structure of activity as an analytical framework 
and method has been used in explaining and analysing foreign language 
development. It is important to have in mind that in the dialectical tradition we are 
not dealing with language acquisition or learning abstracted from the problem of 
the psychological and social development of the individual. In fact, Vygotsky 
inaugurated the subject of child development by introducing the problem of the 
learning of a foreign language, along with learning how to write one’s own 
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language and the introduction of the theoretical concept. In my view, we are 
dealing with different categories of metalinguistic processes. Therefore, foreign 
language learning is not a subset of the socio-genetic theory of development but it 
is an intrinsic part of it. The same can be said of Bakhtin’s theory, with which we 
will deal briefly afterwards when we introduce Holland and colleagues’ cultural 
theory.  
 
2.3.1.1 Speech as activity and language development 
 
In the dialectical tradition, the analysis of the development of both native and 
foreign languages is carried out by giving language the status of activity. Thus, 
meaning does not reside in the mind of the speaker but in the interaction between 
speaker and listener. A.A. Leont’ev (2006b) reminds us that “…in L.S. Vygotsky’s 
definition, the meaning of a word is the ‘unity of generalization and association, 
communication and thinking’” (p. 71). In this regard, when deploying the term 
language in the dialectical tradition we are referring to a relation between cultural 
ready-mades whose existence precedes the learner, communication and thinking. 
We should not remit ourselves to the conceptualisation given to it in modern 
linguistics as a set of rules, as a code extracted from its communicative 
instantiations. As Wertsch (2007) comments, Vygotsky, drawing on his mentor 
Gustav Gustavovich Shpet, considered language as activity and therefore focused 
on speech, as opposed to language (p. 185).  
 
Implicit in this view is the idea that the boundaries between external (social 
speech) and internal activity (inner speech) are blurred. In other words, meaning is 
activity and, as such, it can be analysed by resorting to the already seen general 
theory of activity advanced by A.N. Leont’ev: 
 
The fact that the macrostructure of external, practical activity shares 
certain features with that of internal, theoretical activity allows us to 
make an initial analysis of activity without regard to the form in which it 
appears. (A.N. Leont’ev, 1977, p. 59) 
 
This implies that development is predicated on some kind of situated cognition in 
which operations occurring on an inner plane cannot be abstracted from their 
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external, societal plane, that is, the structure of activity. It is another way of saying 
that object and subject do not exist independently, for they are moments of 
something that cannot be divided or severed. That unit is activity itself. Subject 
and object are but moments of activity. Focusing on the social (as activity theory 
does) or the psychological (as cultural historical psychology does) aspects of 
speech is a matter of assuming a temporary point of view, for these two aspects are 
inseparable. 
 
As seen above, in activity, the societal object or motive and the goal that directs 
the individual’s action are no coincidental realities. Therefore, sense (personal 
meaning) can be defined, as A.A. Leont’ev (1977) does, borrowing from A.N. 
Leont’ev, as the ‘relationship between motive and goal’ (p. 34). This implies that 
sense depends upon social instantiations, that is, on the repertoire of cultural tools 
produced by society. In the words of A.A. Leont’ev, citing A.N. Leont’ev again: 
  
If ‘meaning is a reflection of reality independent of a person’s individual, 
personal relationship to it, sense defines what meaning is for me, for me 
personally’; it is ‘that aspect of an individual’s consciousness determined 
by his own relationships’ … Sense is not a concretization of meaning; 
rather, ‘sense is concretized in meanings (as a motive is concretized in 
goals)’. But without this concretization, sense does not exist; ‘a personal 
sense is always a sense of something; pure sense without an object is as 
meaningless as an essence without an object’. (A.A. Leont’ev, 1977, pp. 
33-34) 
 
This material view of speech and thought, as depending on the actual formation of 
social objects implies, in turn, a peculiar understanding of the sign. The material 
nature of the sign, as a tool to be mastered in a process of (intergenerational) 
enculturation, extends representations beyond the boundaries of the individual 
organism. Yet in contrast to the appropriation of the non-sign tool, the sign, in its 
ideal, abbreviated form in inner speech, is a unit that (1) reorganises lower 
psychological functions such as sensorimotor functions by placing them in the 
system of conceptual thought, (2) reorganises the developmental line worked out 
by the individual himself or herself prior to being introduced to true (theoretical) 





Thus, unlike the non-sign tool, which is outwardly oriented, the sign is a tool that 
plays a role in reorganising both inner and outer activity. As Bugrimenko and 
El’konin (2002) point out, the introduction of the sign represents a transition from 
the natural to the cultural, a process that should not be seen as a lineal, 
non-disrupting one but one full of contradictions (p. 22). In its innermost 
functioning, meaning is considered to be a process whose structure is at once 
associative and disjunctive, rather than merely associative (p. 21), which has 
important implications in conceptual instruction, as we will see later on. 
 
2.3.1.2 Foreign language development 
 
In this section I will deal first with the general problem of psychological 
development and second with the particular problem of foreign language 
development.  
 
Language development is the cornerstone of psychological development at large 
since Vygotsky (1987) traced back the social origins of higher psychological 
functions to the moment thinking and speech intersect – thinking becomes verbal 
and speech intellectual (p. 112) – serving, as already seen, two differentiated 
functions: a representational function and a communicative one; the former being 
predicated on the latter.  
 
Vygotsky maintains that as soon as the use of signs is incorporated and 
internalised, the actions are qualitatively transformed and organised along entirely 
new lines. In consequence, speech plays a critical role in both internal and external 
activity, being essential in the development of a variety of functions such as 
generalisation and abstraction, in self-regulation, and in the organisation of 
external practical activity (p. 112). Inner speech is therefore essential in the 
process of thinking.  
 
According to Wertsch (2007), in advancing word meaning as a unit of analysis, 
Vygotsky sought to highlight the importance of studying thinking and speech as 
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part of a fundamental unity, which prior to that had been systematically ignored by 
psychology (p. 183). Wertsch reflects on this germinal opposition, which is at the 
base of the emergence of control on internal and external activity, by contributing 
the distinction between explicit and implicit mediation and grounding it in 
Vygotsky’s ‘functional method of dual stimulation’ (1987, p. 127). This 
understanding of differentiated forms of mediation will arguably shed light on the 
complexity of development processes and the implications that semiotic mediation 
bears upon them.  
 
The method of dual stimulation was conceived by Vygotsky to observe externally 
the emergence of internal processes. As its name suggests, subjects were presented 
with two sets of stimuli. One set fulfils the function of the object on which the 
subject’s activity is directed. The second functions as signs that help the subject in 
organising this activity. By explicit mediation, Wertsch is referring to the first set 
of stimuli, in the sense that they are intentionally and overtly introduced into 
problem-solving activity (e.g. by using material supports such as diagrams or even 
the written word). In contrast, by implicit mediation he is referring to the second 
set, which characteristically involves spoken language whose make-up is transitory 
and transparent, since the signs used pre-exist in everyday communication. Thus, a 
dialectical relationship emerges between forms of mediation that target the 
solution of objective problems and forms of mediation needed to organise activity 
to accomplish them, the former being a function of the latter.  
 
The starting point is Vygotsky’s (1978) analysis of the relation between learning 
and development in preschool and school-age children within the framework of a 
thorough critique of various predominant psychological theories of instruction. 
Vygotsky eventually concludes that learning and development constitute a 
non-identical unity, establishing a dialectical link between them. Development is a 
consequence of learning activity but not every form of learning leads to 
development. For development to take place, learning must be organised in such a 
way that it sets in motion a variety of transformations of behaviour. Hence, he 
points out that ‘the only “good learning” is that which is in advance of 
development’ (p. 89).  
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Vygotsky (1987) makes a distinction between spontaneous and formal learning. 
He advances the hypothesis that the development of scientific concepts – a process 
that takes place mainly through formal schooling – leads to forms of generalisation 
and abstraction of internal forms of activity, which foster mastery. This is because 
generalisation brings about reflection – e.g. through the organisation of the means 
to achieve an action – or conscious awareness about external and internal activity. 
In other words, the formal instruction of conceptual systems opens the way to 
conscious awareness, self-regulation and mastery in a manner that spontaneous 
learning does not (p. 191).  
 
To sum up, by development, Vygotsky is referring to the restructuring of the 
psychological functions needed to achieve self-regulation in the process of 
participating in joint activity. By learning, in contrast, Vygotsky is referring to a 
process of mastery of tools that do not necessarily require the restructuring of 
psychological functions. 
 
Language development is subject to the basic premises formulated by Vygotsky 
about concept formation, including the more general implications inherent in the 
notion of zone of proximal development. Vygotsky defines the zone of proximal 
development in the following terms: 
 
The strength of the scientific concept lies in the higher characteristics of 
concepts, in the consciousness awareness and volition. In contrast, this is 
the weakness of the child’s everyday concept. The strength of the 
everyday concept lies in spontaneous, situationally meaningful, concrete 
applications, that is, in the sphere of experience and the empirical. The 
development of scientific concepts begins in the domain of conscious 
awareness and volition. It grows downward into the domain of the 
concrete, into the domain of personal experience. In contrast, the 
development of spontaneous concepts begins in the domain of the 
concrete and empirical. It moves toward the higher characteristics of 
concepts, toward conscious awareness and volition. The link between 
these two lines of development reflects their true nature. This is the link 
of the zone of proximal and actual development (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 
220). 
 
The problem Vygotsky is highlighting here is that the theoretical concept and 
theoretical systems require forms of speculative reflection whose production and 
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teaching differ drastically from the emergence of spontaneous concepts. 
Spontaneous concepts are brought to the process mainly by the students; 
theoretical concepts, by the instructor. Theoretical concepts are, nevertheless, 
mediated by everyday or spontaneous concepts.    
 
It can be argued that foreign language development is a particular occurrence of 
concept mediation, since the mediation of foreign language concepts does not 
depend solely upon spontaneous concepts but upon the complete 
conceptual-semantic system of the native language, including the scientific 
concepts that have reorganised the spontaneous concepts in the native language. 
Thus, according to Vygotsky, native language development proceeds upward, that 
is, from spontaneous to scientific concepts, whereas foreign language development 
proceeds downward, on a line similar to the development of theoretical concepts. 
There are some differences worth mentioning, though: 
 
To a limited extent, learning a foreign language also requires mastering 
the semantic aspect of foreign speech, just as the development of 
scientific concepts requires the mastery of the scientific language (i.e. the 
mastery of scientific symbolism) … Problems arise, however, if we 
attempt to extend this analogy further. In learning a foreign language a 
system of developed meanings is given from the outset in the native 
language. This existing system is a prerequisite for the development of 
the new system. In the development of scientific concepts, on the other 
hand, the system emerges only with the development of the scientific 
concept and it is this new system that transforms the child’s everyday 
concepts … This system which emerges with the scientific concepts is 
fundamental to the entire history of the development of the child’s real 
concepts. (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 223) 
 
Consequently, in the dialectical tradition, adult foreign language education relies 
on concept-based methods of instruction in the native language, especially during 
the early stages of instruction, because it has to take account of the fact that, 
contrary to native language development, foreign language development is 
achieved first and foremost by conceptual understanding and second by a 
transition of actions into unconscious operations or internalisation, a process 
predicated on the emergence of abbreviated sign forms in inner speech. I argue 
that this constitutes a development route or blueprint based on a sequence of 
functions that need to be mastered. Let us see how this works.   
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2.3.1.3 A zone of proximal foreign language development 
 
The zone of proximal development, however, is not a metaphor for instruction or 
for determining intended processes at inter- and intrapersonal level with the aim of 
achieving microgenetic internalisation, but a formulation that mediates between 
learning and development. We have to remember that for Vygotsky (1987) ‘The 
only instruction which is useful in childhood is that which moves ahead of 
development, that which leads it’ (p. 211).  
 
Vygotsky introduced the zone of proximal development as part of a rather general 
analysis of child development, addressing a particular age period. Thus, as 
Chaiklin (2003) maintains, the zone of proximal development mediates between 
learning and ontogenesis – the trajectory of individual development – and warns 
against confusing it with microgenetic processes. The main purpose of the zone of 
proximal development is to determine the psychological functions that need to 
mature in the child so that she or he can carry out certain activities.  
 
Special attention must be given to the leading activity, which is a notion that helps 
in identifying the particular social interactions that are likely to contribute to the 
development of the functions leading to the structural reorganisation of a child’s 
psychological functions (Chaiklin, 2003). In other words, there are targeted forms 
of activity requiring from the individual particular forms of social interaction that 
help to develop the functions enabling him or her to carry out those targeted forms 
of activity. In consequence, particular forms of interaction, such as problem 
solving and role-playing – which may be framed as concrete learning tasks – will 
help the individual develop the psychological functions (e.g. voluntary memory, 
generalisation, abstract analysis, speech activity, etc.) needed to carry out a 
historically-formed and socially-sanctioned activity. 
 
I argue that we can translate the principle of the zone of proximal development to 
the field of foreign language development by setting up a developmental model or 
blueprint that actually guides adult instruction. I will introduce below a general 
idea of how this may work. However, I would like to explore a bit further what 
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top-down instruction entails.  
 
Contrary to the view that seems to associate conceptual instruction with some kind 
of constraining and rigid unilateral top-down approach to education aimed at 
producing genius learners, it is important to stress that Vygotsky (1987) presented 
an interconnected model of the relationship between theoretical and everyday or 
spontaneous concepts, rather than a univocal top-down one. In fact, he warns 
against empty ‘verbalism’ (p. 169), a form of instructional malaise whereby 
theoretical concepts are not linked to everyday referents. By development, 
Vygotsky is referring mainly to the development of higher psychological functions 
associated with abstraction and logical thinking, but this does not mean that other 
functions do not develop as well, since higher mental functions are but one aspect 
of the child’s cultural development. Alongside this view, Hedegaard (2002) points 
out that instruction within the zone of proximal development can be characterised 
as ‘a double move between appreciating the traditions of practice that have 
characterised students’ everyday life and concepts and procedures central for 
subject-matter traditions’ (p. 78). According to Vygotsky, the formation of 
concepts develops simultaneously from the direction of the general and the 
particular. Theoretical concepts are developed out of verbal definitions. As part of 
an organised system, these verbal definitions descend to the concrete, to the child’s 
experience. In contrast, everyday concepts tend to develop outside any definite 
system. Their direction is upwards, toward abstraction and generalisation. 
 
Everyday concepts and theoretical concepts are interdependent; both have a role in 
mediating mental activity. As Daniels (2001a) points out, Vygotsky argues that the 
systematic, organised and hierarchical thinking associated with scientific concepts 
becomes progressively embedded in everyday referents and thus achieves a 
general sense in the contextual richness of everyday thought (p. 53). This implies 
that the formation of theoretical concepts allows the individual to reflect across 
contexts and gain control of dissimilar situations, but that leads, in turn, to new 
ways of social interaction and forms of social bonding, which are always 
context-tied. The dialectical interdependency of theoretical and everyday concepts 
is also expressed in the aforementioned distinction between explicit and implicit 
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mediation grounded in Vygotsky’s functional method of dual stimulation. In other 
words, theoretical concepts are mediated by everyday concepts in 
teaching-learning activity, as it constitutes a particular form of joint activity.  
 
As we have already seen, the zone of proximal development, as a construct, does 
not seem the most adequate for analysing adult development. Vygotsky’s 
conceptualisation was restricted to the analysis of a particular age period. 
Alternative conceptualisations such as Negueruela’s (2008) zone of potential 
development (ZPOD), which is an attempt to translate the zone of proximal 
development’s underpinnings into the second language development field, 
represents a step forward. In a nutshell, the ZPOD is expressed through three 
principles: (a) conceptual development, (b) granting mediation the status of a 
psychological process, and (c) creative imitation. Thus, the ZPOD seems to be an 
invaluable construct for instructional design. However, it does not address the 
need to give an account of the relationship between the learning task (i.e. actions, 
operations) at microgenetic level and the projected vector of development (i.e. 
activity) at ontogenetic level, especially when one undertakes an analysis of 
instruction. What I miss from the ZPOD is the blueprint that guides adult 
instruction from the very first steps onto higher levels of mastery and beyond. 
 
I argue that a viable alternative is to look carefully at A.A. Leont’ev’s insights into 
the relation between foreign language development and the structure of activity. 
In the case of adult foreign language development, the activity of speaking a given 
language entails many expectations (e.g. certain ideas about participation in 
communication activity such as communication readiness) and may comprise 
many related activities in order to accomplish it. This would require, according to 
A.A. Leont’ev (1981), different forms of activity, from speech activity to 
communication activity, both in the native and the foreign language (pp. 21-30). 
Speech activity is defined as speech whose ‘guiding motive is the production of 
correct and appropriate speech’ (p. 23), whereas communication activity is defined 
as speech whose motive lies outside the concrete speech acts but is specific and 




…the student must learn to establish, with the help of the new language, 
an independent communication activity, that is to say an activity, the aim 
of which is not the immediate satisfaction of concrete practical objectives, 
but the setting up of contact and mutual understanding, the establishing of 
interaction with the other members of his social group (collective), the 
impact of the knowledge, skills, system of social values (convictions), or 
emotions of another individual or group. The teacher’s explanation, the 
pupil’s answer (here we have in mind not a language lesson but a more 
general situation), the lecture or report, the commentator’s speech on 
television – these are all forms of communication activity (A.A. Leont’ev, 
1981, p. 23). 
 
More specifically, these activities are: (a) communication activity in the native 
language and speech activity in the foreign language in order to lay the 
foundations for speech activity teaching, (b) foreign language speech activity and 
discrete foreign language speech acts with the object of achieving foreign 
language speech operations and habits, (c) foreign language speech activity and 
foreign language speech acts as part of non-verbal communication activity with the 
object of transforming the foreign language speech activity into foreign language 
speech acts, and (d) foreign language communication activity with the aim of 
achieving not only linguistically correct speech but also the best possible 
utterances.  
 
Every activity presupposes the mastery of the previous one, although a slight 
alteration of this order suggested by A.A. Leont’ev is not significant. The most 
important aspect of this sequence is that it does not deal with specific instruction at 
the microgenetic level but provides links between operations in general (i.e. 
actions to be abbreviated) and activity targets at ontogenetic level. These activities 
represent a basic blueprint from which a leading activity can be designed for each 
step of the sequence.  
 
After the initial stages have been accomplished, the programme for the creation of 
speech habits follows a pragmatic progression. Hence, it is a semantic-pragmatic 
model of development. In other words, controlled or non-controlled utterances in 
the foreign language depend in this schema on conceptual instruction given in the 
student’s native language. A.A. Leont’ev is also drawing on Gal’perin’s work on 
controlled learning and concept-based instruction (see Gal’perin, 1969, 197, 1989a, 
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1989b, 1989c, 1992a). A.A. Leont’ev (1981) maintains that the transition from 
communicative intention to the actual utterance, that is, the formation of 
operations, is not easy. Nonetheless, the task of instructors is ‘to “get rid” of the 
intermediate stage as quickly as possible and to bring the psychological structure 
of the utterance in the foreign tongue as close as possible to that which operates in 
the mother tongue’ (p. 27). Therefore, according to A.A. Leont’ev, besides being 
acquainted with the rules of translation from the native to the foreign language, it 
is essential to get acquainted with the rules that govern the transition from the 
speech operation of the native language to those of the foreign language. 
 
This represents an analytical advantage for no matter what the SLA instructional 
method or technique being used (e.g., the grammar-translation method, the 
audio-lingual method, the silent method, the direct method, structural drills, the 
communicative approach) we can always ascertain what kind of psychological 
function the particular method or technique is trying to develop. Thus, different 
methods may be used in targeting the same kind of function. This, in turn, will 
allow us to compare different foreign language learning settings regardless of the 
instructional method or technique being deployed.  
 
To sum up, the dialectical tradition’s approach to foreign language development 
consists of linking together the functional systems that are needed in the 
production of speech, instead of relying on the gradual increase in grammatical 
complexity according to a natural order of development, as is the case of many 
SLA approaches to foreign language instruction (see the input hypothesis (Krashen, 
1985), the morpheme studies in Ellis (2008, pp. 82-91), and Pienemann’s (1998) 
processability theory). 
 
For all the ontological and epistemological problems that communicative language 
teaching presents, such as being still dominated by a cognitivist paradigm in which 
the social is kept at bay or is assumed to be constant and universal (see Johnson, 
2004, pp. 85-99), as an explanatory principle of language development, it 
reproduces the socio-genetic underpinnings of the dialectical tradition. As Ellis 
(2003) points out, ‘CLT [(communicative language teaching)] aims to develop the 
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ability of learners to use language in real communication’ (p. 27). Drawing on 
Brown and Yule (cf. 1983), Ellis further asserts that communication involves ‘two 
general purposes—the interactional function, where language is used to establish 
and maintain contact, and the transactional function, where language is used 
referentially to exchange information’ (p. 27). This claim is significant because it 
reproduces at the foreign language pedagogical level Vygotsky’s distinction 
between language’s socio-communicative and representational functions. 
 
In communicative language teaching we even find two major approaches that 
could be homologated – if properly adapted to fit an ontogenetic paradigm – to the 
double move between the upper and lower reaches of the zone of proximal 
development. Borrowing from Howatt (cf. 1984), Ellis distinguishes a ‘weak’ and 
‘strong’ version of communicative language teaching: 
 
The former is based on the assumptions that the components of 
communicative competence can be identified and systematically taught 
… Thus, instead of (or perhaps in addition to) teaching learners the 
structural properties of language, a weak version of CLT proposes they 
be taught how to realize specific general notions such as ‘duration’ and 
‘possibility’, and language functions such as ‘inviting’ and ‘apologizing’ 
… In contrast, a strong version of CLT claims that ‘language is acquired 
through communication’ (Howatt 1984: 279). That is, learners do not first 
acquire language as a structural system and then learn how to use this 
system in communication but rather actually discover the system itself in 
the process of learning how to communicate. (Ellis, 2003, p. 28)  
 
In conclusion, there are links that are worthwhile to explore when analysing 
learning settings apparently informed by communicative language teaching, as 
they could be rather easily translated into the dialectical tradition, especially into 
the proposed foreign language development blueprint advanced by A.A. Leont’ev.  
 
I will leave here the discussion about foreign language development in order to 
keep building up a theory of pedagogic discourse that can incorporate both 
Vygotsky’s views on development and the ideas of A.N. Leont’ev and A.A. 
Leont’ev on the structure of activity together with Bernstein’s code theory and 




Although we can see in A.N. Leont’ev’s method of analysing the non-coincidental 
nature of collective activity and individual action the introduction of sociological 
categories that extend Vygotsky’s word meaning as a unit of analysis, we are still 
missing a full-fledged theory of discourse in which the role of intermediate 
organisations or institutions not only are fully accounted for but they are framed 
within the rationality of differentials in the distribution of power, on which 
educational systems are built on. For all the theoretical weight that the 
cultural-historical activity theory tradition has on the problem of agency, I believe 
that Bernstein’s code theory brings in a singular sociological dimension that will 
complement it. 
 
2.3.2 Bernstein’s code theory 
 
Bernstein (1971) inaugurated his research on code theory by examining 
differences in achievement between middle-class and working-class students in the 
United Kingdom and tracing them back to differentials in interpretative principles 
or orientations to meaning (p. 6). If intellectual capacity is considered to be 
normally distributed among a given student population, why then did 
working-class learners have lower achievement levels than their middle-class 
peers? Bernstein’s answer was to inquire about orientation differentials. 
 
These differentials, eventually, were explained by Bernstein as the outcome of 
pedagogic practices based on principles of recontextualisation of discourse, or 
pedagogic discourse, regulated by the pedagogic apparatus, or pedagogic device. 
In other words, Bernstein was not only situating pedagogic discourse within the 
sociological structure of the pedagogic apparatus but gave discourse the status of 
transformational principle, operating as the distributor of knowledge and forms of 
consciousness.  
 
I will refrain from entering here into a proper ontological argument about the 
constructs knowledge and discourse in Bernstein’s sociology, as I am tempted to 
understand knowledge as a particular form of discourse as well. It will suffice to 
point out that for Bernstein (2000) knowledge may have many forms, including 
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theoretical and practical knowledge. Knowledge is also subject to different 
epistemic verification criteria, such as ‘local’ knowledge, whose verification 
largely depends on common sense; or ‘official’ or ‘school(ed)’ knowledge (p. 156), 
whose epistemic verification criteria is based precisely on uncommon sense. 
Overall, what transpires from Bernstein’s use of the term knowledge is that he is 
referring to socio-historical constructs that are relatively independent from the way 
they are produced and put into circulation. Thus, in his seminal essay on vertical 
and horizontal discourse (pp. 155-174), which deals precisely with knowledge 
structures, Bernstein refers to knowledge as being ‘realised’ through discourse (p. 
156). Knowledge remits us to epistemic relations, whereas discourse remits us to 
social relations.  
 
As far as discourse is concerned, Bernstein’s use of the term is relatively recent. In 
fact, one can trace its appearance back to volume IV of the series entitled ‘Class, 
codes and control’ (see Bernstein, 1990). Nonetheless, the term still coexists with 
another terms: ‘(pedagogic) communication’ (p. 9) and ‘pedagogic text’ (p. 193). 
There is no use of the term discourse in prior volumes. The notion is conveyed 
somehow by the term transmission, as in ‘knowledge transmitted’, in volume III 
(Bernstein, 1975, p. 89), and, in volume I (Bernstein, 1971), by the terms 
‘linguistic realization’, ‘speech variants’ (p. 15), ‘language-use’ (p. 33), ‘forms of 
communication’ and ‘form of the language’ (p. 43). However, no matter how the 
concept is rendered in actual words, Bernstein’s conceptualisation has always been 
sociological, paying attention to power differentials, social class and distribution 
of labour. In this regard, the concept of discourse as ideology or the process of 
naturalisation of subject positions through which a dual function of recognition 
and misrecognition is performed has always been closer to the one deployed by 
Althusser (1971, pp. 171-172) than the way it has been deployed in pragmatics in 
connection with a more loosely defined social context.  
 
What is the pedagogic device exactly? The pedagogic device can be defined as the 
apparatus whereby educational institutions select and recontextualise the 




Thus, in our case, Japanese tertiary organisations select, on the one hand, diverse 
academic knowledge such as linguistic, applied linguistic, philology or history, 
produced in different fields of production (research groups, academic societies, 
universities, conferences, publications) and, on the other, local knowledge such as 
agreed forms of conveying meaning by a certain Spanish-speaking community 
mainly through a vast array of arts and media (press, radio, television, literature, 
theatre etc.).  
 
The device, according to Bernstein (2000) provides three interrelated rules: 
‘distributive rules, recontextualising rules and evaluative rules’ (p. 28), which in a 
less abstract way can be rendered as curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation.  
 
By distributive rules, Bernstein understands the distinction of two classes of 
knowledge, the ‘thinkable class and the unthinkable class … one class of 
knowledge that is esoteric and one that is mundane’ (p. 29). 
 
In modern society today (this is indeed a very brutal simplification which 
I will develop later), the control of the unthinkable lies essentially, but 
not wholly, in the upper reaches of the educational system. This does not 
mean that the unthinkable cannot take place outside the educational 
system, but the major control and management of the unthinkable is 
carried out by the higher agencies of education. On the other hand, the 
thinkable in modern complex societies is managed by secondary and 
primary school systems. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 29) 
 
These two classes of knowledge have different forms of abstraction that relate ‘the 
material world and the immaterial world’ (p. 29), which are regulated by the 
division of labour and the particular relation between meanings and their material 
base. In other words, Bernstein is referring to the regulation of power relations 
between social groups by means of distributing different forms of knowledge and 
creating, therefore, consciousness differentials, whether we understand these 
differentials as orientations to meaning or pedagogic identities. 
 
The meanings which are not directly linked to a material base create a potential 
discursive gap. Put in a rather blatant way, there is knowledge to be taught, which 
ensures the reproduction of institutions and social relations, and there is 
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knowledge to be produced, which has the potential to reshape institutions and 
social relations. For Bernstein, ‘this potential gap or space … is the site for the 
unthinkable, the site of the impossible, and this site can clearly be both beneficial 
and dangerous at the same time … [it] is the meeting point of order and disorder, 
of coherence and incoherence. It is the crucial site of the yet to be thought’ (p. 30). 
More specifically: 
  
Any distribution of power will attempt to regulate the realisation of this 
potential…The modes of the regulation will differ, but the gap will 
always be regulated. Any distribution of power will distribute the 
potential of this gap in its own interest, because the gap itself has the 
possibility of an alternative order, an alternative society, and an 
alternative power relation (Bernstein, 2000, p. 30). 
 
It is worth mentioning that, paradoxically, in the process of controlling the access 
to these two forms of knowledge, ‘the contradictions and dilemmas are rarely 
suppressed’, for ‘in controlling or attempting to control the realisations of the gap, 
it must necessarily reveal the modes which make connections between the two 
worlds’ (p. 31). In other words, the very same process that hides or regulates the 
separation between the thinkable and the unthinkable reveals and allows social 
change to happen. At a practical level this happens when students recognise a 
crack or some form of incoherence in the teacher’s discourse and ask questions 
that can only be answered by drawing on other resources stemming from other 
areas of a field of production of knowledge or other fields altogether. Discourse is 
then surpassed by other discourse but soon a form of evaluation of the dislocation 
takes place. The teacher may feel compelled to contain the dislocation by pointing 
out that what is required to understand the problem is rather difficult (or 
dangerous), and it is better to see it at a later stage, deal with it with the student 
apart from the class, on a one-on-one basis, or disregard it altogether.   
 
Thus, the recontextualisation process is done by means of the pedagogic discourse. 
Pedagogic discourse is defined as ‘a rule which embeds two discourses; a 
discourse of skills of various kinds and their relations to each other, and a 
discourse of social order’ (pp. 31-32). Here, Bernstein is introducing the notions of 
instructional discourse and regulative discourse. Yet, for Bernstein, ‘there are not 
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two discourses, there is only one’ (p. 32), for instructional discourse, the discourse 
that creates skills, is a function of regulative discourse, or the discourse that 
creates order, relations and identity. 
However, the recontextualisation process, which entails the move of discourse 
from the production field to the position of pedagogic discourse, creates in fact an 
imaginary discourse. This implies that for Bernstein, pedagogic discourse is not a 
discourse but a recontextualising principle whereby ‘other discourses are 
appropriated and brought into a special relationship with each other, for the 
purpose of their selective transmission and acquisition’ (p. 32). It is important to 
emphasise that the grammar taught in class is also an imaginary discourse that 
does not represent the actual field of production of the grammarian. In fact, this 
happens with any pedagogic discourse, whether it contains theoretical concepts or 
not.  
 
This notion has direct implications for Vygotsky’s ideas of mind formation and 
development through the introduction of theoretical concepts. What Bernstein is 
stressing is the fact that those theoretical concepts are not actual theoretical 
concepts, as they do not belong to the production field in which they were 
produced but correspond to an imaginary discipline that is ultimately dominated 
and modulated by particular notions of the social order. In the case of the 
discourse that does not contain theoretical concepts but everyday concepts, let us 
say, the discourse of a communication class where implicit forms of instruction are 
used, the Spanish produced will constitute an imaginary form of Spanish, not the 
actual discourse produced in Spanish-speaking communities. 
 
Furthermore, the recontextualising principle not ‘only recontextualises the what of 
pedagogic discourse, what discourse is to become subject and content of 
pedagogic practice’ but ‘the how; that is the theory of instruction’ (p. 34). By the 
what, Bernstein is referring to ‘the translation of power, of power relations’ or 
classification. By the how, he is referring to ‘the translation of control relations’, 
or framing (p. 5). Bernstein views the theory of instruction as ancillary to 
regulative discourse, containing ‘within itself a model of the learner and of the 
teacher and of the relation’ (p. 35). 
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In our case, we are concerned about the instructional methods deployed in 
teaching Spanish as a foreign language, which are cultural tools in themselves. Our 
concern is primarily with communicative forms of instruction such as 
communicative language teaching. We are therefore required to analyse the kind 
of social order that this method of instruction carries within it and in the particular 
way it is deployed in the communication classroom.    
 
Finally, the evaluative rules are the transformation of the pedagogic practice from 
its abstractness into its concrete form at the level of classroom practice. ‘At the 
most abstract level, pedagogic discourse specialises time, a text and a space, and 
brings these into a special relationship with each other’ (p. 35), that is, specialising 
meanings to time and space. At an intermediate level of abstraction, time will be 
transformed into age, text into content and space into context. The final 
transformation is from age into acquisition, content into evaluation, and context 
into transmission (p. 35-36). Bernstein is referring here to the special relation that 
evaluative rules create between the curriculum’s contents and the time units 
employed in the pedagogic process, which create a hierarchisation of contents. 
Some contents are seen to be more important than others and therefore more time 
units are given to them. In other words, pedagogic discourse at its most concrete 
level creates a relational space between pedagogies, evaluation and learning.  
 
Bernstein goes on to signal that ‘Evaluation condenses the meaning of the whole 
device’ (p. 36), that is, evaluation is the moment in which we can judge the extent 
to which the distributive rules (i.e. the distribution of knowledge) have been 
accomplished. The evaluative rules bring the what and the how into a final relation 
to each other. The recognition of the what is assessed by evaluating the capacity of 
the student to recognise what is asked for, the context of the text, that is, passive 
realisation; and the recognition of the how is assessed by evaluating the capacity 
of the student actually to produce the required text, that is, active realisation. Let 
me give you an example about evaluative rules. Sometimes students do not do well 
in an examination not because they are unable to produce the right answer to a 
problem (produce the appropriate text) but because they have not understood what 
the problem was all about and what was demanded from them. Thus, the 
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possession of evaluation rules comprises recognition (passive realisation) and 
(active) realisation on the part of students (pp. 16-18). We can see now that the 
differential in the possession of recognition and realisation rules is an indicator of 
the students’ orientation to meanings in terms of the perceived relevance of those 
meanings (p. 18).  
 
The purpose of the device is none other than providing ‘a symbolic ruler for 
consciousness’ (p. 36). By ruler, Bernstein is exploiting the term’s two meanings, 
one linked to having the power over consciousness, and the other linked to 
‘measuring the legitimacy of the realisations of consciousness’ (p. 114). 
 
2.3.2.1 Pedagogic code 
 
So far I have given a general outline of Bernstein’s theory. Let us analyse now the 
specific way of determining the pedagogic code of any recontextualisation practice. 
Let us start by the notion of pedagogic code itself. 
 
A pedagogic code is a function of a particular social formation or qualities of 
social structure involved in the (re)production of those very formations. More 
specifically, code refers to a set of socially-acquired principles that are involved in 
the internalisation and organisation of orders of relevance whereby students 
orientate towards meaning. A code is therefore a set of principles whose function 
is to recognise the other and sustain social (trans)formation.  
 
Unlike other theories of cultural reproduction, Bernstein’s (2000) code theory 
regards forms of communication as a function of external power relations that are 
carried in the discourse itself, that is, in its structure. As a consequence, the 
analysis of discursive forms must be part of a comprehensive account of the 
external boundaries created by the distribution of power differentials, such as those 
that arise from the division of labour, for those boundaries also have an 
intrasubjective dimension, giving rise to imaginary identities. The degree of 
complexity of the social division of labour manifests in the coding orientation, i.e., 
on the orientation to meanings:  
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The simpler the social division of labour, and the more specific and local 
the relation between an agent and its material base, the more direct the 
relation between meanings and a specific material base, and the greater 
the probability of a restricted coding orientation. The more complex the 
social division of labour, the less specific and local the relation between 
and agent and its material base, the more indirect the relation between 
meanings and a specific material base, and the greater the probability of 
an elaborated coding orientation. (Bernstein, 1990, p. 20) 
 
As already seen, Bernstein (2000) is concerned with both the translation of power 
relations and of control relations. On the one hand, the translation of power 
relations into principles of classification and how these principles establish social 
divisions of labour – and therefore identities and voices – is called classification. 
This is the structural level. For Bernstein, these classifications conceal the 
arbitrary nature of power relations, produce imaginary identities, replace the 
non-essential by the necessary, and build psychic systems of defence that may lie 
at an unconscious level. On the other hand, the translation of control relations into 
forms of realisation of discourses – and therefore messages – is called framing. 
This is the interactional level. More specifically, classification (C) refers to the 
degree of maintenance between categories (subjects, spaces/agencies, discourses). 
In fact, for Bernstein, the key metaphoric element of classification is the idea of 
boundary. Framing (F) refers to the communicative outcomes of the relations 
between categories within the pedagogic relation. Framing between subjects refers 
to the control they have over selection of instructional contents and roles (e.g. the 
roles acquirers and transmitters assume to carry out pedagogic tasks), sequence, 
pacing, and evaluation criteria, that is, the discursive rules that regulate 
instructional pedagogic practice. It also refers to the hierarchical rules which 
regulate norms of social conduct, or regulative pedagogic practice, according to 
what is seen as legitimate or appropriate in a given pedagogic context.  
 
Bernstein asserts the existence of the pedagogic code in this form: ‘+/– are the 
strengths of classification and framing ±C/F’ (Bernstein, 2000, p. 14). In other 
words, the existence of the pedagogic code is predicated on the variations in the 
strengths of classification and framing. Where framing is strong, the instructor has 
explicit control over selection, sequence, pacing, criteria and the social base from 
which ideas of the social order spring. Where framing is weak, the student has 
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more apparent control over the communication and its social base. Indeed, 
Bernstein stresses the fact that the control the student brings to bear is apparent. 
Furthermore, Bernstein also points out that classification can have an internal 
value (Ci) (for example, arrangements of the space and objects in it, as well as 
classification of dress, of posture, of position), while framing can have an external 
value (Fe) (for example, social class may play a role if it enters pedagogic 
communication) adding sensitivity to the description. 
 







where E refers to the orientation of the discourse (elaborated): —— refers 
to the embedding of this orientation in classification and framing values. 
Thus variation in the strength of classification and framing values 
generates different modalities of pedagogic practices (Bernstein, 2000, p. 
100). 
 
The assessment of pedagogic code above is based upon ascertaining the position 
subjects take up in social practice. Thus, Bernstein advances a method of 
determining the subject’s position by examining (a) the characteristics of the 
division of labour within a given social formation (voice) and (b) the forms of 
communication internal to that division (message). Power is a means by which 
voice is constituted and control is a means by which message is formed. The 
logical relations between voice and message amount to actual codes inasmuch as 
they position subjects not only with respect to discourse but to the relationships 
between and within them (Bernstein, 1990).  
 
2.3.2.2 Boundaries and consciousness 
 
Voice is a manifestation that is at once predicated on but in opposition to forms of 
distribution of power. Hence, voice emerges from intrasubjective and 
intersubjective divisions whose boundaries are set by more or less liquid social 
constructs or particular social formations such as class, which spring from 
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differentials in the distribution of power. It is here that the problem of 
consciousness emerges since the differential in the distribution of power amounts 
eventually to a differential in the distribution of forms of consciousness (e.g. 
access to and therefore recognition and production of discursive forms). Therefore, 
attention needs to be paid to the external and internal boundaries set by the forms 
of distribution of power. It is in those boundaries that the personal and collective 
experience is structured. However, this does not entail a passive or mechanical 
formation. Diaz (2001), for instance, notices that boundaries and transgressions are 
interdependent and defines Bernstein’s notion of voice as ‘the living condition of 
power within the limits structured in experience by the subject’ (p. 87). To sum up, 
the analysis of the distribution of labour is a pre-condition to understanding 
differentials not only in terms of access to discourse but to forms of consciousness 
as well. 
 
I would like now to analyse the logic between voice and message in code theory, 
and to explore succinctly the issue of the conscious and the unconscious in 
semiosis in general. 
 
As is the case with Vygotsky’s socio-genetic theory, in which internalisation is not 
necessarily equal to conscious mastery, the pedagogic subject in code theory 
carries inherently a theory of the unconscious. I am far from unwrapping here a 
fine-grained analysis of the unconscious in code theory and how this compares to 
the work of the Frankfurt School or to theories of structuration, especially to 
Bourdieu’s notions of habitus and symbolic capital, which draw, as Steinmetz 
(2006) maintains, on substantial readings and interpretations of psychoanalysis, 
especially on Lacan’s ideas on subject formation and internalisation of the 
symbolic order. Suffice it to point out that alongside Davis (2004), Lapping (2008) 
and Ivinson (2011), I see a strong connection between the way the unconscious is 
treated in code theory and a psychoanalytical – especially Lacanian – notion of 
subject formation. I also establish strong links between the emergence of the 
subject and the structure or form of semiosis, which paradoxically unveils and 




At an ontological level, the unconscious in Marxian thought and a significant 
number of post-Freudian theories rests on the nonidentical relation between 
subject and object, that is, on what is eventually internalised, especially the sign in 
its abbreviated form, as a reflection that stands out from other objective images – 
as fetishism, in the end, rests on the form of the commodity (see Marx, 1976). In 
other words, knowledge emerges from indeterminacy or from a principle of 
nonidentity of the subject as the subject draws on social semiotic systems 
(including non-linguistic signs) to structure the individual experience and agency 
(perception being one more form of agency). This coincides with Lacan’s 
structuralism and with the status he gave to the sign as a structure from which the 
unconscious emerges.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting contribution made to unmasking both the paradoxical 
concealing and revealing dimensions of semiosis in recent years is the work done 
by Kockelman (2006) in the field of anthropology. Kockelman establishes a theory 
of meaning that equates the commodity with semiosis. This is done by first 
abandoning the dichotomy subject-object and its Hegelian dialectical relations, and 
Saussure’s signifier-signified to explain meaning, and deploying, instead, the 
Peircean trichotomy sign-object-interpretant and equating it with Marx’s logic of 
the commodity: use-value, value and exchange-value. Hence, semiosis has to take 
into account the abstract system comprised by all speech acts, just as the 
commodity’s value is ultimately determined by the abstract sum total of the values 
of all commodities in the marketplace. In other words, semiosis is not identical to 
itself since every act of semiosis (e.g. speech act) enters the abstract space of all 
possible interpretations – understood as the relation between sign and object made 
by an interpretant – altering, by its very addition, the sum total of all 
interpretations. Through this operation, social relations, affect and, more 
importantly – given the positivist conception of language in modern and 
contemporary linguistics – the speech act are given the status of immaterial 
commodities. Semiosis as a particular form of commodity obscures and mystifies 
at once social relations. This is a condition inherent to its relational structure.  
 
By the same token, Bernstein (2000) asserts that communication is needed because 
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power establishes differentials in the distribution of forms of consciousness. Stated 
somewhat tautologically, communication forms are not arbitrary but respond to 
power differentials. In order to close the gap produced by the lack of a unified 
consciousness, communication is needed. However, communication itself brought 
about different forms of consciousness in the first place. This compels Bernstein to 
maintain that, eventually, all forms of pedagogic communication (i.e. discourse) 
are calls to sustain a particular moral order, helping to explain why the 
instructional discourse is finally a function of regulative discourse (see Diaz, 2001). 
In conclusion, from an ontological point of view, unlike Saussure’s structuralism, 
Bernstein’s code theory represents a brand of structuralism based on a principle of 
incompleteness, grounded on a nonidentical relation between subject and object.  
 
I would like to leave here the discussion on Bernstein’s code theory and turn to 
Holland and colleagues’ cultural theory, as it will shed light onto some of the 
problems touched by Bernstein, especially regarding the emergence of (pedagogic) 
identities, but more importantly to the analytical framework they advance in order 
to ascertain subject position.  
  
2.3.3 A relational semiotic analysis of subject position 
 
Holland et al. (2001) configure their ideas on identity and agency drawing on 
Vygotsky’s socio-genetic analytical framework, and the conceptions of A.N. 
Leont’ev and Bourdieu of the self in practice, supplementing them with Bakhtin’s 
views on self-authoring. Their focus on narrativised and dramatised accounts of 
self, which are, nevertheless, regulated by socio-relational and socio-interactional 
structures, amounts to a semiotic approach to analysing subject position.  
 
Thus, they deploy two intertwined notions that configure their semiotic approach. 
The first one is the notion of figured worlds, which is associated with the 
construction of the identity through semiotic means, by resourcing to narratives, 
genres and voices. The second one is the notion of positional identities, which is 
associated to the interactional and relational social world which distributes the 
access to the aforementioned semiotic means. 
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Whilst they acknowledge the fact that Vygotsky paid attention to the social realm, 
they miss social elements that Bakhtin emphasised. Their critique is focused on 
two aspects: first, they believe the conflictual nature of social relations and the role 
institutions play in modulating them are undertheorised; and second, they miss a 
complex analysis of the conflicting nature of ready-made artefacts used in inner 
and social speech processes. In their own terms: 
 
While the social was clearly important to Vygotsky, we miss the elements 
of power, status, stratification, and ownership that Bakhtin emphasized. 
In Vygotsky’s vision cultural forms became fused with mental life within 
social interaction, but he avoided attention to the conflictual in social life 
or to the oppressive nature of many institutions in which humans interact 
[with] these cultural forms … And so we miss the social struggles and 
conflicts that drive aspects of inner speech. Vygotsky recognized 
differences between inner speech (speech for one’s self), and social 
speech (speech for others), and thus recognized a tension, for example, in 
moving from inner to social speech. But the tension lay in such contrast 
as those between the ‘sense’ of a word or phrase for one’s self, the 
connotations and memories of the contexts of the word’s use, and the 
‘meaning’ of a word or phrase for generalized others. Bakhtin view of the 
social and the fusion of the social with cultural forms was much more 
complex. (Holland et al., 2001, pp. 176-177) 
 
Holland and colleagues draw on Bakhtin’s notions of ‘self-fashioning’, which they 
call the ‘space of authoring’, and ‘dialogism’ (p. 169), an interpretation of the 
underlying principle of Bakhtin’s literary theory and philosophy of language given 
by Holquist (1990), to formulate their notion of figured worlds. The notion of 
figured worlds is deployed to analyse the person as a composite of many, often 
contradictory, self-understandings and rather impermanent identities.  
 
Let us start with the notion of dialogism. Holland et al. (2001) assert that the 
‘…figured world of dialogism is one in which sentient beings always exist in a 
state of being “addressed” and in the process of “answering”’ (p. 169). According 
to Holquist (1990), Bakhtin understands the individual as always being in a state 
of being addressed by messages coming from the natural environment or from 
other persons, whether they are psychological stimuli, natural language, social 
codes or ideologies. The individual existence always takes a position and from that 
position is compelled to answer or ignore those messages. The response, in the 
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case of persons’ messages is articulated by ‘making sense’ or producing ‘meaning’ 
out of the utterances (p. 47).  
 
The question is why the individual person must take up a social position, even if 
that position involves ignoring, rejecting or resisting his or her own social 
position? I believe a possible answer to this question is given by the fact that sense 
must take the form of an object; it must be objectivised in tools widely available in 
society, in meanings that, although they may be the object of conflicting views, are 
widely recognised and somehow understood as such. According to Bakhtin (1981), 
the word is a pivot between ourselves and others: ‘In the everyday rounds of our 
consciousness, the internally persuasive word is half-ours and half-someone else’s’ 
(p. 345). Therefore, the individual is subject at once of socio-historical forces and 
of his or her own personal trajectory and there is no way out of this. 
 
At a more abstract level, a similar contradiction between subjective and objective 
forces takes place. For Bakhtin languages and voices form part of a system in 
which there is unity and division at the same time, which Bakhtin refers to as 
centrifugal and centripetal forces: 
 
Every utterance participates in the ‘unitary language’ (in its centripetal 
forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and 
historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces).  
 
Such is the fleeting language of a day, of an epoch, a social group, a 
genre, a school and so forth. It is possible to give a concrete and detailed 
analysis of any utterance, once having exposed it as a 
contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in 
the life of language (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 272). 
 
The process of subjectivation is accompanied necessarily by social objectivation. 
This implies a creative appropriation of meanings and forms of language, that is, 
of socio-ideological belief systems and of speech genres or forms of discourse. 
The appropriation takes place in a space constituted by the interrelationship of 
differentiated vocal perspectives on the social world. Therefore, the authoring of 




It is worth underlining the fact that Holland and colleagues are not referring to 
some kind of abstract and distant voices as the materiality of figured worlds but 
concrete and familiar referents linked to the social institutions that modulate social 
positions:  
 
Cultural worlds are populated by familiar social types and even 
identifiable persons not simply differentiated by some abstract division of 
labour. The identities we gain … are thus specifically historical 
developments, grown through continued participation in the positions 
defined by the social organization of those worlds’ activity. (p. 41). 
 
Let us analyse how the process of appropriation takes place. Alongside Vygotsky’s 
ideas of appropriation through imitation, which are at the basis of the zone of 
proximal development, cementing the space of collaboration, Bakhtin saw the 
appropriation of discourse by the subject as a progression in consciousness 
awareness. Thus, the appropriation of the tool takes place before the individual can 
make full sense of it:   
 
When someone else’s ideological discourse is internally persuasive for us 
and acknowledged by us, entirely different possibilities open up. Such a 
discourse is of decisive significance in the evolution of an individual 
consciousness: consciousness awakens to independent ideological life 
precisely in a world of alien discourses surrounding it, and from which it 
cannot initially separate itself; the process of distinguishing between 
one’s own and another’s discourse, between one’s own and another’s 
thought, is activated rather late in development. When thought begins to 
work in an independent, experimenting and discriminating way, what 
first occurs is a separation between internally persuasive discourse and 
authoritarian enforced discourse, along with a rejection of those congeries 
of discourses that do not matter to us, that do not touch us. 
 
Internally persuasive discourse – as opposed to one that is externally 
authoritative – is, as it is affirmed through assimilation, tightly 
interwoven with ‘one’s own word’ (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 345).  
  
For Holland et al. (2001), the space of authoring is a particular zone of proximal 
development, ‘… extremely important in an explication of the development of 
identities as aspects of history-in-person’ (p. 183). This space is marked by 
improvisation, but an improvisation that is a reconfiguration of language (and 
therefore of action). In other words, the individual is not completely free to answer 
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to the world but at the same time is not completely constrained by that language. 
Every attempt at reconfiguring the world and every identity that emerges out of 
that process is both an individual and social endeavour. In fact, as Holland and 
colleagues assert, it is a form of co-development (p. 270). The individual 
consciousness, therefore, is socially distributed. 
 
Drawing on A.N. Leont’ev’s concept of activity, they advance the notion of 
figured worlds to analyse how subjects explain themselves, the positions they 
assume, the imaginative solutions they give or the actions they take in a 
narrativised and dramatised form when a particular event unfolds. Their focus is 
on language as activity, since the word (i.e. speech) is a pivot between external 
and internal planes.  
 
The external is expressed in the ready-made characteristics of the word and its link 
to the now vestigial social relations that shaped its meaning, but drift away in the 
course of history. The internal is expressed in sense, that is, to paraphrase A.N. 
Leont’ev, the relation between motive and object or the relation between the 
subjective and the objective. More specifically: 
 
Persons develop more or less conscious conceptions of themselves as 
actors in socially and culturally constructed worlds, and these senses of 
themselves, these identities, to the degree that they are conscious and 
objectified, permit these persons, through the kinds of semiotic mediation 
described by Vygotsky, at least a modicum of agency and control over 
their own behaviour.  
 
Significant to our concept is the situatedness of identity in collectively 
formed activities. The ‘identities’ that concern us are ones that trace our 
participation, especially our agency, in socially produced, culturally 
constructed activities–what we call figured worlds. (Holland et al., 2001, 
pp. 40-41) 
 
The dialectical nature of language puts the person under a form of literary 
vocational spell, understood here as a practice in imaginative and liberating 
observation of one’s situation in the world and a form of self-regulation that is, 
nonetheless, constructed with restrictive, given, ready-made elements (e.g. words, 
voices, speech genres, styles). Thus, the Bakhtinian concept of the space of 
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authoring is used to capture an understanding of the mutual shaping of figured 
worlds and identities in social practice.  
 
Regarding the situatedness of identity, Holland and colleagues argue that ‘… 
figured worlds, like activities, are social encounters in which participants’ 
positions matter’ (2001, p. 41). They deploy the notion of positional identities to 
make a distinction between aspects of identity associated with figured worlds, that 
is, ‘storylines, narrativity, generic characters, and desire’, and aspects that have to 
do with ‘one’s position relative to social identified others, one’s sense of social 
place, and entitlement’ (p. 125). It is precisely here that power and control enter 
into the analysis: 
 
Positional identities have to do with the day-to-day and on-the-ground 
relations of power, deference and entitlement, social affiliation and 
distance – with the social-interactional, social-relational structures of the 
lived world. Narrativized or figurative identities, in contrast, have to do 
with the stories, acts, and characters that make the world a cultural world. 
Positional identity, as we use the term, is a person’s apprehension of her 
social position in a lived world: that is, depending on the others present, 
of her greater or lesser access to spaces, activities, genres, and, through 
those genres, authoritative voices, or any voice at all (Holland et al., 2001, 
pp. 127-128). 
 
Holland and colleagues are concerned with the transformation of social positions 
into dispositions. They argue that social positions ‘… become dispositions through 
participation in, identification with, and development of expertise within the 
figured world’ (p. 136). The transformation does not only work unilaterally, 
though: ‘People may develop a “sense” (in Bourdieu’s terms) of their worlds, an 
expertise in the use of cultural artifacts that may come to re-mediate their positions 
in them’ (p. 137). 
 
In conclusion, for Holland and colleagues individual consciousness and identities 
emerge from the individual’s attempt at reconfiguring the world, a process that is 
marked by improvisation and carried out by the very same affordances and 
constraints inherent in semiosis. Although they draw extensively on Vygotsky, 
they explore analytical notions such as figured world and positional identities to 
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add the conflicting dimension of cultural tools as they are used in producing and 
reproducing social relations and the very institutions that bind together those 
relations.  
 
Overall, we have seen throughout this discussion that even though Vygotsky 
works with a notion of language as speech and activity, he falls short of actually 
working with a fully-fledged sociological notion of discourse. A.N. Leont’ev’s 
structure of activity is an attempt theoretically and empirically to unwrap 
Vygotsky’s word meaning unit of analysis in order to introduce the actual position 
subjects assume in social relations. However, the method of contrasting collective 
activity and individual action does not seem sufficient to account analytically for 
the institutional aspects that modulate social positions and discourse, especially 
when those institutions (i.e. schools, universities) are the key intermediary 
organisations involved in shaping social consciousness and the pedagogic 
apparatus, embodied in the educational institution, acts to recontextualise the 
theoretical systems that are being communicated through pedagogies. That 
recontextualisation process not only acts upon the selection of the theoretical 
systems to be taught but modulates the pedagogic process as well. It is as if all the 
effort made by Vygotsky on advancing pedagogies that can effectively deliver the 
human being from ignorance could be easily brushed away by watering down 
pedagogies. That is the power of the pedagogic apparatus as a moderator of the 
theoretical concept.  
 
I do not want to suggest that cultural-historical activity theory does not offer the 
right analytical framework, for it does, provided that an empirical extension is 
worked out. We have seen that development, understood as socially generated, is a 
key aspect in Vygotsky’s work and I have argued that it is absolutely necessary to 
provide a blueprint for foreign-language development, a blueprint that allows us to 
determine if and how instruction is fostering development. In other words, we 
have to position ourselves between microgenesis and ontogenesis. We cannot 
succeed in determining a zone of proximal development for foreign language 
pedagogic relations if we are unable to establish first which psychological 
functions need to be developed in the first place through what kind of instruction. 
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That blueprint has been advanced by A.A. Leont’ev as an application of A.N. 
Leont’ev’s insights into activity. Speech, no matter whether in the native or a 
foreign language, is activity. The golden rule is to analyse activity according to its 
object and therefore we can ascertain the kind of activity foreign language speech 
is depending on its object. Is the object of speech outside or inside the speech 
system we call language? If the object is internal, that is, the linguistic production 
is all about producing grammatical utterances, we are facing speech activity; if the 
object is external, we are facing communication activity, and so forth. Thus, 
instead of analysing a myriad of instructional methods or techniques as if they 
were organising principles, we ought to determine if those methods are being used 
in accomplishing certain psychological functions. Here, the denomination of the 
instructional method or technique does not matter, as one method may share the 
functions it targets with other methods. Activity gives us an ontogenetic object and 
action gives us a microgenetic goal. Yet, I believe the next step is to climb up the 
sociological ladder from speech as activity to discourse.   
 
What I have been trying to convey through this discussion is the fact that we are 
lacking ready-made tools that enable us to explore empirically the problem of 
mastery in complex pedagogic settings. We need to answer why a segment of the 
student population, in a sociological dimension, as a group being sociologically 
profiled, achieves higher levels of foreign-language mastery: why pedagogic 
discourse is different for different segments of the student population. Here, 
Bernstein’s insight is decisive. Differences are produced by differentials in the 
distribution of knowledge or consciousness, which are called orientations to 
meaning. Bernstein’s code theory provides an empirical way to approach the 
assessment of those differentials by paying attention to the subject matter 
boundaries (the curriculum) and the principles of control of discursive practices 
within those boundaries. These have been set by the educational institutions. In 
other words, Bernstein’s code theory provides the means to carry out an empirical 
analysis of the social structure, especially how power differentials bring to bear 
intra- and inter-subjective divisions and identities that are manifested in discourse, 
with special emphasis being made on implicit semiotic mediation, which is the 
carrier of the social order and the structuring principle of instruction. The positions 
92 
 
subjects take can be ascertained through an analysis of the structure and the active 
and passive realisation of discourse by students. However, Bernstein’s code theory 
does not tell us much about the potential for activity, about the aspirations of 
subjects, for it is focused on the outcome of the pedagogic apparatus as a ruler of 
consciousness, on the evaluation of the pedagogic process within its restrictive set 
of rules that act as recontextualisation principles. Code theory takes the point of 
view of the instructor. It is here that cultural theory enters the scene. Holland and 
colleagues advance a method of accessing the figured world of subjects as they 
rationalise the appropriation of cultural tools they have made and reflect about 
their social position. The analysis allows for taking up the position of the student. 
 
Let us sum up the discussion by pointing out that this chapter has dealt with 
language as the quintessential form of development. However, we have seen that 
language as activity, as speech, is not enough to ascertain the sociological 
dimension of development. The process of appropriating cultural tools such as 
speech takes place in institutions which act as intermediary social organisations 
that modulate at once speech and social relations. They act as modulators of 
meanings and the actual concrete forms that those meanings take as objects. In 
such analysis speech is no longer speech but discourse, that is, language or speech 
in which there is an assessment of the social positioning of subjects. Discourse, as 
a sociological category, is therefore inherently associated with the notion of 
subject. Subject is a relational process of subjectivation and objectivation. It is 
within this relation that a fair analysis of individual agency can be obtained. 
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CHAPTER 3: EPISTEMOLOGY, METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH 
METHOD 
 
But this present has a name: it is the present of absolute knowledge, in 
which consciousness and science are one and the same, in which science 
exists in the immediate form of consciousness, and truth can be read 
openly in the phenomena, if not directly, at least with little difficulty, 
since the abstractions on which the whole historico-social science under 
consideration depends are really present in the real empirical existence 
of the phenomena.  
(Althusser, see Althusser and Balibar, 1997, p. 137) 
 
 
In a crucial way the evolution of the theory is a function of the attempt to 
develop greater powers of description, greater conceptual clarity and 
control, increased generality and increased delicacy at the level of detail. 
This evolution is directly related to the extensive empirical research which 
the theory has both influenced and responded to.  






This chapter sets out the epistemological, conceptual and methodological 
framework for the thesis. It explains how and why the thesis combines the 
approaches of the dialectical tradition, mostly represented by, but not limited to, 
Vygotsky’s psychology and Bernstein’s sociology, and argues for the coherence 
and productivity of bringing these two theorists together in this way. There are 
several stages to this argument. The first and overarching argument relates to a 
conception of dialectical method. I begin by setting out the general features and 
advantages of a dialectical approach. I then develop a more specific argument 
about the different ways in which Bernstein and Vygotsky might be understood to 
develop dialectical methodologies. While both might be understood as dialectical 
in some way, Vygotsky remains in a more traditional Hegelian-Marxian mode of 
dialectical methodology, while Bernstein foregrounds the need for social scientific 
research to engage in a movement between the theoretical and the empirical. I 





The second key argument relates to the conceptualisation of the social. I argue that 
while the social is key to Vygotsky’s account of individual development, his 
theory lacks an operationalisable conception of the social. At the same time, 
Bernstein’s sociology, which provides tools for an analysis of the social, lacks an 
account of individual development or learning. Since this thesis is interested in 
both individual developmental trajectories in language learning and the social and 
institutional constraints on (or construction of) instructors and students 
subjectivities in the articulation or instantiation of these trajectories, neither 
Vygotsky or Bernstein alone can provide the necessary conceptual tools for my 
endeavour. The later sections of the chapter develop in some detail the tools 
provided by Vygotsky and Vygotskian scholars to provide an account of language 
development, and then the tools provided by Bernstein to construct an account of 
the social. 
 
It is worth also noting in advance the way a notion of the dialectic is maintained 
through these sections of the chapter: in the movement between two conceptual 
frameworks, both of which offer a distinct and necessarily incomplete perspective; 
and in the ongoing and always incomplete construction of the subject in the 
movement between what we might call an individualised psychology, an idea of 





The methodology of the present thesis is based on Bernstein’s translation device. 
By translation device what is meant is the linking of the theory and the empirical 
problem under certain epistemic conditions, for they depend on one another and it 
is in the research methodology that their languages of description must be developed 
and intersect. More precisely, by languages of description, Bernstein (2000) refers to 
the devices that allow the translation of one language into another in a non-circular 
way. This amounts to an operation in which the ‘principles of description, although 
derived from the theory, must interact with the empirical contextual displays so as to 
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retain and translate the integrity of the display’ (Bernstein, 2000, p. 91). It is 
therefore a form of translating the theory to the empirical problem so as to grasp its 
whole complexity but keeping the translated device relatively autonomous from the 
theory. 
 
This particular aspect of the translation device, that is, the avoidance of circularity, 
together with code theory, attracted me to Bernstein’s theory in the first place, 
making me reflect about the nature of theoretical and empirical practice. Whilst 
developing a method to address the problem of classroom disruption at the tertiary 
level in Japan, which would later be integrated under the subject foreign language 
education resistance (Escandón, 2004), I came to the conclusion that my approach 
had a serious empirical limitation. The deployment of the notion of habitus allowed 
me to describe the problem to a great extent, but I knew I had reached a dead end in 
terms of making it empirically operational, which eventually meant that its 
explanatory power was severely constrained. The notion of habitus, together with 
other notions belonging to Bourdieu’s sociology, lacked explanatory power as well. 
The problem was its circularity. Habitus – these ‘systems of durable, transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53) – was a product of habitus and I could not overcome its 
circularity. I could only recognise these systems but I could not have any idea about 
their specific formation. Thus, I was limited in terms of understanding why certain 
segments of the student population resisted education, even though the resulting 
taxonomy and description of their disruption look superficially impressive. In other 
words, it amounted to a classification of symptoms disconnected from the causes. I 
remember in particular the categories for different forms of simulation students 
developed. In some cases, they complied with the classroom rules but ended up not 
carrying out the instructional task under established parameters. Resistance 
amounted to a sophisticated form of pretence. At that time I knew I had to adopt a 
different theory and method and I was examining various dialectical approaches: 
activity theory, distributed learning, and communities of practice. Therefore, when I 
wrote my original research proposal I knew it had to comply with two basic 
requirements. The first was the problem: I did not want to start addressing again the 
problem of resistance, for it was worded too negatively and it made me feel more 
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depressed than I already was with having to experience every day, as a language 
instructor, disruptive classrooms. The wording had to be positive. Why not study 
and give an explanation for success? What made students succeed in communicative 
language teaching contexts? More than a problem with the wording, I did not want 
to search for students’ wrong deeds but for good deeds, instead. I believe that 
studying resistance is, eventually, like studying crime. You soon are too focused on 
searching for the unlawful that you become obsessed with it and may start 
disregarding lawful behaviour. The second point was that I needed a theoretical and 
methodological approach that allowed me to address the question without incurring 
circularities. I wanted to explain the problem, not only describe it and I decided not 
to draw strong theoretical and methodological boundaries but to draw on any theory 
and methodology that allowed me to effectively address the problem. That was 
when I met my supervisor and he directed me to the advantages of combining 
Bernstein’s sociology and Vygotsky’s psychology (for his views, see Daniels, 2001b, 
2004, 2008, 2010). In fact, Bernstein’s sociology not only had the potential to 
address partially the problem I wanted to resolve but it also offered me a set of 
methodological principles to curtail or eliminate circularity altogether.  
 
Right from the beginning, I found the following assertion: 
 
…if we take a popular concept, habitus, whilst it may solve certain 
epistemological problems of agency and structure, it is only known and 
recognised by its apparent outcomes. Habitus is described in terms of what 
it gives rise to, and brings, or does not bring about. It is described in terms 
of the external underlying analogies it regulates. But it is not described 
with reference to the particular ordering principles or strategies, which give 
rise to the formation of particular habitus. The formation of the internal 
structure of the particular habitus, the mode of its specific acquisition, 
which gives it its specificity, is not described…Habitus is known not by its 
output, not by its input. Putting it crudely, there is no necessity between the 
concept or what counts as a realisation. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 133)    
 
Bernstein’s assertion is far more sophisticated than the conclusion I drew regarding 
the theoretical and empirical dead end I had reached whilst deploying Bourdieu’s 
sociology in my research, but our conclusions were identical.  
 
Eventually, the problem of method seemed to have overtaken the initial pedagogic 
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problem, but in fact the two, the practical pedagogical problem and the method, are 
dialectically related. What is clear now is that by addressing the methodological 
problem I am in a position, I believe, to offer an original contribution to the 
educational field in general, and to close ties between sociology and psychology. 
Furthermore, I believe the SLA field is nowadays being dramatically 
recontextualised (see Sanz, Igoa and Escandón, 2012) by drawing on the dialectical 
(sociocultural) tradition and this thesis can also be seen as a direct contribution to 
that process. Last but not least, I do not forget that by addressing the practical 
pedagogic problem, the work can be seen as an original contribution to improving 
instructors’ pedagogic practice and students’ chances of developing mastery in a 
foreign language such as Spanish, with all the complexities and benefits that the 
mastery of a cultural tool has.  
 
In the following sections I will attempt to address the advantages that the translation 
device presents for research and discuss the links between theory and empirical 
research, especially in light of producing a theoretical and empirical hybrid as is the 
case with the present thesis and its methodological implications. I will also provide 
the exact method and advance a research model.   
 
Theory and empirical research, a dialectical approach 
 
What is Bernstein’s translation device all about? Bernstein (2000) understood the 
internal language of description (L¹) as the ‘syntax whereby a conceptual language is 
created’ and the external one (L²) as ‘the syntax whereby the internal language can 
describe something other than itself’ (p. 132). In other words, on the one hand, pure 
theoretical derivations (an internal language of description) are inadequate, as they 
will disregard or exclude (a) the actual conditions of the object being researched or 
(b) accurate descriptions of phenomena, and, on the other hand, the researcher 
cannot fully rely on empirical constructs (an external language of description) for 
they lack any norms outside the logic of their own relations.  
 
This represents a dialectical conception of research that I believe shares some 
aspects with the dialectical tradition of the kind Vygotsky drew on when advancing 
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his psychology. Let me review first the principles that inform dialectics and 
approach the problem of theory and empirical research from Vygotsky’s practice. In 
the interest of saving time, I will not touch on the differences between dialectical 
idealism (Hegel) and materialism (Marx). Thus, both forms will be considered as 
part of the same dialectical line. 
 
I believe there are two important premises in the dialectical tradition: the first one 
deals with the nature of the ideal and the second one, with the way to proceed in 
order to produce absolute truth, that is, a method of enquiry that eventually detaches 
knowledge from empirical observation. Thus, theoretical knowledge is something 
said about something, i.e., it maintains the form subject and predicate, but absolute 
knowledge is not, for it is a philosophical speculation that unites subject and 
predicate. In other words, absolute truth is the unification through philosophical 
means of theoretical and practical knowledge (see Hegel, 1910). 
 
First, under Marx’s conception, the ideal is not what is in the mind of the individual 
as opposed to reality, something that stands outside the mind – as it is in the vulgar 
conception of the term –, but socially realised human life activity, whose existence 
precedes (and therefore is external to) the individual mind. The ideal nonetheless is 
established in cultural tools, its material form, and this implies its reification 
(Ilyenkov (1977a). Thus, for Marx the ideal is grounded in social relations, 
especially in the actual conditions of human existence. The categories that guide 
human activity have their origin in human activity and, therefore, the method to 
liberate human beings from their own misconceptions or illusions is the dialectical 
method by which the ideal is enquired after through examining those conditions.  
 
Second, in relation to the exact method, Marx in Grundisse advances this when 
addressing the problem of a science of political economy:  
 
It seems to be correct procedure to commence with the real and the 
concrete, the actual prerequisites; in the case of political economy, to 
commence with population, which is the basis and the author of the entire 
productive activity of society. Yet on closer consideration it proves to be 
wrong. Population is an abstraction, if we leave out for example the classes 
of which it consists…If we start out, therefore, with population, we do so 
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with a chaotic conception of the whole, and by closer analysis we will 
gradually arrive at simpler ideas; thus we shall proceed from the imaginary 
concrete to less and less complex abstractions, until we arrive at the 
simplest determinations. This once attained, we might start on our return 
journey until we finally come back to population, but this time not as a 
chaotic notion of an integral whole, but as a rich aggregate of many 
determinations and relations…The concrete is concrete because it is a 
combination of many determinations, i.e. a unity of diverse elements. In 
our thought it therefore appears as a process of synthesis, as a result, and 
not as a starting-point, although it is the real starting point and, therefore, 
also the starting-point of observation and conception. By the former 
method the complete conception passes into an abstract definition; by the 
latter the abstract definitions lead to the reproduction of the concrete 
subject in the course of reasoning. (Marx, 2000, p. 386) 
 
Marx is obviously talking about concepts such as value or labour when he refers to 
the ‘concrete’ but it can be applied to other fields of research as well. The method is 
also known in social sciences as immanent critique. The categories it works with 
come from imaginary concrete forms and not from empirical (i.e. sensory, 
experiential) apprehension, although it does not exclude empirical forms of 
apprehension at intermediate stages. In fact, the intermediary process is required. 
The intermediate judgements are eventually criticised and, to complete the process, 
the critique is criticised as well, which means that a philosophical stance is assumed. 
In other words, the fundamental difference is the conceptual organisation given by 
the method, which attempts to capture in germ-cell form the total number of 
determinations of a system. What it guarantees is the conservation of the totality or 
whole, which ensures in turn that no single determination is above the others. As 
already seen, it is a method whereby existence (the actual conditions of life, or 
actuality) as grasped by reason are united with the ideal, or concept, a procedure that 
will reveal inner contradictions and produce the absolute idea. As Hegel points out 
in The Encyclopaedia Logic: 
 
As unity of the subjective and the objective Idea, the Idea is the Concept of 
the Idea, for which the Idea as such is the object, and for which the object 
is itself—an object in which all determinations have come together, This 
unity, therefore, is the absolute truth and all truth, it is the Idea that thinks 
itself, and at this stage, moreover, it is [present] as thinking, i.e., as logical 
Idea. (Hegel, 1991, p. 303) 
 
The end result of such a procedure is beyond theoretical and practical knowledge or, 
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as Hegel, adds in the commentary (Zusätze) to the above assertion, ‘The absolute 
Idea is first of all the unity of the theoretical and the practical Idea, and hence 
equally the unity of the Idea of life with the Idea of cognition’ (p. 303). Further, 
Buchwalter (1991) defines it as a methodological approach that has as its principle 
the ‘identity of reason and reality’, as a way to avert ‘the dichotomy of descriptive 
and prescriptive analysis’ (p. 253). This assertion is the key to an understanding of 
the implications of immanent dialectics for research.  
 
In the case of the notion of habitus that I mentioned above, the notion served well at 
the beginning in terms of its descriptive power, but it lacked prescriptive power, for 
it did not embrace the totality of the phenomenon it tries to deal with, i.e. explaining 
human action, leaving outside the very formation of habitus. This meant that 
eventually its descriptive or analytical power was compromised, for that seems to be 
the nature of the relation between the abstract and practical ideas, they are 
co-constituted. Immanent critique, on the other hand produces notions that are both 
an analytical framework and an explanatory principle. However, as I will attempt to 
show later on with the case of Vygotskian psychology, it still must rely on 
intermediate, empirical forms of verification, that is, an external language of 
description, even if this criterion is borrowed from methodological paradigms that 
do not belong to the dialectical tradition. 
 
Let me go back now to Bernstein’s translation device. For Bernstein the quest for 
validity must extend beyond the boundaries of the text. Moore (2001), referring to 
this principle formulated in Bernstein’s ideas of sociological research, maintains that 
textual circularity – explaining a text through the very same text – is not enough. 
The epistemic conditions set by Bernstein (2000) focus on the construction of ‘what 
is to count as an empirical referent’ (p. 133):  
 
…the external language of description (L²) is the means by which the 
internal language (L¹) is activated as a reading device or vice versa. A 
language of description, from this point of view, consists of rules for the 
unambiguous recognition of what is to count as a relevant empirical 
relation, and rules (realisation rules) for reading the manifest contingent 
enactments of those empirical relations. Principles of description, then, 
consist of recognition and realisation rules. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 133) 
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By recognition rules, Bernstein is referring to the ability of an agent to recognise 
what the requirements for the production of a given text are, which are regulated by 
the degree of insulation between categories. By realisation rules, he is referring to 
the ability of an agent to produce an adequate text, which is regulated by the 
principles of control or interaction (pp. 104-105).  
 
Bernstein sees differentials in terms of how research deploys the internal and 
external languages of description, which he calls ‘modes of enquiry’ He sees 
differentials that go from one extreme, in the ‘classical experimental context’, to the 
other, the ‘ethnographic position’ research (p. 134).  
 
Let us take first the mode of enquiry posed by the experimental research. Here, 
variables are controlled and what occupies the imagination of the researcher is the 
design of the context:  
 
Here we can say that the language of description (L²) is embedded in the 
context it created. The text produced by the ‘subject’ is less the response 
but more the created context…from the point of view of the researcher, it is 
the realisation rule which is responsible for the design of the context…In 
this mode of enquiry the researcher has the realisation rule that generates 
the context and the recognition rule is embedded in the realisation rule. 
(Bernstein, 2000, p. 134)  
 
In contrast, in the ethnographic research, the subjects have the recognition and 
realisation rules, but the model from which these rules are derived are tacit. The goal 
of the researcher is to find the rules and the model. 
 
The problem is to construct the tacit model. If the researcher fails to 
construct the model s/he is marooned in the specific contexts and their 
enactments, and is in no position to appreciate the potential of the 
meanings of that particular culture, and thus its possible enactments. 
Without a model, the researcher can never know what could have been and 
was not. But the model the ethnographer constructs to grasp the potential 
semantic of the culture will not be only the tacit models of the members. 
Such models enable members to work the culture but not to know its 
workings. Cultures are not transparent in this respect. The models that 
attempt to show the transparency of the culture are constructed by the 




Thus, Bernstein recognises in each case the need to provide a criterion by which the 
text means something beyond itself. Put in other words, in the experimental case, the 
researcher must provide proof of what counts as true realisation on the part of the 
subject for the researcher is limiting his or her capacity to listening to the subject’s 
own voice. In the case of the ethnographer, a simple grounded method or, let us say, 
a constructivist research design is not enough because the subjects being researched 
may overlook the real workings of the culture they live in even if they are competent 
agents in that culture. A model needs to be constructed. 
 
Moss summarises in a more comprehensible and colloquial way the two general 
directions the modes of enquiry take:  
 
The researcher must be ‘prepared to live with the muddle which is the 
unordered data, and enjoy the pleasure of its potential, in order to be able to 
generate the theoretical apparatus which is specific to it’ (Bernstein, 
personal communication). Get in there too soon with the theory and it will 
overwhelm the data, limiting its potential to say something new. Delay 
pulling back from the data too long, and the researcher runs the risk of 
ending up submerged in the specifics, with no way of identifying the 
general principles which underpin the whole. (Moss, 2001, p. 18) 
 
Thus, the L¹-L² mode of enquiry (description I) runs the risk of silencing the subjects 
and the L²-L¹ mode of enquiry (description II) may not lead to an internal language 
of description capable of going beyond the subjects of the study. That is why the 
translation must meet the requirements of the translation device. 
 
Bernstein sees a complex relation between the internal and external languages of 
description; a relation determined by the position the researcher and the subject 
being researched take regarding the possession of recognition and realisation rules 
for both languages. Thus, the particular modes of enquiry will remain under a 
dialectic paradigm provided the right movements from L¹ and L² are exhausted in 
research, producing some kind of synthesis. This means that a tool of enquiry widely 
considered positivist or quantitative can actually be part of a dialectic relation with 
other more interpretive or qualitative tools. The methodology and the method are 
also situated in a particular context, both in terms of the actual material conditions of 
the research and the historical state of abstraction of the categories or science. 
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Under this framework, empirical research cannot, of course, be understood in the 
terms of an empiricist science. Vygotsky’s dialectical approach, for example, 
articulates theory and empirical observation in ways quite different to other 
traditions. The point of departure of Vygotsky’s research is from concrete forms 
such as development, mediating activity or word meaning, following the method 
advanced by Marx in the development of political economy. Vygotsky, explaining 
the method deployed in studying the development of higher mental functions asserts 
on a purely dialectical key that 
 
…because of the close tie between the method and the material base of our 
research…, to present a formula means to disclose beforehand the central 
idea of the whole study, to anticipate to a certain degree its conclusions and 
results which may be fully understood, convincing and clear only at the 
end of the exposition. (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 39) 
 
This is a pure dialectical approach. However, when faced with the problem of 
presenting the exact method, even though the framework is cultural-historical, and 
therefore dialectical, Vygotsky draws on Engels and presents a criterion of proof 
based on the natural sciences:    
 
We have decided to present the formula which is the basis of our method 
and to develop the basic idea of our research as a working hypothesis at 
first. In choosing this way of presenting it, we might depend, in this case, 
on the words of Engels, which precisely express the methodological 
significance of our way of thinking. He says, “The form of development of 
natural science, insofar as it thinks, is the hypothesis. Observation 
discovers some new fact which invalidates the former method of 
explaining facts pertaining to a specific group. From that moment the need 
arises for new methods of explanation based at first only on a limited 
number of facts and observations. Subsequent experimental data lead to 
refinement of these hypotheses, eliminate some of them and correct others, 
until finally a law is established in pure form. If we should want to wait 
until the date is ready for the law in a pure form, it would mean suspending 
thoughtful research until then, and for this reason alone, we would never 
get to the law” (K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 20, p. 555). 
(Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 39)  
 
Are we witnessing Vygotsky’s empiricist turn? I do not think so. The true concepts 
which underlie his methods in psychology such as development or mediating activity 
were derived from dialectical social science, that is, they pertain to or are an 
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extension of a network of concepts that were not developed through sensual, 
immediate experience. Such concepts belong to a scientific system, the dialectical 
tradition at large. Vygotsky (1987) considered scientific concepts to be ‘the purest type of 
nonspontaneous concept’ insofar as they can only be acquired through scientific 
instruction, that is, their development line is different to the one used to develop 
spontaneous concepts (p. 177), that is, concepts that are gradual generalisations of 
experience. Even true scientific practice does not share with spontaneous concepts a 
bottom-up development path. Nevertheless, Vygotsky did resort to empirical verification 
of his method, especially through experimentation, but this does not mean that he worked 
with immediate categories that emanated from empirical data. As Vygotsky points out: 
 
In our view, an entirely different form of analysis is fundamental to further 
development of theories of thinking and speech. This form of analysis 
relies on the partitioning of the complex into units. In contrast to the term 
“element”, the term “unit” designates a product of analysis that possesses 
all the basic characteristics of the whole. The unit is a vital and irreducible 
part of the whole. (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 46) 
 
Thus, the complex notions we sometimes take for granted in Thinking and speech 
(Vygotsky, 1987) have been verified through diverse forms of experimental research. In 
fact, empirical research (L²) served Vygotsky as a validation criterion of the general 
method (L¹) or model he had found, that is, the genesis of higher mental functions was a 
case of development that depended on mediating activity, especially by means of signs. 
In Vygotsky’s own words: ‘We intend to subject to precise, empirical research the role 
of signs and behaviour in all its real uniqueness’ (p. 61). Moreover, as A.N. Leont’ev 
(1997) comments, ‘For Vygotsky the hypothesis of the mediation of mental functions, 
combined with the historical-genetic method, opened new perspectives for his research’ 
(p. 23) and furthermore 
 
… does the hypothesis of mediation suggested by Vygotsky really allow us 
to isolate a new and adequate universal unit of the structure of mental 
functions? If this were true, then Vygotsky might proceed to the solution of 
the problem of consciousness from the position of the historical-genetic 
method. But first this general hypothesis had to be verified. Models for 
such a verification became first memory and later attention … In the course 
of the experiments on attention, the mediation hypothesis was once again 




A criterion of proof based on experiments may not always be required, but any 
research process requires an empirical criterion of proof in terms of the procedures 
being used or the translation between the internal and external language, even if the 
research involves, for instance, comparing two theoretical systems or giving new 
light to a conceptual system as part of an hermeneutical method, let alone with 
intervention research.  
 
What is the main difference between Vygotsky’s approach and the one advanced by 
Bernstein? First of all, the translation device does not deal with absolute truth, but 
with intermediate links between theoretical and practical knowledge. The translation 
device does not require that the knowledge of the internal language of description be 
derived from book knowledge, that is, the kind of philosophical speculation of 
absolute knowledge sought by Marx. Nonetheless, the use of the translation device 
does not prescribe its avoidance. In other words, it does not forbid the use of the 
type of concepts developed through Marxian social science or Vygotsky’s 
psychology. However, there are few implications we must notice. The most 
important one is that the activation of an empirical validation principle implies (a) 
the dissolution of the unified prescriptive and descriptive aspects of knowledge and 
(b) the admission that the theory is subject to change in light of the empirical 
evidence or gap between the internal and external language of description. Thus, 
Vygotsky, when deploying mediating activity as a method must, during the research 
process, through the particular model used, define if the translation is operating 
mainly as an explanation or a description. The empirical process does not admit the 
use of both at once, although they are mutually constituted and in fact they are being 
co-constructed at once. As Bernstein (2000) asserts, ‘the real problem is that the two 
processes of constructing description [the internal and the external] are not discrete 
in time. They are going on together, perhaps one more explicit than the other’ (p. 
135).  
 
Nonetheless, the avoidance of circularity is based eventually upon a form of 
empirical proof that I recognise, borrowing Popper’s (1959) ideas, as a principle of 
falsification. This means that proof or verification is inverted. A positive empirical 
result does not verify the hypothesis but only confirms that it has not yet been 
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falsified, not in the specific terms set by the language of description. This inversion 
of common-sense epistemology puts the theoretical imagination ahead of empirical 
practice, suggesting that the hypothesis is constructed not as a mere collection of 
empirical evidence or elements. Thus, the design of empirical procedure must target 
key areas susceptible of being falsified. In fact, as seen above, this is implicitly done 
by Vygotsky and his team but with the double purpose of expanding the theory’s 
analytical or descriptive power (see Vygotsky, 1997a). However, the principle in the 
dialectical tradition of working with notions, i.e. with absolute truth in a Hegelian 
sense, tends to minimise empirical practice when reporting research outcome. If one 
reads Thinking and speech, one gets the idea that the method is incontestable. This is 
because we are never presented with the true prototype, the twists and set backs of 
theoretical development and empirical research. In contrast, everything starts very 
neatly with the method, derived from the dialectical tradition, the unit of analysis 
already in synthetic form (i.e. word meaning, ‘the inner aspect of the word, in its 
meaning’, Vygotsky, 1987, p.47), and concepts belonging to the scientific network 
(e.g. ‘inner speech’, p. 44) and we embark on a developmental or narrative line that 
is not chronological. In other words, synthesis reigns over analysis, erasing the 
tracks of research production.  
 
The problem is when there are areas (a) empirically unaccounted for, such as what is 
exactly the social in Vygotsky’s system, which in fact opens a way for activity 
theory to develop, but in a kind of theoretical schism (see Engeström and Miettinen, 
1999), or (b) empirically very problematic, such as what kind of mediation is inner 
speech (i.e. ‘speech that is psychologically inner and that functions in a manner 
analogous to external egocentric speech’, Vygotsky, 1987, p. 71). There are cases, 
especially when inner speech is linked to inner programming and coding, in which 
empirical data falsify several hypotheses derived from Vygotskian psychology (see 
Průcha, 1972, pp. 53-99). Not in Vygotsky’s psychology, but in Soviet 
psycholinguistics, one gets the impression that the concept of inner speech is 
contested or lacks precision and it is better to return to the concept of speech activity 
in general without making distinctions between inner and external/social speech. In 
either case, it seems that the empirical chaos is far ahead of the possibilities of 
theoretical reorganisation without advancing a new notion. In conclusion, one seems 
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to get to a theoretical dead end when using true dialectical notions that do not 
correspond to the phenomena empirically described and a new formulation is 
required altogether. In other words, the ontological-epistemic knot of the dialectic 
tradition does not have room for vertically integrating, in pyramidal fashion, 
knowledge that does not seem to be accounted for in the aggregation of 
determinations, requesting a complete restructuring of the model. It rather follows a 
spiral form of integration. In fact, as it will be seen in our case, the solution is to 
work out a new formulation, rather than collecting together a series of elements. 
 
Finally, there have been areas of Vygotsky’s theory that have experienced change or 
expanded in terms of analytical power in light of empirical processes without 
changing its basic assumption. This has introduced classification categories that 
expand the analytical power of the theory without changing the theoretical paradigm. 
This could be considered a pure mode II of enquiry. An example of this are the 
experiments done to prove the socio-genetic nature of the development of higher 
mental functions, in particular, the experiments about the use by the child of external 
tools that allow controlling his/her behaviour (e.g. memory) until those tools are no 
longer needed, for the activity has been internalised. In these experiments the 
reaction time was measured among other parameters such as the number of 
repetitions needed until the activity was internalised. Thus, Vygotsky (1987) points 
out that in the light of the experiments he can recognise three types of such 
revolution or transition of an external operation to an inner plane: the seam type, in 
which the child uses an intermediate tool to connect the stimulus and the reaction; 
the whole, in which the child transfers the complete series of external stimuli; and 
finally the one in which the structure of the process is completely assimilated by the 
child and he begins to use verbal stimuli (p. 117). Such a categorisation does 
contribute better to analysing the developmental process of memory but it is 
formulated in the light of and shaped by the empirical evidence. It is fundamentally 
a description II mode of enquiry. In other words, the researchers, and Vygotsky was 
working with a team of them, let the data talk, but always within the dialectical 
framework already accounted for above. Furthermore, empirical processes led 
Vygotsky and his team to proclaim laws, not unlike Newton may have proclaimed 
the law of universal gravitation, such as is the case with the ‘genetic law of 
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memory’ (p. 185), which in fact was formulated by A.N. Leont’ev after doing a 
longitudinal study in which the coefficients of word retention (memory) in children 
for direct (e.g. without the help of a mediating tool) and mediated cases were 
compared. Both curves, representing these two different development lines, were 
compared and the law was called ‘the parallelogram of the development of memory’ 
(p. 185) because of the peculiar shape of both curves. Vygotsky succinctly defines it 
as ‘mnemotechnical memory must be considered as a process of mastering memory 
with the aid of external stimuli-signs’ (p. 185). Vygotsky is even concerned about 
the generalisation of the experiments’ outcome, asserting that ‘the data was collected 
on a very large number of children and adults’ (p.185), not unlike any researcher is 
concerned nowadays with the generalisation potential of an experiment or case. 
 
In conclusion, the fact that Vygotsky was working with concepts derived from 
Marxian social science does not overwrite the need to adopt an empirical validation 
criterion at intermediate levels of enquiry. This does not eliminate the possibility of 
eventually presenting the results of research in synthetic form, as Vygotsky clearly 
does in Thinking and speech. Therefore, I do not see an intrinsic incompatibility 
between the dialectical tradition and Bernstein’s translation device, provided that a 
common, compatible concrete form that articulates the theoretical hybrid is 
deployed in the internal language of description. The external language of 
description always implies a dialogue with empirical practice and there is no way 
out of this. The actual difference stems from the fact that immanent critique implies 
the assumption of a philosophical standpoint, something that it is missing in 
Bernstein’s sociology. In other words, the kind of accumulation of knowledge 
allowed or sought by immanent critique is different to the kind of accumulation of 
knowledge allowed or sought by Bernstein’s translation device, and more 
particularly by Bernstein’s sociological method. In the former, the intermediate links 
between theoretical and empirical knowledge are eventually dissolved by adopting a 
philosophical stance that does not admit empirical observation, and therefore takes a 
post-hoc position, which is the whole idea of an absolute. The process is subsumed 
into being. As Hegel (1991) comments, ‘the absolute Idea is to be compared with the 
old man who utters the same religious statements as the child, but for whom they 
carry the significance of his whole life’ (p. 304). As Sloterdijk (2010) asserts, the 
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dialectical or Hegelian position is set on the conviction that one needs to be located 
at the end of the process to be able to tell the truth. Thus, recognising is 
remembering and understanding is reconstructing. In the latter, there is a progressive 
integration of knowledge into more abstract concepts that do not necessarily carry 
the whole aggregation of determinations. Eventually, the theory tries to preserve its 
empirical potential. As Bernstein (2000) asserts, ‘a theory is only as good as the 
principles of description to which it gives rise’ (p. 91). Further, the presentation of 
the accomplishments seems always incomplete. As Bernstein points out, ‘… for me 
the aim of a paper is productive imperfection. That is it generates a conceptual 
tension which provides the potential for development… the papers are the means of 
discovering what I shall be thinking, not what I am thinking’ (p. 211).  
 
Finally, I believe, like Marx and Vygotsky, that the use of a dialectical notion does 
open ways for a more critical integration of theories than the mere addition of them, 
as attention will be paid to all possible determinations. However, the theory will be 
translated, so as to describe and explain empirical problems. This is what will be 
attempted here.  
 
 
3.3 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
3.3.1 Solving some problems in the conceptualisation of the social 
 
What, then, are the assumptions made in the present thesis? What is its method? 
Briefly put, it is the ascertaining of subject position under the fundamental tenets of 
a socio-genetic framework and a common conception of subject. These fundaments 
are shared by all the theoretical bodies that will be drawn on: the cultural-historical 
tradition, especially cultural-historical activity theory, Vygotskian approaches to 
understanding agency and identity, such as Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural theory, 
and Bernstein’s code theory.  
 
The question is why the present methodology needs to draw on these different 
theories. A simple answer was already given above when I pointed out that the 
social in Vygotsky’s psychology remains empirically unaccounted for. In other 
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words, word meaning is a unit of mind formation that does not allow empirical 
descriptions of how macrostructures shape intersubjective relations and vice versa. 
Thus, I have to draw on a series of theories that do provide that empirical aspect in 
order to translate the theory into the empirical problem at hand. 
 
There are several difficulties with what constitutes the social in Vygotsky’s 
psychology. As Hasan points out: 
 
…‘the child’ in Vygotsky remains undifferentiated; whatever the historical 
rationale for this, the role of social structure and of social positioning is 
never foregrounded in Vygotsky. It appears as if semiotic mediation would 
have the same efficacy, no matter what the environment for the interaction. 
(Hasan, 2005, p.41) 
 
This constitutes a paradox in Vygotsky’s theory since he viewed the development of 
language as subject to the socio-historical laws of dialectical materialism. As Lee 
asserts, language development, in Vygotskian thought, is part of a dialectical 
relation with the organisation of production (Lee, 1985, p. 75). Yet the aspects of 
school organisation, social organisation, social class are rarely accounted for. Hasan 
strengthens this view in the following terms: 
 
… speech, Vygotsky maintained, is social; semiotic mediation is social. But 
when it comes to the process of mediation, it appears to be curiously 
a-social. Vygotsky’s is a theory that would celebrate the social foundations 
of mental development, while disregarding almost completely if not 
entirely the role of language in enacting social relations, as well as the 
relevance of social relations to mental development… The child after all is 
not just a repository of mental functions; through the living of life in 
community, s/he is first and foremost a social person. But in the discourse 
on semiotic mediation, the mediator and mediatee remain socially 
innocent; the acculturated adult mentioned sometimes in connection with 
semiotic mediation remains in Bernstein’s terms, ‘culturally non-specific’ 
and neither participant seems to be located in the social structure, which in 
no way appears to impinge on their life. (Hasan, 2005, p. 149) 
 
Although the criticism seems unwarranted, for the social is there in all the 
theoretical formulations of Vygotsky, starting by word meaning, Hasan points out 
that the social aspect of the formation of the human psyche has not been specified 
enough in empirical terms.  
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The criticism does not come exclusively from the Bernsteinian camp (Hasan was a 
member of Bernstein’s Sociological Research Unit at University of London) but 
from cultural theoreticians and researchers, and even from the sociocultural camp. 
Bakhtin’s theory of authoring the self provides for Holland et al. (2001) an answer 
to Vygotsky’s lack of analysis of the materiality of social relations. Drawing on 
Wertsch, Minick and Arns (1984), they point out that: 
 
While the social was clearly important to Vygotsky, we miss the elements 
of power, status, stratification, and ownership that Bakhtin emphasized. In 
Vygotsky’s vision cultural forms become fused with mental life within 
social interaction, but he avoided attention to the conflictual in social life or 
to the oppressive nature of many institutions in which humans interact 
these cultural forms. (Holland et al., 2001, p. 177) 
 
I will return to this point later to point out that Bakhtin’s theory does not solve the 
problem of delivering a comprehensive and detailed empirical analysis of the social, 
although it is a step on the right direction. The question, then, is what exactly is the 
social in Vygotsky’s psychology, one of the leading developments of the dialectical 
tradition?  
 
For Blunden, the social in Vygotsky is represented by the figure of the adult who 
bridges the universal reservoir of social tools to the child through the particular kind 
of activity that takes place in the zone of proximal development. However, the 
assumption was that in this relation, framed under particular organisations such as 
the school, the family or the State, there were not problematic aspects. It was A.N. 
Leont’ev who started to touch on those problematic aspects of the social structure 
under the notion of activity. The activity of individuals depends on their social 
position. As A.N. Leont’ev points out: 
 
Despite all its diversity, all its special features the activity of the human 
individual is a system that obeys the system of relations of society. 
Outside these relations human activity does not exist. How it exists is 
determined by the forms and means of material and spiritual 
communication that are generated by the development of production and 
that cannot be realised except in the activity of specific individuals. It 
stands to reason that the activity of every individual depends on his place 




The possibilities for the use of cultural tools, that is, the means of material and 
spiritual communication A. N. Leont’ev refers to above, are determined by the 
subject’s social position. Under this model, human agency is understood as the 
capacity of a subject for action after assuming a concrete position (the emergence of 
object/motive) in a process that is social and historical and requires accessing 
universal mediational means (a social repertoire of cultural artefacts). The formation 
and emergence of objects/motives and the actions individuals engage in to pursue or 
fulfil them are inseparable from semiotic mediation. During this process, the fabric 
of social life is altered and the subject’s position changed as well.  
 
Subject comprises the social as a whole 
 
As was already mentioned in chapter 2, the ascertaining of subject position depends 
upon working with a Hegelian Notion of subject, such as the one advanced by 
Blunden (2007). In a nutshell, this procedure consists of subsuming the individual 
psyche under the larger unit of subject as a way to link the social macrostructure of 
power and control with the social micro processes of the formation of the individual 
psyche. Blunden’s proposed solution is condensed in the following way:  
 
A subject is therefore the identity of agency (or moral responsibility, the 
capacity to do something), “cogito” (knowledge or understanding), and 
self-consciousness (or identity). Agency, cogito, and self-consciousness are 
however never in absolute identity with one another; the identity of agency, 
cogito, and self-consciousness is a process, never complete or fully 
adequate at any given point… This trichotomy constitutes the definition of 
subject and allows the development of subjectivity to be traced through the 
independent development, reciprocal transformation, intersection, relative 
unity, and contradictions between its three components. As such this 
definition bridges the sciences of ethics, sociology, political science, 
psychology, and so forth. (Blunden, 2007, p. 257) 
 
Blunden’s formulation helps in bridging the social macrostructure and the micro 
processes involved in mind formation through a series of relationships. The ongoing 
process of identification of agency, cogito and self-consciousness implies that in 
ascertaining the subject’s position we are dealing with differentials in (a) the 
capacity of individuals to operate in the social world and the potential to change it 
from within, (b) the mastery of the cultural tools that represent affordances and 
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constraints, including a certain structural determination given by the need to 
reproduce the social system and the conditions necessary for the appropriation of 
those cultural tools, and (c) the identity, understood as the individuals’ 
self-reflection, which draws on the very same cultural tools of point (b) above and 
therefore represents conflicting positions, but the logic of its formation must have a 
correlate with points (b) and (a) above. 
 
I will refer in a moment in detail to how cultural-historical activity theory, Holland 
et al.’s (2001) cultural theory, and Bernstein’s code theory can shed light onto these 
relations. First, let us concentrate on the unit of analysis.  
 
As was already seen, the method in the dialectical tradition depends upon finding a 
concrete that serves both as a framework of analysis and an explanatory principle. 
Blunden’s formulation is completed with the advancement of a Hegelian notion of 
subject in which we can pay attention to the whole system of determinations and 
therefore constitutes our unit of analysis:  
 
Hegel defines the subject as the identity of three moments, each of which 
mediates the other two: Individual (e.g., meaning a single, finite, mortal 
individual psyche), Particular (e.g., meaning the continuing activity of 
individuals, in definite, continuing forms of social practice), and Universal 
(e.g., meaning the eternal and universal products of culture mobilized in 
activity and mediating the activity of individuals). This notion can be 
utilized to achieve a radicalization of notions of social subjectivity, not just 
at the individual level as already achieved by CHAT but also in relation to 
culture and society. (Blunden, 2007, p. 258) 
 
As an even handier formulation, Blunden sees the three moments of subject as 
‘psyche-activity-culture’ (p. 263). He asserts that in cultural-historical activity 
theory, the social macrostructure and the individual psyche are subsumed under the 
notion of activity. Blunden suggests that in the case of working with the above 
notion of subject, activity alone cannot be used to subsume the entirety of social 
institutions and the entirety of culture and a finer grain of analysis is needed in order 
to ascertain individual agency (p. 263). In other words, a simple deployment of the 




My proposal therefore is to use Bernstein’s code theory as a sort of general 
framework for analysing the links between (a) the social structure (e.g., the 
university organisation, curricular schemes) and (b) the structure of the individual’s 
experience, which is given in terms of coding orientations, that is, as forms of 
organisation of the relevance of meanings.  
 
Consubstantial to this is the deployment of the concept of (pedagogic) discourse as 
the recontextualising principle whereby knowledge and discourses are appropriated 
and communicated by institutions in ways that (re)produce the social structure, 
acting as a modulator of meanings, of the things we can and cannot think. This 
means that, unlike Vygotskian theory, in Bernstein’s code theory we are no longer 
dealing either with speech or language, for these concepts lack the sociological 
dimension of social structuring, i.e., they are non-specific. Whilst it is clear that 
Bernstein is concerned with speech or the individual instances of language 
production (see Bernstein, 1971, p. 174), making unsustainable the criticism that his 
theory is a form of structuralism, speech, as activity, is framed within the 
relationship between language (as a universal), social structure, social relations, and 
individual agency. In other words, in discourse, language use or speech acts depend 
upon the position of the speaker, that is, on the subject’s position. I will return to this 
in a moment to add another dimension to discourse in general so as to produce a 
more accurate analytical notion, as I see Bernstein’s notion of discourse does not 
suffice. 
 
What, more precisely, is Bernstein’s code theory? Bernstein is concerned with the 
reproduction of culture, especially with socialisation processes that shape the 
discursive possibilities of individuals and structure their experiences. Unlike other 
theories of culture reproduction (e.g. Bourdieu’s sociology), Bernstein views 
discourse as reproducing in its own inner logic the external power relations that 
shape it. This suggests that the power field does not shape discursive practices from 
without but the structure of those discursive practices also gives rise to the power 
field. Thus, for Bernstein, symbolic systems are at the same time realisations and 




Codes, or speech systems, as Bernstein (1971) calls them in their earliest 
formulation, ‘create for their speakers different orders of relevance and relation. The 
experience of the speakers may then be transformed by what is made significant or 
relevant by different speech systems’ (p. 144). Bernstein draws on (a) Durkheim’s 
notion of boundary (see Muller, 2001) to analyse the relationships between symbolic 
order, social relations and the structuring of experience in terms of different forms of 
social integration (organic and mechanical solidarity) combining it with (b) Marx’s 
notion of social class, paying attention therefore to the subject’s social position. 
Thus, Marxian theory provides theoretical tools not only for analysing social 
formations in terms of the class-structured distribution of power, but most crucially 
it provides the theoretical principles to explain social change. Different forms of 
socialisation, shaped by class structure, orient the individual towards different forms 
of (speech) codes, which in turn control access to relatively context-tied or 
context-independent meanings, structuring as well the individual’s experience.  
 
What Bernstein does is to place a Kantian-informed descriptive dichotomy such as 
Durkheim’s notion of the boundary (e.g., the sacred and the profane, or organic and 
mechanical solidarity) under the Marxian notion of class structure. The notion of 
class structure, although capable of producing a low-level description of cultural 
transmission, is very powerful in terms of explaining the social formation and 
change of symbolic systems. As Bernstein points out: 
 
One major theory of the development of and change in symbolic structures 
is, of course, that of Marx. Although Marx is less concerned with the 
internal structure and process of transmission of symbolic systems, he does 
give us a key to their institutionalization and change. The key is given in 
terms of the social significance of society’s productive system and the 
power relationships to which the system gives rise. Further, access to, 
control over, orientation of and change in critical symbolic systems, 
according to the theory, is governed by power relationships, as these are 
embodied in the class structure. It is not only capital, in the strict economic 
sense, which is subject to appropriation, manipulation and exploitation, but 
also cultural capital in the form of the symbolic systems through which 
man can extend and change the boundaries of his experience. (Bernstein, 
1971, p. 172)      
 
This hybrid constitutes the basic fabric of Bernstein’s code theory. Therefore, in 
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Bernstein’s code theroy, the notion of classification does not only refer to 
boundaries marked by cultural tools but to different forms of power distribution. 
Durkheimian theory provides the way to analysing experience in terms of its 
grounding in social relations, but it does not explain how those social relations were 
formed. In other words, the social system and the symbolic system are static. Unlike 
Best (2007), who asserts that ‘Bernstein’s earlier neo-Durkhemian analysis is much 
more effective in terms of understanding of the relationship between agency and 
structure’ than the later use of a Marxian-based notion of agency (p. 123), I believe 
that, on the contrary, it is precisely Marx’s notion of class structure and social 
position that allows Bernstein’s code theory to account for both the mutual shaping 
of the individual and the social structure in a non-deterministic fashion. Bernstein 
stresses this point in the following way: 
 
Without a shadow of doubt the most formative influence upon the 
procedures of socialization, from a sociological viewpoint, is social class. 
The class structure influences work and educational roles and brings 
families into a special relationship with each other and deeply penetrates 
the structure of life experiences within the family. The class system has 
deeply marked the distribution of knowledge within society. It has given 
differential access to the sense that the world is permeable. It has sealed off 
communities from each other and has ranked these communities on a scale 
of invidious worth. We have three components, knowledge, possibility and 
invidious insulation. It would be a little naïve to believe that differences in 
knowledge, differences in the sense of the possible, combined with 
invidious insulation, rooted in differential material well-being, would not 
affect the forms of control and innovation in the socializing procedures of 
different social classes. I shall go on to argue that the deep structure of 
communication itself is affected, but not in any final or irrevocable way. 
(Bernstein, 1971, p. 175) 
 
Bernstein is making the case for the importance of social class in structuring 
experience through discourse, as discourse is the fundamental means of distribution 
of knowledge. Yet, Bernstein is leaving open the possibility for changing the 
structure. This introduces a dynamic way of viewing social and individual 
experience, which it is missing in the original conceptualisation made by Durkheim.  
 
Durkheimian theory lacks the sort of social intervention position that Marxian theory 
inherently assumes. In Marx, social position is ascertained to produce social change, not 
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to analyse social phenomena passively. Therefore, Bernstein’s drawing on Marx also 
must be understood as carrying through this interventionist dimension as well. A simple 
overview of Bernstein’s work reveals that he is trying to correct the sort of arbitrariness 
generated by class structure in terms of students’ access to cultural tools differentials. He 
is not only concerned with understanding how social structure shapes individual 
consciousness and agency and vice versa, but concerned with producing social change. 
Overlooking, disregarding or diminishing this dimension in Bernstein’s theory in 
general, as I believe Best does, steals from it its transformative vocation.  
 
A real matter of concern is how to go about ascertaining class and social position while 
overcoming the difficulties and limitations that a classic theory of class structure poses, 
as societies grow more complex every day. I will return to this in a moment. Let me now 
explain the main relationship that I will establish between Bernstein’s code theory and 
cultural-historical activity theory. 
 
3.3.2 A non-conventional notion of discourse 
 
The notion of activity will be deployed together with Bernstein’s code theory to 
ascertain discourse as units of functions that correspond to different development 
vectors but also units that are socially structured by virtue of social positions. My 
concern is to find a way of breaking down pedagogical interaction into significant 
units that can contain both their (a) development characteristics, that is, as targeting 
a particular form of appropriation or mastery of a universal cultural tool with the aim 
of changing the subject and (b) the subjects’ current social position. This constitutes 
the basic complementary formulation of discourse. As Rodríguez Illera points out: 
 
I believe that Bernstein’s conception of the subject is very similar in its 
genetic format to that derived from Vygotskian psychology in spite of the 
fact that emphasis is placed differently and that the fundamental resort to 
the course of development does not exist in Bernstein’s case. Of course, 
they may be viewed as complementary; in Vygotsky the social and cultural 
reference is usually nonspecific (and therein lies its ineffectiveness), while 
for Bernstein it is central and generates the code modalities. Or from the 
opposite view, there is nothing in Bernstein’s work that can be considered 
a mechanism of change at the subject level, while the content of 
Vygotsky’s position rests on the idea of the Zone of Proximal 
Development. (Rodríguez Illera, 1995, p. 200)  
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This implies that the notion of discourse is deployed in a non-conventional form that 
should condense the dialectical relationship between the actual social position of the 
subjects and their intended social position. In other words, discourse will differ as it 
will comprise the specific contradiction between social activity and individual action 
in which certain developmental vectors emerge. The development vector is a function 
of language’s socio-communicative and representative functions, or, put in terms of 
the zone of proximal development, the dialectical relationship between the zone’s 
upper (scientific/theoretical concepts) and lower reaches (spontaneous/everyday 
concepts).  
 
3.3.3 Language’s differentiated functions and communicative language 
teaching 
 
Communicative language teaching (CLT) seems to reproduce within the foreign 
language pedagogical field Vygotsky’s model of socio-genetic development. As 
Ellis (2003) points out, ‘CLT aims to develop the ability of learners to use 
language in real communication’ (p. 27). Drawing on Brown and Yule (1983), 
Ellis further asserts communication involves ‘two general purposes–the 
interactional function, where language is used to establish and maintain contact, 
and the transactional function, where language is used referentially to exchange 
information’ (p. 27). For Vygotsky, in turn, the transactional or representational 
function of communication is subject to the development of the interactional 
function. In other words, the representational function cannot be built on if 
intersubjective links are not established through communication in the first place. 
In Lee’s words: 
 
Vygotsky believed that language eventually comes to serve two major 
well-differentiated functions for the adult. For adults, these two functions 
of social contact (communication) and representation are constantly 
interwined. Ontogenetically, the representational function grows out of 
the social-communicative function that is primary. The major body of 
Vygotsky’s work on language development focuses on showing the long 
and gradual differentiation between these two functions, then the use of 
the representational function to regiment both itself and other speech 
functions, and the consequent internalization of speech… Vygotsky’s 
insight was to see that the use of language to represent functions would 
result in two dialectically related but contrasting ‘vectors’ of development. 
Language used to represent to represent or refer to referential aspects of 
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language use eventually results in the development of logic and abstract 
thought. Language used to represent the means-end and interpersonal 
aspects of communicative interactions leads to the development of ‘inner 
speech’ and linguistically mediate motivation. (Lee, 1985, pp. 82-83) 
 
Communicative language teaching also seems to reproduce the development 
vectors within the zone of proximal development, although on a dualistic key, with 
the issue about the explicit-implicit instruction option and the code-communication 
dilemma, as if these instructional approaches were exclusive and not 
complementary. Let us remember that the code-communication dilemma deals 
with opposite views held by practitioners and SLA scholars regarding second 
language instruction. Thus, code, on the one hand, refers to forms of instruction 
that introduce the linguistic code, i.e., a theoretical system. Communication, on the 
other hand, refers to forms of instruction that deal with real communication. 
Nonetheless, in recent accounts there is agreement on asserting that the 
representational aspects of language are a function of its socio-communicative 
dimension (see Brown and Yule, 1983; Ellis, 2003). Thus, for Stern (1983) code 
refers to a view of language as formal or academic and the way to approach its 
instruction is analytically. From an alternative perspective, language use in the 
natural language environment is ‘communicative’, inasmuch as it is non-analytical 
or ‘experiential’ (p. 405). In other words, and translated to the dialectical tradition, 
a dialectical contradiction exists between spontaneous and theoretical concepts or 
between the lower and upper reaches of the zone of proximal development.  
 
More specifically, there are two contrasting visions of communicative language 
teaching: the weak and strong versions, respectively. As Ellis (2003) points out, 
the former is based on the premise that the elements of communicative 
competence can be identified and systematically taught, incorporating explicit 
instructional methods with the aim of achieving general notions such as ‘duration’ 
and ‘possibility’, and language functions such as ‘inviting’ and ‘apologizing’ (p. 
28). In contrast, a strong version of communicative language teaching claims that 
language is acquired through communication and therefore instruction should rely 
fundamentally on implicit pedagogies. We must notice here that learning is linked 





Let me give an example. If an instructor believes students need to master the 
foundations of the target language formal system, she or he will select instructional 
tasks in which the target language is discussed and reflected, especially by means of 
using theoretical concepts. In contrast, if the instructor is targeting the creation of 
speech habits, she or he will select instructional tasks that necessarily do not deal 
with metalinguistic terms, as the formation of habits requires casting reflection out. 
The introduction of theoretical concepts in such an instructional task will introduce 
back levels of reflection that do not contribute to the creation of speech habits. Thus, 
instructional tasks need to be analysed in terms of their relationship to sought 
developmental vectors as part of the overall development objectives of the activity 
system. In other words, the deployment of the notions of development and activity 
solves the problem of situating pedagogic discourse between ontogeny and 
microgeny. This will help in recontextualising SLA’s methods of, or approaches to, 
instruction (e.g., communicative language teaching) under Vygotskian and 
Bernsteinian theories.  
 
3.3.4 Discourse and generalisation  
 
In summary, discourse is understood as two mutually constituted dialectical 
systems: the activity system and the development system. The combined use of code 
theory and activity theory allows us to assign discourse a pedagogical code. This 
will allow us in turn to transcend organisational barriers for what used to be 
interaction has been segmented according to developmental targets. Thus, we can 
compare the specificity of discursive practices in terms of development objects 
across pedagogical contexts.  
 
Although I am framing here a methodological problem, the issue is a very practical 
one as well. One of the main challenges both SLA practitioners and researchers 
face is to provide some kind of codification of the organisation and learning 
setting so that their research or reflection can have higher levels of generalisation, 
that is, the findings can be of use in institutions other than the ones the studies 
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were conducted in. In the Spanish-as-a-foreign-language context in Japan, there 
are many aspects that contribute to making this kind of codification a difficult 
methodological and empirical undertaking. First, the findings of the research 
carried out in organisations specialising in Spanish teaching do not make sense or 
are irrelevant to the practitioners who work in organisations that are not 
specialised in teaching Spanish. The differences are enormous. Whilst in the 
former students can enjoy almost three years of intensive study (the fourth one is 
more or less dedicated to finding a job), including in many cases one year of study 
abroad, the latter usually comprises a programme limited to a few hours per week 
for a maximum of two years. The opposite is also true: the findings of the research 
carried out in organisations that offer Spanish as an option among a pool of foreign 
languages, whether mandatory or not, do not make sense or are peripheral to those 
practitioners or researchers who work in organisations specialising in teaching 
Spanish. Second, how can we provide an account of language teaching that is not 
subject to unsubstantiated labels or non-scientific accounts? In other words, as I 
have already mentioned, I think it would count as a flagrant mistake just to classify 
a course or lesson based upon the label produced by the instructor without a 
thorough inspection of the claim or accept prima facie the label used in the 
organisation’s syllabi such as ‘Spanish Grammar I’ or ‘Spanish Conversation I’. 
Moreover, there are a myriad of labels out there. Thus, what could be 
conversational for one instructor may not be so for another. Our teachers’ 
associations and conferences are pretty much divided within and without between 
the linguistic and the pedagogic camps. The former is represented by the Spanish 
linguist or philologist, a Japanese native speaker who teaches Spanish grammar; 
whereas the latter is represented by the Spanish instructor, a native speaker of 
Spanish who teaches the practical aspects of language use. Among the former, 
there are instructors who stick to the ways they were taught three, four or five 
decades ago and try to reproduce those pedagogies in the courses they teach, 
including a vernacular version of the grammar-translation method or a systematic 
presentation of the Spanish grammar that pays attention to the gap that exists 
between the linguistic consciousness of the Japanese and the Spanish speaking 
people. Let me give one example of this: the place the Spanish subjunctive should 
take in the curriculum is always a matter of debate because it is extremely difficult 
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to translate the sense of one into the other; although Spanish articles are taught 
during the first two or three lessons, they are hard to grasp for the speakers of a 
language like Japanese that uses none. There are also younger generations of 
Japanese instructors who underwent extensive training in Spanish or 
Latin-American universities or language schools and therefore had more 
opportunities to experience other language teaching pedagogies. Furthermore, 
even among the native instructors, there is a similar generation gap. Older 
generations tended not to specialise in SLA but in so-called area studies (e.g. 
Spanish and Latin American studies), developing their own methods of instruction 
and materials, and among the ones who have gained a master degree in Spanish as 
a foreign language, there seems not to be a common understanding of teaching 
methods and approaches, such as the communicative language approach, which 
supposedly is informed by communicative language teaching. In fact, a lot of time 
is spent in conferences trying to reach an agreement about what version of 
communicative language teaching we are speaking of. Moreover, instructors often 
express the view that they would like to be true to their ideal pedagogic identity 
and teach their courses using a particular approach, such as one based on 
task-based language teaching or content-based teaching, but soon find out that the 
kind of curriculum they encounter at their particular university, including the 
omnipresent curricular grammar-conversation divide, the selection of textbooks, 
the structural or spatial disposition of the classroom, let alone the expectations, 
abilities and motivation of students, make them transform dramatically their 
approach and turn out practicing an unintended eclectic mix that is hard to define. 
In other words, the structure imposes a heavy toll even though practitioners may 
not deal with those structural issues for they are out of their reach.  
 
Let me go back to activity and its capacity to segment discourse and link both 
macrostructures and micro processes.  
 
3.3.5 Speech as activity, discourse 
 
Similar to Vygotsky’s theory of consciousness formation and the development of 
higher psychological functions, A.N. Leont’ev’s (1977, 1987, 1981) theory of 
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activity draws on the socio-genetic premise that intrasubjective processes have 
their formative stages and eventually depend upon intersubjective ones. In fact, 
Leont’ev’s theory avoids drawing a dividing line between these two planes and 
opts for referring to them as human activity in general (see A.N. Leont’ev, 1977; 
1978). Within A.N. Leont’ev’s theory of activity, activities are distinguished 
according to their objects. The objects of activity satisfy necessarily societal needs. 
The organisation of activity towards a particular object is called motive. For A.N. 
Leont’ev, the division of labour makes impossible that the object/motive of 
activity coincides with the products individuals partaking in that activity produce 
through their own goal-oriented actions. In other words, even in the simplest 
technical division of labour, no single individual action can satisfy the needs of 
each participant and thus constitutes an intermediate result. 
  
For A.N. Leont’ev, action corresponds therefore to a process subject to a 
conscious goal, that is:  
 
It will easily be understood that this “intermediate” result which forms 
the pattern of man’s labour processes must be identified by him 
subjectively as well, in the form of an idea. This is, in effect the setting of 
the goal, which determines the method and character of the individual’s 
activity. (A.N. Leont’ev, 1978, p. 185) 
 
 
Goal formation, therefore, can be said to be a process of reification whereby the 
abstract is made concrete. Thus, the idea or goal that directs action has a Janus 
face: on the one hand, the subject is conscious of the object of activity, and on the 
other, there is a fetishist component attached to this process by simple virtue of 
being an objectivation that came about by resourcing to already available 
ready-mades, which are translations of the social relations that have (re)produced 
or developed them along time. The fetishist component of the idea is that, in order 
to last in the mind of the subject, or to be communicated, it needs to be represented, 
embodied in a tool. That tool, as a token, is mistaken as objective reality because 
the bonding needed to satisfy societal needs legitimise and naturalise the relation 




This has enormous implications for our endeavour, for pedagogies (e.g. 
CLT-based pedagogies, instructional methods, approaches) are also tools and 
therefore our analysis must uncover what they, as reifications, stand for as 
legitimate educational forms. 
 
The non-coincidental nature of societal activity and individual action is a source of 
permanent contradiction but also the locus of change, as the very emergence (or 
formative) of the action’s goal is but a subjective construction that arises by the 
use of cultural tools (e.g. a speech-mediated idea, a product), which are culturally 
and historically developed by the community. In other words, personal sense 
(subjective meaning) is possible (concretised) due to the existence of societal 
meaning (objective meaning) that precedes it. Furthermore, not only the 
emergence (or formative) of the action but the tools to carry it out (e.g. methods of 
production/organisation) are all expressions of objectivised societal activity.  
 
The social dimension of individual action is also present in the case of operations, 
i.e., in the actual realisation of an action according to the material conditions 
available and the specific methods used to achieve its goal. Again, the resources at 
hand (e.g. the methods or procedures to achieve it) are of a collective nature even 
though they are the expression of individual action. For instance, if the goal of an 
action is to read and understand a given text passage, this can be done by 
consulting words in a bilingual or monolingual dictionary, by asking questions to 
peers or to the instructor about the meaning of words or by deducing their meaning 
without consulting anyone. Thus the operation, even if it is the expression of 
individual practice, draws on different cultural tools and adapts to particular 
conditions.  
 
Due to their recurrence or convenience some operations may become automatic 
and seem to be out of the individual’s conscious grasp. The process whereby an 
action is embedded in another one is called by A.N. Leont’ev (1978) ‘technization’ 
(p.66). Operations can nonetheless be transformed back into reflective actions 
when individuals encounter performative problems. A.N. Leont’ev alerts us to the 
fact that when an operation is apparently removed from the activity by means of 
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carrying it out automatically, it does not mean that it has been separated from the 
action, as the action is never estranged from the activity, since the operation is still 
one of the means to carry out the action of the individual.  
 
The notion of technization has very important implications in this study, since 
foreign language development in its foundational stages can be considered as a 
long process of technization in which unconscious control over speech is sought. 
The idea is to free the consciousness of the students from speech processing acts, 
so that they can focus on activity that does not necessarily have verbal 
performance in the foreign language as an object. The idea is that the foreign 
language becomes invisible. A fundamental aspect of technization in regard to 
foreign language development in adult students is that actions are eventually 
abbreviated, becoming automatic. However, because instruction is largely 
dependent on the deployment of theoretical concepts, the automatic process can be 
expanded at the time of difficulty and the student can go back to analysing and 
reflecting on language as an object at any given time. I will go back at this issue in 
a moment.   
 
Let us translate A.N. Leont’ev’s ideas on activity into a foreign language 
pedagogic context. Let us suppose an instructor instructs students to carry out a 
pedagogic task which requires some form of joint work as part of a series of tasks 
that contribute to achieve the objects of pedagogic activity already set by some 
notion of what is considered desirable foreign language educational practice. A 
group of students (Group A) discusses the object of the task and organises the way 
to approach it using their native language. Another group of students (Group B) 
does the same, but uses the target language instead. Although both groups 
accomplish the instructional task’s object, the actual operations differ from one 
group to another.  
 
There is yet another dimension to this, and that is the individual dimension. Even 
if both groups approached the task in identical fashion, that is, their operational 
structures coincided, the meaning of the goal-oriented actions involved in carrying 
out the task may be different from one individual to other, depending on how they, 
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as social subjects, are socially positioned. Thus, even if individuals carry out the 
same operations, the meaning of a goal-oriented action rests on the overall motive 
they have set for the activity. If what motivates student A is to obtain a pass and 
what motivates student B is to learn the foreign language to study abroad, we 
encounter actions that are similar in their operational structure but are completely 
different in terms of their meaning. In other words, what varies is their 
motivational structure and personal sense (subjective meaning). We will cover this 
in more detail when we go through the notion of (pedagogic) identity.     
 
What is clear from this example is that the societal need that drives the provision 
of foreign language education to students as either a way to have them joining the 
global community, reasserting their sense of nationality, acquiring invaluable tools 
to get work done in cross-cultural settings, or even landing a job, and the 
individual need of teaching or studying can only be accomplished through 
collective activity. These aspects of societal and organisational needs among 
others can be ascertained through code theory and will be referred to later. Yet the 
collective objects of the activity and its motive also may represent a mismatch for 
the needs of the individual or particular groups of individuals. Most members of 
Group A are willing to carry out the task to successful completion, that is, they 
share the action’s goal, but their operations substantially differ from those of 
Group B. Furthermore, individuals have different motives, which might be 
reflected or not in the actual operations they engage in. 
 
In Japan, for instance, the emergence of a series of classroom disruptive practices 
at university level in the 1990s might have altered the provision of foreign 
language education up to a point where the object of activity was to sustain some 
form of educational activity not subjected to disruption regardless of its foreign 
language pedagogic merits (see McVeigh, 2002). In other words, the priority was 
to discipline students, not necessarily teaching them a foreign language. Going 
back to our example above, even if the instructor started with a clear activity 
object, he or she will have to respond in some way to the fact that the individuals’ 




3.3.6 Discourse as foreign language development 
 
This brings us to the issue of vectors of foreign language development. If the instructor 
is targeting a certain foreign language development vector, which can be expressed as an 
object of activity, his or her actions will take the form of different operations depending 
on how students recognise and carry them out, taking into account, their motivational 
and operational structures. Therefore, I argue that the key to a successful analysis of 
foreign language activity is to ascertain the relationship between the action and the 
motive of activity in the actual form the goal of an action is made operational, that is, in 
what is called the task. As it will be seen later, this will be in actual fact the unit of 
analysis of discourse. 
 
Following the general principles of the theory of activity A.A. Leont’ev (1981) advances 
a scheme of speech as activity that pays attention to the vectors of development, state of 
consciousness and degrees of automaticity of second-language instruction. After A.A. 
Leont’ev and also drawing on Gal’perin (1969, 197, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992a) and 
Robbins (2003), I have put together a table that systematises activities, tasks in relation 




Table 3.1 Speech as activity and related mediational means 
Motive-activity Activity Object of 
motive-activity 
Tasks/ Object of 









To attain not only 
linguistically 
correct speech 
but best possible 
utterances 
Motive-actions that place 
the motive of speech 
outside concrete speech 
acts (e.g. dominant 
activities: conducting an 
interview, making a 
presentation, producing a 






of conscious grasp is 
related to a standard 
preserved in the 





L2 speech activity 
+ L2 speech acts 






To transform the 
L2 speech activity 
into L2 speech 
acts  
Motive-actions that have 
textual production for 
object but whose aim is 
the completion of a 
non-verbal task (e.g. 
solving functional 
problems: making a 
reservation, giving 
directions, describing 
people, etc.). Students 
are placed in situations 
where they will be 
compelled to use speech 
as a tool. 
Conscious 
control.—Students are 
required to exercise 
conscious control, 
they are no longer 
directly aware of the 
object of conscious 
grasp, but may gain 




L2 speech activity 







acts included in 
the L2 language 
speech activity in 
order to transform 




Motive-actions that aim at 
the production of speech 
acts within a (contrasting 
and restricted) set of rules 
(e.g. rehearsing a 
dialogue, rehearsing a list 
of utterances, completing 




The conscious mind of 







Dominant L1 (and 
L2) 
communication 
activity + L2 
speech activity 




Motive-actions that aim at 
the acquisition of 
mediational tools (e.g. 





The conscious mind of 




Although the objects of activity and tasks may seem familiar to the instructors who 
are not acquainted with the work of A.A. Leont’ev, i.e., they may recognise them 
as part of their teaching, the advantage of this scheme is that it offers a sequence of 
activities according to intended development objects, that is, in regards to the 
development of psychological functions at an ontogenetic level. In other words, 
the instructional methods or approaches are subject to or will be chosen depending 
on their contribution to the achievement of those objects and not the other way 
around. In sum, SLA researchers and practitioners have been focusing most of the 
time on microprocesses (e.g. microgenesis) but the relationship between 




A.A. Leont’ev (1981) makes key distinctions between speech activity, speech acts 
and communication activity, all depending on the object/motive of the activity. 
Thus, he speaks of speech activity when ‘the guiding motive is the production of 
correct and appropriate speech (as in a language lesson)’, speech acts, as part of 
non-verbal activity, ‘when the motive for speech is non-specific and is common to 
that activity as a whole’, and finally, communication activity, ‘when the motives 
for the speech lie again outside the concrete speech acts but are specific and can 
only be satisfied by means of speech’ (p. 23). Speech, therefore, is not seen as an 
independent activity but in the system of motives. As A.A. Leont’ev points out, 
speech can be an independent activity but only in a metalinguistic form, when the 
object is to construct a correct utterance, as it is the case in speech activity. As can 
be seen in Table 3.1, the motive of activity also is associated to states of 
consciousness. The idea is that the student learns to form ‘new language 
automatically, without any participation of the conscious mind’ (p. 22). However, 
that learning process must involve the participation of the conscious mind during 
the first stages (i.e. foundation and structural, see Table 3.1). The ultimate object is 
that the student engages in communication activity, that is, in activity in which the 
foreign language occupies a peripheral stage and it is at the service of 
communicating and, consequently, attention is not given to the formation of 
language. The communicative intention is rendered automatically in the foreign 
language.  
 
In the SLA tradition there have been historically two ways to go about the study 
programme, which I find deeply problematic: (a) to adopt an eclectic collection of 
learning methods or approaches, which more or less could coincide with the 
activities proposed by A.A. Leont’ev, perhaps not following the exact sequence 
(e.g. the use of a variation of the grammar-translation method together with some 
form of communicative language teaching) or leaving some stages out, and (b) to 
rely on a single solution whereby only one method or approach is thought to do the 
trick (e.g. the use of task-based instruction). In either way there seems to be a 
mutually reinforcing relationship between, on the one hand, the method or 
methods that rule or inform practice, and, on the other hand, students staying in 
what I call a comfort zone, that is, a zone that, unlike the zone of proximal 
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development, will not help students in developing psychological functions. Thus, 
the deployment of instructional methods that end up been carried out mechanically, 
assimilated externally, without actual personal involvement, might also be seen as 
students’ silent demand to stay in the comfort zone. The SLA approach, 
nonetheless, does not afford reflecting on the social structure. Therefore, the actual 
causes for having students remaining in the comfort zone are not addressed.  
 
It must be highlighted here that, as Robbins (2003) points out, development is not 
linear and necessarily entails periods of frustration that are subsumed by catharsis 
(p. 145). Second language development should be seen as the consequence of a 
learning process designed to overcome well-programmed challenges set in the 
right gradient of difficulty. A too steep gradient may be of no help in maturing 
certain psychological functions. Yet, a too soft path will not be of help either as it 
will keep students in the comfort zone. Thus, whilst A.A. Leont’ev believes the 
order of the sequence could be slightly varied and activities can be mixed, as they 
are in fact in any pedagogical practice, he points out that it is very difficult for the 
student to go far beyond the next stage or floor level without having achieved the 
prior one: 
 
Naturally, this sequence is of a very general character, and merely 
indicates which ‘floors’ would be unthinkable if the others have not been 
built. In practice, we always put the finishing touches to the lower floors 
while work on the upper floors is already under way; the mastering of 
vocabulary and grammar, for instance, continues in parallel to the 
formation of speech activity and its conversion into speech acts. (A.A. 
Leont’ev, 1981, p. 25) 
 
According to this scheme, the most reflexive and less automatic part is located in 
the lower floors, that is, what I have called substructural/foundation and structural 
levels, and the less reflexive but more automatic is located in the upper floors, that 
is, in what I have called the functional and rhetorical levels. In the upper levels, 
the activity is no longer reflexive with regard to the form of the speech but on the 
objects the speech refers to and the communicative intentions (see Table 3.1). 
 
Functional activity represents a breaking point regarding reflective activity due to 
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the fact that it requires higher levels of automaticity of L2 language production. 
The object is the creation of speech habits but paying attention to the 
communicative intention that arises spontaneously. The object of the speech acts is 
non-verbal. In this case students do not perform a task pursuing a linguistic object. 
This has been reflected in the SLA literature that deals with CLT’s strong version, 
in which the instructional tasks do not prompt a rigid set of procedures to 
accomplish their object, including the language the task should be approached in. 
At the functional floor, students are free to communicate what they want, 
accessing their experiences in order to carry out instructional tasks. It is for this 
reason that in functional activities active speech, instead of reactive speech is 
produced (see Robbins, 2003, p. 84). The former is characterised by a higher 
degree of spontaneity: the themes that students bring to the table or the ways they 
solve the problem posed by the task are as varied as their personal experience and 
interests. Moreover, it is possible that they resource to their native language to 
solve the problem posed by the instructional tasks. The latter is well represented 
by instructional tasks in which contents are jealously controlled by the instructor 
or by the instructional designers: imagine the learning activities of the audiolingual 
method that try to create linguistic habits. In those learning activities the number 
of elements is limited and the communicative intention is tamed so that the focus 
is put onto the automatic acquisition of a speech pattern. Here, the object of the 
speech act is linguistic.    
 
3.3.7 Discourse and its unit of analysis 
 
As already seen, (societal) activity and (individual) action are non-coincidental 
realities by definition. This contradictory or, more precisely, dialectical condition 
is the consequence of the social division of labour. The question about second 
language development is how we can give an account of this contradiction without 
missing its totality. In other words, how can our account take into consideration 
the structural and interactional aspects of activity? I believe the answer is to use 
the task, in terms of motive-action, in its relationship with motive-activity as a unit 
of analysis. Thus, we position the analysis between microgeny (instructional 
forms) and ontogeny (development vectors). It is worth mentioning that ontogeny 
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is also a function of the organisational structure, more specifically, of the division 
of labour, and, therefore, the assessment of targeted development vectors also tells 
the story of the particular curricular and disciplinary divide. Figure 3.1 depicts the 

















Figure 3.1 Organisation and learning settings: relationship between structure 
(macro level) and interaction (micro level) and its unit of analysis 
 
More specifically, the assessment of the task should take first the point of view of 
the instructor, who not only ranks higher in terms of the possession of power to set 
the object of the activity, by virtue of his or her investiture, but also in terms of his 
or her capacity to draw on resources or cultural tools (i.e. methods, approaches, 
instructional tasks). This power differential is expressed in the zone of proximal 
development by the idea of appropriate ‘collaboration’ and ‘instruction’ (see 
Vygotsky, 1987, p. 211). As Vygotsky puts it:  
 
In school, the child receives instruction in what is accessible to him in 
collaboration with, or under the guidance of a teacher. This is the 
fundamental characteristic of instruction. (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 211)  
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The fact that the zone of proximal development is a space of collaboration does 
not mean that there are no knowledge/power differentials. This, of course, does not 
guarantee that students will share the task’s object. In fact, motive-action should be 
assessed in its totality. Thus, whilst the instructor may set a task according to an 
intended development vector or unknowingly setting a development vector by 
drawing on a particular instructional tool, students may alter it and the task could 
be transformed in terms of its relation to motive-activity. This is of course the 
locus of students’ deviation or resistance. There is also the possibility that the task 
is adjusted by the instructor to meet new requirements in light of how students 
co-construct its object, changing its relation to motive-activity. Nonetheless, by 
selecting the task, as communicated and implemented first by the instructor, we 
are able to fragment the pedagogic discourse continuum.  
 
3.3.8 Pedagogic code of the task 
 
Bernstein’s code theory may further help giving shape to such a typology, 
specifically to the task in relation to motive-activity (i.e., foundation, structural, 
functional and rhetorical (see Table 3.1), including management, which refers to 
activities aimed at managing the class and the course as a whole.  
 
For Bernstein (1971), the system of social relations generates (speech) codes, i.e., 
functions or speech systems that symbolise the intent of the speakers in an explicit 
way, either verbally or extra-verbally, and generate ‘different orders of relevance 
and relation’ (p. 144).  
 
Bernstein holds that the degree of complexity of the social division of labour 
manifests in the coding orientation, i.e., on the orientation to meanings.  
 
The simpler the social division of labour, and the more specific and local 
the relation between an agent and its material base, the more direct the 
relation between meanings and a specific material base, and the greater 
the probability of a restricted coding orientation. The more complex the 
social division of labour, the less specific and local the relation between 
and agent and its material base, the more indirect the relation between 
meanings and a specific material base, and the greater the probability of 
an elaborated coding orientation. (Bernstein, 1990, p. 20) 
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This implies that elaborated and restricted codes have different values in terms of 
predicting semantic (lexical) and syntactic selections. 
 
In the case of an elaborated code, the speaker will select from a relatively 
extensive range of alternatives and the probability of predicting the 
organizing elements is considerably reduced. In the case of a restricted 
code the number of these alternatives is often severely limited and the 
probability of predicting the elements is greatly increased. (Bernstein, 
1971, p. 125) 
 
Thus, we see that in an elaborated coding orientation the discourse, if it is going to 
be understood by the listener, is self-explanatory, as it draws from different 
sources, contexts or traditions. In contrast, in the restricted coding orientation, 
because speaker and listener both share the base or context, the discourse does not 
need to be self-explanatory. In a more Vygotskian tone, the restricted and 
elaborated coding orientation may reflect the deployment of different conceptual 
systems within the pedagogic relation, from spontaneous concepts (restricted) to 
theoretical concepts (elaborated). 
 
The pedagogic code is ascertained by assessing the dialectical relation between 
structural (classification) and interactional (framing) levels. As has already been 
seen, classification (C) refers to the degree of maintenance between categories 
(subjects, spaces/agencies, discourses), whilst framing (F) refers to the 
communicative outcomes of the relations between categories within the pedagogic 
relation. Framing between subjects refers to the control they have over the selection 
of instructional contents and roles (e.g. the roles students and instructors assume to 
carry out instructional tasks), sequence, pacing, and evaluation criteria, that is, the 
discursive rules that regulate instructional discourse. It also refers to the hierarchical 
rules that regulate norms of social conduct, or regulative discourse, according to 
what is seen as legitimate or appropriate in a given pedagogic context.  
 
Bernstein (2000) points out that instructional discourse and regulative discourse do 
not move in complementary relation to each other, since regulative discourse is 
embedded in instructional discourse, claiming that ‘where there is weak framing 
over the instructional discourse, there must be weak framing over the regulative 
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discourse’ (p. 13). In other words, all forms of instruction correspond to a view of 
the social world or the social order. These aspects are analysed through the notion 
of framing, which deals with the principles of control over several aspects of the 
instructional discourse and with the degree of assertion (from implicit to explicit) of 
conduct and structure of hierarchical relations of regulative discourse.  
 
Bernstein’s code theory is especially concerned about the regulative aspects of 
discourse as they are usually empirically overlooked. This concern constitutes an 
empirical extension of Vygotsky’s notion of mediation and it is in fact one of the 
strengths of code theory, as it allows for the analysis of how discourse mediates 
action in an invisible way. Let us see in more detail this aspect of code theory as it 
relates to Vygotsky’s ideas on mediation. 
 
Vygotsky was able to point out two forms of semiotic mediation when referring to 
the dialectics of speech and thought: explicit and implicit mediation. Wertsch (2007) 
discusses this dialectical relation in terms that the former is ‘explicit in the sense that 
it is intentionally and overtly introduced into problem solving activity, often by an 
outside party’, especially by means of a material tool, whereas the latter is ‘informal 
in that it typically involves spoken language, whose materiality is transitory and 
seemingly ephemeral’ (p. 191), that is, it involves the use of tools such as speech.  
 
The distinction is also contained in language’s representational and 
socio-communicative function: some words are used in addressing the object of the 
activity and some others are used in sustaining the social bonds needed to 
accomplish it. By the same token, drawing on Bernstein, Hasan (2005) understands 
visible semiotic mediation as ‘the conscious discourse aimed at mediating a specific 
category of reasoning, a certain range of technical concepts and a particular relation 
to the physical phenomena of the world whereby the world is classified and 
categorised in a certain way’. In contrast, invisible semiotic mediation is understood 
as ‘how the unself-conscious everyday discourse mediates mental dispositions, 
tendencies to respond to situations in certain ways and how it puts in place beliefs 
about the world one lives in, including both about phenomena that are supposedly in 
nature and those which are said to be in our culture’ (p. 152).  
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When analysing foreign-language instruction, the focus is put most of the time on 
explicit mediation, and little or nothing is said about implicit mediation. Teaching 
conversation skills seems to address this difficulty by explicitly teaching through a 
so-called direct approach the implicit features observed in conversational analysis 
and oral discourse theory (see Richards, 1990). These disciplines analyse 
spontaneous conversation. However, even if the implicit features of spontaneous 
conversation are explicitly taught, the instructor needs to organise that teaching 
relying mostly on implicit forms of mediation that may or not be resisted by 
students.  
 
My impression is that the direct approach has serious limitations as it fails to directly 
link conversational mechanisms such as turn-taking with the actual social structure 
that shapes those mechanisms, especially social ideas about hierarchy or conduct. In 
other words, in order to teach the logic and mechanisms of turn-taking used, let us 
say, in conversational Spanish in Spain, the instructor will have to eventually change 
the views held by students about what is considered appropriate conduct. The 
problem is how to have students moving away from the subject positions they 
actually have and assuming a social position they have never experienced, even if it 
is through a sort of play or pretence. Can students situate themselves in an unknown 
social context that is explicitly transmitted and be able to internalise, appropriate it 
and make it their own? In other words, what is the exact zone of proximal 
development?  
 
The following paradox can occur as well: in order to teach turn-taking in horizontal 
hierarchical schemes the instructor has to resort to instructional means that rely on a 
vertical hierarchical scheme. In my experience, the teaching of the mechanisms of 
conversation does not guarantee that students will apply those mechanisms because 
the Japanese organisation of the social space will tend to prevail and students may 
not be able to understand the need for certain mechanisms not linked to actual 
experiences in Japanese society. For instance, the hierarchical relations between 
senior and junior Japanese students, which are inexistent or uncommon in Spain or 
Latin America, are difficult to address when students have to try horizontal forms of 
turn-taking. The same goes for ways of grouping within the classroom. Male and 
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female students often sit separately from each other, which may considered as a 
form of educational resistance by conversation instructors who come from societies 
with different gender boundaries (see Escandón, 2004).  
 
Students who have returned from study abroad programmes seem to have a higher 
status compared to those who have not. More generally, there are very difficult 
issues about collaboration and individual accountability. Some students will not 
address the instructor directly even after being called on individually, but will 
mediate their response through the group, tending to deliver a group answer. These 
are just a few of the issues a foreign instructor needs to deal in conversation classes 
in Japan, which touch the very fabric of Japanese social relations. Furthermore, in 
many oral proficiency tests, the particular form of mediation the examiner is using, 
i.e. implicit mediation, is not fully taken into account when evaluating the 
examinee’s proficiency. Implicit mediation does not follow a strict protocol and 
therefore, whilst the examination design tries to control the explicit mediation 
variable (e.g. by applying all sorts of validation and reliability criteria), it leaves 
inexplicably unchecked the implicit mediation variable.  
 
Any instructor knows that the students’ performance varies considerably depending 
on the kind of help they receive or not from the instructor, sometimes rooted in 
paralinguistic clues, such as smiling, nodding, spatial features of the examination 
room, the way the seats are located, etc., let alone helping defining indirectly a word 
or giving clues about its proper use, interpreting/facilitating the imaginary social 
context or situation of the task, etc.  
 
The distinction between explicit and implicit mediation brings to the forefront the 
complexity of pedagogic discourse as shaper of cognitive functions but also of social 
rules. In other words, coinciding with the socio-genetic principle of the development 
of higher mental functions, these are eventually a function of social rules, of 
particular ideas of what the social order is or should be. Figure 3.2 summarises the 
network of notions already seen, leaving temporarily out the notions of classification 
and framing, which will be covered in more detail in the next section. Thus 
pedagogic discourse is the outcome of the social position in terms of the 
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contradiction between individual action and societal activity. Discourse mediates 
development in terms of targeted development vectors, which are the outcome of the 
dialectic between the upper and lower reaches of the zone of proximal development, 
which can also be expressed in terms of socio-communicative and representative 
functions. The nature of discourse is essentially a regulative one, even if 
instructional discourse (more visible by default) may disguise its (more invisible by 














Figure 3.2 Discourse as determined by the actual subject position and future 
development targets  
 
 
3.3.9 Voice and message 
 
Let me expand now the notions of classification and framing in Bernstein’s code 
theory, as I will try to explain further how discourse’s pedagogic coding is 
ascertained.  
 
For Bernstein, classification gives rise to voice, and framing gives rise to message. 
More precisely: 
 
From this perspective classificatory (boundary) relations establish ‘voice’. 






























on what can legitimately put together (communicated). Framing (control) 
relations regulate the acquisition of this voice and create the ‘message’ 
(what is made manifest, what can be realized). (Bernstein, 1990, p. 260) 
 
This constitutes an important development in code theory for Bernstein is able to 
put together the distribution of power and principles of control of macrostructure 
and interaction into two interlinked categories that help in understanding the 
reproduction and change of the social system, social relations, subject position, the 
emergence of identities and the shaping of discursive practices. Together with task, 
the unit of analysis of discourse, they form a powerful hybrid in which it is 
possible to analyse the connections between social structure, social position, 
identity and targeted subject position (development) and anticipated identity. In 
fact, for Bernstein, identity emerges ‘through differential specialisation of 
communication and of its official base’ (p. 204), which is given by variations in (a) 
the distribution of power (classification) and (b) the principles of control (framing). 
Furthermore: 
 
‘Voice’ referred to the limits on what could be realised if the identity was 
to be recognised as legitimate. The classificatory relation established 
‘voice’. In this way power relations, through the classificatory relation, 
regulated ‘voice’. However, ‘voice’, although a necessary condition for 
establishing what could and could not be said and its context, could not 
determine what was said and the form of its contextual realization; that is 
the ‘message’. The ‘message’ was a function of framing. The stronger the 
framing the smaller the space accorded for potential variation in the 
message. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 204)       
 
Yet identity is not the only construction that emerges from differences in 
classification and framing, or, put another way, identity is the more visible 
construction. Bernstein sees the forms of communication that classification and 
framing give rise to through the pedagogic process forming consciousness, 
disguising ‘the arbitrary nature of power relations’ and also giving rise ‘psychic 
systems of defence internal to the individual’ (p. 12). In other words, the 
classification that operates at the macro structure also produces intrapsychological 
classification. This is done in order to maintain the classification and avoid the 




We can say, then, that the insulation which creates the principle of the 
classification has two functions: one external to the individual, which 
regulates the relations between individuals, and another function which 
regulates relations within the individual. So insulation faces outwards to 
social order, and inwards to order within the individual. Thus, externally, 
the classificatory principle creates order, and the contradictions, 
cleavages and dilemmas which necessarily inhere in the principle of 
classification are suppressed by the insulation. Within the individual, the 
insulation becomes a system of psychic defences against the possibility of 
the weakening of the insulation, which would then reveal the suppressed 
contradictions, cleavages and dilemmas. So the internal reality of 
insulation is a system of psychic defences to maintain the integrity of a 
category. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 7) 
 
There seems to be an ontological necessity by the subject to maintain and defend a 
given identity as form of outward orientation to the social world and as a way to 
maintain internal coherence. Lapping (2008) suggests that the psychic defences are 
deployed as a way to cover over the dependency of the individual on the 
community, the sphere of the profane, and the assertion of his or her autonomy, 
the sacred sphere of knowledge specialisation, to use Durkheim’s terms. 
Nonetheless, according to Bernstein (2000), insulation is permeable, as ‘these 
psychic defences are rarely wholly effective and the possibility of the other, the 
unthinkable, the yet to be voiced, is also rarely silenced’ (p. 7). I will return to this 
when I introduce Holland et al.’s theory of figured worlds, in which identities are 
seen as constructed or self-authored by resourcing to many, sometimes 
contradictory voices or identity models.  
 
Let me now put this in the context of foreign language teaching in Japan. If a 
particular university decides to divide the foreign language teaching programme 
into two different subjects, e.g. grammar and conversation, the voice in every one 
of the subjects will be quite different to the voice in one organisation in which no 
such division is in place. In the former, the instructor of grammar may feel 
compelled to only teach grammar and ignore the actual communicative aspects or 
potential of language constructions. By the same token, the conversation instructor 
may feel it is inappropriate to teach grammar and will avoid any questions made 
by students regarding syntax or semantics. In the latter, it may be possible to deal 
with all aspects of language teaching within the same lesson, even if that means 
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that the instructional tasks will lack clear developmental objects. The instructor 
may well accept the interruption of a functional task in order to explain a 
grammatical point, or move beyond the grammar explanation into the 
communicative potential of a certain grammar construction.  
 
Voices, that is, what is considered legitimate practice, will drastically differ, as 
well as the identities of those who are given the task of teaching those subjects. 
Will a grammar instructor reassert or resist his identity as a grammar instructor? 
Will a student reassert or resist his identity as a conversation/grammar student? 
How will both mutually recognise each other as legitimate identities? Yet this 
classification will also have repercussions on the way control is exerted in the 
classroom, for different subjects or disciplines represent, overall, different 
development vectors. Disciplines impose a certain teaching logic as well as a 
traditional form of instruction, which may or may not reflect the historical 
formation of the discipline (not its recontextualisation by the educational 
institutions).  
 
For instance, the teaching of Spanish grammar still depends upon the deployment 
of grammatical categories that come from the teaching of Latin, which passed 
down to the teaching of Spanish as a native language. In fact, grammar textbooks 
follow pretty much the same sequence structure, modified to the special needs of 
Japanese speakers. I have never come across a grammar class in Japan that 
employs, for instance, functional linguistics either to present or analyse grammar. 
The introduction of these concepts requires a lot of top-down instruction, 
especially when the categories deployed in the teaching of Japanese do not 
coincide or they are not taught at all at the primary and secondary levels. Most of 
the grammar categories used in teaching Spanish (e.g. article, adjective, adverb, 
verb tense, subject, predicate, etc.) come from the teaching of English, not 
Japanese. These categories are not very useful when analysing the Japanese 
language. In contrast, teaching conversational Spanish under the strong version of 
the communicative language teaching approach requires avoiding theoretical 
concepts and focusing on situational instructional tasks (e.g. at the supermarket, at 
the airport, at the real state agency) that demand from the student taking control 
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over practice and group or pair-work management. Furthermore, instructors will 
exert different forms of control depending on the developmental objects set for the 
activity/subject. In other words, the message will also vary. Yet the contrary must 
be considered as well: if students do participate, asking many questions or making 
specific demands they can impose on the class a different message, which may 
eventually lead to a different classification, i.e. instructors may talk to each other 
and reorganise the programme. Students being quiet and avoiding personal 
engagement in instructional tasks may also, as already seen, change the form of 
control exerted by the instructor. The instructor may have to strengthen the control 
over instructional tasks or change the method of evaluation in order to secure some 
kind of preferred involvement from students, but sacrificing the introduction, for 
instance, of necessary instructional tasks that give students apparently more 
control over their own learning.  
 
As has already been seen, the instructor may directly and explicitly assert a 
conduct model (an identity) by demanding certain behaviour from students or 
praising certain roles, but also may resort to strengthening the instructional 
discourse, tacitly enforcing a conduct model, which is a function of the regulative 
discourse through the instructional discourse. The differentials in classification and 
framing therefore represent differentials in forms of socialisation, which are given 
by forms of recognition (consciousness) of what constitute legitimate discourse 
and forms of discursive production or realisation that also can be seen as 
legitimate discourse. 
 
Let me return to the issue of ascertaining discourse’s code and expand the notion 
of classification to introduce its internal value, as well as framing’s external value, 
something that may sound as a paradox, given the fact that classification is 
external and framing, internal, by default.  
 
Bernstein (2000) asserts the existence of the pedagogic code in this form: ‘+/– are 
the strengths of classification and framing ±C/F’ (p. 14). Where framing is strong, 
the instructor exerts explicit control over instructional discourse (i.e., selection, 
sequence, pacing, criteria) and regulative discourse (i.e., the social base). Where 
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framing is weak, the student has more apparent control over the communication 
and its social base (p. 13). Nevertheless, classification can have an internal value 
(Ci) (for example, arrangements of the space and objects in it, as well as 
classification of dress, of posture, of position), while framing can have an external 
value (Fe) (for example, social class may play a role if it enters pedagogic 
communication) adding sensitivity to the description. A summary of these 
relations is depicted in Figure 3.3. In our case, legitimate or illegitimate dress or 
posture becomes part of knowledge of Spanish within the classroom, that is, within 
the recontextualisation of Spanish discourse that takes place at the Japanese 
university, as opposed to Spanish as the reproduction means and outcome of 
production fields. In the same way, class relations become a part of transmission 
within the classroom. 
 
Let us review now what these relations entail. On the one hand, the particular form 
in which the space and objects that are used during the pedagogic process (e.g. 
classroom chairs, desks, notice boards), as well as the regimentation of the student 
body through dressing elements such as uniforms or bodily habits such as posture, 
which establish boundaries among the population, are all but instances of internal 
classification values (Ci). On the other hand, framing can adopt an external value 
(Fe). It is remarkable how little attention is given to the sizeable Spanish-speaking 
Latin American population living in Japan by Japanese universities specialising in 
Spanish language education. Thus, how students’ and instructors’ practices are 
engaged or not with other communities of practice such as other university 
departments, for instance, through drama or speech competitions, or immigrant 
communities, Latin American music and dance clubs, schools, Spanish 
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Figure 3.3 Classification and framing relations, after Bernstein (2000), Daniels 
(1995) and Morais and Neves (2001) 
 
Students who favour a practical approach to language learning may choose a 
particular university for its prospects of using a foreign language in practical ways, 
for instance, through a study abroad or exchange programme, which may tend to 
shape students’ motivation for learning a foreign language, giving them a concrete 
learning goal. This is not to mention that access to these programmes represents a 
case of socio-economic selection. The students who cannot afford them will not 
even bother to apply to them, or may not look forward to the offering of such 
programmes when selecting a university. The policy followed by a particular 
organisation may prescribe engaging into economies of scale and grouping 
students in large grammar or conversation classes. All of these are important 
determinations that will shape pedagogic discourse. Pedagogic discourse, in turn, 
145 
 
may reshape as well classification boundaries. As was already mentioned, students 
may break the boundaries by establishing pedagogical relations with instructors 
other than their subject instructor. Even instructors may agree on collaborating 
with one another despite the subject division found in the curriculum. As was 
already seen, there is yet another determinant of discourse linked to message, 
which is internal to interaction itself or framing. Once the instructor chooses, 
consciously or unconsciously, a particular development object, this imposes 
certain demands on interaction. In other words, the instructor under given 
structural circumstances has certain freedom to choose a development target, but 
once that decision is made and a particular instructional task is communicated in 
order to achieve this goal, i.e. the operationalisation of the action, the task, 
everything is set for particular forms of interaction that are correlated to the 
development vector being sought. For instance, a instructor who seeks students 
carrying out tasks whose object is non-linguistic will have to surrender control 
over the instructional sequence and contents. Students will be able to bring in their 
own repertoire of meanings (experiences). On the contrary, a instructor who aims 
at having students carrying out tasks with a linguistic object (e.g. a structural drill), 
will have to exert control over the contents and the instructional sequence; students 
will not be able to bring in their own experiences and repertoire of meanings. 
Overall, what the coding orientation expresses here internally is that there is a 
correlation between development vectors, tasks, language’s differentiated 
functions and particular forms of interaction. Figure 3.4 summarises these 
relationships. Thus, we may say that Bernstein’s code theory finds its homologue 
in A.N. Leont’ev and A.A. Leont’ev’s activity theory, applied to second language 
development, and Vygotsky’s conception of dialectical development vectors and 
language’s differentiated functions by virtue of sharing a common point of 
departure: a socio-genetic explanatory principle and framework of analysis of the 





Figure 3.4 Basic conceptual homologation between Bernstein’s code theory, 
cultural-historical activity theory and Vygotsky’s conception of dialectical 
development   
 








where E refers to the orientation of the discourse (elaborated): —— refers 
to the embedding of this orientation in classification and framing values. 
Thus variation in the strength of classification and framing values 
generates different modalities of pedagogic practices. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 
100) 
 
In sum, the dialectical relation between classification and framing, on the one hand, 
and between instructional discourse and regulative discourse, on the other, brings 
into question the view that there is an infinite freedom to choose a given pedagogy 
by the part of instructors. Moreover, the opposite is also true: a particular 
instructional method or approach, if sustained, will certainly give particular 
direction to foreign language development. The question is what exactly are these 
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correlations and functions and what do they depend upon? 
 
3.3.10 Identity, where trajectory and future activity meet 
 
Subject position is ascertained in Bernstein’s theory by evaluating the capacity the 
individual has to recognise (also called passive realisation) instructional discourse 
and regulative discourse and produce or realise (also called active realisation) texts 
that comply with both the rules of instruction and social order (see Morais and 
Neves, 2001, p. 198). By ‘text’, Bernstein (2000) means ‘anything which attracts 
evaluation’ (p. 18) and therefore the term must be understood as any kind of 
discourse that is being evaluated, not necessarily a written text. Recognition is a 
function of classification, that is, the boundaries created by the division of labour; 
whereas realisation is a function of framing, the principles of control of discourse. In 
other words, pedagogic discourses are recognisable for the degree of specialised 
language they deploy as they move away from common sense. A more intensive 
division of labour is necessarily associated to a specialised language. Thus, the 
student is able to recognise what the context of discourse is by establishing 
discursive boundaries. However, the actual production of a text that abides to the 
discursive rules of a given discipline is a function of reproducing, eventually, the 
regulative principles established through the pedagogic relation. Put another way, 
recognition is about determining what the context or question is; realisation is about 
answering the question in the right way, attending the rules of the game.   
 
A few words need to be said about recognition and realisation, especially in terms 
of possessing passive and active realisation of instructional and regulative 
discourses. Bernstein (1975) asserts that although the role of pedagogic institutions 
is to have students adopting a subject position committed to their instructional and 
regulative discourses, variations in recognition and realisation, in terms of 
understanding and accepting the instructional and regulative means and ends, 
actually produce different subject positions that eventually may be at odds one to 
another. These subject positions are described as commitment, detachment, 




In cases where the possession of realisation rules is accompanied by the 
appropriate aspirations, motivations and social values, that is, appropriate 
socio-affective dispositions, then we may affirm subjects have truly internalised or 
appropriated those rules, that is, they have made them their own (see Morais and 
Neves, 2001). They have committed to them. However, we have to consider that 
those motivations, aspirations and values are framed within the pedagogic relation, 
and therefore they depend on the pedagogical context. For this reason, in the 
present study, mastery will be understood restrictively as the possession of 
realisation rules, according to the demands set by the pedagogic relation. Yet, we 
have to make a distinction between the actual socio-affective dispositions of the 
‘activities in the field of production of discourse’ (Bernstein, 2000, p. 34), that is, 
the actual production of Spanish as discourse, and the socio-affective dispositions 
of the pedagogic activity. The former may inform the latter but once they are 
framed in the pedagogic relation they acquire independence. This is because we 
are dealing not with Spanish but with a language that has been appropriated and 
recontextualised by the educational system by virtue of a pedagogic device (see 
Bernstein, 2000, pp. 25-39). Bernstein gives the following example of the 
difference between discourse and pedagogic discourse: 
 
When I was at school I spent three years in a large room with wooden 
benches and with side benches with saws and hammers and chisels. After 
three years, I had a pile of wood chippings as high as the bench itself. But 
what was I doing? Well, what I was doing was this: outside pedagogy 
there was carpentry, but inside pedagogy there was woodwork. In other 
words, here was a transformation of a real discourse called carpentry into 
an imaginary discourse called woodwork. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 33)  
 
Here, distributive rules (power) operate to regulate the access to the fields of 
production of discourse. In fact, power relations actually not only control the 
access to the fields of production of discourse but create the fields and their rules. 
We are dealing, in other words, with pedagogic discourse, not with actual 
discourse. As Bernstein points out: 
 
…pedagogic discourse is a recontextualising principle. Pedagogic 
discourse is constructed by a recontextualising principle which 
selectively appropriates, relocates, refocuses and relates other discourses 
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to constitute its own order. In this sense, pedagogic discourse can never 
be identified with any of the discourses it has recontextualised. (Bernstein, 
2001, p. 33) 
 
Can instructors expect students to become foreign nationals, that is, to internalise a 
set of values shared by the societies in which the foreign language is spoken? It 
may help in certain cases but it can be argued that students academically succeed 
(achieve mastery) without having to drastically change their inner selves to adjust 
to the actual expectations of the field of production of Spanish as discourse. 
Nonetheless, they are required to possess adequate socio-affective dispositions as 
established in the pedagogic relation. Notice that by ‘adjust’ to the expectations of 
the field I mean to ‘influence’ or ‘transform’ the field.   
 
Let us analyse this sort of splitting of socio-affective dispositions. In a 
communicative instructional task that requires collaboration among group 
members to arrive to the solution to a problem, students may comply with the 
requirements and procedures set by the task (which usually demand the situated 
establishment of social relations according to the societies that have Spanish as a 
native language), but may not have actually internalised it. As soon as the task is 
accomplished, students will return to a state in which collaboration (the 
Spanish-way or Latin-America-way so to speak) may not be present. This situation 
is typical in the assessment of communication, for assessment or evaluation 
‘condenses the meaning of the whole [pedagogic] device’ (Bernstein, 2000, p. 36). 
At the time of the oral assessment students engage in the tasks appropriately, 
simulating the right dispositions. Communication instructors may wish every 
teaching day to be like that, but as soon as the assessment is over, students go back 
to their Japanese selves, to the network of Japanese university social relations, 
with its own views on hierarchy and conduct values. In other words, the right 
motivations, aspirations and values are difficult to assess and may be confounded. 
The accomplishment of the regulation rules implies an embedded form of 
simulacrum of Spanish as a real vehicle of communication. Consequently, as 
Wertsch and Stone (1985) assert, mastery differs from internalisation inasmuch as 
it does not necessarily require appropriation. Although qualitatively different, the 
mechanism in place, paradoxically, is that of resisting legitimate forms of 
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discourse by complying with the requirements of the pedagogical relation and 
realising the appropriate text. What transpires is that students who have 
motivations, aspirations and values that are more compatible with the realisation 
rules of regulative discourse may potentially have less problem with that 
realisation. In some cases, instructors may evaluate realisation as artificial or not 
completely adequate but they may not be allowed to fail students on those grounds. 
In other words, regulative discourse is negotiated in the classroom, as it always 
implies a relation of some sort, even if that relation is a dominator-dominated one, 
whereas the socio-affective dispositions that the foreign language instructor 
believes are the most appropriate may be external to the pedagogical context, the 
organisational setting and the educational system as a whole.   
 
Yet again, the problem is that the actual field of production of Spanish discourse (and 
also the fields of production of linguistics, literature, history and other discourses) 
does partially inform the pedagogic discourse in terms of regulative discursive 
practices, as it is being appropriated in different ways. Bernstein (2000) asserts that the 
regulative discourse is in fact the provider of ‘the rules of the internal order of 
instructional discourse itself’ in terms of instructional ‘selection, relation, sequence 
and pace’ (p. 34). He goes on and asserts that recontextualisation principle, of which 
regulative discourse is the dominant discourse, recontextualises not only ‘the what of 
pedagogic discourse’ (e.g. the subject matter or discipline, or the pedagogic sequence) 
but the how, ‘that is the theory of instruction’ (p. 34). In other words, the regulative 
discourse orders and dominates the instructional discourse.  
 
Another way to look at the ancillary relation between instructional discourse and 
regulative discourse is through the film Karate Kid. In that film, two competing 
karate pedagogies are shown. On the one hand, we have a Western instructor who 
teaches karate by promoting competition among apprentices. The aim of karate is 
competing and winning competitions without paying too much attention to the 
means deployed, only to the ends. The activity is outwardly oriented. On the other 
hand, we have an old Japanese karate instructor from Okinawa who is teaching 
karate to one apprentice. His teaching focuses on the process. He wants the 
apprentice learning techniques but being patient. Honour, fair-play and achieving 
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some form of self-realisation are far more important than winning a karate 
competition. The activity is inwardly oriented. Eventually, we have not only two 
karate styles, but we can argue that the kind of karate practiced by the team of 
apprentices of the Western instructor and the kind of karate practiced by the 
apprentice of the Japanese instructor amount to two different sports or martial arts. 
The interesting thing is that the techniques (e.g. the kicks, locks, restraints, throws, 
etc.) are codified, they are given technical names, but they are all sustained by the 
philosophical approach to the subject and to instruction, by regulative discourse. 
 
The question is that karate does not exist in itself but in the particular, in the 
institutions that practice it and develop it. Practicing and developing a subject or 
discipline must necessarily incorporate pedagogies that ensure its reproduction, 
otherwise disciplines and practices die. We may be tempted to call the kind of 
karate practiced by the old Japanese instructor the real one, but there is no real 
karate. What Bernstein is saying with his use of ‘real’ is that the real is an actual 
codified form that owes its existence to the agreed criteria held by actual 
institutionalised social practices. The old Japanese instructor also recontextualised 
karate through a pedagogic device in an attempt, perhaps, of instilling in the 
apprentice some morals which were missing in the social environment in which 
the pedagogic practice took place. If he had taught karate in Japan, his regulative 
discourse might have changed, since social competition is not an issue. 
Nevertheless, in Japan, there are different karate schools which emphasise 
different principles as well.    
 
The implication is clear and important: individual development is framed within 
the limits the recontextualisation produced by the pedagogic device impose as well. 
However, Bernstein also points out that contradictions and dilemmas of the 
recontextualisation process ‘are rarely totally suppressed’ and ‘the very pedagogic 
process reveals the possibility of the gap’ (p. 31). Here, Bernstein is referring to 
the gap between the thinkable and the unthinkable. The total suppression of the 
unthinkable is not possible for it is a source of enticement toward activity. At the 
level of instructors, instructors target the actual production field of Spanish 
discourse, although eventually, the evaluation will not be informed by actual 
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Spanish discursive realisations but by a text instead. Nevertheless, instructors may 
be required to believe that courses are actually a bridge to the field of discursive 
production. Moreover, at the level of students, students may be required to believe 
that their discursive practices are actual discursive realisations and not mere 
pedagogic discursive production. 
 
The discursive gap operates then as a source of illusio or imaginaries with vast 
implications for identity and subject position. Let us take first Bourdieu’s notion of 
illusio. Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) defines illusio as the interests 
the social agents have in participating in a social game. ‘Interests that are both 
presupposed and produced by the functioning of historically delimited fields’ (p. 
115). Put another way, illusio refers to the interest agents have to engage in a game 
in which they will have to abide by certain rules but in a field that has been 
restrained. For Bernstein, the pedagogic apparatus produces that delimitation 
through pedagogic discourse itself. Bernstein (2000) refers to this as the 
transformation of ‘unmediated discourse to an imaginary discourse’ (p. 33). More 
specifically, Bernstein asserts that:  
 
As pedagogic discourse appropriates various discourses, unmediated 
discourses are transformed into mediated, virtual or imaginary discourses. 
From this point of view, pedagogic discourse selectively creates 
imaginary subjects. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 33)  
 
In conclusion, the fact that the actual field of production of Spanish as discourse is 
out there imposes some form of relation with the pedagogic discourse, which 
reveals the gap between both fields of production. ‘[I]n controlling or attempting 
to control the realisations of the gap, it must necessarily reveal the modes which 
make connections between the two worlds. The power relations, for which the 
distributive rules are the relay, are then necessarily subject to change’ (Bernstein, 
2000, p. 31). Thus, every historical change in foreign language pedagogies in 
formal schooling reveals how the discourse is recontextualised time and time 
again. 
 
However, the actual difference between the real (unmediated) discourse and the 
pedagogic (mediated) discourse is that the former has the potential to transform 
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the field of production, whereas the latter does not have that potential. Any 
discursive form, in my opinion, whether plain or pedagogic discourse, configures 
an imaginary, a form of misrecognition given by some form of projection and 
reflection of the self through symbolic means in which the self is necessarily 
configured at a social plane by the other, by the other’s discourse. However, the 
symbolic, i.e. discourse, is always incomplete (even though is misrecognised as 
complete) and therefore it is always impossible to grasp the real (see Lacan, 1991, 
p. 166). 
 
An interpretation of the network of conceptual relations of the pedagogic device as 
shaper of imaginary subjects such as Spanish Communication and Spanish 
Grammar, and subject position is depicted in Figure 3.5. In sum, the pedagogic 
discourse is structured by the pedagogic device, which Bernstein (2000) defines as 
a system of rules that regulate ‘the communication it makes possible, and in this 
way it acts selectively on the meaning potential’ (p. 27). ‘The device continuously 
regulates the ideal universe of potential pedagogic meanings in such a way as to 
restrict or enhance their realisations’ (p. 27). Further, the device is composed of (1) 
distributive rules, by which knowledge is distributed to different social groups. 
This amounts, for Bernstein, to distributing ‘different forms of consciousness to 
different groups’ (p. 114); (2) recontextualising rules, which construct the 
pedagogic discourse as such, especially in terms of selecting a regulative principle 
that will structure the forms of instruction; and (3) evaluative rules, which provide 
the criteria by which realisation will be judged, a form of ‘ruler for consciousness’ 
(p. 28). In conclusion, unlike discourse, pedagogic discourse is a case of discourse 
that has been subjected to a recontextualisation process in which the communication 




























Figure 3.5 The pedagogic device as shaper of imaginary disciplinary subjects and 
subject position   
 
There are various methods to ascertaining recognition and realisation. One is 
advanced by Bernstein himself and relies on the labelling of students by their 
instructors. I will refer to this in a moment when I deal with Holland et al.’s theory 
of figured worlds. The other two I will briefly mention here have to do with (a) 
presenting students with discourse fragments and having them classify those 
segments according to disciplinary subject (see Daniels, 1995) and (b) developing an 
external language of description of practices whereby appraisers evaluate 
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classification and framing in terms of strength (from weak to strong 
classification/framing) (see Daniels, 1995; Morais and Neves, 2001). These two 
methods will be used in the present study. Method (a) above is built on the 
assumption that the individual who is able to correctly classify discourse as 
belonging to a particular discipline or school subject possesses recognition rules. 
Method (b) is built on the assumption that organisational context and classroom 
interactions can constitute a system in which different relations, including 
instructional and regulative practices can be coded in terms of their relative strength. 
It is therefore, an extension and translation of the relations depicted in Figure 3.3. I 
will, however, supplement these methods by deploying the notion of trajectory so as 
to understand the impact that class structure has over recognition and realisation 
rules.  
 
As already mentioned, the ascertaining of social class is somewhat complex in 
societies in which capital, capital goods, commoditisation, migration movements, 
international markets, among other factors, erase traditional boundaries and create 
fast-changing new ones. The access to a personal computer and a printer can be seen 
as both the acquisition of a commodity but also of capital goods. Many Japanese 
households can afford a trip overseas, but what they do whilst in a foreign land is 
different and may reflect class structure (e.g., going to a holiday resort or thematic 
park versus visiting art or science museums; travelling in organised travel tours 
versus travelling on their own). Access to university is widespread among the 
Japanese high-school student population, reaching a rate of 50.2% in 2009 (MEXT, 
2012), yet there are many differences between faculties in terms of educational 
excellence even within the same organisation. Although class-structure mechanisms 
of selection and distribution of cultural capital still operate, it is the ascertaining of 
those mechanisms that is extremely difficult.  
 
The proposed construct to overcome this problem is the notion of (second language 
education) trajectory. What is then is trajectory? Within the cultural-historical 
tradition, Griffin and Cole (1984) and Chaiklin (2003) draw on Vygotsky’s (1967; 
1987) notion of leading activity to identify the social relations that promote the 
development of functions that lead to the structural reorganisation of psychological 
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functions. The leading activity contributes to the reorganisation of prior 
developmental stages, transforming them into customary processes. Wertsch (1998) 
refers to the same operation as dominant activity. It is necessary to emphasise that 
this reorganisation is not lineal or progressive, and in fact is accompanied by some 
form of crisis in which improvisation is key. Drawing on Vygotsky, Robbins (2003) 
indicates that the successful process of internalisation is ‘…long and arduous and is 
ultimately a result of what Vygotskian terminology refers to as catharsis’ (p. 89). 
This means that the cathartic experience or ‘magic moment’ (p. 89) follows after 
periods of tension and frustration. Thus, second language development is the result 
of a process informed by a ‘principle of maximal frustration’, which is 
acknowledged to be ‘the antithesis of many methods in practice today’ (p. 90). The 
search for acquirers’ past improvisations, magical moments, or leading activities, 
therefore, seems fundamental in any account of trajectory.  
 
These episodes must be understood as enabled by organisations or activity systems 
that are class-regulated. Let us think for a moment on what a foreign language is for 
an individual who has lived overseas with his or her parents because his or her father 
was commissioned by a multinational Japanese corporation to live and work there, 
and what a foreign language is for an individual whose family is settled in rural 
Japan and has never come across a foreigner in his or her life. One can imagine that 
in the former case, a second language is no longer a school subject but a practical 
communication tool; whilst in the latter, a second language is fundamentally a 
school subject. Yet again, the understanding of what a second language is for an 
individual whose parents work in a Japanese factory and are in communication with 
relatives living overseas, because his or her ancestors emigrated from Japan in the 
middle of the 20th century, is quite different to the practical conception of a foreign 
language by an individual who has not had that experience. In all three cases it is 
quite hard to assess social class by using the classic parameter of ownership or 
control of production means. 
 
Furthermore, educational organisations appropriate knowledge and recontextualise it 
in different ways according to a different set of aims. Some of those aims may come 
down directly from Japan’s Ministry of Education, but some of them do not. Private 
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high schools and universities in Japan may have supplementary but different aims to 
those of the Ministry of Education regarding foreign language education. Just to 
give one example, a Christian university is not only interested in teaching a foreign 
language as a discipline or business tool but as a means of accessing the Christian 
scriptures, communicating with overseas institutions or missionaries or having 
students break away from their ethnocentrism and fostering a sort of universal 
identity. The process of recontextualisation varies enormously. Trajectory, therefore, 
is an intermediate construal between class relations and the distribution of different 
forms of communication and ways of making meaning that differentially position 
subjects. Combined with code theory, especially with the methods code theory has 
for ascertaining the pedagogic codes of organisational and learning settings, 
trajectory can help in providing valuable data on class structure. 
 
Let us go back to Bernstein’s code theory and in particular to the way of 
ascertaining the possession by the individual of recognition and realisation rules. 
The method fundamentally relies on the instructors’ labelling of students’ realisation, 
but in the present study it will be supplemented by deploying Holland et al.’s (2001) 
notion of figured worlds and their anthropological approach.  
 
Drawing on A.N. Leont’ev’s notion of activity, Holland et al. define figured worlds 
as a close system of ‘historical phenomena, to which we are recruited or into which 
we enter, which themselves develop through the works of their participants’ (p. 41). 
The position participants take up in social encounters matter:  
 
…figured worlds, like activities, are social encounters in which 
participants’ positions matter. They proceed and are socially instanced and 
located in times and places, not in the ‘everywhere’ that seems to 
encompass cultural worlds as they are usually conceived. Some figured 
worlds we may never enter because of our social position or rank; some we 
may deny to others; some we may simply miss by contingency; some we 
may learn fully. (Holland et al., 2001, p. 41) 
  
In any figured world, positions are taken up, constructed and resisted. This notion 
is deployed to analyse how subjects explain themselves, the positions they assume, 
the imaginative solutions they give or the actions they take when a particular event 
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unfolds in narrativised and dramatised form. Thus, identity and agency are studied 
taking into account the subjects’ own definitions of their social space, the positions 
they take up within and their own resourceful constraints. 
 
Let me focus on the similarities and differences between Bernstein’s code theory 
and Holland and colleagues’ cultural theory. First, attention needs to be placed to the 
regulation of conduct, character and manner in terms of expectations, which are 
condensed in a network of figured identities, which may or not be communicated by 
instructors to students (or acquirers, in Bernstein’s terms). Bernstein (2000) sees 
labelling as a function of framing, that is, of the principles of control of the 
pedagogic discourse: 
 
…the rules of social order refer to the forms that hierarchical relations take 
in the pedagogic relation and to expectations about conduct, character and 
manner. This means that an acquirer can be seen as a potential for labels. 
Which labels are selected is a function of the framing. Where the framing 
is strong, the candidates for labelling will be terms such as conscientious, 
attentive, industrious, careful, receptive. Where the framing is apparently 
weak, then conditions for candidature of labels will become equally trying 
for the acquirer as he or she struggles to be creative, to be interactive, to 
attempt to make his or her own mark. The actual labelling of the acquirer 
varies with the nature of the framing. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 13)    
 
 
The idea is to ascertaining the subject’s position by assessing a network of figured 
identities regulated by the specific form and degree of control of the pedagogical 
relation.  
 
I believe that Bernstein’s code theory, although it provides an explanatory principle 
for the emergence of identities, poses certain limitations that need to be addressed 
and overcome. The main limitation is that it does not give a thorough idea of the 
identity’s potential. This limitation is not located at the theoretical level but rather 
the empirical use of code theory has overlooked this aspect, perhaps because 
research has taken a rather classic sociological standpoint. Realisation is about 
judging students’ past or present performance, an operation done by those who are 
entitled to judge if the requisites were met or not, that is, by the students’ instructors, 
the body of evaluators. However, I am also interested in exploring the projected 
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activity of individual students in terms of future prospects or development. Identities 
condense the subject’s trajectory and orientation to meanings as judged by those 
whose already possess realisation rules, but also give an idea of the subject’s 
potential for change. I believe this dimension is covered quite well by Holland and 
colleagues’ cultural theory.   
 
Holland et al. (2001) focus on language, since the word is a pivot between the 
external and the internal. The external is expressed in the ready-made 
characteristics of the word and its link to the now vestigial social relations that 
shaped its meaning but which drift away in the course of history. The internal is 
expressed in sense, that is, the relation between motive and object or the relation 
between the subjective and the objective. The dialectical nature of language puts 
the individual under a form of literary vocational spell, understood here as a 
practice in imaginative and liberating observation of one’s situation in the world 
and a form of self-regulation that is, nonetheless, constructed with restrictive, 
given, ready-made elements (e.g. words, voices, speech genres, styles). Every 
attempt in reconfiguring the world and every identity that emerges out of that 
process is both an individual and social endeavour. In fact, as Holland and 
colleagues (2001) like to assert that it is a form of co-development (p. 270). 
However, the dialogic aspect of intersubjective relations is also preserved in 
intrapsychological functions and in fact is one of the fundaments of Bakhtinian 
and Vygotskian theories alike (see Wertsch, 1980). 
 
The Bakhtinian concept of the ‘space of authoring’ is used by Holland et al., (2001, 
p. 183) to capture an understanding of the mutual shaping of figured worlds and 
identities in social practice. The space of authoring is marked by improvisation but 
an improvisation that is a reconfiguration of language (and action) that is 
inherently conflictual and dialogic. As Bakhtin (1981) points out, ‘In the every 
rounds of our consciousness, the internally persuasive world is half-ours and half 
someone else’s’ (p. 345). This is precisely the inner contradiction of appropriating 
any cultural tool, a universal. The tool is used in the process of socialisation in 
which the individual must comply with expectations set from the outside, but also 
he or she can creatively use the tool to act upon society. In other words, cultural 
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tools, especially speech, are positioning devices that constitute real pivots between 
the individual and the social context. The use of those tools is essentially a form of 
positioning.  
 
Holland et al. (2001) point out that the space of authoring is a zone of proximal 
development that is significant in an account of the development of 
historically-situated identities. For them, identities emerge in the course of 
socially-located individual trajectories: 
  
A Bakhtinian “space of authoring” is then much a particular “zone of 
proximal development,” and one that is extremely important in an 
explication of the development of identities as aspects of 
history-in-person. Bakhtin does not take development as the center of his 
concerns, as does Vygotsky. Yet he does write about differences between 
the neophyte, given over to a voice of authority, and the person of greater 
experience, who begins to rearrange, reword, rephrase, reorchestrate 
different voices and, by this process, develops her own “authorial stance”. 
(Holland et al., 2001, p. 183)  
 
In other words, development targets also give rise to different identities as the 
individual reorganises them in terms of ideal characters or role models. The zone 
of proximal development must not be seen as neutral enabler of some form of 
knowledge absorption, for development is about changing the individual. 
Development is all about the acquisition of an identity capable of dealing with 
particular psychological functions. It implies a reconstruction of self. In this regard, 
sense or personal meaning, or how the student is able to engage in societal activity, 
is a function of particular forms of reflection in conscious form that have a 
correlate in an assumed identity that enables him or her to carry out the learning 
process. 
 
For Holland and colleagues, this reconfiguration of self is done by resourcing to 
models that are familiar:   
 
Cultural worlds are populated by familiar social types and even 
identifiable persons, not simply differentiated by some abstract division 
of labour. The identities we gain within figured worlds are thus 
specifically historical developments, grown through continued 
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participation in the positions defined by the social organization of those 
worlds’ activity. They are characteristic of humans and societies. 
(Holland et al., 2001, p. 41)  
 
They see differences between the position individuals take as a form of 
self-reflection, a construction that is made by resourcing to multiple cultural tools 
and therefore voices, but also in relation to their relative social position, which is in 
fact a sort of entitlement that condenses an activity potential. Holland et al. look for 
positional markers in subjects’ discursive practices (p. 133), that is, the 
establishment of boundaries, in similar fashion to the labelling in Bernstein’s code 
theory. Yet the dialectic between figured worlds in terms of the individuals’ 
self-constructed narrativity and resourcing to generic role characters as a response to 
desire, and the individuals self-asserted social position, offer a much more complex 
sketch of the individuals’ potential for future activity. This dialectic explains why an 
individual seems to accept, agree with societal objectives or, on the contrary, ignore, 
reject or resist them. It is here that Holland et al. refer to Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus to give social positioning the dimension of everyday or ordinary embedment 
of activity. As Holland and colleagues assert, ‘Positional identities inhabit the 
landscape of Bourdieu’s habitus (p. 138).   
 
The acceptance or rejection, however, is not mechanical. The distance between how 
the individual sees him or herself and the actual assertion of his or her social 
position is an indicator of how the idealised character or identity can be a source of 
creativity or self-censoring (p. 132). In other words, if there is too much distance 
between the ideal and the actual position, the individual may feel “compelled to 
assume the identity of the ‘Other’”, which in fact is a form of silencing his or her 
‘native voice’ (p. 132). Resistance can be seen as a form of assertion of one’s own 
social position and identity, another strategy developed to close the gap between 
idealised requirements and actual social position.  
 
In the hypothetical example given above, how do individuals who believe learning a 
language is all about learning a school discipline, not a real communication tool, 
position themselves to the ideals explicitly or tacitly transmitted by instructors who 
believe it is a communication tool, not only a school subject? Will they be good or 
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bad students? Will they work towards adopting a new idealised self or resist it? 
What sense for the social game do they have and will they develop?  
 
Holland et al. (2001) believe such dispositions, that is, the sense for the game, are 
the result of a long process: 
 
The development of social position into a positional identity—into 
dispositions to voice opinions or to silence oneself, to enter into activities 
or to refrain and self-censor, depending on the social situation—comes 
over the long term, in the course of social interaction. Relational identities 
are publicly performed through perceptible signs. People “tell” each other 
who they claim to be in society in myriad ways. (Holland et al., 2001, p. 
137-138)    
 
This telling facilitates our task, for the social positioning depends upon drawing on 
limited cultural resources, and therefore, meaning making must necessarily have an 
inner logic configured by variations positioned within the totality of the system.  
 
Not unlike the aforementioned notions of leading activity and catharsis, Holland and 
colleagues (2001) look at improvisations as moments in which identity 
reorganisation occurs. Thus, they point out that 
 
Improvisations are the sort of impromptu actions that occur when our past, 
brought to the present as habitus, meets with a particular combination of 
circumstances and conditions for which we have no set response. Such 
improvisations are the openings by which change comes about from 
generation to generation. They constitute the environment or landscape in 
which the experience of the next generation “sediments,” falls out, into 
expectation and disposition. The improvisations of the parental generation 
are the beginning of a new habitus for the next generation. Pace Bourdieu, 
we suggest that the process is also condensed into the space of a lifetime. 
In our view, improvisations, from a cultural base and in response to the 
subject positions offered in situ, are, when taken up as symbol, potential 
beginnings of an altered subjectivity, an altered identity. (Holland et al., 
2001, p. 18) 
 
Yet, the problem of working with Bakhtinian theory is similar to the problem 
already pointed out about using Vygotsky’s word meaning as a unit of analysis, 
although to a less extent: the social remains being non-specific. Not unlike 
Vygotsky’s theory of the development of mind, Bakhtin’s theory is fundamentally 
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a theory of human communication in which the unit of analysis is the utterance, 
which can be homologated to Vygotsky’s word meaning (see Akhutina, 2003). 
Bakhtin (1986) sees every speech act as informed by stable generic forms or 
speech genres, which are in turn determined by the ‘specific nature of the given 
sphere of speech communication, semantic (thematic) considerations, the concrete 
situation of the speech communication, the personal composition of its participants, 
and so on.’ (p. 78). Bakhtin goes on to argue that we get to know a language 
through genre-informed utterances, not through some kind of generative code such 
as grammar. He asserts that ‘[s]peech genres organize our speech in almost the 
same way as grammatical (syntactical) forms do’ (p. 79). The difference is that 
grammar imposes stable and compulsory norms for the speaker, but the generic 
forms of speech genres are more flexible. One cannot help but establishing a 
connection between Bakhtin’s speech genres and Bernstein’s study of speech 
phenomena such as speech hesitation and speech prediction (see Bernstein, 1971). 
Thus, speech genre could well be homologated with Bernstein’s notion of code. 
Nonetheless, as Hasan (2005) points out, social positioning in Bakhtin’s theory of 
genres seems insufficient: 
 
Though Bakhtin’s views concerning speech genres are rhetorically 
attractive and impressive, the approach lacks…both a developed 
conceptual syntax and an adequate language of description. Terms and 
units at both these levels in Bakhtin’s writings require clarification; 
further, the principles that underlie the calibration of the elements of 
context with the generic shape of the text are underdeveloped, as is the 
general schema for the description of contexts for interaction. (Hasan, 
2005, p. 143) 
 
Therefore, Bernstein’s code theory proves again to be at the centre of our 
endeavour for integrating these different theories and translate them into external 
languages of description. In fact it constitutes the vertebral column of this attempt. 
 
In summary, the notion of subject advanced by Blunden embraces an aggregation 
of determinations which can be expressed as the three moments of subject, i.e., the 
individual psyche, activity and culture. In order to comprise these three moments of 
subject, I will be deploying Bernstein’s notion of pedagogic discourse as an 
intermediary link between organisations and learning settings, in which speech or 
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language is produced according to the position subjects take up within the 
possibilities generated by the recontextualising principles of the pedagogic device, 
which translate universal cultural tools through the pedagogic relation. The focus is 
on using the task as the unit of analysis of pedagogic discourse as it helps in 
positioning the observation within macro and micro levels of analysis or between 
ontogeny and microgeny. This will allow understanding instruction as the outcome 
of the constraints and affordances given by the organisational structure in its 
relation to development, that is, in its relation to the targeted transformations of 
subjects. Furthermore, vectors of development, embodied in selected 
motive-activity appropriate to analysing foreign language development (foundation, 
structural, functional and rhetorical) will be ascertained in terms of pedagogic 
codes by using Bernstein’s code theory. This will allow for recontextualising 
SLA’s notion of communicative language teaching within the dialectical tradition, 
providing an account of learning contexts. Whilst there is nothing new or original 
in terms of understanding the pedagogic discourse as activity, I believe research in 
foreign education repeatedly misses the exact positioning it should adopt in order 
to attempt capturing the complexity of the whole. In addition, there is nothing new 
in deploying Bernstein’s code theory in analysing organisations and learning 
settings either; however, the virtue of the approach presented here lies on its 
capacity to segment discourse according to functions. In other words, with the 
exception of the research also informed by Systemic-Functional Linguistics, one 
of the most problematic aspects of deploying Bernstein’s code theory is the 
tendency to consider the interaction time of discourse as a continuum. What I am 
saying here is that discourse is subject to functions which can be described in 
terms of motive-activity, that is, as development vectors and be codified 
accordingly for coding orientation using the complex tools developed along many 
decades of empirical research by Bernstein, his disciples and research colleagues, 
this time adapted for foreign language pedagogies. The differential in coding 
orientation, or consciousness, will be tested in terms of trajectory or the 
aggregation of leading activities as a way to ascertaining the impact of class 
structure on consciousness formation. Furthermore, in order to assess the 
possession of recognition and realisation rules by individuals, on which identities 
are created, maintained or changed, I will use what could be called classic or 
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traditional Bernsteinian code theory coding methods (see Daniels, 1995; Morais and 
Neves, 2001), but I will add Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural theory’s anthropological 
approach. The ascertaining of recognition rules will be done by presenting students 
segments of discourse already pedagogically coded in terms of coding orientation 
(i.e. the particular valence of classification and framing, from weak to strong). The 
coding will be done by developing an external language of description of 
classification and framing which will be checked by instructors and modified 
accordingly (following a description II mode of enquiry). Students will have to 
determine if the segment belongs to either a grammar or communication class, 
depending on the widespread division of disciplines (classification) in the Japanese 
tertiary level: grammar/communication. Finally, the possession of realisation rules 
will be ascertained by paying attention to the labelling of students by instructors as a 
figured world, and so the individual identities of students will be ascertained as 
reflections of potential for future activity in terms of their preferred development 
vector in order to achieve their learning objectives. 
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The present study has two main goals that are interrelated. The first one addresses 
a major pedagogical problem encountered in the teaching and learning of Spanish 
as a foreign language in communicative learning settings at the tertiary level in 
Japan. Informal observation tells me that only a small segment of the student 
population attains mastery in oral communication in settings informed by 
communicative language teaching across a variety of educational organisations 
and I want to know why this is the case with the future aim of tackling the root of 
the problem through appropriate intervention. The second goal is threefold and 
deals with the theoretical and methodological assumptions that are used to 
construct a model to resolve the pedagogical question. In this regard, the second 
goal is (a) to provide a unifying framework for three theoretical corpora that 
hitherto have not been used in conjunction. The feasibility of such a framework is 
subject to theoretical and empirical verification, which actually implies (b) the 
development of a new underlying epistemic method and methodology, and (c) the 
development of new instruments of analysis. 
 
 
4.2 OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL 
 
4.2.1 Teaching and learning oral communication at the Japanese university 
 
The way the Spanish as a foreign language study programmes have been put 
together in Japanese universities for the last three decades divides instruction into 
two main subject-matters: grammar and oral communication. Spanish grammar is 
usually taught in Japanese by Japanese instructors, whereas communication is 
taught presumably in Spanish by native Spanish instructors. On the one hand, 
grammar is presented as a generative code. Producing adequate sentences is a 
matter of knowing the language’s algorithm. On the other hand, communication 
instructors tend to draw on communicative-language teaching methods of 
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instruction (e.g., the communicative approach, task-based language teaching) to 
inform their practice in the classroom.  
 
Communicative language teaching, being a fundamental instructional approach of 
current SLA models (see Johnson, 2001, 2004), is based on a weak and 
ontologically problematic sociogenetic principle that views language mastery as a 
competence, that is, as knowledge, acquired through the use of language in social 
contexts. However, because the emphasis is put precisely on competence, 
communicative language teaching assumes that the social context is stable and 
understood by all participants. In other words, communicative language teaching 
does not recognise that the social context, including its institutions, is constructed 
through language itself. This implies that communicative-language teaching 
pedagogies tend to operate on what I call (a) a notion of semantic normalisation, 
that is, learners have to acquire word meanings, but these are considered, 
nonetheless, stable entities, and (b) a notion of pragmatic normalisation, that is, 
pragmatic functions can be explicitly taught because learners understand and can 
put themselves in all social roles across social contexts. This is problematic 
because it implies a division between, on the one hand, the learner’s cognitive 
consciousness and the semantic system of his or her native language, and, on the 
other hand, between the learner’s linguistic consciousness and the pragmatic 
system of his or her native language. The learner who has not mastered a second 
language is subject to the dominance of the semantic and pragmatic system of his 
or her native language unless he or she has been trained in philosophy or 
semiology. The ‘world of things’, to use Vygotsky’s (1987, p. 180) term, is 
constituted through the very same semantic system of the learner’s native language. 
And the ways to address people and organise activity are also dominated by the 
pragmatic system of the learner’s native language. Therefore, the fundamental 
problem I have with SLA research in general is that its ontological foundations are 
incompatible with the ontological principles of the dialectical tradition, which 
operates with a true socio-genetic ontology of social being. Unfortunately, this 
makes the incorporation of SLA methodology and methods, and even of SLA 
research findings, very difficult. There is no easy reconciliation of SLA and 
dialectical epistemologies. Nevertheless, this study aims to establish links with 
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SLA through the recontextualisation of the SLA notions of communicative 
language teaching under a dialectical paradigm. This may help to establish a 
bridge between both traditions and serve as a place of common identification. 
 
There are two contradictory ways to go in order for students to acquire 
communicative competence in communicative-language teaching pedagogies. The 
first, which corresponds to the strong version of communicative language teaching, 
is communicating in the target language. Instruction is implicit. No elements of the 
sociolinguistic or grammar codes are (explicitly) instructed. The second, which 
corresponds to the weak version of communicative language teaching, allows for 
the explicit instruction of pragmatic and grammatical elements of language that are 
nonetheless framed under pragmatic functions.  
 
These pedagogical conceptualisations seem to represent the top-down and 
bottom-up moves in Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development. The problem is 
that in SLA they tend to be seen as mutually exclusive. In any case, these 
conceptualisations are limited in terms of offering a description of actual practices. 
They inform pedagogies, but are not pedagogies in themselves. Therefore, if one 
wants to compare pedagogic settings within and across organisations, as is the case 
in the present study, a more precise categorisation is required. 
 
After working for almost nineteen years teaching Spanish as a foreign language at 
the tertiary level in Japan, I have informally observed that less than one third of 
students achieve mastery of oral communication in learning settings informed, 
presumably, by communicative language teaching. By mastery of oral 
communication I mean that students can actually cope with the requirements of an 
unfolding conversation adjusted to the skill levels targeted by instruction under 
circumstances that acknowledge the fact that one or more interlocutors, and even 
all of them, are not native Spanish speakers. In this regard, I am using Wertsch’s 
(1998) notion of mastery as ‘knowing how’ (p. 53), a mastery of operations that 
does not require the appropriation of or identification with a cultural tool. 
Consequently, mastery of oral skills in Spanish does not require an appropriation 
of or identification with the socio-affective attitudes and practices of the numerous 
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fields of production of Spanish as discourse, that is, with the different cultural 
spheres of Spanish-speaking societies. I do not require native-like mastery of the 
basic conversation skills targeted by the study programme but rudiments that allow 
a basic dialogue to take place so as to weaken at once the cognitive and linguistic 
dominance of the Japanese language and relativise the cognitive and linguistic 
power of the Spanish language as well. This may require a certain negotiation and 
mutual recognition of the communicative context between interlocutors, but I am 
not assuming this context is the real context in which Spanish is spoken. In other 
words, what I believe the outcome of communicative-language-teaching 
instruction should be is that, paradoxically, language becomes at times relatively 
transparent, a mediating tool, and at times, an obstacle to be tackled, an object of 
study, perhaps even a science. In both cases, as a tool and as an object, the 
outcome must be adjusted to the context of the classroom but must remain dialogic, 
allowing for a gradual conceptual build-up. Thus, the outcome is a subcultural 
metalanguage, but a language, nevertheless, with an emancipatory vocation. 
 
Alongside Bernstein (1975), I argue that this is an ideal outcome that may or not 
be reflected in the actual pedagogic activity of numerous Japanese tertiary 
institutions. Mastery, therefore, must be defined and needs to be assessed 
according to the pedagogical goals and objectives set in every institution and in 
every course, and, more importantly, according to the actual intersubjective 
practices that take place in and shape those institutions. In other words, the criteria 
to be used in evaluating the ideal know-how should not be placed outside the 
pedagogic activity (p. 136). When I refer to the mastery of oral communication in 
the aforementioned terms I am taking an ideal position that helps me formulate the 
problem to be studied, but this should not be confused with the actual ideals set for 
Spanish as a foreign language pedagogy. This is a basic position that, as we will 
see later, puts the Bernsteinian sociological approach on a different ground 
because it places the pedagogic process within the autonomous field of the 
recontextualisation of knowledge and skills. 
 
The question is why only a small segment of students attain mastery in oral 
communication in Spanish. In contrast, a large segment of the student population 
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achieves some degree of language mastery, but not of the kind one would expect 
in an oral communication class. 
 
My research on resistance to foreign language education at a university not 
specialising in foreign language education actually depicts a grim picture of a great 
majority of students resisting learning Spanish as a foreign language, especially in 
its oral dimension. As a consequence, they hijack the whole pedagogic process so 
that the programme eventually limits the achievement potential of those students 
who are targeting the mastery of conversational skills (Escandón, 2004). The 
assumption is that, knowingly or not, instructors adjust their pedagogies to match 
the expectations of the majority of students. Instructional tasks that target oral 
fluency are interpreted by students in different ways. Some of these ways 
undermine the intent of the task. For the most part, students simulate doing the 
instructional task but they are not really engaged in the process. For instance, they 
do the task but in a mechanical way, sometimes restricting their performance to 
compliance with the very minimum requirements. In this case, the instructor may 
not be able to point out explicitly to the students that they are not doing the task, 
because they are. Most of the problems come from the organisation required in 
order to do the task, that is, its procedural steps. If the procedure is kept open, as is 
the case in instructional tasks informed by the strong version of communicative 
language teaching, students will solve the object of the task by resorting to 
procedural shortcuts. Often, this means that the problem or object of the task is 
solved in Japanese. If the procedure is set and clearly stated, as is the case with 
instructional tasks informed by the weak version of communicative language 
teaching, students may comply with it by doing exactly what is said but 
disregarding the creative potential of the task, its exploratory learning potential, 
including the freedom to express oneself. Communicative tasks may be 
transformed in structural drills or exercises. A course whose initial target is the 
mastery of oral skills may end up becoming a very loosely organised grammar 
course.  
 
Drawing on McVeigh (2002) I define resistance not as ‘a conscious, organized, 
and systematic insurrection against the sociopolitical order’, but as a term that 
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designates ‘actions and attitudes that do not directly challenge but scorn the 
system’ (p. 185). Furthermore, this ‘form of subtle resistance ignores rather than 
threatens and is a type of diversion (if only temporary) from, rather than a 
subversion of, the dominant structures’ (p. 186). What is implied here is that 
students’ resistance is not voluntary. The question is, how does it emerge? One 
may presume that because Spanish instruction takes place in organisations that do 
not specialise in foreign language education, in which students enrol on the 
language programme without a clear goal in mind, resistance is rampant. However, 
my informal observation tells me that although the conditions are better in 
universities specialising in foreign language education, the problem remains 
practically unchanged. Only about one third of the student population attains 
language mastery according to the definition of mastery provided above, even if 
they are enrolled on a four-year intensive Spanish studies undergraduate 
programme. In other words, students who attain mastery of oral communication in 
communicative learning settings do so in spite of rather than because of the 
pedagogic system. 
 
Students are not conscious about their own resistance to learning, and instructors 
may partially disregard the issues of social structure when adjusting their 
instructional methods to match students’ expectations, as these factors may be 
beyond their control. Hence there is no point in deploying exclusively 
ethnographic methodology in which a model that attempts to explain the reasons 
for resistance is to be built by questioning participants, for agents may not be 
aware of the rules of the complete system of determinations. Instructors who are 
native Spanish speakers often lack the power to make changes in the study 
programme. Even instructors who are Japanese native speakers and may have 
more control over the study programme face similar problems. Overall, the 
response is to disregard issues that concern social structure and focus on 
pedagogies instead. This constitutes a severe limitation for bottom-up 
ethnographic approaches such as grounded or constructivist approaches to research 
or tautological notions such as Bourdieu’s (1990, 2000) notion of habitus, on 
which I based my prior research on foreign language education resistance 
(Escandón, 2004). The answer lies in the construction of a model that can clearly 
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explain formation of consciousness and therefore allows us to answer why a 
relatively small segment of the student population attains mastery of oral 
communication in Spanish in communicative learning settings whilst a larger 
segment does not.  
 
4.2.2 A sociogenetic holistic model 
 
The proposed model draws on three theoretical bodies that share a common 
sociogenetic explanation of the formation of consciousness, that is, they all see 
consciousness as emerging out of social relations: Cultural-historical activity 
theory, Bernstein’s theory of codes, and Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural theory. 
Although these theoretical bodies have different strengths in terms of the accuracy 
of the empirical analysis they afford, they have been put together using an 
underlying method that preserves cell-like holistic unity (see chapter 3).  
 
By using the term cultural-historical activity theory I am positioning my research 
with the work of A.N. Leont’ev, as I share his attempt to bridge psychology and 
sociology, but this does not mean that I do not also drawing on the theoretical 
corpora advanced by Vygotsky, Luria and the post-Vygotskian tradition that is 
widely identified as sociocultural theory. Moreover, by cultural-historical activity I 
mean the contributions to the human sciences of the dialectical tradition in general 
as an inherently interdisciplinary (see Blunden, 2010) and emancipatory practical 
endeavour (see Chaiklin, 2012). 
 
In this section I will attempt to summarise the rationale for including these three 
theoretical bodies into one single model by focusing precisely on their relative 
strengths and weaknesses. I will not be able to discuss all the theoretical, 
ontological and epistemological implications of the choices I have made during the 
construction of such a model taking into account their own merits, because that 
would make the present study a piece of philosophical research, but I will offer a 
discussion linked to the particular methodological problem at hand. 
 
First, cultural-historical activity theory with the theoretical scope given above 
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affords an accurate description and analysis of the subject’s transformation as he or 
she engages in inter- and intrasubjective activity by means of internalising 
operations that employ cultural tools. The cultural tool, especially speech (words), 
represents a form of mediation unique to humans inasmuch as they are both stimuli 
and response. In the specific case of speech, words that originally were social, 
external speech, are internalised and help the subject to regulate his or her activity. 
This amounts to a reorganisation of (natural) lower psychological functions that 
opens the way to forms of self-consciousness, self-mastery and, eventually, 
scientific forms of consciousness, that is, the development of higher psychological 
functions. According to Vygotsky (1997a), the methods deployed in the acquisition 
of new forms of behaviour are three; assimilation, invention and imitation (p. 109). 
In every single case the social (intersubjective) plane is ahead of the psychological 
(intrasubjective) plane, a regularity that is dubbed by Vygotsky the ‘genetic law of 
cultural development’ (p. 106). For Vygotsky (1997b), self-consciousness is a 
function of the consciousness of others: ‘I am conscious of myself only to the extent 
that I am another to myself, i.e., to the extent that I can again perceive my own 
reflexes as stimuli’ (p. 77). 
 
Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development may be interpreted, as Robbins (2003) 
does, as an analytical metaphor that helps to represent ‘the fusion of the individual 
and the social setting’ (p. 34). It is an adjustable blueprint or instrumental method 
that helps to assess instruction that is ahead of development, with the purpose of 
developing the child along the aforementioned path. However, these functions and 
the notion of zone of proximal development are problematic in the study of foreign 
language education in adults. On the one hand, the development of higher 
psychological functions cannot be equated with the simple mastery of operations 
at microgenetic level, that is, with an array of disconnected learning tasks (see 
Chaiklin, 2003). On the other hand, the adult learner has already achieved a higher 
degree of self-consciousness and control and therefore the pedagogic approach 
toward foreign language instruction must take into account that the native 
language, both as a semantic and a pragmatic system, is mediating the learning of 




Two sets of issues come to mind. The first set deals with the issue of language 
development, the second with the process of internalisation and the adult learner. 
In language development, what are the operations that need to be mastered in order 
to achieve the mastery of a foreign language, especially of oral communication? 
As is the case with age period in relation to functions in child development, are 
there functions that need to mature first in order to approach other functions? I 
believe the answer is given by A.A. Leont’ev (1981) who views the problem of 
language development as activity. The main parameters of his approach are the 
object of activity and the state of consciousness of the learner. According to this 
approach, there are forms of activity which need to be mastered before the learner 
can move onto fully automatised activity. Thus, ‘foreign language teaching 
compels us to transmute the learner’s speech activity into speech acts and then into 
speech operations – a transition from conscious to fully automatized activity’ (p. 
41). This represents a conception of language development that relies on the 
translation of a communicative intention into speech operations in the foreign 
language. Some activities and operations may seem to have a correlate in SLA 
methods and techniques of instruction. For example, speech activity may be 
considered an equivalent in the deployment of some kind of grammar-translation 
methods, or speech habits may be confused with structural drills. Thus, to a SLA 
practitioner, A.A. Leont’ev’s approach may appear indistinguishable from those 
methods. However, for Leont’ev, there is no single method of instruction that 
serves as a silver bullet. Instructional methods, approaches and techniques are 
deployed inasmuch as they help to develop language in the aforementioned terms. 
Another difference is that instruction is based on Gal’perin’s (1969, 197, 1989a, 
1989b, 1989c, 1992a) controlled learning approach, which requires that instruction 
be carried out by providing the students with concept-based forms of instruction 
that are able to give them a complete orientation to activity.  
 
These two elements – language development as relying on (a) specific 
psychological functions and (b) complete orientation to activity – constitute what I 
believe is the ideal image of language development. Without this idea, we would 
be unable to situate and compare actual pedagogical practices, as it would be 
impossible to locate the actual reaches of the zone of proximal development 
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without a clear description of age period in children’s development. As Wertsch 
(1998) points out, ‘To make even the simplest observation about development, one 
must posit some a priori claims about where this development is headed’ (p. 36). 
Without this benchmark, the whole analysis of pedagogic activity is virtually 
impossible or futile. This also amounts to refusing an understanding of language 
development as dependent on nativist or natural order ideas of acquisition, and a 
strong questioning of current SLA paradigms, such as those based on notions of 
competence.  
 
Turning to the second set of issues, the process of internalisation and the adult 
learner, the main question here is what kind of intramental operation is resistance? 
The student who is resisting foreign language education either has or has not 
internalised the structure of the operations as they have been introduced by the 
instructor and negotiated through the pedagogical relation with students: or the 
way to evaluate the mastery of the operations has been changed and adapted to 
match the lack of internalisation of the intended structure. Can an adult learner 
master an operation without internalising it? The problem lies in reflection, a 
higher psychological function that works by objectivising subjective experience. 
Whilst the structure of any operation is abbreviated and therefore internalised 
through a process full of conflicts in which the subject also resists the cultural tool, 
the process of reflecting on that process produces a form of ontological dualism. It 
is only then that we may differentiate internalisation from both appropriation and 
mastery, after some form of introspection that breaks away the total identification 
with the operation takes place. As Packer (2008) asserts, ‘to know consciousness 
we cannot rely on introspection because in self-examination mind splits into 
subject and object: a dualism arises in the act of self-reflection. We can’t establish 
a psychological science on the basis of what we experience directly (as Husserl 
tried to do); it must be based on knowledge.’ (p. 20). Knowledge is, eventually, 
subject to empirical verification. Even though Packer is referring to introspection 
within the methodological framework of subjective psychology, the principle 
applies to various methods of subject inquiry. Thus, the moment a single question 
is made to (or by) the subject about his or her identification with the means or 
objects of learning, with a particular operation that has been abbreviated, or with 
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any experience in general, we are triggering a process of objectivation that results 
in the ontological dualism subject/object, unless we take a truly scientific stance 
and, as Vygotsky suggests, cited in Packer (2008), we construct our own Das 
Kapital (p. 20). This implies a move toward what Hegel calls ‘absolute 
knowledge’, that is, a kind of knowledge that dissolves the separation between 
subject and predicate, and between theory and empirical evidence or verification. 
This implies that the research subject not only reflects on the means or objects of 
learning but also reaches a final resolution on them through metaphysical 
speculative means. However, to accomplish this kind of task is impossible, for not 
only consciousness but knowledge is fundamentally social, and therefore the 
means to verify knowledge pass necessarily through some further forms of 
objectivation. The contradiction may be sublated, that is buried and overcome, but 
never completely eliminated and there is no way out of it. In sum, it amounts to a 
kind of dialectical empiricism. 
 
What then is the problem with the notion of zone of proximal development applied 
to the development of a foreign language? The main problem we face here is that 
Vygotsky’s account of the genesis of higher mental functions represents an 
abstraction from the social in his quest to understand common traits in human 
ontogenetic development. This move may be interpreted as a form of ontological 
monism (see Robbins, 2003, pp. 31-39), for internalisation would be treated as a 
transformation of the external rather than a reflection of it, or as a form of dualism, 
that is, the actual separation of individual from society (see Sawyer, 2002, p. 294). 
In the former, the terms reflection (as in self-reflection) and introspection are 
methodological anathema. The solution to avert the subject’s self-reflection and 
introspection is Vygotsky’s dual stimulation method, which allows the analysis of 
internal operations externally without introspection. Yet, the use of that method 
keeps reproducing the kind of laboratory and experimental conditions that 
perpetuate the individual/society separation, which is the kind of argument 
contained in the latter position above.    
 
Although Vygotsky conceptualised development as the outcome of conflict and 
crisis, the main contradiction formulated in the notion of internalisation is between 
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natural (and spontaneous) and cultural tool-mediated processes (that depended on 
deliberate instruction), not among the social positions of individuals (and 
institutions) manifested in their different discursive practices, which corresponds 
more to a Bakhtinian stance. Thus, for Bakhtin (1981) ‘The importance of 
struggling with another’s discourse, its influence in the history of an individual’s 
coming to ideological consciousness, is enormous’ (p. 348). It is the latter the one 
that seems more attuned to our endeavour.  
 
I am not suggesting here that intersubjective conflict is not present in Vygotsky’s 
conceptualisation, for any fair reading of Consciousness as a problem for the 
psychology of behaviour will clearly disprove that notion (see Vygotsky, 1997b, 
pp. 63-79), but Vygotsky was concerned first and foremost with putting 
cultural-historical psychology on solid ground in terms of the precise dialectical 
relation between organic (biological) and psychological phenomena, that is, the 
role that ‘reversible reflexes’ (i.e., signs) had in controlling and coordinating 
behaviour (p. 77). In fact, without this empirical work, the claims of the 
workability of the socio-genetic law of development in its intersubjective 
dimension, as representing a unity, could have been easily dismissed. 
 
Let us analyse the problems that emerge from this stance in the construction of a 
methodology able to link social macrostructure with the social microprocesses (e.g. 
instruction aimed at learning something) involved in the formation of 
consciousness. After clarifying the general situation it will be easier to understand 
why I believe the adaptations of the dialectical tradition in SLA have done nothing 
but translate the same problems to this field. Vygotsky was obliged to deploy a 
method of historical investigation of child development, but such an endeavour is 
impracticable and futile in adult foreign language development, for such a method 
cannot but be socially situated. That is an imperative when different learner groups 
do not share the same semantico-pragmatic system, that is, the same native 
language. The conclusions on mind or language development from a given setting 
(e.g., English native speakers learning Spanish versus Japanese native speakers 
learning Spanish) are not mutually transferable. This means that, unlike 
Vygotsky’s history of the development of higher mental functions, its outcome 
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will lack generalisation power as every single native-language-determined 
semantico-pragmatic system mediates foreign language mastery in different ways. 
The question of development in such a case will be reduced to a question of ad hoc 
methods or techniques of instruction. The current SLA approach that draws on 
sociocultural theory, unfortunately, falls into that trap.  
 
Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development is an instrumental method that puts 
together the potential for action of the individual with the historically-constructed 
demands imposed on ontological development, including what is considered an 
appropriate age period and instrumentalised forms of instruction. More specifically, 
there is a dialectical relation between the learner’s personal sense and society’s 
objective meaning, the latter being advanced by the instructor or more 
knowledgeable peer. Cultural-historical activity theory takes this dialectical 
relation beyond and offers analytical ways to understand the relation between 
individual action and collective activity, especially through A.N. Leont’ev’s (1979, 
1981) notion of structure of activity. However, as Blunden (2007) asserts, this 
theorisation is still psychological and falls short of providing an account of the 
particular social formations that frame pedagogic relations. To use sociological 
terminology, historical or social laws are dismissed or neglected and we are only 
left with the life of individuals. In other words, although the historically and 
materially constructed pedagogic objectives and relations are acknowledged, there 
are no analytical tools to understand (a) the sociological background of students 
(e.g., association to a social, political, religious class that distributes experience, 
knowledge or cultural capital, in different ways, especially through their families 
and former schooling) and (b) the intermediary institutions such as school, 
university, the state, the labour market, as corporate loci in which individuals 
collaborate or compete with one another, in which agreement is forged, but also 
places in which conflict emerges.  
 
Even the introduction of apparently innocuous scientific concepts as a way to 
restructure intrasubjective operations (psyche), which is the trademark of 
Vygotsky’s understanding of the development of higher psychological functions 
(see Vygotsky, 1987), must be understood in the cultural context of formal 
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schooling, that is, as fundamentally an ideological process. This process is framed 
differently depending on the subject’s position and on the role that that institution 
seeks to perform within the educational system as a whole, what we could call the 
institution’s position. Therefore, networks of scientific concepts or conceptual 
systems are recontextualised according to the educational aims of each particular 
institution and eventually mean something very different for students, depending 
on the organisation they belong to and the positions they take toward pedagogic 
discourse.  
 
Whilst students’ personal motivations and goal formation are somehow accounted 
for in Vygotskian literature, we do not know much about the children that 
participated in Vygotsky’s research as social subjects. Thus, in the section of 
Thinking and Speech that deals with the development of scientific concepts, in 
which Vygotsky (1987) advances the idea that ‘[i]n scientific concepts, we 
encounter higher levels of thinking than in everyday concepts’ (p. 214), Vygotsky 
never asks the question of the different repertoire of everyday concepts that 
children have access to in order to mediate scientific concepts depending on their 
educational trajectories, including their family background. The only variable that 
is accounted for is ‘age group’ (p. 214), but never social class. In fact, any other 
variable is dismissed: ‘The child performs better on tasks based on scientific 
concepts … It seems unlikely that this is a function of the child’s familiarity with 
the material involved, that he is less familiar with falling off a bicycle or the 
destruction of a ship than with class struggle, exploitation, or the Paris Commune’ 
(p. 214). We do not even know where the data came from, what kind of pupils 
participated in experimental research; if the experiment took place in a laboratory 
and involved children from a vast array of backgrounds or not. Everyday language 
for Vygotsky seems to be evenly distributed among children, when in actual fact it 
is not. As Hasan (2005) asserts, summarising these two important aspects that are 
missing in Vygotskian psychology, ‘“the child” in Vygotsky remains 
undifferentiated; whatever the historical rationale for this, the role of social 
structure and of social positioning is never foregrounded in Vygotsky. It appears 
as if semiotic mediation would have the same efficacy, no matter what the 
environment for the interaction.’ (p. 41)  
180 
 
A.N. Leont’ev (1978, 1979, 1981), in contrast, starts to explore systematically the 
links between social position and meaning within a cultural-historical-activity 
theory theoretical frame. More specifically, A.N. Leont’ev (1978, p. 89) asserts 
that meanings ‘lead a double life’. On the one hand they are objective products of 
social life, having their history in the evolution of language and forms of social 
consciousness, expressing the movement of human knowledge and cognition, ‘as 
well as an ideological representation of society – religious, philosophical, political’. 
As objective products, ‘they are subordinated to social-historical laws’. On the 
other hand, personal sense is concretised in meanings (see also A.A. Leont’ev, 
1977), and therefore they obey ‘the internal logic of their development’ (A.N. 
Leont’ev, 1978, p. 89). This approach puts Vygotsky’s psychology on a different 
ground altogether as it calls for instruments of analysis of collectives (e.g. rules, 
laws and forms of implicit regulation). 
 
The deployment of Vygotskian psychology in the study of SLA, especially in 
studies that draw on the sociocultural tradition or position themselves within that 
tradition (see Lantolf and Thorne, 2006), has fallen into the same conundrum. 
Although a fair and accurate account of the complexity of their distinctions and 
theoretical twists would require a thesis of its own, it suffices to point out here that 
the sociocultural tradition tends to use word meaning, that is, Vygotsky’s (1987, 
pp. 43-51) original formulation, as a unit of analysis of consciousness formation, 
whereas cultural-historical activity theory tends to use activity, that is, A.N. 
Leont’ev’s (1977, p. 182) formulation. Every single approach within the blurry 
limits set by these broad generalisations I am making presents various degrees of 
ontological monism and dualism. In fact, one could not easily argue that 
sociocultural theory preserves Vygotsky’s intended ontological monism whereas 
cultural-historical activity theory does not, for both tend to work within a monist 
ontological framework. Yet, dualist fractures start to appear in practically all 
approaches as soon as we pay attention to the empirical unfolding of theory and 
witness its corrupting pull. Even Vygotsky’s approach is contested, as it can be 
said to embrace individual/social and internal/external dualisms by using the term 




The question is what is meant by socio in sociocultural theory? The answer is 
given forthrightly by Lantolf (2004) when he points out that ‘despite the label 
“sociocultural” the theory is not a theory of the social or of the cultural aspects of 
human existence. … It is, rather … a theory of mind … that recognizes the central 
roles that social relationships and culturally constructed artifacts play in organizing 
uniquely human forms of thinking.’ (pp. 30-31).  
 
Lantolf’s stance seems to work fine when the subject’s position and the position of 
the institution are compatible, but its application can be seriously questioned when 
there is a mismatch between them. Put another way: What do we make of 
individuals who resist what they are taught? That is, students who do not make 
that teaching their own, even though they can show mastery of what has been 
taught, but not of what they should have learned. 
 
Let me give you one example before I expand the problematic implications of the 
SLA sociocultural position. It is quite common for oral communication instructors 
in Japanese universities to evaluate students’ knowledge of grammar through 
written examinations, even though oral communication is the goal of the course. 
Presumably, it is a safe way not to fail the two thirds of the class who resisted oral 
communication instruction. Through everyday practice, this large segment of 
students influences to a great extent the recontextualisation of course objectives 
and methods of instruction and evaluation done by the instructor. In other words, 
this large segment of students pulled the course into their comfort zone and made 
it eventually impossible for the instructor to evaluate the mastery of oral 
communication skills. What kind of zone of proximal development is this? 
 
Lantolf and Thorne (2006) believe that Wertsch’s (1998) notions of appropriation 
and mastery represent a Western reading of Vygotsky’s notion of internalisation 
that breaks away from Vygotsky’s monism. As we have already seen, for Wertsch, 
appropriation is ‘taking something that belongs to others and making it one’s own’, 
whereas mastery refers to ‘knowing how’ (p. 53). An individual may master a 
scientific system or a foreign language but that does not mean that he identifies 
with his or her discursive production. In fact, borrowing from Bakhtin (1981), 
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Wertsch asserts that cultural tools (e.g. words) resist being appropriated: ‘there is 
often resistance, and there [is] minimally something that might be called “friction” 
between mediational means and unique use in mediated action’ (p. 54).  
 
In sum, the above terms were introduced by Wertsch in an attempt to account for  
(a) the individual’s different degrees of control of cultural tools (see also Wertsch 
and Stone, 1985), and (b) the social positioning of individuals in or through 
discourse as having a correlate in different agency structures (Wertsch et al., 1993, 
p. 348). However, for Lantolf and Thorne (2006), Wertsch’s distinction is not 
warranted since the notion of internalisation already contains the conflicting nature 
of cultural ‘artifacts’ (pp. 160-165) and in fact ‘accounts for the organic and 
dialectical relationship between individuals and collectives’ (p. 165). However, as 
already seen, internalisation is also a debatable notion. As Packer (1993) 
maintains, it implies a form of dualism, as it creates a dubious inside/outside 
divide that is hard to sustain from a monist ontological standpoint. Furthermore, 
borrowing from Sawyer (2002), Lantolf and Thorne (2006) subscribe to 
Vygotsky’s ‘analytical separation’ position (p. 165) when they assert that 
‘Vygotsky’s own research on children reflects analytical dualism to the extent that 
while he theoretically underscored the seamless and organic connection between 
the individual and the social, he focused his research on children learning to use 
mediational artifacts outside of the larger sociocultural framework’ (p. 165).  
 
My problem with all this is that whilst Lantolf and Thorne disagree with Wertsch’s 
dualistic position, they embrace Vygotsky’s own brand of dualism. In other words, 
Lantolf and Thorne disregard Wertsch’s incipient introduction of sociological 
categories, in which the political/ideological aspects of cultural tool-mediated acts 
start to emerge, whilst at the same time they (a) emphasise an analysis of mind 
formation in which categories of socio-cultural laws are restricted or absent, which 
amounts to a practical separation of the individual from social intermediate 
formations, and (b) implicitly accept the dualism internal/external activity that is 
contained in the notion of internalisation. 
 
Again, the question is what can we make of the fact that only one third of the 
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student population actually attains mastery in oral communication in settings 
apparently informed by communication language teaching pedagogies? Is this a 
developmental problem to be solved at the instructional level without taking into 
consideration the social positioning of subjects and institutions?  
 
The answer is a difficult one because I still believe that Vygotsky’s ‘word 
meaning’ (1987, p. 47), as a unit of analysis of psychology, does carry the 
contradiction between sense and meaning or, more precisely, the dialectical 
relation between sense, which obeys the laws of individual development, and 
meaning, which is subject to socio-historical laws. The problem is how to unfold 
this unit empirically. In other words, the problem is of method, rather than 
assuming a non-compromised dialectical, monist, inseparability-driven theoretical 
stance.  
 
In this regard, the research conducted by Wertsch (1998, 2002), which looks at (a) 
the appropriation of collective, historical discourse, as being capable of shaping 
individuals’ experience as if they were direct witnesses of history, and (b) the 
mastery of accounts in which people are bonded to official discourse in public 
settings, but they resist them in private settings, achieves a sociological dimension 
that is difficult to find in other sociocultural research. Wertsch (2002), for that 
matter, bases his work by exploring the tension between ‘agent’ and ‘cultural 
tools’ (p. 6) under the notion of ‘mediated action’ (p. 6), which is another way of 
phrasing Vygotsky’s unit of ‘word meaning’ (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 47) or ‘complex 
mediated act’ (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 40). Thus, the question is how researchers who 
could be considered to be inscribed within SLA’s sociocultural school are 
empirically unfolding Vygotsky’s unit rather than judging the works by the 
contents of superficial labels.  
 
This is why I hold the view that the theoretical gap between sociocultural theory, 
which works with a unit of analysis that focuses on semiotic mediation, and 
cultural-historical activity theory, which works with a unit of analysis that focuses 
on activity, is not significant at the theoretical but at the empirical level when the 
chosen unit is unfolded in empirical research. Unfortunately, most of the research 
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in SLA that draws on Lantolf and Thorne (2006) or that positions itself as 
sociocultural falls short of accounting for the social position of subjects and 
institutions, leaving agency almost completely unaccounted for (see Aljaafreh and 
Lantolf, 1994; Antón, 1999, 2003; Lantolf, 1994; Negueruela, 2003, 2008), unless 
they draw on activity theory, in which case a more robust sociological standpoint 
is assumed (see Thorne, 2005). However, as I have tried to demonstrate, even 
activity theory does not address well enough the issues of social macrostructure.  
 
I believe the method introduced in chapter 3, which I summarise again as the 
expansion of the notion of subject, allows the incorporation of the sociological and 
psychological dimensions of these two post-Vygotskian schools and represents an 
alternative solution to Sawyer’s (2002, p. 297) proposed ‘analytic dualism’ 
whereby individual and society are viewed as essentially interrelated but 
analytically distinct. Furthermore, instead of seeking to confront both units of 
analysis, I explore the notion of subject as a bridge that helps to incorporate the 
psychological and sociological dimensions of mediation. 
 
Second, Bernstein’s (2000) code theory partially addresses the problem 
encountered by cultural-historical activity theory above by advancing empirical 
ways of accounting for social formations. Bernstein’s theory focuses on pedagogy 
as a device that regulates consciousness through (a) the appropriation of the 
knowledge that is being produced in different production fields, (b) the 
recontextualisation of that knowledge through the pedagogic practice, and (c) the 
evaluation of the recontextualisation process, which actually acts as a ruler of the 
device and of the intended consciousness. The accent is put on pedagogic 
discourse as a ‘recontextualising principle’ (p. 33). This amounts to placing the 
accurate analysis of subject transformation that is afforded by cultural-historical 
activity theory within the context of pedagogic relations that regulate meaning 
potential. In other words, if cultural-historical activity theory views the pedagogic 
process that takes place, for instance, in the zone of proximal development, as 
relying on language and framed within the contradiction between personal 
meaning (individual action) and objective meaning (collective activity), in 
Bernstein’s theory the process relies on pedagogic discourse, which actually 
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constrains or enhances the realisation of those meanings.  
 
Besides observing the contradictions between individual action and collective 
activity, which is the method deployed in cultural-historical activity theory, 
Bernstein’s formulation of the pedagogic device allow us to observe (a) the 
arbitrariness of the boundaries established among categories (e.g., 
institutional-labour market relations, subject-matters and curricula, vertical or 
horizontal relations among faculty); (b) the principles of control of pedagogic 
practice and the assertion of moral or social order regulation; and (c) the critical 
moment of evaluation of students’ textual production as complying or not with 
what is considered adequate realisation. This critical moment actually reveals the 
hidden social order values that inform pedagogic practice and make it possible to 
assess pedagogic identities and positions towards the means and ends of 
instruction and social order rules. 
 
Third, Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural theory affords an accurate analysis of 
identity, which is the most visible aspect of consciousness. Their notion of figured 
worlds, which could be defined as the subject’s historical development and 
continuous construction of a self-narrative in his or her everyday life by resorting 
to multiple and often contradictory voices, what Bakhtin (1981) calls heteroglossia, 
enters into contradiction with the subject’s self-asserted social position. This 
dialectic relation affords a complex depiction of the subject’s potential for future 
activity or agency.  
 
Borrowing from Bakhtin and Vygotsky, Holland et al. (2001) conceive the 
Bakhtinian space of authoring as a particular zone of proximal development: 
‘Vygotsky leads us to look at a more asocial, developmental effect of cultural 
forms, as mediating devices of consciousness. Bakhtin leads us to capture the 
ongoing social struggles, and the continuous social demands, the responsibility of 
“answering,” that follow along with the symbolic gift.’ (pp. 185-186). Drawing on 
Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism, which views consciousness and identity as 
intrinsically dialogical, they assert that ‘Identity, as the expressible relationship to 
others, is dialogical at both moments of expression, listening and speaking’ (p. 
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172). This constitutes the core of their ethnographic method to capture the space of 
positional identities. Thus, a positional identity is ‘a person’s apprehension of her 
social position in a lived world: that is, depending on the others present, of here 
greater or lesser access to spaces, activities, genres, and, through those genres, 
authoritative voices or any voice at all’ (pp. 127-128). In sum, discursive practices 
form a system of semiotic references that are used by individuals to position 
themselves, but the act of positioning is inherently a historical and social 
undertaking, not an abstract or individual one, because the individual depends on 
distributed forms of semiotic mediation to voice him- or herself. These forms are 
historically constructed by collectives but also, ontogenetically, by the individual 
throughout the social relations in which he or she takes part. 
  
There are striking similarities between Bernstein’s notion of identity and Holland 
and colleagues’ notion of figured world. For Bernstein, identity is built upon 
principles of external (social) and internal (individual) classification, in terms of 
the boundaries set to create order and suppress the ‘contradictions, cleavages and 
dilemmas’ of the social world and its categories (p. 7). Identity amounts to a 
‘psychic defence’ that is constituted internally and externally to suppress 
arbitrariness. Holland and colleagues, drawing on Bakhtin, make a similar case in 
terms of coming to terms through discursive practices to the internal and external 
conflict presupposed in language. Identity, under both conceptualisations, is hardly 
permanent but is constantly forming because it is itself a social category.     
 
I also see a strong connection between some aspects of Bernstein’s method of 
assessing subject position and identity and Holland and colleagues’ ethnographic 
approach. Bernstein (2000) asserts that in pedagogic practices the strength 
between categories (classification) and differences in the principles of discursive 
control within them (framing) create different forms of ‘labelling’ of students (p. 
13), especially when the labelling is done by instructors (Bernstein, 1996, pp. 
106-113) and they have to set boundaries between different ‘expectations about 
conduct, character and manner’ (Bernstein, 2000, p. 13). The assessment of such 
labelling can take the form suggested by Holland and colleagues through their 
ethnographic study of subject positions and identity in a figured world of 
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self-narratives. However, figured world is a far wider notion that also allows 
exploration of the potential for future activity or agency. Whilst I believe 
Bernstein’s notion of ‘labelling’ can be deployed, it is mainly constrained to the 
assessment of past achievement from the perspective of instructors, but lacks a 
projection of potential from the perspective of students.      
 
 
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.3.1 Research questions 
 
Because the model is framed as an external language of description resting on a 
fundamental underlying hypothesis, although it can be reformulated depending on 
the findings, the model itself needs to be tested. Therefore, the pedagogical 
question has a correlate in terms of the theoretical and methodological system that 
will be put in place to address it. Thus, the questions that frame this study belong 
to two groups. They correspond to the two goals of the study, theoretical and 
pedagogical, which reveal the dialectical relationship between the actual empirical, 
pedagogic problem and the method that needs to be developed in order to address 
it.  
 
QUESTION 1 (THEORETICAL PROBLEM): How do the structural conditions of 
university organisation modulate subject position, social relations and discourse 
and therefore shape individual consciousness and activity? 
 
QUESTION 2 (PEDAGOGICAL PROBLEM): What sort of common trajectory, 
pedagogic identity and coding orientation (consciousness) enables a relatively 
small segment of students to attain higher levels of language mastery (active 
realisation) in Spanish as a foreign language learning settings informed by 
communicative language teaching? 
 
As can be seen, the questions have been framed within the methodological 
framework advanced in the previous chapter, which combines Bernstein’s code 
theory, cultural-historical activity theory and Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural 
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theory. The assumptions (a priori) of QUESTION 2 are contained in QUESTION 
1 and reflect the basic Bernsteinian stance that says that social structure has a 
correlate in terms of learners’ realisation of discourse (mastery). In other words, 
the social structure, that is, the way power is distributed creating boundaries 
between disciplines, social groups, and the principles of control of the activity that 
occurs within those boundaries, enter the pedagogic discourse creating different 
forms of consciousness and temporary identities. Discourse itself can be defined as 
socially-situated language and therefore inherent in discourse is the social position 
of subjects.  
 
According to the methodology advanced in chapter 3, the method proposed is to 
ascertain students’ subject position by working with a Hegelian notion of subject 
in which all the determinations are accounted for, represented by the three 
moments of subject: psyche-activity-culture. This implies the deployment of the 
notion of pedagogic discourse, whose unit of analysis is the task, that is, individual 
motive-action in relation to societal motive-activity, which allows to ascertaining 
development targets and paths and assign them a pedagogic code. Tasks are coded 
by deploying Bernstein’s code theory in terms of orientations (or forms of 
consciousness) to discourse (from elaborated to restricted), that is, variations in 
the strength of classification and framing, or pedagogic code. This allows 
recontextualising communicative language learning pedagogies under our 
dialectical framework of reference. Subject position is ascertained in terms of 
discourse recognition (passive realisation) as a function of students’ trajectories 
(aggregation of activity systems as a function of class structure) and discourse 
realisation (active realisation). The former is ascertained by assessing students’ 
trajectories and presenting students with discourse fragments and having them 
classify them according to their origin (belonging to either grammar or 
communication). The latter is ascertained by analysing the system of labelling 
used by instructors within the figured world of students, and by exploring the way 
students reflect about the figured world of learning Spanish as a foreign language, 
that is, their position and potential for future activity in terms of their desired 
development vector vis-à-vis their learning objectives. Finally, the pedagogic 
identity of students is conceived as the particular relationship that takes place 
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between trajectory, orientation and the potential for future action, represented by 
students preferred development path in order to attain their learning objectives 
within the system of demands on active realisation imposed by instructors in 
particular learning settings. 
 
I will come back to these procedures after introducing the organisations and 
participants secured for the study, as the former had to be adjusted in light of the 
asymmetries of access presented by the latter. 
 
4.3.2 Overview of research design 
 
As already seen in chapter 3, the purpose of the study is to contribute as much as 
possible to the improvement of the pedagogical conditions in foreign language 
education at the tertiary level in Japan in two of the most common institutional 
settings: universities specialising in the teaching of foreign languages and colleges 
that do not specialise in foreign language education. This implies that certain 
comparisons need to be made between both kinds of settings. Furthermore, the 
method essayed in chapter 3 and the model essayed in the previous sections calls 
for the use of a mixed-model research in which, broadly speaking, sociological, 
psychological and ethnographic research instruments can be deployed. The 
aforementioned procedures demand putting together qualitative and quantitative 
methods and instruments. Thus, the most feasible approach is a mixed-model 
research comprising longitudinal case studies.  
 
Originally, I planned to conduct three longitudinal case studies. However, the first 
of the three cases had to be terminated without completing the designed research 
procedures because of a complete programme reshuffle done by one of the 
programme heads. The reshuffle consisted of assigning first-year students, 
including those who were part of the original cohort, to different communication 
instructors in the middle of the semester. Although I could have incorporated the 
reshuffle as part of the development of the conditions of the study programme, I 
did not have personal contact with the new instructors. The original instructors 
managed to pass the new instructors the final questionnaires to be administered to 
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student participants and collect them back, but the relationship with the new 
instructors was indirect and did not allow me to collect enough qualitative data 
regarding the students’ evaluations. Consequently, the longitudinal case study was 
abruptly terminated after the administration of the final questionnaire, lacking 
important data on students’ academic achievement during the last half of the 
course. However, the data collected before the reshuffle informed the procedures 
of the other two case studies and therefore I am compelled to incorporate it here as 
a case study, although in fact it does not constitute a longitudinal case study.   
 
The second one was successfully completed but lacked the ethnographic 
dimension of the third case, due to certain access restrictions. Nevertheless, I may 
say with some degree of confidence that the second and third cases, involving a 
university not specialising in foreign language education and another one 
specialising in foreign language education, comply with the intended research 
design. In this section I will systematically return to the issue between ideal 
research design and the actual conditions in which research was conducted, 
including the order in which some instruments had to be designed, validated and 
tried across case studies.  
 
4.3.3 Case studies 
 
I will now introduce the particular organisations that took part in the case studies. 
This is because, as I have already mentioned, the instruments of analysis are not 
only an extension of the methodology and method introduced in the previous 
chapter, and the above model, but had to be adapted to match the asymmetric 
access I had to the organisations that were studied. After this, I will offer a 
panoramic view of the procedures adjusted to the actual conditions I encountered 
in the field. In other words, the revised procedures that will be introduced later are 
the result of the clash between intended method and available field resources. 
 
I conducted case studies in three higher education institutions (AU, BU and CU, see 
below). Each case study comprised two courses – one grammar and one 
communication course – with their respective instructors and students. The differences 
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in access to the participants in these organisations made me develop more or less 
qualitative and quantitative research approaches. In other words, even if I had 
envisioned a qualitative approach based, for instance, on the extensive use of 
interviews with student participants, I had to adapt it and use open questions through 
questionnaires to get the data I was looking for. For example, in some cases, I could 
not observe directly the classes being taught (e.g. in AU and BU) because of schedule 
constraints or because the institution did not support pedagogic research and imposed 
many restrictions on pedagogic research either from internal or external researchers. In 
those cases I could only make audio recordings of classroom interaction in order to 
codify discursive practices and reach student participants by means of questionnaires. 
Furthermore, as already mentioned, my collection of AU’s data ended prematurely 
due to a sudden rearrangement of instructors and courses. This was a major setback 
for the research. However, I could still use the data already gathered from AU to 
inform other data collection procedures involving BU and CU. The longitudinal as 
such could therefore only be completed for BU and CU. In the case of CU, I had 
complete access to courses and faculty because the university supports pedagogic 
research. In fact, faculty members were not only keen to grant access but also willing 
to work together with researchers in order to produce interventions. Pedagogy is not 
seen as something static but subject to periodic evaluation and improvement by 
research means. In other words, the institutional settings vary greatly. Some of them 
allow a kind of positivist approach to research (use of questionnaires, audio recordings 
or anything that does not substantively alter the normal functioning of courses) but 
others allow more interventionist research approaches (including classroom 
observation, video recordings, interviews with students, and more importantly, 
reshaping pedagogy itself depending on the nature of the research). In sum, the former 
view research as mere observation of the pedagogic process, whilst the latter see 
research as an intervention in the pedagogic process. This is not to say that observation 
is not a form of intervention, which it is, but the stance of the researcher is that of the 
outsider. This may well reflect the degree of engagement of those universities to the 
fields of production of discourse. Less access granted to researchers may signal a 
stronger recontextualising role of (disciplinary) discourses by the part of the institution. 
In contrast, more access granted to researchers may signal that the institution is not 
only engaged in recontextualising (disciplinary) discourses but also producing them, 
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that is, it is an interlocutor in the field of production of disciplinary discourses (e.g. 
linguistics, psycholinguistics, applied linguistics, SLA) or the field of production of 
Spanish discourse (e.g. by participating in Spanish-language media, cultural events, 
etc.).  
 
Overall, I must emphasise that conducting any kind of empirical study in Japan in 
this area of research is quite difficult because of lack of access, especially to the 
courses taught by Japanese instructors. Japanese instructors tend not to specialise in 
pedagogy, applied linguistics or SLA but rather in Spanish philology, linguistics and 
area studies. Therefore, they do not have a culture of research involving student 
participants or pedagogies. Higher education institutions tend to build a wall around 
themselves that separates them from competitors. Citing Amano (1979), McVeigh 
(2002) asserts that Japanese professors identify first as members of their universities 
rather than as experts in their specialism (p. 139). Collaboration among local 
institutions is not common. However, local institutions, especially if they are 
involved in foreign language teaching and studies, do favour creating partnerships 
with foreign universities. Another problem is that even if native Spanish speakers 
teaching in Japan are more accustomed to researching pedagogy, they tend to rank 
lower in terms of faculty hierarchy. They usually are part-time instructors or 
lecturers and tend not to have control over the study programmes. I feel lucky to 
have been able to muster all the support I received from all the instructors, students 
and institutions involved in the present study. As a result I believe it gives a good 
account of the kind of institutions involved in foreign language education at the 
tertiary level in Japan. I am very grateful to each and every one of them for working 
with me. 
 
The rationale for choosing particular organisations and courses with the aim of 
conducting case studies was based on the principles outlined in chapter 3, that is, the 
need to cover the widest range possible of organisational and pedagogical contexts, 
including institutions specialising in foreign language education and those that do 
not specialise in this area, and the need to cover the grammar-communication 
curricular divide. The idea is that the study achieves the highest possible degree of 
generalisation and, therefore, can contribute to the improvement of a wide array of 
193 
 
pedagogic contexts. I chose a beginners’ course from each institution to limit the 
number of confounding variables within institutions, since the variety of study 
programmes adds more asymmetry to the students’ background and makes it more 
difficult to trace the trajectories of individual student participants. For example, 
students studying at an organisation specialising in foreign language education may 
participate in study-abroad programmes from their second year of study, whilst 
students studying at organisations that do not specialise in foreign language 
education may not have access to that kind of programme. In other words, it is 
difficult to compare a second-year or third-year programme at a university 
specialising in foreign language education with one at a university not specialising 




4.4 DATA COLLECTION 
 
Data on student participants from AU and BU were collected over a semester, of 
fourteen and fifteen weeks respectively, during autumn 2007. Data on student 
participants from CU were collected over two fourteen-week semesters starting in 
autumn 2008 and ending in winter 2009. There are two main sets of data for this 
category: (a) personal and trajectory data; and (b) recognition of instructional 
discourse data. The number of participants compared with the number of students 
enrolled in the programmes per organisation is given in Table 4.1. The disparity 
between the number of enrolled students and participants is the result of students 
who (a) decided not to participate in the study or (b) answered questionnaires in an 
incomplete and careless way, and (c) students whose data sets were incomplete 









Table 4.1 Summary of student participants  
 
   Participants  
Organisation No. of students enrolled in 
both Grammar and 
Communication Courses 
 
Male Female  
 
Total 
AU         6                  1 3  4 
BU  27  6 13  19 
CU 21  3 10  13 
       




Data on and from instructor participants were collected, respectively, over a similar 
time span but lasted four weeks longer. There are four main sets of data for this 
category: (a) trajectory and organisational data; (b) validation of the recognition 
instrument of analysis data; (c) students’ realisation data; and (d) labelling of 
students’ data.  
 
The different data and data sets will be described more comprehensively in the 
following sections due to the complexity presented by a mixed research method in 
terms of the intertwining of the data along different procedures. 
 
Data collection on classroom interaction in AU and BU started in the first week of 
May 2007 with audio recordings of three consecutive classes each in both grammar 
and communication courses. Data collection on classroom interaction in CU started 
in the third week of May 2008 with the audio and video recording of three 
consecutive grammar classes and of two consecutive communication classes. 
 
4.4.1 Overview of organisations and participants 
 
The next sections present information about the institutions, courses, curricula and 
participants. The names of the institutions and the participants have been coded to 
protect their privacy, since all participants were ensured anonymity. Written consent 
was obtained from all instructor participants at the beginning of the study. Student 
participants were informed of the aims of the study at each stage in which they were 
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involved, written consent was obtained from them, and they were informed that they 
were permitted to withdraw from the study at any time (see Appendix 4A). 
 
4.4.2 ‘A’ University (AU) specialising in the teaching of Spanish as a foreign 
language 
 
4.4.2.1 Female foreign instructor teaching communication (GI) 
 
GI, a native Spanish speaker, started teaching Spanish as a foreign language as a 
part-time instructor in a small language school where she was active for three years. 
She then started teaching Spanish as a foreign language part-time at the secondary 
level, a position that she had held until the time of the data collection. In 2003, she 
started teaching part-time at the tertiary level, in two colleges specialising in foreign 
language education, positions that she also held at the time the data collection took 
place. Her educational background is in the humanities but in a field completely 
different from language education. 
 
The reason I became a Spanish instructor is not clear. It was not a meditated 
decision. I let myself fall into it because it enabled me to find a job quickly. 
After teaching for a while, I started liking it. I thought, to my surprise, that it 
was something that I could do relatively well. I believe the most important 
thing is to develop in the students the interest and curiosity for the language 
and the cultures where Spanish is spoken. If this is achieved, students will 
know how to find the best way to learn what they need to learn by themselves. 
As an instructor, what I believe is the most important is not that students learn 
many grammatical structures or a large vocabulary but to make them feel 
interested. The Spanish language is too complex to be learnt the way other 
subjects are learnt. Students cannot study for an examination and forget 
everything the next day. That’s nonsense. My students always ask me for the 
contents that will be covered in the exam and I always answer them: from 
page one. If a student understands this and works to achieve it, his learning 
will be satisfactory. The one who studies the most is not the one who learns 
the most but the one who keeps alert inside and outside the classroom. The 
good student must be interested in the subject and I believe that in order to do 
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that she has to have a clear objective. That objective can be very peculiar, but 
nonetheless [it] is an objective. Students should be open minded, not come to 
class with a prejudice, something that is very common. Japanese students 
have a fixed idea of what their chances to succeed are, how their learning 
process should be and how the instructor should teach, even before attending 
the first session. If something does not match their ideas, they just feel lost and 
do not pay attention any more. Their active participation in the classroom is 
very important, more than what they can do in their homes. 
 
4.4.2.2 Female Japanese instructor teaching communication/grammar (MI) 
 
MI started teaching Spanish part-time as a foreign language at the tertiary level after 
finishing her MA in Latin American literature. She had completed a BA in Spanish 
philology in one of the few public foreign-studies colleges that exist in Japan. At the 
time of the data collection she was holding part-time positions as an instructor in 
four different colleges. Overall, she had been teaching for a period of ten years, 
especially Spanish grammar. 
 
After finishing my MA there was no alternative. Students have to work by 
themselves. The most difficult aspect of teaching is to prepare well ahead 
what one is going to teach. Japanese students get easily confused if there is 
some twist in the teaching sequence. Students have to work, think and be 
active. I think that what distinguishes my teaching from other colleagues is 
that I make students work hard and think a lot. 
 
4.4.2.3 AU’s programme and cohort 
 
The cohort of students at AU comprised a first-year Spanish communication class 
(one of four classes in AU’s Spanish language programme, with each class 
containing approximately seven students). The first-year Spanish communication 
course lasted two semesters (28 weeks in total) and consisted of two lessons per 
week (90 minutes each) for each class. In the year of the study, the head of the 
department decided to rotate the instructors teaching all four first-year 
communication classes. Therefore, the instructors who participated in the study were 
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required to hand over their classes in the middle of the semester to a new pair of 
colleagues. The reasoning behind this decision was to have the only Spanish native 
speaker, GI, teaching every first-year class during the whole year. Consequently, GI 
and MI taught their respective cohorts and then moved on to teach another first-year 
class. The study programme included two 90-minute sessions of grammar, one 
90-minute session of language drills, and one 90-minute session of composition per 
week. This curricular change was announced after the data collection had started and 
compromised the scope of the analysis, as will be shown below.  
 
4.4.3 ‘B’ University (BU), not specialising in the teaching of Spanish as a 
foreign language 
 
4.4.3.1 Male foreign instructor teaching communication (JO) 
 
JO began teaching Spanish as a foreign language at the tertiary level in a university 
specialising in foreign language education. At the time of the data collection, he had 
completed an MA in Spanish as a foreign language through distance learning and 
was teaching Spanish as a foreign language full-time in one college and part-time 
once a week in another one. His prior education had been in the humanities but in a 
field completely different from language education. He had been teaching in Japan 
for seven years, especially Spanish communication. 
 
Teaching Spanish was a way to secure a living in Japan. At the beginning, I 
wanted to work in another field and supplement my income by teaching 
Spanish as a foreign language, but soon the opposite started to happen. I 
would be satisfied if my students could express themselves in Spanish to carry 
out everyday activities, such as shopping at the supermarket, giving directions, 
introducing themselves, talking about their birthplace or their family. Students 
should know why they are studying Spanish. Perhaps, I would recommend 
they take a virtual tour around the Spanish-speaking world to see what is 
underneath the language. Students should be bold and have a positive attitude 
towards learning. They should pay attention and be focused during class. 
They should never be afraid of making mistakes. They should also come to 
class with the purpose of making the most of the time that they practise with 
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their peers and to ask me what they don’t understand. My Japanese 
colleagues teach grammar through many explanations and repetition, 
substitution and translation exercises. About my native [Spanish-speaking] 
colleagues, some use new technologies, some follow a rather notio-functional 
method. 
 
4.4.3.2 Female Japanese instructor teaching grammar (YU) 
 
YU’s educational background was a BA in Spanish philology. She had completed an 
MA in Spain, where she had also worked as a Spanish-Japanese interpreter and 
translator. At the time of the data collection YU was teaching Spanish grammar 
part-time in a couple of universities. She had been teaching in Japan for ten years. 
 
I believe I have to create the conditions for students to ask me questions. I 
would like them to be happy and feel satisfied about acquiring new knowledge. 
They should pay attention, be focused and enjoy what they do. I think during 
the class I speak much more in Spanish than my Japanese colleagues. 
 
4.4.3.3 BU’s programme and cohort 
 
The cohort at BU was formed by thirty first-year students belonging to the Faculty 
of Social Sciences registered in the programme. The first-year Spanish programme 
lasted two semesters (30 weeks in total). Courses on which data were collected are 
first-semester communication (one 90-minute session per week) and grammar (one 
90-minute session per week). The study programme included another 90-minute 
session of grammar per week delivered by a grammar instructor other than YU. 
 
4.4.4 ‘C’ University (CU), specialising in the teaching of Spanish as a foreign 
language 
 
4.4.4.1 Female foreign instructor teaching communication (MO) 
 
MO started teaching Spanish as a foreign language in CU after completing her 
masters and doctoral studies in linguistics overseas. At the time of the data 
collection she had been holding a tenured post for the last ten years. Apart from 
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teaching Spanish as a foreign language she was teaching linguistics, SLA, and was 
tutoring Japanese and international students enrolled in CU’s BA and MA 
programmes. 
 
I began teaching Spanish because the MA and PhD programme required me 
to become a teaching assistant. I came to Japan through an exchange 
programme and I was offered a job here. Instructors should know what 
students’ requirements and demands are so that they can perform as guides. 
Learning languages is painful, there is suffering. It is not that instructors 
teach, [but rather that] students learn, and therefore instructors are guides 
and they have to be aware of the particular suffering their students are going 
through so that they can help them out. Students have different methods of 
learning. The ones who are very successful, and every year we have one of 
those in our courses, are the ones who are dedicated and don’t work part time. 
They spend many hours studying, reading, looking words up. They are not 
particularly communicative. I know other kinds of students as well. They are 
nice, communicative students, but it is not clear if they can outperform the 
students of the first kind. Practice is not enough. In order to learn a foreign 
language there is real dedication and hard studying going on. Japanese 
instructors focus on grammar and translation, especially translation. My 
native-speaker colleagues focus on communication. 
 
4.4.4.2 Male Japanese instructor teaching grammar (NO) 
 
NO studied Spanish philology at one of the public foreign-studies colleges, 
completing his MA there. After graduating, he gained a tenured post and began 
teaching Spanish grammar and literature. He then completed his doctoral studies in 
Spain in the field of linguistics. At the time of the data collection he had been 
teaching Spanish for more than thirty years. 
 
I would like students to love the Spanish language and the Hispanic culture. I 
would like them to acquire a minimal but solid knowledge of the Spanish 
language. If you are not interested in the target language, you don’t want to 
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study it. And it is necessary to give an incentive to the students to learn the 
vocabulary and the grammatical rules by heart. The most important thing we 
have to do is to know properly the level students are in and what they want to 
learn. A course is co-work done by the instructor and the students. It is 
important to avoid producing an instructor’s monologue that gets the 
audience bored. Students who are interested and curious about other cultures, 
the language system and who become involved in the course’s activities are 
successful. My Japanese colleagues spend more time explaining the 
grammatical rules and translating. My native-speaker colleagues carry out 
more communicative activities. I am in between both methods. 
 
4.4.4.3 CU’s programme and cohort 
 
The cohort at CU comprises twenty-one first-year students registered in a 
programme leading to a major in Spanish language. The programme, during its first 
year, consists of six mandatory subjects: Grammar 1, Grammar 2, Reading and 
Grammar, Pronunciation and Grammar, Language Laboratory and Communication. 
All subjects are taught for one 90-minute session per week. The first-year 
programme lasted two semesters (28 weeks in total). The data was drawn from the 
two-semester Grammar 1 and Communication participants. 
 
 
4.5 DATA COLLECTION AND DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 
 
Each procedure below is linked to a subset of research questions called procedural 
questions. Some of them call for the development of or are framed under 
qualitative or quantitative research methods or instruments. Some procedures 
comprise more than one research instrument, mixing qualitative and quantitative 
methods. In this section I will present the intended outcome of the procedure, the 
actual procedural questions and I will explain what part of the procedure has 
already been carried out and what is left to carry out during the data analysis stage. 
I will also be commenting on the ethical implications of the data collection and 
analysis, including the position and attitude towards data collection and analysis 
from participants. Thus, rather than having a separate section dealing with the 
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ethical implications of the data collection and analysis, these will be given for each 
procedure in the form of commentary. 
 
4.5.1 Ascertaining the pedagogic code of tasks 
 
There are three intended outcomes for this procedure. The first is a description of 
development paths in terms of moves (top-down, bottom-up) within the zone of 
practical development and the motive-activity structure per task. The second is the 
possibility of comparing pedagogies across learning and organisational settings 
according to the development targets set by the instructor and negotiated with 
students during classroom interaction. The third is a description of the task in 
terms of orientation (relevance of meanings) or consciousness requirements, that is, 
the coding orientation of the task. 
 
4.5.1.1 Research questions 
 
PROCEDURAL QUESTION 1: How do foreign language pedagogies in different 
organisations and learning settings compare in terms of tasks (motive-activity 
structure)? 
 
PROCEDURAL QUESTION 2: What pedagogic code do organisations and 




The procedure is based on segmenting the classroom interaction continuum into 
tasks, in terms of the operationalisation of actions done by the instructor according 
to the relationship between motive-action and motive-activity. This is the first step 
needed in order to translate plain interaction into discourse and relies on the 
transcription of audio-recordings of classroom interaction. The segmenting is 
based on A.A. Leont’ev’s (1981) views of language development as an overall 
transition from speech activity to communication activity, Gal’perin’s (1969, 197, 
1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992a) views on the state of consciousness and degrees of 
automaticity, and Robbins’ (2003, p. 84) notions of reactive and active speech. 
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Thus, every single task, understood as the operationalisation of motive-action, is 
classified according to the motive-activity structure (foundation, structural, 
functional, rhetorical). Another category was added: management. Management is 
defined as the activity aimed at administering the course. In cases in which the 
management of the course coincides with another category of the motive-activity 
structure, especially with foundation motive-activity, the latter takes precedence. 
For instance, if an instructor uses the roll-call either to teach or to have students 
practise some aspect of the foreign language, the activity will not count as 
management but as either foundation or structural. The instrument to be used in 
this classification is contained in chapter 3, Table 3.1. It amounts to a theoretical 
extension of several theoretical bodies which have been subject to empirical 
verification by their respective authors. In other words, they are not solely 
speculative theoretical bodies. Every segmented task is then coded by deploying 
Bernstein’s code theory in terms of orientations (or forms of consciousness) to 
discourse (from elaborated to restricted), that is, variations in the strength of 
classification and framing, or pedagogic code, which constitutes the second step 
toward transforming classroom interaction into discourse. For Bernstein, 
pedagogic identities – understood as forms of consciousness –, and therefore 
subject position, are predicated on particular modes of practice that can be 
described using descriptors to assess different modes of pedagogic practices or 
‘pedagogic codes’ (Bernstein, 2000, p. 99). This language of description emerges 
from an analysis of (a) the distribution of power, which creates and maintains 
boundaries in organisational form (classification/structural level), and the 
principles of control that regulate communication within specific forms of 
interaction (framing/interactional level). The overall framework is contained in 
Daniels’s (1995) and Morais and Neves’s (2001) description of classification and 
framing relations (spaces, agents, discourses, subjects) (see chapter 3, Figure 3.3). 
 
In conclusion, we may argue that pedagogic discourse, as an analytical research 
method, is the outcome of a simplified rendition of pedagogic interaction, a written 
(linguistic) representation that condenses but also helps to expand analytically the 
role of agents in a given setting during the very process of production of the 
setting according to precise coding filters. These filters help to objectivise those 
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agents’ activity objects trying to preserve the complexity of the whole. More 
succinctly put, discourse is a form of representation of subject position.  
  
The translation of interaction into activity and eventually into discourse, properly 
speaking, through systematic structured observation, was subject to many biases 
that are worth noting. Some of those biases are the inherent product of the 
procedure itself, as it constitutes a reductionist version of interaction (e.g., using 
A.N. Leont’ev’s notion of activity structure, A.A. Leont’ev’s notion of speech 
activity, and Bernstein’s notion of pedagogic code to make sense of interaction), 
but some others correspond to the actual practical choices that I had to make in 
order to gather, structure, and analyse data (e.g., the placing of the IC audio 
recorders in the classroom and the place the researcher occupied when video 
recording classroom interaction). 
 
The transcriptions tried to preserve the complexity and sense of the activity and 
discourse but they do not constitute a reflection of activity or discourse, for they 
are a projection of the researcher’s ideas about what activity and discourse really 
consisted of. As a condensation that is based on linguistic means, transcripts 
contain the researcher’s position.         
 
In the case of AU and BU, classroom interaction was recorded using IC audio 
recorders. The recorders were worn by the instructor participants about the neck, 
picking up instructor-student interaction and some background sound, but the 
recordings did not sufficiently pick up students’ interactions that were occurring 
away from the instructor. Therefore, along with the interviews held with instructor 
participants, half a dozen questions were asked with the aim of clarifying what was 
happening in the classroom, especially in terms of spatial dispositions. This 
implied the introduction of the instructor’s bias into the interaction codification. In 
the case of CU, it was not necessary to resort to explanations about classroom 
interaction, since the sessions were not only audio-recorded in a similar way but 
also video-recorded. I video-recorded the communication instructor’s sessions, and 
an assistant recorded the grammar instructor’s sessions. All transcriptions tried to 
preserve the complex mix of languages that took place in the classroom, ranging 
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from Japanese to Spanish and sometimes another foreign language such as English, 
and were based only on the audio data from the IC recorders so as to maintain a 
consistent approach to the data.   
 
Eventually, I had to limit the study to the structuring and analysis of only one out 
of three class interaction recordings per course due to the enormous volume of 
work involved in the transcription and coding of classroom interaction. The ones 
chosen were those that showed the greatest variety of instructional methods and 
techniques as this was considered more representative of the activity of the whole. 
 
Also, an external language of description of classification and framing relations 
adapted to foreign language educational organisations/learning settings was 
required. This was done by dividing the descriptions in two: (1) Description of 
classification and framing relations and (2) Discursive and social order rules 
indicators for foreign-language learning general contexts at the tertiary level in 
Japan. I will explain the development of these descriptions in detail below.  
 
In order to execute the procedure, which was intertwined with the one dealing with 
students’ discourse recognition (see section 4.5.3), I had to rapidly carry out the 
segmenting of tasks and coding for motive-activity. This was done promptly and, 
due to time constraints, I could not count on appraisers to test inter-coder 
reliability. However, the validation of the already mentioned language of 
description of discursive and social order rules relations, which I will explain in 
detail below, helped me to have a more accurate idea of the development targets 
set by instructors in particular activities, constituting a form of evaluation of the 
segmenting and coding for motive-activity. Overall, the characteristics of the 
coding process, which relied on dividing classroom interaction into small 
segments, and its overall length, amounted to a recoding procedure, ensuring 
higher intracoder reliability.  
 
Description of classification and framing relations 
 
Data were collected from instructor participants with the aim of understanding the 
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organisational structure in the university in which they were employed, in terms of 
external and internal framing and classification values. This was done through a 
questionnaire administered by e-mail that included coded open-ended questions 
regarding the aforementioned description of relations, except for instructional and 
regulative practices, which were part of the next description and was carried out 
separately. The questionnaire also included questions about their personal 
trajectories and their social space, developed after Holland et al. (2001), which are 
part of other procedures (see Appendix 4B for the questionnaire). 
 
The questions spanned the whole range of organisational relations regarding the 
particular universities in which the instructors were working, their departmental 
structure, the communication between faculty, the co-ordination with peers, 
curricular arrangements, the connection between their own programmes and other 
programmes in countries where Spanish was widely spoken and the relevance of 
the programmes vis-à-vis the labour market. After collecting and analysing the 
data in its totality, as a system of relative classification and framing strengths, I put 
together the table of descriptions that is contained in Table 4.2. This implied two 
moves. First, a top-down approach of looking at classification and framing 
relations in general terms in the aforementioned areas (spaces, agents, discourses, 
subjects) through the outcome of open-ended questions, and second, a bottom-up 
approach in which the data provided by instructors were organised according to 
the relative strengths of classification and framing using a simple two-point 
(strong and weak) classification and framing scale.  
  
The validation of this instrument was hampered by the very same lack of 
knowledge of the majority of instructor participants about various areas of the 
inquiry, especially those areas that deal with the internal organisation of 
departments, the design of study programmes and other issues concerning the 
relationship between the university and other communities of practice and the 
labour market. Thus, four of the six transmitter participants were part-time 
instructors who were not involved in the external or internal relations of their 
organisations other than teaching a course and selecting its textbook. In the case of 
AU grammar and AU communication, the textbook had already been selected by 
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full-time faculty. AU and BU instructors had very limited knowledge of the whole 
range of relations their organisations engaged in, especially external relations. In 
conclusion, that form of organisational blackout corresponds to strong 
classification, but participants could not judge the whole array of relations, 
restricting the description to all-or-nothing values. 
 
Eventually a relational space for classification and framing values was developed 
to chart organisational differences. This was based on the coding of both the 
answers given by the instructors to the questions contained in the aforementioned 
questionnaire and the observation data collected in the classroom. The 
questionnaire data was coded for strength of classification and framing across a 
range of different relations: instructor-instructor (horizontal), instructor-instructor 
(vertical), between subjects, within a discipline, college-communities of practice, 
college-colleges, college-employers, academic-non-academic (see Table 4.2). The 
audio and video observation data was coded for classification and framing in a 
similar way across the following relations; space instructor-student, space 
student-student, instructor-student, and student-student. However, the detail of the 
data, in comparison with the instructors’ interview data, allows for the 




Table 4.2 Description of classification and framing relations 
 











Specialisation of classroom 
space 
Variable use of classroom 
space 
Control of space arrangements 
by instructor. 
Shared control of space 
arrangements by instructor and 
students. 
Space student-student 
Individual and specialised use of 
classroom space. Personal 
space. 
Collective and variable use of 
classroom space. Collective 
space. 
Individual control of classroom 
space. 
Collective control and 
negotiation of classroom space. 
Instructor-student 
 
Instructor assumes the role of 
instructor and student the role of 
learner. 
Instructor assumes the role of 




Student seems in control of the 
communication. 
Student-student 
Students assume fixed roles in 
their interaction with peers. 
Students redefine the roles 
they play in their interaction 
with peers. 
Students communicate with 
peers following closely the 
activities/procedures of an 
‘exercise’. 
Students communicate with 
peers in a creative way 





Instructors stick to their role 
according to their discipline or 
actual division of labour. 
Instructors across disciplines 
cross boundaries. 
There is no communication 
between instructors. 





Planning roles such as the 
curriculum are assumed 
arbitrarily by one instructor or a 
group of instructors. 
Most of the teaching staff 
shares the job of curriculum 
planning. 
Academic decisions are 
transmitted unilaterally from a 
instructor or group of instructors 
higher within the organisation. 
Academic decisions are 
consensual, made through 




Grammar is seen as an 




Communication are seen 
interdependently. Subject 
boundaries blurred. 
Communication and Grammar 
are taught independently. 
Communication is taught as an 
enaction of Grammar (or vice 
versa). 
Communication and Grammar 
are taught inter-dependently. 
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Within a discipline 
 
A sole discipline or school is 
sought. 
The boundaries of a discipline 
or school are continuously 
crossed. 
Limited selection of contents or 
instructional methods. Not able 
to make changes to the syllabus. 
Wide selection of contents or 
instructional methods. Variable 




Foreign language is seen as an 
abstract discipline, isolated from 
actual uses in communities of 
practice outside classroom. 
Foreign language is seen as 
an actual communication tool 
which connects with 
communities of practice 
outside classroom. 
Foreign language is learned in 
isolation from real uses in 
communities of practice outside 
classroom. 
Instructor and Student bring to 
class language use linked to 
communities of practice outside 




Foreign language classes are 
seen as isolated from external 
college programmes overseas 
(study abroad, college exchange 
programmes, postgrads). 
Foreign language classes are 
seen as a step towards 
accessing external college 
programmes overseas. 
Foreign language is learned in 
isolation from external college 
programmes. 
Foreign language is learned as a 




Foreign language classes are 
seen as independent from labour 
market skills. 
Foreign language classes are 
seen as providing skills to 
supply labour market 
demand. 
Foreign language is learned in 
isolation from labour market. 
Foreign language is learned as a 
step forward to accessing the 





Foreign language is seen as a 
discipline, independent from 
everyday use. 
Foreign language is seen as a 
means of everyday 
communication. 
Foreign language production in 
the classroom emphasises 
academic skills and language 
use. 
Foreign language production in 
the classroom emphasises 




Discursive and social order rules indicators 
 
A serious of indicators for instructional (discursive rules) and regulative (social 
order rules) discursive practices were constructed by drawing on Morais and 
Neves (2001) but adapted to foreign language teaching. Data were collected with 
the aim of validating this language of description. The validation process included 
two methods. In the first one, instructor participants were given audio segments 
extracted from their own course interaction that had previously been provisionally 
coded on a four-point scale, from weakly (F--) to strongly framed (F++), using the 
provisional indicators. The data from this method were collected from instructor 
participants during the last two weeks of the data collection. One of the 
methodological principles set for this study was to avoid imposing Bernstein’s 
framing categories, or any other theoretical categories, during interviews with 
participants or data gathering through questionnaires and therefore they were 
asked first for their intention or what they were trying to accomplish during that 
segment. If the answer was considered vague or ambiguous, the participant was 
then asked, ‘Who exerted more control in this segment, the student(s) or the 
instructor?’. Hence, the methodology followed Tomlinson’s (1989) hierarchical 
focusing guidelines whereby research interviews go from the general to the 
particular, avoiding as much as possible the use of ready-made construals. These 
data also informed the procedure dealing with students’ recognition of discourse as 
not only the indicators in coding discourse but also the audio segments given to 
instructors were used as questionnaire items given to students (see section 4.5.3). 
The second method was to present each set of attributes/indicators (corresponding 
to selection of contents, selection of classroom jobs, sequence, evaluation criteria, 
hierarchy and conduct) to the participants written on cards. The participants were 
asked to organise the cards on a chart according to their level of agreement with 
the depicted practice, as if they agreed to carry out that practice in their own 
teaching, and with the relative value of control oriented according to ‘instructor 
control’ and ‘student control’ (see Appendix 4C). This method was 
time-consuming and I could only secure the participation of CU’s communication 
instructor. Because I wanted to incorporate the opinion of a grammar instructor, I 
had to resort to an external instructor participant (MA). This participant was 
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Japanese and had fifteen years of experience in Spanish language teaching, 
specialising in the teaching of grammar, in a large array of pedagogical contexts. 
The data were gathered during the summer break in 2008, in face-to-face 
interviews. In this way I managed to get valuable data from practitioners covering 
both aspects of the curricular divide (i.e., communication and grammar).  
 
In the case of the first method, most of the commentary done by the instructors 
coincided with the provisional indicators. In the case of the second method, 
participants offered different views in the area of evaluation criteria and 
assessment, especially about the role of the instructor and students in assessing 
students’ linguistic production. These views were incorporated and the indicators 
were adjusted accordingly.   
 
The resulting indicators and their framing descriptions (after validation) are contained 
in Table 4.3. They form a four-point ordinal scale: weakly framed (F--), not so weakly 
framed (F-); not so strongly framed (F+) and strongly framed (F++); or, their 
equivalent in numerals, weakly framed (1), not so weakly framed (2); not so strongly 
framed (3) and strongly framed (4). The intervals between each successive point on 
the scale were not necessarily equal.  
 
The definitions for the indicators grouped under instructional and regulative discourse 
are the following: 
 
A. Instructional discourse (discursive rules) 
1. Selection 
1.1 Selecting contents. This indicator refers to the control instructors and 
students have over the selection of instructional contents. Are the 
instructional contents limited? Are they given to students? Are students 
allowed to resort to their personal experience? Can students choose or 
suggest instructional contents? 
1.2 Selection of classroom jobs. This indicator refers to the control 
instructors and students have over the roles they assume when carrying 
out instructional activities. Are students allowed to organise themselves 
211 
 
to carry out an instructional activity? 
2. Sequence 
2.1 When instructing or facilitating. This indicator refers to the control 
instructors and students have over the instructional sequence (e.g. the 
programmed steps to complete an instructional exercise or task). Are 
acquirers allowed or encouraged to find the best instructional sequence 
for themselves or is this sequence provided and enforced by instructors? 
3. Pace 
3.1 When introducing a new activity. This indicator refers to the control 
instructors and acquirers have over the pace of instruction. Can students 
determine the time they need to carry out an instructional activity? 
4. Evaluation criteria. 
4.1 When instructing or assessing. This indicator refers to the control 
instructors and students have over the role of evaluator. Can students 
become evaluators for themselves or for their peers? Do instructors 
correct textual production? 
4.2 When referring to future assessment. This indicator refers to the degree 
of assertion of evaluation criteria for future assessment. Do instructors 
inform acquirers about how the assessment will be evaluated? 
 
B. Regulative discourse (social order rules) 
B.1 Learning of socio-affective competences 
1. Conduct 
1.1 When giving instructions/evaluating text production. This indicator 
refers to the degree of assertion of models of conduct. Do instructors 
make explicit models of conduct?  
B.2 Distinction of power and control relations 
2. Hierarchy 
1.1 Students asking questions. This indicator refers to the degree of control 
students may exert on the relation with their instructors. Can students’ 





Table 4.3 Discursive and social order rules indicators for foreign-language learning general contexts at the tertiary level in Japan. After 
Bernstein (2000) and Morais and Neves (2001)  
[Items are coded F++ for strongly framed; F+, for not so strongly framed; F-, for not so weakly framed and F--, for weakly framed.] 
 




     
SELECTION 
 
Selecting contents The instructional contents 
are provided to the 
students. 
 
The instructional contents 
are provided to the students 
but some personal 
information or personal 
experience is elicited from 
them. 
The function of the 
instructional contents is 
limited to elicit students’ 
personal information or 
experience. The 
instruction is based 
mainly on the students’ 
personal information or 
experience. 
The instructional 
contents are provided 
fundamentally by the 
students (e.g., students 
give presentations to the 
class). 
 Selection of 
classroom jobs 
The instructor uses an 
unrevealed system of 
participation (may 
involve the class as a 
whole) and chooses those 
students who will carry 
out the instructional 
activity. 
The instructor 
communicates a system of 
participation for the 
instructional activity and 
selects those students who 
will carry it out. (A 
previously set method of 
selection may be used.) 
The instructor 
communicates a system 
of participation for the 
instructional activity 
(e.g., make groups of 
three; make pairs) but 
allows students to 
organise themselves. 
The instructor suggests a 
variable/loose system of 
participation for the 
instructional activity but 
permits students to make 




The instructor enforces an 
unrevealed instructional 
sequence. 
The instructor sets and 
makes explicit an 
instructional sequence and 
enforces it. 
The instructor sets an 
instructional sequence 
(either explicitly or not) 
but in practice allows 
students to depart from it. 
Students are allowed or 
encouraged to discover 
the best instructional 





When introducing a 
new activity 
The instructor decides the 
time needed to carry out 
an instructional activity 
but does not communicate 
it to the students 
beforehand. 
The instructor decides the 
time needed to carry out an 
instructional activity, 
informs the students of it, 
and may assess their 
progression in order to 
adjust it. 
The instructor consults 
students beforehand 
about the time needed to 
carry out an instructional 
activity, sets the time but 
may assess their 
progression in order to 
adjust it. 
Students decide how 
much time they need to 
carry out an instructional 





When instructing or 
assessing 
The instructor takes the 
role of evaluator 
(especially by pointing 
out what is incorrect or 
missing, indicating what 
the problem is, correcting 
it or not). (Top-down 
move evaluation.) 
 
The instructor refers part of 
the evaluator’s role to 
students (especially by 
pointing out something is 
incorrect or missing but 
neither indicating what the 
problem is, nor correcting 
it). (Bottom-up move 
evaluation.) 
Students assess each 
other’s or their own 
production. 
The instructor accepts 
students’ production even 
if mistakes are made. 
 
 When referring to 
future assessment 
The instructor makes 
explicit the assessment 
criteria before assessment 
takes place. 
The instructor gives some 
clues about the assessment 
criteria before assessment 
takes place. 
The instructor refers to 
past performances to 
assert the assessment 
criteria before assessment 
takes place. 
The instructor does not 
assert assessment criteria 
















The instructor asserts, 
either explicit or 
implicitly, a model of 
conduct according to a 
non-explicit model of 
The instructor explicitly 
asserts a model of conduct 
[e.g. You have to 
co-operate with each 
other]. 
The instructor reinforces 
(encouraging or 
inhibiting) an already 
(explicitly or implicitly) 
known model of conduct 
The instructor does not 




conduct [e.g. Let’s see if 
you can wake-up this 
morning]. The assertion 
has an emotional 
component (e.g., satiric, 
sarcastic) not entirely 
based on reason. 
[e.g. I told you, you have 
to do the activity in 
pairs]. 
(Distinction of 






The instructor ignores the 
question. 
Students do not ask 
questions. 
The instructor answers the 
student directly. 
The instructor asks 
questions, gives some 
information or points out 
some references to guide 
the student to find the 
answer by herself/himself 
The instructor answers by 
promoting discussion 
between students and 
instructor in order to 




Every task corresponding to foundation, structural, functional or rhetorical motive-activity 
structure was then coded for instructional and regulative discourse using the language of 
description contained in Table 4.3. If there was more than one event related to the indicators 
within the task, the median was calculated so as to have a general estimate of each indicator’s 
framing strength per task. Eventually, the median for all the same motive-activity structure 
tasks could be calculated in a similar way for each course: BU grammar, BU communication, 
CU grammar, CU communication. This also allowed the comparison of tasks across courses 
and organisations.  
 
Table 4.4 is an extract of the coding done for one functional task corresponding to CU 
communication. I will use this extract to explain the procedure for coding the framing of tasks. 
The task, in terms of motive-action (see the ‘Motive-action’ heading), comprises the instructor 
making students recognise and pronounce words carrying the Spanish sounds ‘l’ and ‘r’. These 
consonants are quite difficult for Japanese to master in oral speech, as the Japanese language 
does not distinguish them. The instructor writes a pair of words on the whiteboard that look 
like homophones, one with the ‘r’ and another one with the ‘l’. The first pair consists of the 
words cala/cara. ‘Cala’ means ‘calla lily’, whilst ‘cara’ means ‘face’. Then, the instructor asks 
the class as a whole to recognise if the word she is pronouncing corresponds either to the first 
or the second word. The instructor also makes students practise the pronunciation of those 
words. The original discourse transcript is contained under the ‘Transcript’ heading. The 
English rendition has been produced in order to facilitate the reading for all those who cannot 
read Japanese under the heading ‘English’. The starting and finishing times of the task are 
given under the ‘Time heading’. The discourse has been segmented into units called ‘lines’ 
(see the ‘Line’ heading) which contains change in (a) participants’ turns (see the ‘Participant’ 
heading) or (b) the theme. Events that correspond to the aforementioned indicators are coded 
for framing using the framing key contained underneath the table’s title under the ‘Framing’ 
heading. Lower case is used for the coding of instructional discourse indicators, whereas upper 
case is used for the coding of regulative discourse. Eventually, a framing outline for the task as 
a whole is worked out as seen above, which is contained under the title ‘Framing outline’ 
under the ‘Motive-action’ heading. Finally, the rationale for assigning the motive-action within 
one of the categories of ‘motive activity’ is given under the heading ‘Motive-activity’.   
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Table 4.4 Extract of the framing coding for a foundation task (No. 8) in CU communication class   
 
NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender (M = male; F = female) and a nominal number at the time 
they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into Spanish and English in cursive 
script.  
FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of Contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); 
Future assessment (EC b); Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI). 
 
Time Line Participant Transcription English Framing 
coding 
Motive-action Motive-activity 





Today, we will stop 
here. Let’s make a 
short revision. 
Cala [the Spanish word 
‘cala’ means ‘calla 
lily’; in contrast to 
‘cara’, which means 
‘face’]. 
 MOTIVE-ACTION No. 8: 
  
The instructor makes students choose 
which of the two words she writes on 
the whiteboard corresponds to the 
word she is pronouncing. This entails 
the distinction between sounds L and 
R. The instructor also makes students 




Selection of Contents: 4 
Selection of jobs: 4 
Sequence: 4 
Pace: 4 
Evaluation criteria: 4 










+ (written and oral) L2 
speech activity intended 
to reflect on Spanish 
language. 
  588 SS Cala. Cala. SE b F++     
  589 I ¿Uno o dos? Cala. One or two? Cala. EC a F++     
  590 SS Cala. Cala.       
  591 I うーん、違う、違
う。 
Mmm…it isn’t, it’s 
different.  






One, two.  
What was it?  
Cala. 
  592 SS Dos. Two.       
  593 I Bien. Emm... 
Hola... 
Good. Emm... Hola... 
[In Spanish ‘hola’ 
means ‘hallo’; in 
contrast, ‘hora’ means 
‘hour’.] 
EC a F++     
  594 SS Dos. No.  Two. No.       
  595 I No. Uno. No. One. EC a F++     
  596 SS Uno. One.       
  597 I Pero. Pero. [In Spanish, 
‘pero’ means ‘but’, a 
co-ordinating 
conjunction; in contrast 
‘pelo’ means ‘hair’.] 
EC a F++     
  598 SS Uno. One.       
  599 I Bien. Cara. Good. ‘Cara’. EC a F++     
  600 SS Uno. One.       
  601 I Bien. Hora. Good. Hora. EC a F++     
  602 SS Dos. Two.       
  603 I Muy bien.  Very good. EC a F++ 
SQ F++ 




4.5.2 Recontextualisation of communicative language teaching  
 
The intended outcome of this procedure is a recontextualised account of communicative 
language teaching within the dialectical tradition, especially Vygotsky’s zone of 
proximal development, at organisational and learning settings. 
 
4.5.2.1 Research questions 
 
PROCEDURAL QUESTION 3: How can the weak and strong version of 
communicative language teaching be described in terms of motive-activity structure and 
development paths/targets? 
 
PROCEDURAL QUESTION 4: Does the foreign language pedagogy in different 
communication learning settings have a correlate in terms of weak and strong versions of 




The procedure is based on the recontextualising of the notion of communicative 
language teaching in SLA in light of the dialectical tradition, in terms of language 
development targets/paths. It draws on Ellis’s (2008) theoretical description of (a) weak 
and (b) strong version of communicative language teaching. The method consists in 
analytically comparing theoretical descriptions of communicative language teaching 
with tasks at particular learning settings across organisations based on the pedagogic 
code of tasks. 
 
4.5.3 Trajectory and organisations as moderators of recognition and realisation  
 
The intended outcome of this procedure is twofold. First, it seeks to attain an account of 
how trajectory, organisation and learning setting structure modulate students’ 
recognition of discourse (or their orientation to discourse) and, consequently, their 
realisation (mastery). Second, it is set to test empirically Bernstein’s hypothesis about 
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the structural conditions of educational organisations modulating subject position, social 
relations and discourse and therefore shaping individual consciousness and activity. 
Furthermore, I test mastery (realisation) as being determined by the subject’s ability to 
recognise (individual consciousness) the rules of pedagogical context, which in turn is 
moderated by educational trajectory 
 
4.5.3.1 Research questions 
 
PROCEDURAL QUESTION 5: What is the foreign language education trajectory of 
individual students? 
 
PROCEDURAL QUESTION 6: What are students’ coding orientations 
(elaborated/restricted), explained by their recognition of grammar and communication 
discourses? 
  
PROCEDURAL QUESTION 7: How much of the variance in the student participants’ 
realisation can be explained in terms of recognition? 
 
PROCEDURAL QUESTION 8: To what extent does the student’s trajectory moderate 
the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of 
recognition? 
 
PROCEDURAL QUESTION 9: To what extent does the student’s organisation 





The procedure is based on (a) ascertaining students’ foreign language education 
trajectories as an aggregation of activity systems; (b) ascertaining students’ (coding) 
orientations in terms of recognition of grammar and communication discourse, and (c) 
the testing of the influence of students’ trajectories and organisation/learning setting on 
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students’ discourse recognition and, eventually, on students’ realisation or mastery. 
 
Ascertaining students’ foreign language education trajectories 
 
Ascertaining trajectories requires a qualitative method for eliciting students’ leading 
activity. Griffin and Cole (1984) use the concept of leading activity to indicate activities 
of great importance to the learner that reorganise other less significant activities. The 
new activity helps to reorganise and internalise prior stages by transforming them into 
the everyday, achieving automaticity, in opposition to the new leading activity (p. 51). 
Therefore, the leading activity is always a reconfiguration whereby already internalised 
functions are drawn on resourcefully by new demands for sense. The eliciting is based 
on having students focus on events or situations that helped them to cope better in 
foreign language learning situations. Attention must be paid to preference for 
model-determined acts versus explicit top-down instruction (see Gal’perin, 1969, 197, 
1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992a) as well.  
 
In the case of AU and BU, the method of inquiry into acquirers’ experiences in foreign 
language learning was mediated through a questionnaire containing two open-ended 
questions: ‘From your experience before taking this course, do you remember any 
activity or situation that really helped you learn a foreign language?’ and ‘From your 
experience before taking this course, can you tell me of a satisfactory or enjoyable 
moment you had while learning a foreign language?’ (see questions 7 and 8, Appendix 
4A). Special care was taken not to overwhelm the student participants with a large 
number of questions, nor did the questions seek to understand students’ complete foreign 
language educational trajectories, but focused on determining moments in which a 
reorganisation of activities occurred. In the case of CU, where it was possible to hold 
interviews with acquirers, a more complete learning trajectory was obtained, but only 
after obtaining information about improvisations or leading activities. The transcript of 
those interviews is contained in Appendix 4D. It is worth remembering that trajectories 
reflect not what the actual trajectory of participants is, but what participants perceive 
their trajectory to be in terms of a leading activity in which they partook in the past. The 
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search for acquirers’ past leading activities informed the emergence of the following 
categories of trajectory: 
 
Trajectory 1 comprises acquirers who did not express their involvement in any particular 
foreign language activity. Their only experience derived from their participation in the 
education system in Japan, especially in activities that could be recognised as speech 
activity.  
 
Trajectory 2 includes acquirers who expressed their involvement either in speech acts as 
part of non-verbal activity (e.g. ‘I could give directions to a foreigner so that he could 
reach the place he was looking for’) or communication activity in Japan.  
 
Trajectory 3 comprises acquirers who responded that the activities that helped them learn 
a language the most, or that were more satisfactory or enjoyable, were associated with 
having been abroad, either for a short high-school trip, as part of a home-stay 
programme, or because they were living abroad. These activities are associated with 
speech acts that are part of non-verbal activity and communication activity. However, 
because the experience of communicating while being abroad is presumably more 
demanding and varied, these activities are considered of a different nature from those 
included in trajectory 2. One key aspect of activities that comprised this trajectory is that 
they may include an array of what Gal’perin (1969) calls model-determined acts, that is, 
models where the learner does not have an indication of how the act should be carried 
out (the kind of instruction one is exposed to when learning a language in the country 
where it is spoken, without formal schooling or training). 
 
Ascertaining students’ coding orientations in terms of recognition of grammar and 
communication discourses 
 
The data were collected with the aim of determining the students’ recognition of 
instructional discourse according to the classification deployed by the study 
programme/organisation (i.e., grammar and communication) and, consequently, their 
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coding orientation. In BU, a questionnaire was administered to student participants by 
their communication instructor at the end of the semester. At CU, the questionnaire was 
administered by their communication instructor at the end of the second semester. At AU, 
due to the curricular change explained above, the questionnaire was administered at the 
end of the first semester but the data gathered were not used in the remaining sections of 
the procedure. The questionnaire listed thirty-seven sample items of instructors’ 
instructional discourse (see Appendix 4E), selected from classroom interactions at AU 
and BU. The items were coded, representing in fact different framing values of 
instructional discourse in areas such as selection of contents, selection of classroom jobs, 
sequence and so on. They also represented regulative discourse in areas such as 
hierarchy and conduct (see Table 4.3). Participants had to determine if the sample came 
from either a grammar or a communication course using a nine-point response format, 
from ‘grammar’ (point 4) to ‘both’ (point 0) to ‘communication’ (point 4). It is pertinent 
to mention that the format was adopted mainly to facilitate participants’ work and to 
obtain as many complete answers as possible. The adoption of such a format responds to 
encouraging higher response rates. Instead of locating one five-point response format for 
grammar and an additional five-point response format for communication, participants 
saw only one nine-point response format for the questionnaire items and their English 
translation and coding). Some of the samples whose original language was Spanish were 
translated into Japanese so as not to offer a simple choice to participants (e.g. ‘samples 
in Spanish belong to communication courses and samples in Japanese belong to 
grammar courses’). Most of these samples contained regulative discourse that could have 
been expressed either in Japanese or Spanish by the instructor. When translating them, I 
tried to preserve the discourse’s communicative intention. This was considered 
problematic from the beginning but there was no other choice. The idea was to confound 
the languages and preserve the communicative intention of discourse. If the segment 
were given in the original language, most of the segments belonging to AU 
communication, which were in Spanish, could have been recognised immediately by 
students just by discerning the language. The idea was to avoid the 




Two pilot studies were conducted to explore the relationship between discourse 
recognition and realisation in oral communication courses, one involving BU and 
another involving CU. For these pilot studies, realisation or mastery was defined as the 
final grade given by the communication instructors. Correlation tests with the data 
collected from BU were conducted for recognition of grammar and communication 
instructional discourse and realisation. A correlative relationship is defined statistically 
as the joint (co-varying or associated) distribution of two or more variables.  
 
The correlation of recognition of grammar instructional discourse (M = 5.61, SD = .88, 
N = 19) and realisation (M = 76.05, SD = 15.60) was significant, r = .57, p = .010, but 
that was not the case for the correlation recognition of communication instructional 
discourse and realisation.  
 
Correlation tests with the data collected from CU participants were carried out. The 
correlation of recognition of grammar instructional discourse (M = 4.55, SD = 1.20, N = 
13) and realisation (M = 78.23, SD = 12.65) was highly significant, r = .842, p = .000, 
and inversely, so was that of the correlation of recognition of communication 
instructional discourse (M = 6.07, SD = .81, N = 13) and realisation, r = -.798, p = .001. 
 
The above outcome, although it did not represent statistical proof, for the number of 
participants was too small to have statistical power, opened a way to looking at the 
problem from a new perspective. First, it was striking to find out that the recognition of 
communication instructional discourse was not correlated to realisation or mastery but 
the recognition of grammar instructional discourse was. Furthermore, in the case of 
communication lessons at CU, a course that took place in a university specialising in 
foreign language education, recognition of communication instructional discourse was 
negatively correlated to realisation or mastery. 
 
The data on students’ trajectory also posed the question of what kind of recognition 
students with different trajectories had, especially trajectory-3 students, whose learning 
presumably (a) relied on model-determined acts, that is, an informal approach to learning, 
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and therefore (b) did not pay attention to grammar instruction. The other question was 
about what kind of discourse communication instruction is. During the validation of the 
discursive and social order rules indicators (see 4.5.1.2) and the pedagogic coding of the 
aforementioned sample items I noticed that theoretical explanations or the facilitating of 
theoretical systems belonging to grammar classes tended to be strongly framed in terms 
of hierarchy (e.g., students were not called to participate in the explanation or the 
instructors answered directly their questions without involving the students in the 
facilitating process). In contrast, the theoretical explanations or facilitating belonging to 
communication classes had more chances of being weakly framed. In other words, 
communication instructors were apparently giving control to students when explaining 
aspects of theoretical systems, establishing some kind of personal horizontal 
involvement that run counter to the intuitively vertical relationship needed in order to 
introduce conceptual systems. For example, let us have a look at item 9, a sample 
belonging to AU communication, which was coded as weakly-framed Hierarchy 
(Hierarchy F--): All right. Let us see the word ‘profesor’ [instructor/professor]. 
‘Profesor’, is it masculine or feminine? In this case, the instructor, after detecting a 
mistake in the production of one student, wanted him to reflect on the morphology of 
nouns. This reflection caused a question to be answered by the student, rather than a 
top-down explanation of the morphological system of Spanish nouns. The 
socio-communicative position used by the communication instructor would have 
transpired even if the item had been rendered into Japanese in the recognition of 
discourse questionnaire. Overall, this implied a serious revision of forms of discourse 
that mixed elaborated and restricted coding orientations and socio-communicative and 
representational functions.      
 
After a thorough analysis of the possibilities, taking into account the trajectories and how 
the recognition of grammar, communication and weakly-framed communication 
instructional discourse may relate to realisation, I devised out eight conjectural 
orientations to meaning, which are plotted in Figure 4.1. These orientations are 
modulated by two opposite vectors of development, the representational and 
socio-communicative functions, which find their expression as modes of self-regulation 
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in elaborated and restricted codes. There are two aspects that should draw our attention. 
On the one hand, whilst there is no doubt that grammar instructional discourse is 
fundamentally a form of elaborated code, communication discourse has a double valence, 
as it can be a form of either elaborated or restricted code. Thus, instructional tasks in a 
communication course may aim at learning language structural or pragmatic aspects as a 
system (elaborated) to more ritualistic social forms that arguably can only be transmitted 
by tacit instruction, such as the right way to address a native speaker (restricted), which 
are learned mainly by imitation. On the other hand, the socio-communicative aspects of 
discourse of native Spanish communication instructors seemed to favour more horizontal 
ways of relating to students when teaching theoretical systems than that of Japanese 
instructors. Communication instructors may feel compelled (a) to use the ways of 
relating to interlocutors that is considered adequate in real communication contexts 
among native speakers (e.g., serving as an example of how a native speaker prefers 
horizontal relations) or (b) to use the ways of relating to students in contexts in which 
Spanish native speakers are instructed (e.g. serving as an example of how instruction 
would be carried out if it were occurring in an educational institution belonging to a 
Spanish speaking society). Those ways seemed to be alien to a segment of trajectory-1 
students, who might have confused them with grammar discourse just because discourse 
was aiming at explaining a theoretical system. However, trajectory-2 and trajectory-3 
students seemed to be able to recognise the horizontality of hierarchy as a trait of 


























Figure 4.1 Orientations as recognition of grammar, communication and weakly-framed 
communication discourses, expressed as modes of self-regulation in elaborated and 
restricted codes 
 
Orientation 1 does not possess recognition rules (confounded orientation). Orientation 2 
only possesses recognition rules for weakly-framed communication instructional 
discourse (informal or restricted-communicative orientation). Orientation 3 possesses 
recognition rules for both weakly-framed communication and communication 
instructional discourse (communicative orientation). Orientation 4 only possesses 
recognition rules for communication instructional discourse (elaborated-communicative 
orientation). Orientation 5 possesses recognition rules for both weakly-framed 
communication and grammar instructional discourse (bipolar orientation). Orientation 6 
only possesses recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse (grammar 
orientation). Orientation 7 possesses recognition rules for both communication and 
grammar instructional discourse but lacks recognition rules for weakly-framed 
communication instructional discourse (elaborated orientation). And finally, orientation 

















































The benchmark for determining the student’s possession of recognition rules for each 
instructional discourse (grammar, communication, and weakly-framed communication 
discourse) was if the individual mean for recognition was equal or superior to the course 
mean. For example, if a student’s recognition mean was above the course mean for 
communication and grammar discourses but below the course mean for weakly-framed 
discourse, that student was considered to have an elaborated orientation (see shape 
number 7 on Figure 4.1). Consequently, orientation is a construct that is formulated as a 
relative possession of recognition rules in relation to the overall discourse recognition of 
course members. Eventually, the orientation for each student participant belonging to 
BU and CU was worked out using the aforementioned method. 
 
These orientations were helpful when analysing qualitative data linked to students’ 
identities. Further statistical analysis including regressions and analysis of variance was 
carried out to understand the exact relation between learning trajectories, discourse 
recognition (orientations) and realisation or mastery, but the lack of a large sample size 
compromised the results as there was no enough power to reject the null hypotheses. The 
whole approach was eventually revised and a new correlation research design was used. 
These two aspects will be covered in the next sections.  
 
Influence of students’ trajectories and organisation/learning setting on students’ 
discourse recognition and, eventually, on students’ realisation or mastery  
 
A correlational research design was applied to answer PQ7, PQ8 and PQ5, defined as 
‘research that involves collecting data in order to determine the degree to which a 
relationship exists between two or more variables’ (Fraenkel and Wallen, 2010, p. G-2). 
The limitation of a correlational design is that it does not explicitly have the power to 
infer causes or effects, because a causal relationship cannot be defined purely in terms of 
the joint distribution of variables. An empirically observed correlative relationship is an 
essential but not a sufficient condition for implying causality (Pearl, 2009). In order to 
establish a causal relationship, proving factual inter-dependence between variables, a 
researcher must use an experimental design to measure how much the variance in a 
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dependent (outcome, criterion, or response) variable is influenced by the systematic 
manipulation of an independent (factor, treatment, or predictor) variable (Ray, 2003); 
however, the variables used to answer PQ7, PQ8 and PQ9 were collected using a 
cross-sectional survey, in which the causes and effects were ex post facto and could not 
be experimentally manipulated. Nevertheless the assumption was made that if a 
correlative relationship could be established between the variables, then it could be 
intuitively recognised, in a hypothetical context, that one variable may have a causal 
influence on another (Holland, 1986). 
 
Choice of statistical methodology. The second stage was to choose an appropriate 
statistical methodology to answer the procedural questions. A relatively modern 
technique, known as partial least squares path modelling (PLS) was chosen to support 
the correlational research design in preference to classical correlation analysis, the one 
that was conducted in the previous section, and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
The essential differences between OLS regression and PLS path modelling are outlined 
in Table 4.5, condensed from Haenlen and Kaplan (2004), Kline (2010) and Hair et al. 
(2010). 
 
Table 4.5 Comparison of OLS Linear Regression and PLS Path Modelling 
 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) Partial Least Squares Path Modelling (PLS) 
Used for over 100 years. Developed in the last 15 years. 
The linear and additive relationships between one 
dependent variable and one or more independent 
variables (usually less than 8) are defined in one 
simple equation. The focus is on prediction rather 
than explanation. 
The linear and additive interrelationships 
among a network of many variables (often 
many hundreds) are visualized in a path 
diagram. The model is specified by a complex 
series of simultaneous equations defining 
predictive relationships between multiple 
latent and indicator variables. 
Only manifest variables, (i.e., measured by the 
researcher) can be included. Latent variables (i.e., 
intangible constructs that are difficult to quantify) 
cannot be automatically operationalized. 
PLS automatically operationalizes latent 
constructs, which are otherwise difficult to 
measure, by projecting groups of manifest 
indicator variables into vector space using 
Principal Components Factor Analysis. 
OLS regression is underpinned by strict 
assumptions about the measurement levels and 
distributional characteristics of the variables. 
PLS has minimal assumptions about the 
measurement levels and distributional 
characteristics of the variables. 
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Variance in the dependent variable is implicitly 
assumed by regression analysis; however, there 
must be no variance in the independent variables. 
No distinction is made between the variance in 
the dependent and independent variables. PLS 
assumes that the latent variables are reliably 
measured, using a minimum of at least three 
indicator variables  
OLS regression partitions the variance in the 
dependent variable into explained and unexplained 
or residual variance. The variance in the dependent 
variable must be homoskedastic (i.e., equal across 
all of the independent variables). The residuals 
(i.e., the differences between the observed and 
predicted values) must be normally distributed. 
PLS assumes that all of the variance is useful 
and can be explained. The variance is 
maximally partitioned across all of the 
variables. There is no concern for the 
distributional characteristics of the variables or 
the distribution of the residual variance. 
A multiple linear regression model cannot tolerate 
multicollinearity (i.e., inter-correlation between 
multiple independent variables.) 
A PLS path model can tolerate 
multicollinearity. 
The relative importance of the relationships 
between the dependent variable and each of the 
independent variables is inferred by the magnitudes 
of the standardised regression coefficients. 
The relative importance of the relationships 
between the latent variables is inferred by the 
magnitudes of the path coefficients 
(theoretically equivalent to weighted partial 
regression coefficients). 
The statistical significance of each regression 
coefficient is tested using inferential statistics (t 
test statistic = coefficient/standard error). 
Violations of the assumptions of regression inflate 
the standard errors, so that statistical inferences are 
compromised. 
The standard errors of the path coefficients 
can be computed by bootstrapping (i.e., 
resampling the data up to 1000 times, and 
recalculating the coefficients). Statistical 




Partial least squares path modelling. The aim of both OLS and PLS modelling is to 
predict hypothetical relationships between variables; however the two methods compute 
coefficients which satisfy different mathematical rules. The rules for OLS are much 
more restrictive than PLS, so PLS is easier to apply in practice; however, the rationale 
for using PLS in this study was not just because it was easy. PLS was applied primarily 
because it empowered the researcher to explore multivariate relationships in a complex 
hypothetical system. The baseline model (excluding the nominal moderating variables, 
trajectory and organisation) was conceived as a network of thirty-nine manifest indicator 
variables measured by the researcher and four latent variables extracted from the 
collected data (contained in Appendix 4F) using Principal Components Analysis (Figure 
4.2). PLS path modelling permitted me to answer the procedural questions using a 
relatively small sample size, without the use of null hypothesis tests, assuming that all of 
the variance was useful, and could be partitioned across a multitude of variables. In 
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contrast, OLS regression and other classical methods of inferential analysis (e.g., 
ANOVA) based on the partitioning of the explained and residual variance between 
dependent and independent variables suffer from numerous serious drawbacks (Hair et 
al., 2010). For example, (a) they can only handle a relatively small proportion of the 
available data set at one time; (b) they require a substantial sample size to provide 
sufficient power to reject the null hypotheses; and (c) if multiple null hypothesis tests are 
applied consecutively to one set of data, then the probability of making Type I errors (i.e., 
the erroneous rejection of false null hypotheses) is elevated. Although regression and 
ANOVA were attempted initially in this study, the results were compromised, mainly 
because the sample size was insufficient to generate accurate results. PLS path modelling 












Sample size. According to the power analysis conducted by Cohen (1992) the 
minimum sample size to correctly reject the null hypothesis of OLS regression 
(i.e. the proportion of variance explained in the dependent variable is greater 
than zero) is N = 67 assuming two independent variables, one dependent 
variable, α = .05, a power of 0.8, and a medium effect size. The sample size 
used in this study (N = 32) was too small to conduct such an analysis. A power 
analysis to determine the minimum sample size was not necessary for PLS path 
modelling. According to Hair et al. (2010, p. 776) ‘PLS is insensitive to sample 
size considerations’. PLS path modelling is particularly useful in generating 
estimates even with very small sample sizes (as low as 30 observations or 
less).The sample size of N = 32 used in this study was therefore sufficient to 
construct PLS path models. 
 
Software. PLS path modelling was performed using SmartPLS software 
Version 2.0 (Ringle et al., 2005). SmartPLS was chosen due to its user 
friendliness compared with other modelling programs, especially its impressive 
graphic user interface (GUI) and its widespread use by many social science and 
business researchers (Henseler et al., 2009; Temme et al., 2006). 
 
Tracing of a path model. The simple rules of path tracing using the GUI 
incorporated in Smart PLS were (a) the latent variables (i.e. the composite 
variables extracted from the indicator variables using Principal Components 
Factor Analysis) were entered into the GUI as egg-shaped symbols. Each latent 
variable represented one factor in vector space; (b) the indicators (i.e. the 
manifest variables measured by the researcher) were entered into the GUI as 
rectangular symbols; (c) the arrows represented hypothetical cause and effect 
relationships between the variables. An arrow could be traced forwards or 
backwards from one variable to another, but never forwards and then 
backwards (i.e. there were no feedback loops). 
 
Assumptions of the baseline model. The assumptions underlying the 




Grammar: Items 02, 04, 08, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 22, 25, 28, 30, 32, 35 and 37 
were specified as reflective indicators. They reflected the ability of the 
participants to recognise a discourse sample from a grammar course. 
Consequently the arrows flowed out of grammar into the indicators. 
 
Communication: Items 01, 03, 05, 06, 07, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 29, 31, 33, 
34 and 36 were specified as reflective indicators. They reflected the ability of 
the participants to recognise a strongly-framed discourse sample from a 
communication course. Consequently the arrows flowed out from 
communication into the indicators. 
 
Weakly-framed communication: Items 09, 10, 12, and 15 were specified as 
reflective indicators. They reflected the ability of the participants to recognise a 
weakly-framed discourse sample from a communication course. Consequently 
the arrows flowed out of weakly-framed communication into the indicators. 
 
Recognition was specified as the hypothesised effect of a combination of 
grammar, communication and weakly-framed communication. Consequently 
the arrows flowed out of grammar, communication and weakly-framed 
communication (the causes) into recognition (the effect). The R² (effect size) 
was printed within the egg-shaped symbol representing recognition (e.g., R² 
= .668 in Figure 4.2). 
 
Orientation was specified as a formative indicator of recognition. This is 
because orientation was measured as the participants’ prior acquisition of 
recognition rules before attending the particular language course, considering 
the fact that the items that reflected the ability of the participants to recognise a 
sample were extracted from a mix of sources different from the setting in which 
measurement took place and, in the case of CU, none of the items were in fact 
extracted from CU’s courses. 
 
Orientation was assumed, for the purposes of this model, to predetermine, but 
not to reflect, recognition. Consequently, the arrow flowed out of orientation 
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and into recognition. It is possible that orientation could also reflect recognition 
after a participant had experience in mastering a foreign language; however, the 
PLS path model assumed that all relationships were unidirectional and no 
feedback loops were permitted. 
 
Realisation was specified as a hypothesised effect recognition. Consequently 
the arrow flowed out of recognition (the cause) and into realisation (the effect). 
The R² (effect size) was printed within the egg-shaped symbol representing 
realisation (e.g., R² = .406 in Figure 4.2). 
 
The instructor’s grade was specified as a reflective indicator. It was a reflective 
and not a formative indicator of realisation because the grade reflected each 
participant’s language mastery at the end of the course. Consequently the arrow 
flowed out of realisation and into instructor’s grade.  
 
Language mastery could not be considered plain linguistic competence since 
the language of the course includes the acquisition of social rules. In other 
words, instructors not only grade students based on their linguistic ability but 
they include other parameters as well (e.g. communication readiness, discipline, 
confidence, attendance record). 
 
In BU’s case, the score was provided by the instructor at interval/ratio level at 
the end of the semester. In CU’s case the score was provided also at interval/ 
ratio level at the end of the second semester. 
 
Computation of model parameters. The SmartPLS algorithm was executed to 
automatically compute the model parameters without intervention or 
manipulation by the user (Ringle et al., 2005). Three types of parameters were 
computed: (a) the factor loadings, located next to the arrows between the 
indicators and latent variables; (b) the path coefficients, located next to the 
arrows between the latent variables; and (c) the effect sizes, located inside the 




Loadings: Loadings were computed between the indicator variables 
(rectangles) and the latent variables (ovals) using Principal Components Factor 
Analysis. Each loading measured the correlation, ranging from -1 to +1, 
between a latent variable and each of its corresponding indicator variables. The 
higher the loading, the stronger was the correlation. Loadings > 0.5 were 
interpreted as ‘strong’, ‘high’ or ‘heavy’ whilst loadings < 0.5 were interpreted 
as ‘weak’, ‘low’ or ‘light’. Loadings < .3 were interpreted as very low or 
negligible (Hair et al., 2010). 
 
Path coefficients: The numbers next to the arrows connecting the latent 
variables were the path coefficients, representing the partitioning of the 
variance (i.e. the partial least squares) between the latent variables. A path 
coefficient indicated the relative strength and direction (positive or negative) of 
the hypothesised predictive (cause and effect) relationship between a pair of 
latent variables. The path coefficients in this study were standardised to take 
into account the different units of measurement of the latent variables; 
consequently all path coefficients ranged from -1 to 1. The path coefficients 
were interpreted in the same way as the standardised regression or β weighted 
coefficients in a multiple regression model. The larger the value of the path 
coefficient, then the stronger was the partial correlation between the latent 
variables and the more important was the predictive relationship. Path 
coefficients > .5 represented the strongest relationships. (For example, a path 
coefficient = .520 between grammar and recognition in Figure 4.2 represented 
the strong ability of the participants to recognise grammar instructional 
discourse.) 
 
Effect size: The number inside an oval symbol was an estimate of the effect 
size, defined as the proportion of the variance in the latent variable explained in 
terms of the other latent variables indicated by the inflowing arrows. (For 
example, R² = .668 printed in the recognition symbol in Figure 4.2 implied that 
66.8% of the variance in recognition was explained by grammar, 
communication and weakly-framed communication). R² values > .15 were 
assumed to be large enough to imply practical and theoretical importance. If 
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there were no other latent variables contributing to the variance, indicated by no 
inflowing arrows, then an effect size could not be computed, and the number 
0.000 was printed by default inside the oval symbol. 
 
Moderation. A moderator is a variable that influences the strength of the 
relationship between two or more other variables; however, the moderator is 
not itself correlated with the other variables. If the moderating effect is 
removed, then the correlation between the other variables is not eliminated 
(Baron and Kenny, 1986). The answers to PQ8 and PQ9 required an evaluation 
of whether the nominal variables trajectory and/or organisation influenced the 
variance explained. The six logical steps used in this study to test the 
hypothesis that a moderator has an effect, based on the protocol described by 
Hair et al. (2010) is outlined in Table 4.5. Six models were constructed, as 
outlined in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6 Protocol for testing the influence of a moderator 
 
 
Step 1. A baseline model is constructed without moderators. 
Step 2. The effect size (R
2
) is measured.  
Step 3. A potential moderator is introduced into the baseline model. 
Step 4. The change in R
2
 is measured. 
Step 5. If R
2 
does not change then the hypothesis of moderation is not supported.  
Step 6. If R
2




Baseline model. The Baseline Model (Figure 4.2) was constructed using the 
data for N = 32 participants, a combination of members of Trajectory 1, 
Trajectory 2, and Trajectory 3 at both BU and CU. The Baseline Model 
represented Step 1 in Table 4.5, providing a theoretical reference point, 
representing the L2 acquisition activities of the sample of students as a whole, 
within which the effects of trajectory and organisation could be evaluated. 
 
Communication was most strongly reflected by Items 03, 23, 29, and 33 with 
loadings of .531, .857, .644, and .695 respectively. Weakly-framed 
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communication was most strongly reflected by Item 09, with a loading of .966. 
grammar was most strongly reflected by Items 04, 08, 17, 22, 28, 30, and 32, 
with loadings of .567, .661, .659, .673, .646, and .779 respectively. The value 
of R2 = .668 indicated that 66.8% of the variance in recognition was explained 
by grammar, weakly-framed communication, communication and orientation. 
The relative values of the path coefficients indicated that recognition of 
grammar (path coefficient = .620) was the most important predictor of 
recognition, recognition of communication (path coefficient = .463) was a less 
important predictor of recognition. Recognition of weakly-framed 
communication (path coefficient = .023) contributed little or nothing to the 
variance in recognition. Realisation was positively correlated with recognition 
(path coefficient = .637). The answer to PQ7 (How much of the variance in the 
participants’ realisation can be explained in terms of recognition?) was 
provided by the value of R2 = .406 indicating that 40.6% of the variance in 
realisation was explained by recognition. The rest of the procedural questions 
for this procedure will be addressed in the data analysis chapter (chapter 5). 
The data analysis provided above should be understood as an extension of the 
aforementioned pilot studies, which were set to confirm an important part of 
both the theoretical underpinnings of the overall research method and the 
empirical underpinnings of the empirical model. 
 




Source of data Number 
of cases 
Baseline All available data 32 
I Data from participants classified in Trajectory 1 
(with a preference for strongly framed learning) 
14 
II Data from participants classified in Trajectory 2 
(with a preference for not so strongly framed 
learning) 
7 
III Data from participants with classified in Trajectory 3 
(with a preference for weakly-framed learning) 
11 
IV Data from participants at BU  19 





Reliability of Baseline Model. If any of the latent variables in a PLS model are 
not reliable then the utility of the model is compromised. Consequently, the 
internal consistency reliabilities of the four latent variables incorporated in the 
baseline model (Figure 4.2) were estimated using Cronbach’s Alpha. The 
recommended threshold of Cronbach’s Alpha to indicate a minimum standard 
of reliability is .6 (Chin, 1999). This threshold was exceeded by all of the latent 
variables (Table 4.7). Consequently, the measurement of recognition was 
reasonably well specified in terms of its reliability.  
 
Table 4.8 Reliability of the latent variables  
 










The main weakness of the model was, on one hand, that realisation was 
measured only once, based on the instructor’s single grade at the end of the 
course. Consequently, realisation was represented by only one indicator 
variable. Ideally, a minimum of at least three reflective indicators are required 
in order to incorporate realisation into a PLS path model as a reliably-measured 
latent variable. On the other hand, although the statistical model overcame the 
reliability issue of counting on a very small sample size, the fact that 
participants could not be selected at random partially compromised its external 
validity. In other words, it is theoretically impossible to generalise the findings 
so that they apply to all foreign-language students, at all times, and in all places. 
Nonetheless, its objectives, in terms of the development of languages of 
description, called for the use of a research methodology that mixed 
quantitative and qualitative research tools and therefore the study was from the 
very beginning subject to the adoption of a basic non-experimental paradigm. If, 
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however, the results of the model are representative of the student population, 
then it can be speculated that foreign language students who possess 
recognition of grammar discourse do actually achieve higher levels of language 
mastery, and those who do not, achieve lower ones. 
 
In conclusion, the correlational research design served to confirm the 
preliminary conjectures reached previously while conducting the two pilot 
studies that (a) realisation was a function of recognition, with (b) recognition 
being formed by three principal components: recognition of grammar, 
communication, and weakly-framed communication discourse; and (c) the 
recognition of grammar discourse being the most important predictor of 
recognition.  
 
4.5.4 Pedagogic identities and mastery in sociologically-situated learning 
settings 
 
The intended outcome of this procedure is twofold. First, it seeks to ascertain 
the relationship between students’ trajectories, orientations, realisation, and the 
developmental goals set by communication instructors in 
sociologically-situated settings. Second, it seeks to ascertain the pedagogic 
identity of students in terms of the relationship between their trajectories, 
orientations, desired development vector and their realisation or mastery in 
those sociologically-situated organisation/learning settings.   
 
The pedagogic identity of students is expressed here as the relationship between 
trajectory (as formative development vector), orientation, desired development 
vector and the socially-situated demands for realisation set by instructors. In 
other words, whilst trajectory represents a student’s past development vector 
and orientation represents his or her present development vector, the desired 
development vector represents the student’s projection of ways to approach 
future activity depending on his or her learning goals. By sociologically 
situated, I refer to a thorough account of how the social structure of the learning 
setting potentiates or restricts students’ realisation or mastery according to their 
trajectory and orientation. In other words, it refers to an account of the 
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pedagogic device.  
 
4.5.4.1 Research questions 
 
PROCEDURAL QUESTION 10: What relationship is there between students’ 
trajectories, orientations, realisation or mastery, and the developmental targets 
set by communication instructors?  
 
PROCEDURAL QUESTION 11: What is the pedagogic identity of students in 
terms of the relationship between their learning trajectories and orientations, 
their desired development vector, and their realisation or mastery, expressed as 




The procedure consists of two stages. The first one is based on ascertaining the 
figured world of students by instructors, especially their labelling of them 
according to their ideas of what constitutes appropriate realisation according to 
the intended vectors of development set for the course (i.e. the dialectical 
moves between the upper and lower reaches of the zone of proximal 
development, or between representational and socio-communicative functions). 
This includes ascertaining not only the ideal instructional outcome but the ideal 
possession of realisation rules in terms of the regulative outcome. The resulting 
data is then contrasted with the data on students’ trajectory and orientation. The 
second one is based on ascertaining the figured world of learning by students 
with the purpose of assessing their desired development path vis-à-vis their 
learning objectives. The resulting data is then contrasted with the data on 
students’ trajectory, orientation and realisation. 
 
The data on the figured world of students supplied by BU and CU 
communication instructors were gathered in two phases. During the first phase, 
the instructors were asked through questionnaires and interviews that took 
place at the beginning of the data collection process for the kind of student 
development they were aiming for, based on Wertsch’s (1998, p. 36) ideas on 
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development as an end point that gives a sense of directionality (see Appendix 
4B). In the second phase, which took place at the end of the data collection 
process, they were asked to place photographs of individual students they 
taught on a chart with an axis designed to indicate where they perceived the 
student to lie, from ‘did achieve the objectives of the course’ to ‘did not achieve 
the objectives of the course’. The instructors were then asked what 
distinguished one student from another student, or one group of students from 
another group, so as to access their figured world, that is, how they built the 
relational space of their own students. Attention was paid to capturing their 
choice of words (labelling) when describing the students (see Appendices 4G 
and 4H). 
 
In the case of BU’s communication instructor, the interview was videotaped 
and a photograph was taken of the chart. In the case of CU’s communication 
instructor, the interview was audio-recorded and a photograph was taken of the 
chart. 
 
The data on the figured world of learning by students were collected from 
thirteen participants from the CU communication course through interviews 
(see a transcript of the interviews in Appendix 4D). Two questions served to 
ascertain participants’ beliefs about what they needed to do in order to master 
Spanish: (a) What would you do to reach the highest level (of Spanish language 
mastery)? and (b) What is the most important thing to study (Spanish) 
properly? 
 
Conducting the interviews was problematic because the office I used to carry 
out the data collection did not have an adequate waiting room, and in fact I 
could only use the office’s corridor to keep students waiting, nor could I count 
on the help of an assistant, and it was hard not to have students who had 
completed the interviews commenting on their impressions about the procedure 
to their fellow students waiting outside. I could not schedule individual 
appointments to conduct the interviews because I did not have enough time to 
address the class as a whole and therefore groups of students assigned 
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themselves to four or five different time slots on two different days. I decided 
to interview students in pairs because, if I were in their presence, I could at 
least control the exchange. If not, then the leaving student might have 
influenced the rest of the students in the queue while I kept interviewing 
students individually. Thus, the answer given by the first student of the pair to 
the questions I posed by might have influenced the answer of the second one. In 
order to avoid this, I introduced one or two dummy questions at the beginning 
of the interview. I also avoided each pair of students commenting on the 
procedure to students on queue by accompanying them out to the building’s 
exit door. This solution, designed to avert a focus-group kind of scenario, 
seemed to work. Students rarely manifested the same opinion or used a 
politeness marker to agree with what the prior student had said but each made 
her or his own statement anew in an independent manner.   
 
As already mentioned, data on the figured world of learning by students 
belonging to BU could not be collected because I could not obtain permission 
to interview students individually. I considered it impracticable to translate the 
data collection method based on interviews into one based on a written 
questionnaire.  
 
The number of trajectory-1 participants was five. The number of trajectory-2 
participants was one, and the number of trajectory-3 participants was seven. 
The lack of enough trajectory-2 participants did not allow for a more detailed 
account of the relationship between this category and the rest of the constructs, 
however, trajectories could be considered in general as pertaining to two groups 
or overall categories: Trajectory 1 was considered to represent a top-down move 
within the zone of proximal development, whereas trajectory 2 and 3 were 
considered to represent a bottom-up move within the zone of proximal 
development.  
 
The strongest aspect of the second part of the procedure was that, if the data 
were contrasted with the first part of the procedure, which was based on prior 
procedures that represented a mix of a handful of qualitative and quantitative 
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methods of analysis, a sort of inborn triangulation or cross-examination took 
place. This allowed generalising, to a certain extent, the findings referred 
exclusively to CU communication to BU communication as well. In other 
words, if the recognition of grammar discourse was a predictor of students’ 
realisation for both BU and CU communication courses, and the findings on the 
figured world of students by instructors happened to coincide for both learning 
settings, there are grounds to argue that a given pedagogic identity of CU 
students linked to higher degrees of mastery may well be the pedagogic identity 
of BU students with higher degrees of mastery. The degree of generalisation is, 




CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS 
 
I do not value formal grammar accuracy. I value much more the 
capacity to express ideas. 
Instructor, BU communication course  
 
Speak, but accurately ... 






In this chapter I analyse the data connected to the procedures already laid down 
in chapter 4 with the aim of addressing eventually the study’s research 
questions: How do the structural conditions of university organisation modulate 
subject position, social relations and discourse and therefore shape individual 
consciousness and activity? What sort of common trajectory, pedagogic 
identity and coding orientation (consciousness) enables a relatively small 
segment of students to attain higher levels of language mastery (active 
realisation) in Spanish as a foreign language learning settings informed by 
communicative language teaching? 
 
The procedures are part of a model in which a Hegelian notion of subject is 
deployed. Subject in the Hegelian philosophical system is the identity of agency 
or the capacity of an agent to transform the world, knowledge or understanding, 
and self-consciousness or identity. These three aspects of subject are in perpetual 
contradiction or, put another way, they cannot reach a complete identification 
with one another. Subject, therefore, is an ever-evolving process, as the agent 
keeps appropriating cultural tools by which he or she acts and is acted upon 
society. Thus, the individual is but one moment of subject. Furthermore, the 
model accounts for all the determinations of subject, represented in three 
moments; psyche-activity-culture.  
 
In cultural-historical activity theory the individual psyche and the social 
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macrostructure are subsumed under the notion of activity, that is, as collective 
forms of practice aimed at satisfying societal needs. More specifically, they are 
subsumed within the contradiction between individual action and collective 
activity. However, a conventional use of activity theory does not allow us to 
subsume the totality of social institutions as intermediate cultural loci, as 
cultural tools themselves. The proposed solution in the present study is to use 
Bernstein’s code theory as a general framework for analysing the links between 
the social structure (e.g., the university organisation, curricular schemes) and the 
structure of the individual’s experience, which is given in terms of (coding) 
orientations, that is, as forms of organisation of the relevance of meanings. 
Bernstein’s notion of (pedagogic) discourse, understood as the use of language 
according to the social position of agents subject to the recontextualisation 
process of the pedagogic structure (pedagogic device), which acts as an expander 
or constrainer of meanings, and cultural-historical activity theory’s notion of 
activity are deployed. I argue that this makes it possible to put together two 
mutually constituted dialectical systems; the activity system and the development 
system. The unit of analysis is the task, that is, the relationship between 
individual motive-action and societal motive-activity as an operationalisation of 
action, which permits ascertaining intended development targets and vectors 
and designate them a pedagogic code. Tasks are coded by deploying 
Bernstein’s code theory in terms of orientations (or forms of consciousness) to 
discourse (from elaborated to restricted), that is, variations in the strength of 
classification and framing, or pedagogic code. This makes it possible to 
recontextualise communicative language learning pedagogies under our 
dialectical framework of reference. Subject position is ascertained in terms of 
discourse recognition (passive realisation) as a function of students’ 
trajectories (aggregation of activity systems as a function of class structure) 
and discourse realisation (active realisation). The former is ascertained by 
assessing students’ trajectories and presenting students with discourse 
fragments and having them classify them according to their origin (belonging to 
either grammar or communication). The latter is ascertained by analysing the 
system of labelling used by teachers within the figured world of students, and 
by exploring the way students reflect about the figured world of learning 
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Spanish as a foreign language, that is, their position and potential for future 
activity in terms of their desired development vectors vis-à-vis their learning 
objectives. Finally, I argue that the pedagogic identity of students is conceived 
as the particular relationship that takes place between trajectory, orientation and 
the potential for future action, represented by students’ desired development 
vector in order to attain their learning objectives within the system of demands 
on active realisation imposed by instructors in particular learning settings. 
 
The exact procedural questions (PQs) rendered under each one of the 
comprehensive procedures are: 
 
Ascertaining of the pedagogic code of tasks 
 
PQ1: How do foreign language pedagogies in different organisations and 
learning settings compare in terms of tasks (motive-activity structure)? 
 
PQ2: What pedagogic code do organisations and learning settings have in terms 
of the strength of classification and framing? 
 
Recontextualisation of communicative language teaching  
 
PQ3: How can the weak and strong version of communicative language 
teaching be described in terms of motive-activity structure and development 
vectors/targets? 
 
PQ4: Does the foreign language pedagogy at different communication learning 
settings have a correlate in terms of SLA’s weak and strong versions of 
communicative language teaching? 
 
Trajectory and organisations, moderators of recognition and realisation 
 




PQ6: What are students’ coding orientations (elaborated/restricted), explained 
by their recognition of grammar and communication discourses? 
  
PQ7: How much of the variance in the student participants’ realisation can be 
explained in terms of recognition? 
 
PQ8: To what extent does the student’s trajectory moderate the degree of 
variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of recognition? 
 
PQ9: To what extent does the student’s organisation moderate the degree of 
variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of recognition? 
 
Pedagogic identities and mastery in sociologically-situated learning settings 
 
PQ10: What relationship is there between students’ trajectories, orientations, 
realisation or mastery, and the developmental targets set by communication 
instructors?  
 
PQ11: What is the pedagogic identity of students in terms of the relationship 
between their learning trajectories and orientations, their desired development 
vector, and their realisation or mastery, expressed as the final grade given by 
their communication instructor? 
 
 
5.2 PEDAGOGIC CODE OF TASKS 
 
The first findings on the pedagogic code of tasks allow us to compare 
pedagogies across organisational and learning settings. I will proceed to report 
those findings first and then move to reporting the ones linked to the 
development vectors and motive-activity structure of tasks across learning 
settings.   
 
The relational space for classification and framing values helps assessment of 
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the visibility and invisibility of pedagogic practices in a given setting or 
organisation. According to Bernstein, instances of weak framing represent 
invisible, more progressive pedagogies, whereas instances of strong framing 
represent visible, more traditional pedagogies. The results of the assessment of 
classification and framing values for internal and external relations across 
organisations and learning settings are contained in Table 5.1. 
 
 
Table 5.1 Internal and external organisational relations, classification and framing, 
for AU, BU and CU Grammar (Gramm) and Communication (Comm) courses 
 





Comm Gramm Comm 
 C F C F C F C F C F C F 
Internal             
1.1 Space instructor-student  + + + + - - - - + + + - 
1.2 Space student-student + + + + - - - - + + - - 
1.3 Instructor-student + + + + + + + - + + - - 
1.4. Student-student + + + + + + + + + + + - 





+ + + + + + + + + + + + 
1.6 Instructor-instructor (V) + + + + + + + + + + + + 
1.7 Between subjects + + + + + + + + + + + + 
1.8 Withi  a discipline + + + + + + + - + + + - 
External             
2.1 College-communities + + + + + + + + - - - - 
2.2 College-colleges + + + + + + + + - - - - 
2.3 College-employers + + + + - + - + - + - + 
2.4 Academic-non-academic + + + + + - + - + + + + 
Note: C, classification, F, framing; H, horizontal, V, vertical.  





The results indicate that the organisation with the weakest classification and 
framing values is CU, followed by BU and AU.  
 
AU represented an extreme case of strong classification and framing. AU’s 
instructor participants concluded that they had to exert strong control over the 
students due to the small number of students enrolled in the programme (six 
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students), their lack of active participation and their irregular attendance. 
 
5.2.1.1 Internal values 
 
The major differences between the organisations in this study in terms of their 
internal values were a relatively more flexible use of the instructor-student 
space and the student-student space in BU and CU, which corresponds to 
weaker classification and framing values. In contrast, AU’s space was tightly 
controlled by both instructors, imposing a more inflexible divide between 
instructor and student. Students had little or no control whatsoever over spatial 
arrangements. Communication courses in both BU and CU also reported weak 
framing in terms of the contents and instructional means deployed by 
instructors, that is, in the relationship within the discipline. They seemed more 
prepared to introduce twists or changes in their teaching plan or programme 
according to the needs of the students as they evolved along the instructional 
activities. In other words, students seemed more capable of influencing the 
pedagogic contents chosen by instructors and the pedagogic sequence in which 
they were deployed.   
 
5.2.1.2 External values 
 
There were major differences in external values. AU’s programme was not 
solidly linked to Spanish-as-a-foreign-language study programmes overseas. In 
contrast, BU and CU ran very successful exchange programmes that gave up to 
one-tenth of the students enrolled in Spanish language courses access to 
overseas colleges each year, especially to institutions that offered practical 
programmes. This acted as an external pressure to streamline BU’s and CU’s 
curricula and get results. It also constituted a stimulus for students to set up 
personal learning goals. Moreover, BU and CU instructors had a more positive 
view about their students’ prospects of getting jobs linked to the use of the 
Spanish language in comparison to their counterparts in AU. Therefore, AU’s 
classification and framing values were stronger in the college-employers 
relationship. In the case of BU, instructors expressed that they emphasised the 
learning of Spanish as a means of everyday communication because the 
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university did not specialise in teaching Spanish as a foreign language. 
Therefore, they did not target the teaching of Spanish for academic purposes. In 
contrast, AU and CU instructors, whilst not opposed to the teaching of Spanish 
as a means of communication, felt that they had to give to students the 
academic foundations that they needed if they decided to specialise in Spanish 
or Latin American studies in the future (e.g. in a post-graduate programme). 
 
A partial answer to PQ2 (What pedagogic code do organisations and learning 
settings have in terms of the strength of classification and framing?) was 
provided by the different organisational configurations of classification and 
framing given in Table 5.1. Evidence was provided to indicate that AU 
presented the strongest classification and framing of the three organisations. 
BU and CU presented similar strengths in classification and framing across 
relations. In terms of Bernstein’s interpretation of instances of weak framing 
representing invisible, more progressive pedagogies, whereas instances of 
strong framing representing visible, more traditional pedagogies, AU presented 
the most visible and traditional pedagogies, whereas, comparatively, BU and 
CU presented less visible and traditional pedagogies. 
 
5.2.2 Learning settings 
 
External values have already been dealt with, since they measure features 
belonging to the organisation as a whole, not to individual learning settings. 
 
As can be seen through the classification and framing values contained in Table 
5.1, the communication course of each institution in this study presented 
weaker classification and framing values than the corresponding grammar 
course. The communication courses may be considered as comparatively more 
progressive than the grammar courses within an already very traditional or 
visible pedagogical framework. 
 
CU’s communication course presented the weakest classification and framing 
values, constituting therefore the most progressive pedagogic context among 
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Instructor-student space. At AU and BU the classrooms presented a 
post-modern design, removed from schemes associated with large-scale 
education, more flexible and able to accommodate individual students in small 
groups if needed, up to a maximum of fifty people. The classrooms emulated a 
small auditorium where the student had a more preponderant position, closer to 
the board, and raised on a low platform which resembled a stage. BU’s 
classrooms were larger and well equipped with a PA system (used by the 
grammar instructor), a set of AV equipment (minidisc and compact disc decks, 
DVD players) and a large plasma TV monitor that could display information 
beamed from a personal computer. 
 
CU’s classrooms had the modern imprint of the language laboratory. CU’s 
grammar classes met in a language laboratory that could accommodate sixty 
people: the instructor’s desk was raised on a platform and students’ desks were 
fixed to the floor. The whole room was designed with the purpose of 
broadcasting information from the instructor’s desk through the PA system or 
headsets and the monitors situated at the students’ desks. The room and the use 
made of it by the teacher resembled a small broadcasting studio. The teacher 
used a wireless lapel microphone to amplify his voice and projected images of 
textbooks, newspaper clippings and photographs by means of an overhead 
projector on to the students’ monitors. Most of the time the teacher stayed in his 
space, but he often crossed the boundaries to reach individual students. When 
this happened, he continued ‘broadcasting’ the interaction through the use of a 
wireless microphone, as if the interactions were television interviews.  
 
The CU communication course met in a small language laboratory classroom, 
accommodating thirty people. It had a large round table equipped for interpreting 
drills, where the students sat, and a small stage close to the board where the teacher 
could write and speak to the class as a whole. Nonetheless, the CU communication 
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course was not completely constrained by the limitations imposed by classroom 
design. The teacher made use of the space very creatively. In other words, the spatial 
arrangements, even though they signalled a big divide between instructor and 
students, could not completely impose a hierarchical relation. The teacher walked 
down the stage close to the board and mingled with the students by walking around 
the round desk and speaking with individual students or groups of students. 
 
Student-student space. Although at AU and BU the classrooms followed the 
spatial arrangements of a small auditorium, the desks and chairs were 
freestanding and could be moved to configure new spatial shapes. AU’s 
communication instructor had the students form a circle. Her grammar 
counterpart did not resort to changing the spatial arrangements though. 
Nonetheless, both teachers controlled all the exchanges between the students 
since they did not occur simultaneously. Each peer-to-peer interaction 
constituted a model for the rest of the students. 
 
In the CU grammar course, the students were not encouraged by the teacher to 
engage in pair work in order to carry out instructional tasks. However, there 
were many instances of informal communication and backchannelling between 
peers. This kind of student-student relation was also present in BU’s courses 
but not in AU’s ones. Class size was one of the determining factors on this. In 
BU’s and CU’s classes, the students could still experience some anonymity and 
they engaged in small chats. That was not possible in AU’s courses since there 
were just half a dozen students enrolled in each course. 
 
Both BU instructors and the CU communication instructor encouraged 
peer-to-peer activities and therefore rich contributions among students took 
place. Students could configure their own spaces within the limits set for the 
activities. 
 
There was no evidence that the spatial features of the classrooms completely 
determined spatial relationships (instructor-student; student-student) across courses 
in all three institutions (e.g. use of fixed desks, podium, stage etc.). Space 
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arrangements seemed to depend more on the kind of interaction teachers sought 
from students in the classroom rather than the default architectural features of 
classrooms. This is not to say that the spatial arrangements do not constitute 
semiotic elements in themselves and eventually could drastically limit certain 
interactional dynamics, but the evidence indicated that those constraints could 
somehow be overcome. 
 
A partial answer to PQ2 (What pedagogic code do organisations and learning 
settings have in terms of the strength of classification and framing?) was 
provided by the different learning settings, configurations of classification and 
framing given in Table 5.1. Evidence was found to indicate that AU grammar 
and communication courses presented the strongest classification and framing 
of the six learning settings. The CU grammar course seemed closer to AU’s 
grammar and communication courses in terms of classification and framing 
strength for internal relations. BU grammar, BU communication and CU 
communication seemed to have a similar, relatively weak, classification and 
framing values for internal relations. Finally, CU communication stood up as 
the weakest in terms of classification and framing values of all learning 
settings.  
 
5.2.3 Motive-activity structure of BU and CU learning settings  
 
The first set of results included in Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 presents the 
motive-activity structure for BU’s and CU’s courses as a function of the time spent 






Figures 5.1 and 5.2 BU grammar course and BU communication course, 
motive-activity structure as a function of time spent (percentage) 
 
 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 CU grammar course and CU communication course, 




The answer to PQ1: How do foreign language pedagogies at different 
organisations and learning settings compare in terms of tasks (motive-activity 
structure)? is that the CU communication course presented a very different 
motive-activity structure from the rest of the courses, as can be seen in the above 
figures. Tasks (motive-action) had a functional purpose. This means that the 
objective motive of the activity was to have students producing speech acts as part 
of non-verbal activity. Students had to carry out instructional tasks that were not 
fundamentally focused on the structural properties of language but on the 
attainment of something outside language by means of language. This did not 
mean that the activity’s ultimate goal was not language acquisition but speech acts 
incorporated a series of elements (e.g., attention to the dialogical context and 
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speakers’ intention) that were not present in speech activity as part of foundation 
and structural activity. This difference, which is strongly linked to the avoidance of 
what Robbins (2003, p. 84) calls ‘reactive speech’ will be analysed more 
thoroughly in the next subsection. Nonetheless, a functional motive-activity 
structure is more aligned with both a strong version of communicative language 
teaching and Vygotsky’s ideas on the representational functions of language being 
predicated on its socio-communicative function. 
 
The BU communication course was similar to BU’s and CU’s grammar courses. In 
fact, it resembled much more closely the CU grammar course than the CU 
communication course. The BU communication course, with its accent on 
structural speech activity, was more aligned with a weak version of communicative 
language teaching. However, in order to perceive clearly the differences between 
structural speech activity in a communication and a grammar course, it was 
necessary to analyse the data on framing for instructional and regulative discourse, 
as will be done in the next subsections. 
 
CU seems to represent a more customary and ideal divide between grammar and 
communication, with a clear differentiation between what grammar and 
communication instruction are (e.g. the communication instructor may rely on the 
grammatical teaching done by her colleague and feel it is not worthwhile to cover 
again aspects of the language system and vice versa); however, that does not seem 
to be the case in BU. Although boundaries exist between subjects, these do not 
seem to be in a relation of complementarity. This may be the result of, on the one 
hand, a study programme set to produce specialists, as in the case of CU; and on 
the other hand, a study programme set to introduce Spanish to students who are 
specialising in something else, as in the case of BU. I do not suggest that all CU 
students will achieve a high degree of specialisation in Spanish or Spanish and 
Latin American studies, but at least the university seems to be offering that 
opportunity to a segment of its students. Again, BU’s programme does not seem to 
be based on an idea of complementarity between subjects. No instructor is 
introducing functional motive-activity tasks and therefore, one may ask when 
students will be confronted with tasks that aim at communication in Spanish. In the 
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case of BU, there are instances in which the communication instructor apparently 
intends to introduce an instructional task as part of a functional motive-action task, 
but soon afterwards the action is reframed under a structural motive-activity. This 
sudden reframing may be due to encountering students’ resistance.    
 
5.2.4 Learning settings’ pedagogic codes 
 
The data on framing values for instructional practice and regulative practice are 
presented in Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. More specifically, the figures contain the 
framing mean of instructional and regulative practices of all motive-actions per 
course. Regulative practice measures are shown in capital letters in the figures. For 










Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 BU grammar course, BU communication course, CU 
grammar course, CU communication course, framing values for instructional 
practice and regulative practice (median)  
 
 
5.2.4.1 CU communication course framing values 
 
The CU communication course was delivered mainly in Spanish. The use of 
Japanese was restricted almost exclusively to the translation of concepts, 
especially when the instructor rendered the term students asked for in Japanese, 
instead of explaining it in Spanish. Additional mediational tools included the 
use of the textbook, audio recordings and a whiteboard. 
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The course presented weak framing values in key areas related to communicative 
language teaching, especially in functional motive-actions. The instructional 
practice presented weaker framing in selection of contents, selection of classroom 
tasks and sequence. In other words, students were to a certain extent allowed to 
choose content, to bring their own experiences or knowledge (not necessarily 
linguistic knowledge) to the instructional practices, to have a say about who they 
worked with when carrying out instructional tasks, and to alter the instructional 
sequences of those tasks to find the sequence most suitable to them.  
 
Weak framing of selection of contents also seemed to be accompanied by a surge 
of concept translation at this stage in functional motive-activities. Students might 
have been compelled to use the instructor as a living dictionary, especially if the 
communication did not take a delayed form (as is the case of a written instructional 
task) but unfolded more spontaneously (i.e., not leaving enough time for the 
student to use the dictionary, or where its use had been tacitly or explicitly 
forbidden). 
 
The following extract of classroom interaction between CU’s communication 
instructor and a female student illustrates this translation surge: 
 
 
Extract 5.1 CU communication course classroom discourse, functional motive-activity, 
motive-action No. 2 
 
 
Line Participant Transcript English translation Coding 
28 I 
Mmm. Apellido. 
¿Cuál es tu apellido? 
Mmm. Family name. 
¿What is your family name? 
EC a F++ 
SE a F+ 
29 SF1 
Apellido か...  
 





¿Cuál es tu apellido? 
Family name. 
¿What is your family name? 
HI F+ 
EC a F++ 
 
31 SF1 I. I.  
 
NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender 
(M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for 
two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and 
rendered in italics.  
FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE 
b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); 
Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI). 
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The weakening of framing in the selection of contents and the consequent surge 
in conceptual translation might also be linked to the strengthening of hierarchy 
(in functional motive-activities). The instructor was being asked by the student 
about the meaning in Japanese of the concept family name. In this case, the 
instructor answered the student directly, translating the term (see a hierarchy 
framing value of + above) and kept the dialogue unfolding. This was due in part 
to the pressure exerted by the functional motive-activity whereby the 
communication unfolded rapidly without time to pause in the search for 
clarifications or explanations.  
 
The following extract also illustrates the link between weak framing in 




Extract 5.2 CU communication course classroom discourse, functional 
motive-activity, motive-action No. 2 
 
Line Participant Transcript English translation Coding 
102 I 
¿Qué escritor te gusta? 
¿Cuál es tu escritor favorito? 
What writer do you like? Who is 
your favourite writer? 
EC a F+ 
 
103 SF13 *Mucho escritores. *Much writers  
104 I 
¿Por ejemplo? ¿Por 
ejemplo? 
For example? For example? EC F- - 
105 SF13 ¿Por ejemplo? For example?  
106 I 例えば。 For example. 









¿JK Rowling? Ah, Harry 
Potter, ja, ja, ja, sí muy bien. 
Vale muy bien. 
JK Rowling? Ah, Harry Potter, ha 
ha ha, yes that’s right. OK, very 
good. 
EC a F++ 
 
 
NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender 
(M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for 
two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and 
rendered in italics.  
FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE 
b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); 
Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI). 
 
 
On the contrary, at foundation motive-activity level questioning was followed 
by a relative weakening of hierarchy. There were more instances in which the 
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instructor did not answer the questions directly but facilitated the answers in 
such a way that she had students answering the very same questions they had 
asked by guiding them through. This was done by mining students’ information 
or making etymological comparisons with English, a language with which the 
students were more familiar at that stage. Hence, there was evidence that the 
weakening of framing values for hierarchy was linked to the facilitating role of 
the instructor at foundation motive-activity level and the fact that at this level 
reflection on language was encouraged. In contrast, at functional 
motive-activity level, the instructor asserted her condition as primary knower 
by quickly translating the terms she was being asked by students so as not to 
interrupt the conversational pace. 
 
The following exchange (see Extract 5.3) makes clear the effect that partially 
lifting the control over the selection of contents and selection of classroom jobs 
had in circumstances where the activity trend favours an already weakly framed 
distinction of power and control relations. As a consequence of a weakly 
framed selection of classroom jobs (‘Do you have questions?’), students did ask 
the teacher questions (‘What is the meaning of oysters?’). Eventually, the 
teacher decided not to answer those questions directly but facilitated the 
answers by making other students participate in the process (‘Is there anybody 
who knows it already?’). 
 
 
Extract 5.3 CU communication course classroom discourse, foundation 
motive-activity, motive-action No. 6 
 
Line Participant Transcript English translation Code 
546 I ¿Tenéis preguntas? De 
estas preguntas, ¿tenéis 
preguntas? 
Do you have questions? On 
these questions, do you have 
questions? 
SE b F- 
547 I ¿Tenéis preguntas?  
質問ありませんか？あなた
は？ 
Do you have questions? 
Do you have questions? You? 
 
(...) SS    
555 SF9 ¿Qué significa ostras? What is the meaning of oysters?  
556 I ¿Ostras? ¿Qué significa 
ostras? 
Oysters? What is the meaning of 
oysters? 
EC a F++ 
HI F-- 
557 I 誰か分かった？ Is there anybody who knows it 
already?  
 
558 2 or 3 
students 
カキ。 Oyster.  
261 
 
559 I うん、貝。牡蠣。 Yes, a shell. Oyster.  EC a F++ 
560 I Ostra. Se parece al inglés 
¿no? Oyster. Ostra. 
Oyster. It looks like English, 
doesn’t it? Oyster. Oyster. 
 
561 I ¿Más preguntas? 
¿Queréis preguntar más? 
¿No? Bueno. Bueno. 
Any more questions? Do you 
want to ask more? No? Alright. 
Alright. 
EC a F++ 
 
NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender 
(M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for 
two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and 
rendered in italics.  
FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE 
b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); 
Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI). 
 
 
The values for each framing indicator suggested that, in general, students 
engaged in experiential socio-communicative functions. Nonetheless, 
regulative practice was still strongly framed, with the exception of conduct 
regulation. 
 
Table 5.2 depicts a few examples of conduct regulation that occurred in the CU 
communication course. All items represent conduct regulation-in-action, that is, 
regulation of conduct as the instructional task was unfolding, except for item 2. 
Conduct regulation seems constant because most of the motive-actions were 
framed within functional motive-activity, that is, the purpose of regulating 
students’ conduct was linked to the need to regulate functional activity. The 
higher in the motive-activity structure the instruction was, the more 
‘operational’ language production became, moving away from conscious 
reflection and closer to automaticity. Therefore, conduct regulation served the 
more immediate goal of regulating a seemingly more chaotic action as it 
unfolded. 
 
The instructor exerted a tight control through questioning individual students or 
groups of students (see the coding in Extract 5.3 above) and asserted her 
position as the primary knower. The instructor’s evaluation criteria were 
strongly framed as well. This meant that the instructor assumed the role of 




Table 5.2 CU communication course, social order rules, regulating 
socio-affective competences 
 
Motive-activity Transcript English translation 
Functional 
(1) A ver. Escuchad. [Students are not 
paying attention to instructor and keep 
doing the task or just talking] F+, CU 
Communication, 207 
(1) Attention. Listen. [Students are not 
paying attention to instructor and keep 





て。勉強してください。 F+, CU 
Communication, 321 
(2) Please study by yourselves. You must 
study. By yourselves, because there is 
nothing to explain. It is self-explanatory. 
Please study it on your own.F+, CU 
Communication, 321 
(3) [Addressing SF6] 言ってください。 
¿Qué tipo de música escuchas? F+, 
CU Communication, 904 
(3) [Addressing SF6] (1) Say it, please. 
What kind of music do you listen to? F+, 
CU Communication, 904 
(4) [Addressing SF4] Sí. ただ、本当の
ことね。あなたの答え。お願い。¿Qué 
tipo de música? Por ejemplo, clásica, 
jazz. F+, CU Communication, 905 
(4) [Addressing SF4] Yes. But make it real. 
Your answer. Please. What kind of music 
[do you listen to]? For instance, classical 
music, jazz.  F+, CU Communication, 905 
 
 
The framing of selection of classroom tasks varied depending on the motive-activity 
structure, with a weakening of framing values the higher the discourse is in the 






Figures 5.9, 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 CU communication course, management, 
foundation, structural and functional motive-activity framing values (median) 
 
 
The analysis of the classroom discourse suggested that the teacher does not rely 
on pair work at the management, foundation and structural levels. He or she 
addressed the class as a whole – a selection of classroom jobs linked to 
traditional pedagogies – at those levels. At the structural level, though, the 
teacher weakened the framing of selection of classroom jobs by asking 
questions to the whole class but allowing students to select themselves 
individually. The teacher asked for volunteers instead of directly selecting 





Extract 5.4 CU communication course classroom discourse, structural 
motive-activity, motive-action No. 14 
 
Line Participant Transcript English translation Coding 
858 T Bueno. Entonces página 
44.¿Quién quiere leer? 
Venga. (1) Voluntario para 
leer. Que no haya leído. Antes 
que no haya.  
うーん、前読んでなかった人。 
Por ejemplo, venga. (1) A.  
Anabel. Ah, en el número tres. 
Son jóvenes españoles que 
dan su opinión. ¿Vale? 
Sobre... Anabel, 30 años, 
Valencia. Sí. 
Well. Then page 44. Who 
wants to read? Come on. (1) A 
volunteer, to read. Someone 
who hasn’t read. Who hasn’t 
read before. 
Umm someone who hasn’t 
read before... 
For example, come on. (1) A.  
Anabel. Ah, number three. 
They are young Spaniards who 
give their opinion. Okay? 
About… Anabel, 30 years old, 
Valencia. Yes. 
 
(1) SE b F+ 
 
NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender 
(M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for 
two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and 
rendered in italics.  
FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE 
b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); 
Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI). 
 
 
The framing of evaluation criteria seemed to be weakened at the functional level as 
well, although there are minimum differences at management, foundation and 
structural levels (see, for instance, the instructor’s acceptance of a student’s 
grammatical mistake, shown in Extract 6.2, line 103 above). Again, the search for 
automaticity might have overridden the need for grammatical correction in certain 
instructional tasks. 
 
5.2.4.2 BU communication course framing values 
 
The BU communication course was delivered mainly in Japanese. The instructor 
gave most of the instructions in Japanese. In cases of using Spanish, the instructor 
rendered key utterances in Japanese as well. Additional mediational tools included 
the use of the textbook and the classroom’s blackboard. 
 
The course presented strong framing values in key instructional practices such as 
selection of contents and sequence. In other words, students were not allowed to 
bring in their own experiences or find the instructional sequence that most suited 
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them since that sequence was provided to them and enforced by the instructor, and 
the instruction constrained the contents. The areas of weaker framing were the ones 
related to hierarchy and evaluation criteria. The instructor tended not to assume a 
direct role as evaluator, engaging students in ways that allowed them to find the 
answers they were looking for by themselves, paying attention to their own mistakes 
(facilitating, not instructing) or referring questions to the class as a whole in search of 
a more knowledgeable student before answering directly. This kind of facilitating, 
whereby the framing of hierarchy weakened, seemed similar to the case already 
discussed in the CU communication course above. The BU communication course 
had a strong component of foundation and structural motive-activities where the 
Spanish language was analysed and reflected upon.  
 
Framing of selection of classroom jobs seemed to be weaker the higher the discourse 
is in the motive-activity structure, as is shown in Figures 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15. Thus, at 
the management level, the selection of classroom tasks was strongly framed (the 







Figures 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 BU communication course, management, 
foundation and structural motive-activity framing values (median) 
 
 
The analysis of the classroom discourse suggests that instructor and students 
resorted more to concept translation the higher the level to which their 
interaction belongs in the motive-activity structure. This means that there were 
more instances of concept translation (Spanish-Japanese) at the structural level 
than at the foundation and management levels, as illustrated in Extract 5.5. 
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Extract 5.5 BU communication course classroom interaction, structural 
motive-activity, motive-action No. 4 
 
Line Participant Transcript English translation Coding 




(1) If there is any word that you 
don’t understand, you can 
ask me, but if you don’t ask 
me in Spanish, I won’t answer 
you. 
 
(1) CO F+ 
ECa F++ 
SQ F- 
24 SM1 ¿Qué significa English ? ¿What does English mean?  





In Japanese English is eigo. 
More? More?  
More? Something you don’t 





NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender 
(M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for 
two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and 
rendered in italics.  
FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE 
b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); 
Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI). 
 
The strong framing of conduct at the structural motive-activity level was also partly 
associated with the fact that the instructor commanded students to ask him questions 
(see Figure 5.15). This produced a surge in questioning from the students’ part that 
was framed explicitly under the instructional input of the instructor (strong framing). 
Thus, student questioning did not sound as natural as in CU communication course’s 
functional motive-activities, where questioning was encouraged tacitly (weak 
framing) but it did resemble CU communication course’s foundation motive-activity. 
The BU communication teacher was encouraging students to ask him questions in 
Spanish at all times, as shown in Extract 5.5, line 23 and Extract 5.6, line 244. 
 
Extract 5.6 BU communication course classroom interaction, structural 
motive-activity, motive-action No. 9 
 
Line Participant Transcript English translation Coding 
244 I A ver, por favor. Ahora, ahora 
y ahora. Tenéis que 
preguntarme a mí. 
質問しなければならない。 
Teneis que preguntarme a mí 
qué lengua se habla en... 
どっかその分からないとこ 




Let’s see, please. Now, now 
and now. You have to ask me. 
You have to ask. 
You have to ask me what 
language is spoken in... 
A place you didn’t know. 
Yes? Please.  
Did you take notes of the 
places you didn’t know how to 
answer, when you answered I 




Por favor. those places. 
Please. 
245 SF20 ¿Qué lengua se habla en 
Bélgica? 
What language is spoken in 
Belgium? 
 
246 I En Bélgica se habla francés y 
flamenco. 
French and Flemish are 
spoken in Belgium. 
EC a F++ 
 
NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender 
(M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for 
two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and 
rendered in italics.  
FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE 
b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); 
Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI). 
 
Moreover, strong framing values at the structural level are associated with a tighter 
control of students who did not comply with the teacher’s instructions (e.g. a call to 
keep silence, to form pairs). Conduct regulation at this level seemed to be linked to 
solving problems arising from the instructional practice rather than making general 
statements about appropriate conduct. 
 
5.2.4.3 CU grammar course framing values 
 
This course was taught mainly in Japanese. Instructions were given in Spanish and 
soon afterwards the Japanese version followed. Additional mediational tools included 
the use of audio and video recordings and, more importantly, visual (photographs, 
newspaper clips, pictures) and textual aids that were projected onto the students’ 
monitors using an overhead projector. The instructor’s voice was also amplified 
through the classroom’s PA system. In general, the setup looked as though this class 
was a television studio, the instructor was the presenter and students were participants 
in a show that was being broadcast beyond the walls to the general public. 
 
The CU grammar course presented a case of strong framing in most areas of 
instructional practice and regulative practice. It was a clear example of visible 
pedagogy.  
 
Conduct regulation presented weaker framing values the higher the level of the 








Figures 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.19 and 5.20 CU grammar course, management, 






Table 5.3 presents some samples of explicit conduct regulation according to 
motive-activity at the three lowest levels in the CU grammar course. Most of 
the regulation of students’ conduct was linked to (a) their need to learn 
dialogues, verb tenses and lexicon by heart, that is, a regulation based on a 
reflection whose object was a past action, and (b) the need to regulate an 
unfolding action, e.g., ‘come quickly’ to pick up the corrected assignment (item 
1), meaning, ‘be diligent’, ‘do not waste time’. Thus, conduct can serve two 
purposes: one, as a warning call to change past conduct (conduct 
regulation-on-action), and two, as a regulator of an unfolding action, serving 
the more immediate purpose of regulating instruction (conduct 
regulation-in-action).  
 
Table 5.3 CU grammar course, social order rules, regulating socio-affective 
competences 
 




はい、 A さん・・・[Instructor keeps 
calling students’ names] F+, CU 
Grammar 1, 2 
(1) Well, I give you back the exam, so please 
come quickly to pick it up. Well, Mr A… 
[Instructor keeps calling students’ names]  
F+, CU Grammar 1, 2  
(2) O sea, ya veo muy claro que 
vosotros no estáis repasando bien el 
diálogo. Así que os aconsejo que 
estudiéis mucho, mucho, mucho, 
sobre todo el diálogo. Os aconsejo que 




Grammar 1, 89  
(2) I see quite clearly that you are not 
reviewing the dialogue well enough. My advice 
is that you study a lot, a lot, a lot, especially 
the dialogue. My advice is that you learn the 
dialogue by heart. 
Learn by heart the diálogo [dialogue]. I thought 
there was no need to tell it to you but now I 
realise that you have not learned it well by 





desastroso es la pregunta siguiente. 
F++, CU Grammar 1, 67 
(3) OK, up to here you have been happy. If the 
exam finished here, it would have been a 
normal result. The disaster comes next. F++, 
CU Grammar 1, 67 
(4) ¡Uy!, calladitos estáis. 
陽気な性格です。F++, CU Grammar 1, 
69 
(4) Oh! how quiet you are. 
You are quiet. F++, CU Grammar 1, 69 
Structural 
(5)ついでに覚えちゃいましょうね。
F+, CU Grammar 1, 401 
 
(5) Well, learn this tense, learn it by heart. F+, 
CU Grammar 1, 401 
(6) Japonés 皆さんはやいね、リアクシ
ョンがね。F++, CU Grammar 1, 468 
 
(6) When it is in japonés [Japanese], your 





The framing of selection of classroom jobs weakened considerably at the 
functional motive-activity level, as well as the selection of contents and 
selection of classroom jobs (see Figure 5.19). At this level, framing values were 
similar to the CU communication course. Unlike the CU communication course, 
however, in the CU grammar course the instructional sequence was strongly 
framed. The instructor interviewed students one by one. Students had the 
possibility of answering the instructor’s questions but under such circumstances, 
it seemed unlikely that students could ask the instructor. There was a complete 
mise en scène. It was as if the interviews were being broadcast to the whole 
class. 
 
The framing of conduct weakened at the higher motive-activity levels. This 
could be partially explained by the fact that those activities were not part of the 
composite final grade. Functional and rhetorical activities were not part of the 
skills that constituted the grammar course’s final grade, at least not in verbal 
production form. Hence, regulating students’ conduct on those activities might 
have been deemed unnecessary.  
 
Furthermore, sequence and selection of classroom jobswere strongly framed as 
functional and rhetorical motive-activities, leaving less room for conduct 
regulation interventions. When the instructional sequence was strongly framed, 
students were not allowed to discover by themselves the most suitable sequence 
to carry out the instructional task. 
 
Nonetheless, this is one of the few instances of weak framing of selection of 
contents in oral text production. CU’s grammar teacher might require students 
to use their personal data – therefore looking for a certain form of functionalism 
– while carrying out a written instructional task, including an assignment or test, 
but demanding the use of personal information under such conditions was 
framed by the need to comply with particular grammar rules. Written 
instructional tasks developed a different kind of automaticity, one that still 




The use of personal information was considered optional in the CU grammar 
course, as was evident when the instructor asked students to use their personal 
information:  
 
Let’s see ... it’s not always necessary to write it in this way [the way of 
the example]. You wrote it as in the example [instead of using your 
personal information], Selection of contents, F+, CU Grammar 1, 795; 
Here you can draw on your own real case to give an answer, Selection of 
contents, F+, CU Grammar, 802.  
 
On the contrary, in the CU communication course, students were encouraged at 
all times to draw on their own experience and personal information, e.g.:  
 
Yes. But make it real. Your answer. Please. What kind of music [do you 
listen to]? For instance, classical music, jazz…, Selection of contents, F-, 
CU Communication, 905.  
 
The kind of information to be used by students in the CU communication 
course was personal by default. 
 
There were other factors involved in the gradual weakening of conduct 
regulation the higher the level of instruction was placed in the motive-activity 
ladder in the CU grammar course. Speaking turns and hierarchy were strongly 
framed and could compensate for a weakening in conduct (see Figure 5.19). In 
other words, in the CU grammar course, the strong framing of instructional 
practice might have produced a relative weakening of conduct regulation at the 
functional motive-activity level. 
 
Finally, this was the only course that registered rhetorical motive-activity 
(communication activity). The teacher played small segments of documentary 




5.2.4.4 BU grammar course framing values 
 
This course was delivered mainly in Japanese. The instructor gave instructions 
in Japanese followed sometimes by their Spanish version. However, 
grammatical explanations were given almost exclusively in Japanese. 
Additional mediational tools included the use of the blackboard, the textbook 
and a few printed hand-outs with additional instructional tasks or exercises. The 
instructor also made use of the microphone and PA system available in the 
classroom. 
 
Overall, the framing values in the BU grammar course were more similar to the 
BU communication course and the CU communication course than to the CU 
grammar course (see Figures 5.21, 5.22, and 5.23). This is because the course 
included foundation motive-activity that presented weak framing in selection of 
classroom jobs, hierarchy and structural motive-activity with weak framing 
values in selection of contents, selection of classroom jobs, and hierarchy (see 
Figure 5.23). The framing values in structural motive-activity were among the 






Figures 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23, BU grammar course, management, foundation and 
structural motive-activity framing values (median) 
 
 
Selection of classroom jobs was strongly framed in foundation motive-activity 
but not as strongly as in other courses. This was due to the fact that the teacher 
communicated the system of participation to the students before the 
instructional activities took place: ‘We will begin from here’. [Instructor 
apparently addresses students by the order they are sitting]’, Selection of 
classroom jobs, F+, BU grammar 1, 50; ‘Let’s see how are we doing. Then we 
start doing the exercises from number two. Please start from this side on, 
Selection of classroom jobs, F+, 179. This gave the students time to prepare 
themselves when questioned by the teacher. 
 
Selection of classroom jobs was weakly framed in structural motive-activity: 
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‘Please group in pairs and ask questions one to another about Do you like 
(something)?’, Selection of classroom jobs, F-, 222. 
 
Framing of hierarchy seemed to weaken the higher the discourse was in the 
motive-activity structure, as is shown in Figures 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23. Thus, at 
management level, hierarchy was strongly framed (students did not ask 
questions), at foundation level the framing weakened (the instructor assumed 
the role of primary knower answering directly or facilitating the answers) and 
at structural level most of the questions were answered indirectly by the 
instructor. 
 
Selection of contents was strongly framed in structural motive-activity but not 
as strongly as in the other courses at that level. In other words, the instructional 
contents were provided to the students but some personal information or 
personal experience was elicited from them. Furthermore, the instructor 
communicated and enforced an instructional sequence. The framing value was 
still lower than the rest of the courses at this level. 
 
The answer to PQ2 (What pedagogic code do organisations and learning 
settings have in terms of the strength of classification and framing?) was 
provided by the different organisational configurations of framing given in 
Table 5.1 and Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. AU presents the strongest 
classification and framing values of all three organisations. CU, on the contrary, 
presents the weakest classification and framing values, closely followed by BU. 
Thus, compared with the other two organisations, AU may be considered an 
example of a traditional (visible) pedagogy, whilst BU and CU may be 
considered more (invisible) progressive pedagogies. In regard to particular 
learning settings and their framing values, Figures 5.24 and 5.25 help compare 
the results at foundation and structural motive-activity, two of the 
motive-activity structures present in all four settings. A 
motive-activity-structure-specific analysis arguably enables a more accurate 





















Figure 5.24 BU and CU learning settings’ framing of instructional and 























Figure 5.25 BU and CU learning settings’ framing of instructional and 
regulative practice upon structural motive-activity (median) 
 
 
Overall, the CU grammar course presents a case of very strong framing, 
compared with the rest of the learning settings, both at foundational and 
structural motive-activity. In general, the BU grammar course, the BU 
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communication course and the CU communication course’s framing is weaker 
at structural motive-activity. Moreover, the CU communication course presents 
very weak framing in conduct regulation at both motive-activity levels. The BU 
grammar course presents weaker framing values than the BU communication 
course at the structural level. In fact, at that level, the BU grammar course 
presents the weakest framing of all four learning settings. In conclusion, there 
is a sharp contrast between the way to approach the instruction of grammar in 
the BU and CU grammar courses. The CU grammar course represents a case of 
traditional pedagogy, whereas the BU grammar course represents a case of 
progressive pedagogy with lower framing values at structural motive-activity. 
 
5.2.4.5 Discussion on the weakly-framed regulative discourse across learning 
settings 
 
Visible and invisible mediation apparently clashed in communication courses 
whose instructional discourse dealt with grammatical contents but their 
regulative discourse was weakly-framed. This represented one of the most 
intriguing contradictions in communication courses, illustrating precisely the 
point where explicit and implicit mediation intersect. 
 
The most noteworthy contradiction occurred in the BU communication course, 
where one of the weakest framing values for hierarchy at the structural 
motive-activity was recorded. However, the instructional content was linked to 
the facilitating of grammatical rules or the teaching of cultural aspects that 
constituted the cultural background of the learning tasks. The most remarkable 
aspect of the BU communication course was the fact that the instructor 
attempted not to answer directly the questions made by students but facilitated 
the answers by promoting discussion between students. This might have been 
possible at foundation and structural level, where reflection was sought, but 
reflection at the functional level might have obstructed the accomplishment of 
the pedagogical task’s object. 
 
However, the facilitating was sometimes the consequence of the way the 
instructor had planned the learning task, as when the instructor instructed 
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students to ask him questions about the learning task items they could not solve 
by themselves. Thus, the questioning was visibly mediated not only because a 
tool had been introduced (e.g. the pedagogical task in textbook form) but in the 
form of the instructor’s request:  
 
A ver, por favor. Ahora, ahora y ahora. Tenéis que preguntarme a mí. 
Tenéis que preguntar. Tenéis que preguntarme a mí qué lengua se habla 
en … Alguna parte donde no sabían. ¿Sí?, por favor. Apuntaron las 
partes donde no sabían contestar, donde contestaron no lo sé, 
pregúntenme de estas partes. Por favor. [Let’s see, please. Now, now, 
and now. You have to ask me. You have to ask. You have to ask me what 
language is spoken in … Of some place you didn’t know. Yes? Please. 
Did you take notes of the places you didn’t know how to answer, where 
you answered I don’t know? Ask me about those places. Please.] (BU 
communication classroom interaction, 244)  
 
This kind of task confounded to a certain degree the actual source of the 
questioning in terms of what was visible or invisible, and might partly explain 
weaker framing values for hierarchy in BU communication at the structural 
motive-activity level. A great number of questions the students asked the 
instructors were actually in response to the instructor’s initiation (‘ask me’). In 
other words, many questions asked by the students were in response to the 
instructor’s request. Nonetheless, there were many instances of students making 
questions motu proprio, without being prompted to do so by the instructor. Still 
BU communication had one of the weakest framing values in hierarchy at the 
structural level among all courses. 
 
Yet the social value that seemed to be transmitted here is the necessity on the 
students’ part to participate in the task by asking the instructor questions, 
according to a particular disposition. 
 
What was not visibly mediated at all was the attempt to involve the class as a 
whole in facilitating the answer to a question, which was the case in the BU 
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communication class. Extract 5.7 shows how this was done within the same 
learning task referred to above. 
 
 
Extract 5.7 BU communication course classroom interaction, structural 
motive-activity, motive-action No. 9 
 
Line Participant Transcript English translation Coding 
249 SM16 ¿Qué lengua se habla en 
Dinamarca? 
What language is spoken in 
Denmark? 
 
250 I [Addressing everyone] 
¿Qué lengua se habla en 
Dinamarca? 
[Addressing everyone] What 
language is spoken in 
Belgium? 
HI F-- 
251 SF21 Dina-maru-qués. Dina-maru-qués [Danish].  
252 I Dinamarqués o danés. 
Dinamarqués o danés. 
Dinamarca en japonés se 
dice デンマーク, Bélgica se 
dice ベルギ. Dinamarca, デ
ンマーク。 
¿Más? ¿Más? 
Dinamarqués o danés [Danish 
(accepted adjective) or Danish 
(more commonly used)]. 
Dinamarqués o danés. 
Denmark in Japanese is 
Denmaaku, Belgium is Berugi. 
Denmark, Denmaaku.  
¿Anything else? ¿Anything 
else? 
EC a F++ 
 
 
NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender 
(M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for 
two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and 
rendered in italics.  
FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE 
b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); 
Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI). 
 
 
The BU communication course was not the only one where this kind of weakly 
framed mediation took place, as the BU grammar course clearly resembled the 
BU communication course. The predominant motive-activity in both courses 
was foundational and structural. The difference is that BU’s grammar teacher 
did not involve the class as a whole in answering questions asked by students. 
Extract 5.8 contains a rather long example of how BU’s grammar teacher did 
not answer the student’s question directly but facilitated it being answered. It 
also reflects the severe limitations inherent in instruction informed half way 
between the trial-and-error and the complete orienting basis.  
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Extract 5.8 BU grammar course classroom interaction, structural 
motive-activity, motive-action No. 7 
 
Line Participant Transcript English translation Coding 
243 I [Addressing a female student] 
はい、どこが分からない？ 
What is your question?  
244 SF13 これってなんかさっき、gusta と
gustanに gustamos とかも・・・  
A while ago I said that apart from 
gusta and gustan, there is also 
gustamos or something like 
that… 
 
245 I これは人間関係のときです。 Es cuando se habla de relación 
entre personas. It is when the 
relationship between people is 
talked about. 
HI F- 
EC a F+ 
 




Do I like you? Do we like each 
other? They are being used in 
those occasions. 
HI F- 
EC a F+ 
 
248 SF13 もののこと好きか聞くときは
gustaか gustan しか使わない。 
When the question is addressing 
things, only gusta and gustan 
















That’s right. But in that way you 
can misinterpret that another 
type of conjugation is not used. 
To avoid that mistake, I placed 
that information here indicating 
that it is used when talking about 
the relationship between people. 
I did not take it as something 
secondary. I say secondary to 
express that there are other 
conjugations. In order to say ¿te 
gusto?, do you like me? That’s 
why you have to leave that aside 
for the time being. 
 
EC a F+ 














It’s a supplementary explanation 
to avoid you thinking that the two 
above are the only possible 
conjugations. If you talk about 
your friends and the question Do 
you like (people’s name)? is 
made. Or if they talk about a 
singer, Do you like Zard?..., etc. 
Well in these two cases, they 
have been about the third 
grammatical person and no 
difference is made, te gusta...  
but when it is referred to us other 
conjugations can be used as 
well. That’s what I want to say.  
EC a F+ 
252 SF13 あー Ah...  
253 I わかる？うん。 Do you understand? Yes. EC a F+ 
 
254 SF13 これは gustamos っていうの
は？ 
Then, gustamos is...?  
255 I Gustamosって活用私たちじゃな
いですか。 
The conjugation of gustamos is 
about we, isn’t it? 
HI F- 
EC a F+ 
256 SF13 はい、では、あの、下に英文・・・ Yes, let’s see, here at the 
bottom, in alphabet letters... 
 
257 I Gustamos って活用自体が私た
ちじゃないですか。今までの活用
The conjugation of gustamos is 
of we. See the conjugations we 





have covered so far. 
258 SF13 じゃあ、もう私たちの話をしてい
るっていうことですか。 
Then, it is talking about we, or 
not? 
 


















That’s right; always this part is 
left out. Ah, in this case an object 
must be placed, otherwise there 
is no way to know what all is 
about. If it is about the 
relationship among people and it 
says gustamos; the subject is 
always we. In this case it is not 
necessary to make it specific. 
HI F+ 





These are samples of other 
possible usage. That’s what is 




NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender 
(M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for 
two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and 
rendered in italics.  
FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE 
b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); 
Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI). 
 
 
Whilst, in theory, a communication instructor should not necessarily engage in 
teaching grammar using a complete-orientating-basis-for-action instructional 
model, one would expect a more comprehensive and organised presentation of 
the Spanish grammatical system in grammar courses. The BU students attended 
another grammar course (which was not covered in the present research) as 
well, but the two courses were not co-ordinated and eventually it transpired that 
a more comprehensive presentation of the grammatical system did not take 
place in BU’s programme at all. It was an example of grammatical rules being 
presented in piecemeal fashion. The example also highlighted the issue of how 
much attention and resources should be allocated to facilitating individual 
students, especially when the facilitating seemed vital for every single student 
to understand the grammatical rules of the Spanish verb gustar, and Spanish 




The CU communication course also presented weaker framing values in 
hierarchy, but only at the foundation motive-activity level. At that level, CU’s 
communication teacher facilitated the answers to students’ questions by asking 
the class as a whole for the meaning of a word (see Extract 5.3). At the 
structural level the task consisted of selected pairs or a pair of volunteers 
reading an interview contained in the textbook to the class as a whole and it is 
focused on learning conversational questions such as, ‘What kind of music do 
you listen to?’. At the functional level, students’ questions were directly 
answered by the teacher so as not to slow down communication. 
Operationalisation of speech acts was sought. 
 
Finally, the CU grammar course presented the strongest framing values for 
hierarchy at every motive-activity level. In fact no question was ever asked by 
any student. Visible mediation was carried through the use of tools such as 
exercises and tasks included in textbooks or elaborated by the teacher and 
shown to students through their monitors. Regulative discourse was strongly 
framed, demanding students’ attention, carefulness and learning words and 
rules by heart. 
 
Framing values for conduct varied among the courses, with the CU 
communication course being the most weakly framed. Compared with BU’s 
communication instructor, the communication teacher at CU rarely asserted a 
model of conduct, especially at the foundation and structural levels. The 
strongest framing values were found at the management and functional levels. 
It was not surprising to encounter stronger framing levels at the management 
level, but it was rather unexpected at the functional level. A careful 
examination of the interaction at this level indicated that CU’s communication 
instructor regulated the performative aspects of the pedagogical tasks, or 
regulating functional activity. 
 
5.2.4.6 Recontextualisation of communicative language teaching  
 
The analysis of instructional and regulative discourse in different learning 
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settings as has been done in the preceding section provides a way to contrast 
those settings.  
 
BU communication course, weak communicative language teaching version 
 
The BU communication course was informed by a weak communicative 
language teaching version for the following reasons:  
 
(1) The structure of the course privileged structure motive-activity, that is, 
speech acts were closely monitored to comply with grammatical norms or 
grammatical structures or the objectives set in the tasks (e.g. ‘be able to talk 
about what language is spoken in a certain place’ by means of acquisition of 
adjectives of nationalities through speech activity or controlled analytical 
speech acts).  
 
(2) Selection of contents was strongly framed. Students could not bring their 
own personal information or experiences into the learning process. The 
personal information they provided was reduced more or less to a binary 
system: ‘I know’ or ‘I don’t know’ the answers to the questions asked for in the 
instructional tasks. 
 
(3) The instructor tightly controlled the instructional sequence enforcing 
students’ compliance. The instructor ensured students used the targeted 
structure (strongly framed instructional sequence), focusing thus on language 
form. 
 
The instructor’s approach to the instructional tasks contained in the textbook 
was to focus on the repetition of language patterns as a means to transform 
speech acts into operations.  
 
For instance, in one of the motive-actions framed under structural 
motive-activity, the instructor introduced the textbook’s instructional task. The 
task consisted of asking what language was spoken in a series of locations 
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(countries, states, regions) listed in alphabetical order. Students had to ask for 
the language spoken in those places following model dialogues. The models 
were:  
 
(1)  A. What language is spoken in Argentina?  
B. Spanish. 
(2)  A. What language is spoken in Canada?  
B. English and French. 
(3)  A. What language is spoken in Belgium?  
B. I don’t know. 
 
However, the instructor framed the task by requesting students to take notes of 
the items they do not know so that they could ask him at the end of the 
exercise.  
 
When approached by students who did not know which language is spoken in a 
certain place and asked for it, the instructor told them to wait until the end of 
the exercise as instructed in the first place, enforcing the instructional sequence. 
An abridged version of the exchange is contained in Extract 5.9. 
 
 
Extract 5.9 BU communication course classroom interaction, structural 
motive-activity, motive-action No. 9 
 
Line Participant Transcript English translation Coding 
128 SM11 ¿Qué significa Bale, 
Baleares? 
What is the meaning of Bale, 
Baleares? 
 
129 I (1) だから、分からなかったら
後で聞いて。 
¿Islas Baleares? 
ここに Islas Baleares. 
(1) Well, if you do not know, 
ask me later. 
Balearic Islands? 




EC a F++ 
130 SM12 ¿Cómo es? How is it?  
131 I ¿Cómo es? ¿Cómo es? No. 
¿Qué lengua se habla en 
Baleares? 
How is it? How is it? No. What 
language is spoken in Balearic 
[Islands]?  
ECa F++ 
EC a F++ 
132 SS [Student asks her peer] 
¿Qué lengua se habla 
en?...[Instructor writes on the 
blackboard]...¿Qué lengua 
se habla en?... 
[Student asks her peer] What 
language is spoken 
in?...[Instructor writes on the 
blackboard]...What language is 
spoken in ?... 
 
  (...) (…)  
154 SF15 ¿[Cómo se dice Bélgica] en 
japonés?... 
[How do you say Belgium] in 
Japanese?... 
 
155 I ¿Cómo se dice? How do you say? HI F- 
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156 SF15 ¿Cómo se dice en japonés? How do you say it in 
Japanese? 
 
157 I ¿Bélgica? Se dice ベルギ. Belgium? It is Berugi. HI F+ 
SQ F- 
158 SF15 ベルギ。 Berugi.  
159 I ベルギ。 Berugi. EC a F++ 
160 SF15 ベルギ。 Berugi.  
161 SF15 ¿Qué lengua se habla en 
Bélgica? 





Ask me everything at the end.  SQ F＋ 
HI F++ 
163 SF15 ああ、全部。 Ah, everything.  
164 I 分からないところ。 The ones you didn’t know.  HI F++ 
EC a F++ 
 
NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender 
(M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for 
two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and 
rendered in italics.  
FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE 
b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); 
Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI). 
 
 
As can be seen, the instructor strengthened the sequence. However, he might 
have facilitated the recognition of the place (by indicating where the Balearic 
Islands were on a map) or provided information about how Belgium was 
translated into Japanese, transforming the instructional task in an opportunity to 
talk about general or background knowledge. The situation was paradoxical 
because there was an increase in speech activity but a reduction of speech acts 
directly linked to the object of the instructional task as a consequence of the 
strengthening of the framing of sequence and selection of contents.  
 
CU communication course, weak communicative language teaching version 
 
The CU communication course was informed by a strong communicative 
language teaching version for the following reasons. 
 
(1) The structure of the course privileged functional motive-activity, that is, 
speech acts were part of non-verbal activity (see Figure 5.1). 
 
(2) Selection of contents was strongly framed but framing values were the 
weakest of the four learning settings. The instructional contents were provided 
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but some personal information or experience was elicited from students. 
 
(3) Sequence was strongly framed but, again, framing values were the weakest 
of all four courses. Even though students were not encouraged to find the 
instructional sequence most suitable to them, the instructor left enough room 
for students to modify instructional sequences. Creativity was encouraged 
within certain limits. 
 
The instructor’s approach to the task-based instructional tasks contained in the 
textbook was to alter them by sustaining a personal dialogue with students on a 
one-to-one, pair or group basis whilst they were carrying out the instructional 
task. Thus, the instructor brought the objectives of the instructional task to the 
personal realm of students, making the few instructional tasks that did not 
include sharing students’ personal information an experiential learning 
opportunity. 
 
Here is one example of how this worked. The teacher told the students to look 
up the instructional task contained in the textbook. The task as depicted in the 
textbook consisted of matching scattered chunks of personal information in the 
blank spaces of a profile of the Spanish pop singer Alejandro Sanz (e.g. 
birthplace, birthday, given name, family name, his mother’s given name, 
profession, favourite colour etc.). In pairs, students were asked to fill out the 
blanks by engaging first in a pattern dialogue. The model was provided: A. 
‘Singer’, that’s his profession, isn’t it? B. Yes, of course. And Maria [his 
mother’s name]?  
 
The students started carrying out the task in pairs. Soon afterwards, the teacher 
approached a pair of students. The exchange is contained in Extract 5.10. 
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Extract 5.10 CU communication course classroom interaction, functional 
motive-activity, motive-action No. 2 
 
Line Part. Transcript English translation Coding 
60 I [Approaching another pair of 
female students]  
¿Dónde nació? Vamos a ver. 
Yo nací en España. ¿Dónde 
naciste tú? 
[Approaching another pair of 
female students]  
Where was he born? Let’s see. 
I was born in Spain. Where 
were you born? 
 
61 SF7 *Mi naciste en Japón. *My were born in Japan.  
62 I Muy bien. Yo nací en Japón. 
Y tú, ¿dónde naciste? 
Very good. I was born in 
Japan. And you, where were 
you born? 
EC a F++ 
 
63 SF8 También, ¿eh?, yo también 
naci-¿ó?... 
[Me] too, eh?, I also was? 
born… [confuses the third with 
the first grammatical person] 
 
64 Instructor Nací... I was born... EC a F++ 
65 SF8 Nací en Japón. I was born in Japan.  
66 I En Japón. ¿Dónde? ¿En 
qué ciudad? 
In Japan. Where? In which 
city? 
EC a F++ 
67 SF8 *De Osaka. *From Osaka.  
68 I Entonces, lugar de 
nacimiento. ¿Dónde nació 
él? 
Then, birthplace. Where was 
he born? 
EC a F- - 
69 SF8 Madrid. Madrid.  
70 I Muy bien. No hay otro. Muy 
bien.  
 
That’s right. It can’t be any 
other. Well done.  
 
EC a F++ 
 
NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender 
(M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for 
two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and 
rendered in italics.  
FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE 
b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); 
Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI). 
 
 
As can be seen, the teacher altered the kind of dialogue proposed in the 
textbook’s instructional activity and began facilitating the meaning and 
structure of a question in the grammatical third person (‘Where was he born?’) 
by asking the students personal questions about where they were born. The 
teacher momentarily disregarded the form but was interested in meaning. She 
might have started to lecture about the verbal phrase ‘to be born’ (e.g. by 
transforming the functional motive-activity into a foundation motive-activity), 
but she did not. The way she did this was by asking personal questions, thus 
prompting the use of the students’ personal contents – a territory, unlike 
grammar structures, where they did have control. This amounts to a demand for 
spontaneity from students. The procedure was repeated with many other pairs 
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in the course of the task and in many other tasks as well. The textbook’s 
instructional task acquired a new significance under the motive-action/task as 
promoted by the instructor and understood by the students in this particular 
case. The teacher selected this kind of facilitating procedure. It was not done in 
the same way with every student. The teacher assessed each student’s needs 
and facilitated accordingly. 
 
The answer to PQ3 (How can the weak and strong version of communicative 
language teaching be described in terms of motive-activity structure and 
development vectors/targets?) was provided by analysing the dominance of 
particular motive-activities, their corresponding framing values, and their link 
to the bottom-up move and top-down move within the zone of proximal 
development. The BU communication course was dominated by foundational 
and structural motive-activity. The CU communication course was dominated 
by functional motive-activity. The results of the analysis show that key 
indicators of pedagogy that distinguish the weak from the strong version of 
communicative language teaching are framing of selection of contents and 
sequence. Strong framing of selection of contents and sequence are associated 
with a top-down move, whilst weak framing of selection contents and sequence 
is associated with a bottom-up move. This is due to the differential in the 
students’ use of their personal experience (everyday concepts) and the 
introduction of theoretical knowledge by the instructor.  
 
The answer to PQ4 (Does the foreign language pedagogy at different 
communication learning settings have a correlate in terms of SLA’s weak and 
strong versions of communicative language teaching?) is that BU 
communication course was linked to the weak version of communicative 
language teaching. Evidence indicates that: (1) the structure of the course 
privileges structure motive-activity, that is, speech acts are closely monitored to 
comply with grammatical norms or grammatical structures or the objectives set 
in the tasks; (2) the selection of contents is strongly framed. Students cannot 
bring their own personal information or experiences into the learning process; 
and (3) the instructor tightly controls the instructional sequence enforcing 
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students’ compliance. The instructor ensures students use the targeted structure 
(strongly framed instructional sequence), focusing thus in language form. The 
CU communication course is linked to a strong version of communicative 
language teaching for the following reasons: (1) the structure of the course 
privileges functional motive-activity, that is, speech acts are part of non-verbal 
activity; (2) the selection of contents is strongly framed but framing values are 
the weaker of the two learning settings specialising in the teaching of 
communication. The instructional contents are provided but some personal 
information or experience is elicited from students; and (3) the instructional 
sequence is strongly framed but, again, framing values are the weaker of the 
two learning settings specialising in the teaching of communication. Even 
though students are not encouraged to find the instructional sequence most 
suitable to them, the instructor leaves enough room for students to modify 
instructional sequences. Creativity is encouraged within certain limits. 
 
 
5.3 TRAJECTORY AND COMMUNICATION LEARNING SETTINGS, 
MODERATORS OF DISCOURSE RECOGNITION AND REALISATION  
 
Using a correlational research design supported by the partial least square 
(PLS) path modeling a multivariate statistical model was constructed to 
measure the variance in the participants’ realisation in terms of recognition (of 
grammar, communication, and weakly-framed communication discourse 
sample items) and test the effect of moderators (trajectory, organisation). The 
aim was (a) to obtain an account of how trajectory, organisation and learning 
setting structure modulate students’ recognition of discourse (or their 
orientation to discourse) and, consequently, their realisation (mastery), and (b) 
to empirically test Bernstein’s hypothesis about the structural conditions of 
educational organisations modulating subject position, social relations and 
discourse and therefore shaping individual consciousness and activity. 
Moreover, it was aimed at testing mastery (realisation) as being determined by 
the subject’s ability to recognise (individual consciousness) the rules of 




Trajectory categories were based on participants’ perceived educational 
trajectory in terms of a dominant activity in which they partook throughout 
their schooling. The categories were obtained while preparing the procedure 
through interviews with CU communication student participants and through 
written questionnaires administered to BU communication student participants 
(see chapter 4). The answer to PQ5 (What is the foreign language education 
trajectory of individual students?) is that students could be assigned to one of 
three categories. The trajectories were as follows: Trajectory 1 comprised 
acquirers who did not express their involvement in any particular L2 activity. 
Their only experience derived from their participation in the education system 
in Japan, especially in activities recognisable as speech activity. Trajectory 2 
included acquirers who expressed their involvement either in speech acts as 
part of non-verbal activity (e.g. ‘… I could give directions to a foreigner so that 
he could reach the place he/she was looking for’) or communication activity in 
Japan. Trajectory 3 comprised acquirers who responded that the activities that 
helped them learn a language the most, or were more satisfactory or enjoyable, 
were associated with having been abroad, either for a short high-school trip, as 
part of a home-stay programme, or because they were living abroad. These 
activities are associated with speech acts that are part of non-verbal activity and 
communication activity. However, because the experience of communicating 
while being abroad was presumably more demanding and varied, these 
activities were considered of a different nature to those included in Trajectory 2. 
One key aspect of activities in this trajectory is that they might have included 
model-determined acts, where the learner did not have an indication of how the 
act should be carried out (the kind of instruction one is exposed to when 
learning a language in the country where it is spoken, without formal schooling 
or training). 
 
A baseline model that used data from both courses was used as a benchmark 
(see chapter 4). The results from the baseline model provided the answer to 
PQ7 (How much of the variance in the student participants’ realisation can be 
explained in terms of recognition?) as the value of R2 = .406 indicated that 
40.6% of the variance in realisation was explained by recognition. 
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Two pilot studies and the construction of the multivariate statistical model 
made it possible to determine that differences in orientation were the outcome 
of the recognition of three different discourses; grammar, communication and 
weakly-framed communication discourse (see chapter 4). These orientations are 
modulated by two opposite vectors of development, the representational and 
socio-communicative functions expressed as modes of self-regulation in 
elaborated and restricted codes. Unlike grammar discourse, which is 
predominantly elaborated, communication discourse has a double valence since 
it may refer to both theoretical aspects of the pragmatic system of a foreign 
language (elaborated code) and more ritualistic forms that depend upon tacit 
transmission (restricted) and depend, for instance, upon the right manner in 
which to address a native speaker. These forms are learnt mainly by imitation. 
Finally, native Spanish communication instructors tended to weaken the 
framing of hierarchy when teaching theoretical concepts by giving students or 
the class as a whole the opportunity to answer their own questions. In other 
words, they facilitated the answers in a complex form of reflection instead of 
answering directly, a form of discourse that was characterised as 
weakly-framed communication discourse. The answer to PQ6 (What coding 
orientation (elaborated/restricted) do students have explained by their 
recognition of grammar and communication discourses?) is that students who 
were able to recognise all three forms of discourse possessed a comprehensive 
or integral orientation (Orientation 8). Students who were able to recognise 
both communication and grammar discourse but lacked recognition rules for 
weakly-framed communication discourse possessed an elaborated orientation 
(Orientation 7). Students who were able to recognise grammar discourse 
possessed a grammar orientation (Orientation 6). Students who were able to 
recognise weakly-framed communication and grammar discourse possessed a 
bipolar orientation (Orientation 5). Students who were able to recognise 
communication discourse possessed an elaborated-communicative orientation 
(Orientation 4). Students who were able to recognise both communication and 
weakly-framed communication discourse possessed a communicative 
orientation (Orientation 3). Students who were able to recognise weakly-framed 
communication discourse possessed an informal or restricted-communicative 
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orientation (Orientation 2). And finally, students were able to recognise none of 
the three discourses possessed a confounded orientation (Orientation 1). 
 
Following a protocol for testing moderators, additional models were 
constructed for participants in Trajectory 1 (Model I); participants in Trajectory 
2 (Model II); participants in Trajectory 3 (Model III); participants at BU 
(Model IV); and participants at CU (Model V). Three types of parameters were 
computed: (a) factor loadings between indicator variables and latent variables, 
using principal components factor analysis, with loadings measuring the 
correlation ranging from -1 to +1. Loadings > .5 were interpreted as ‘strong’, 
‘high’ or ‘heavy’ whilst loadings < .5 were interpreted as ‘weak’, ‘low’ or 
‘light’; (b) path coefficients (standardised, ranging from -1 to 1; interpreted in 
the same way as the standardised regression or β weighted coefficients in a 
multiple regression model) between the latent variables and (c) the effect sizes 
(R² values > .15 were assumed to be large enough to imply practical and 
theoretical importance). 
 
I will proceed to report the results obtained after the construction of the 
moderator testing models. 
 
5.3.1 Model I 
 
Model I (Figure 5.26) was constructed using only the data for participants 
classified in Trajectory 1 who had a more formal experience of language 
learning. Communication was most strongly reflected by nine items (01, 03, 16, 
18, 20, 23, 29, 33, and 34) with loadings of.-593, 
717, .576, .646, .714, .779, .675, .841 and.694 respectively. Weakly-framed 
communication was strongly reflected by Item 09, with a loading of .825. 
Grammar was strongly reflected by five items (04, 08, 28, 32 and 37) with 
loadings of .617, .807, .638, .747, and .673 respectively. R2 = .715 indicated 
that 71.5% of the variance in recognition was explained. This substantial effect 
size was 4.7% higher than in the Baseline Model. The relative values of the 
path coefficients indicated that grammar (path coefficient = .620) was the most 
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important predictor of recognition. In contrast, communication (path coefficient 
= .178) was a much less important predictor, even less than in the Baseline 
Model (path coefficient = .463). Recognition of weakly-framed communication 
(path coefficient = -.132) was negatively correlated with recognition. 
Realisation was strongly positively correlated with recognition (path coefficient 
= .632 compared with 0.637 in the Baseline Model). 
 
The data thus indicates that the trajectory modified the variance explained in 
the model. A partial answer to PQ8 (To what extent does the student’s 
trajectory moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be 
explained in terms of recognition?) was provided by R2 = .399, i.e., 39.9% of 
the variance in realisation was explained by recognition. This effect size was 









5.3.2 Model II 
 
Model II (Figure 5.27) was constructed using only the data for participants 
classified as members of Trajectory 2 who considered most enjoyable or 
beneficial a less formal experience of learning. Communication was strongly 
reflected by eight items (03, 05, 06, 18, 21, 23, 24 and 29) with loadings 
of .873, .746, .518, .866, -.727, .708, .666 and .708 respectively. 
Weakly-framed communication was strongly reflected by four items (09, 10, 12 
and 15) with loadings of .940, .742, .561, and -.785 respectively. Grammar was 
relatively weakly reflected by four items (11, 14, 17 and 32) with loadings of 
-.539, .544, .783, and .661 respectively. R2 = .762 indicated that 76.2% of the 
variance in recognition was explained. This effect size was 9.4% higher than in 
the Baseline Model. The relative values of the path coefficients indicated that 
for participants with a less formal trajectory of learning, grammar (path 
coefficient = .338) was not such an important predictor of recognition as 
communication (path coefficient = .435). A low negative correlation was found 
between weakly-framed communication and recognition (path coefficient = 
-.211) consistent with a less formal experience of learning. Realisation was 
only weakly correlated with recognition (path coefficient = .470 compared 
with .637 in the Baseline Model).  
 
Evidence was provided to indicate that the trajectory modified the variance 
explained by the model. A partial answer to PQ8 (To what extent does the 
student’s trajectory moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can 
this be explained in terms of recognition?) was provided by R2 = .221 
indicating 22.1% of the variance in realisation was explained by recognition, 
18.5% lower than the Baseline.  
 
In conclusion, a relatively small proportion of the variance in realisation (about 
22%) was explained by recognition among the participants in Trajectory 2, who 









5.3.3 Model III 
 
Model III (Figure 5.28) was constructed using only the data for participants 
classified as members of Trajectory 3 who favoured the least formal experience 
of learning. Communication was strongly reflected by seven items (05, 07, 16, 
21, 23, 24, and 34) with loadings of -.618, .770, .774, .750, -.721, .788 and 
-.567 respectively. Weakly-framed communication was strongly reflected by 
Item 09, with a loading of .964. Grammar was strongly reflected by items 03, 
08, 11, 14, 17, 22, 25, 28, 30 and 32 with loadings 
of .620, .748, .614, .832, .782, .764, .527, .789, .803, and .861 respectively. R2 
= .674 indicated that 67.4% of the variance in recognition was explained. This 
substantial effect size was less than 1% lower than in Baseline Model. 
Grammar (path coefficient = .524) was a moderately strong positive predictor 
of recognition, whilst communication was inversely correlated with recognition 
(path coefficient = -.372). Recognition of weakly-framed communication (path 
coefficient = .017) contributed little or nothing to the variance. Realisation was 
only weakly correlated with recognition (path coefficient = .438 compared 
with .637 in the Baseline Model).  
 
A partial answer to PQ8 (To what extent does the student’s trajectory moderate 
the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of 
recognition?) was provided by R2 = .192 indicating 19.2% of the variance in 
realisation was explained by recognition, substantially (21.4%) lower than the 
Baseline Model.  
 
In conclusion, amongst the three trajectories, the smallest proportion of the 
variance in realisation (about 19%) was explained by recognition among the 
participants in Trajectory 3. These participants, similar to those in Trajectory 2, 
were characterised by a relative moderate ability to recognise grammar 
instructional discourse. Trajectory 1 strongly moderated the proportion of the 









5.3.4 Model IV 
 
Model IV (Figure 5.29) was constructed using only the data only for the 
participants at BU, not specialising in the teaching of L2. Communication was 
strongly reflected by seven items (03, 05, 06, 18, 20, 23, and 33) with loadings 
of .553, .543, .635, .812, .592, .881, and .759 respectively. Weakly-framed 
communication was reflected by two items (09 and 1) with loadings of -.786 
and .769. Grammar was relatively weakly reflected by four items (08, 17, 30 
and 32) with loadings of .665, .662, .696, .and .534 respectively. R2 = .834 
indicated a high proportion (83.4%) of the variance in recognition was 
explained. This effect size was 16.6% higher than the Baseline Model. The 
importance of grammar (path coefficient = .494) as a predictor of recognition 
was equivalent to that of communication (path coefficient = .495) but lower 
than the Baseline Model (path coefficient = .520). Recognition of 
weakly-framed communication (path coefficient = .095) contributed little or 
nothing to the variance in recognition. Realisation was moderately correlated 
with recognition (path coefficient = .596 compared with .637 in the Baseline 
Model).   
 
A partial answer to PQ9 (To what extent does the student’s organisation 
moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in 
terms of recognition?) was provided by R2 = .355 indicating that 35.5% of the 
variance in realisation was explained by recognition, 5% less than the Baseline 
Model. 
 
It was evident that, relative to the Baseline Model, the organisation moderated 
the proportions of the variances explained by the model. A relatively moderate 
proportion of the variance in realisation (about 35%) was explained by 
recognition among the participants at BU, who were characterised by a 





Figure 5.29 PLS Path Model IV for participants at BU
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5.3.5 Model V 
 
Model V (Figure 5.30) was constructed using only the data for the participants 
at CU, specialising in the teaching of L2. Communication was weakly reflected 
by four items (18, 24, 27, and 29) with loadings of .731, .664, .744 and .800 
respectively. Weakly-framed communication was strongly reflected by three 
items (09, 10, and 15) with loadings of .849, .677, and .843 respectively. 
Grammar was very strongly reflected by ten items (04, 08, 11, 17, 19, 22, 28, 
32, 35, and 37) with loadings 
of .675, .738, .674, .596, .644, .630, .779, .884, .627, and .710 respectively. R2 
= .679 indicated a high proportion (67.9%) of the variance in recognition was 
explained, 1% higher than the Baseline Model. The relative values of the path 
coefficients indicated that grammar (path coefficient = .739) was a stronger 
predictor of recognition than communication (negative path coefficient = -.182 
compared with positive coefficient = .495 at BU). Recognition of 
weakly-framed communication (path coefficient = .091) contributed little or 
nothing to the variance in recognition. Realisation was very strongly correlated 
with recognition (path coefficient = .755 compared with .637 in the Baseline 
Model).  
 
A partial answer to PQ9 (To what extent does the student’s organisation 
moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in 
terms of recognition?) was provided by R2 = .569 indicating 56.9% of the 
variance in realisation was explained by recognition, 16.3% more than the 
Baseline Model. 
 
It is concluded that a high proportion of the variance in realisation (about 57%) 
was explained by recognition among the participants at CU, who were 
characterised by a very strong ability to recognise grammar instructional 











The findings supported the view that trajectory and organisational differences act 
as moderators of recognition and ultimately of active realisation. In conclusion, 
evidence was provided to indicate that the recognition of grammar instructional 
discourse (an elaborated coding orientation) is crucial in attaining higher levels of 
language mastery. 
 
Evidence was provided to indicate that acquirers who possessed an elaborated 
coding orientation (recognition of elaborated-code instructional discourse, 
especially grammar instructional discourse), that is, orientations 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, 
attained higher levels of language mastery (realisation) in learning settings either 
informed by communicative language teaching’s weak or strong version.  
 
The answer to PQ7 (How much of the variance in the student participants’ 
realisation can be explained in terms of recognition?) is that the proportion (R2) 
ranged very widely from a minimum of 19.2% in Model III to a maximum of 
56.9% in Model V. The proportion of the variance in realisation explained in terms 
of recognition tended to be high when the participants were characterised by a 
relatively strong ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse, indicated by 
a high path coefficient between grammar and recognition. The proportion of the 
variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition tended to be low when the 
participants were characterised by a relatively weak or moderate ability to 
recognise grammar instructional discourse, indicated by a relatively low path 
coefficient between grammar and recognition. 
 
The answer to PQ8 (To what extent does the student’s trajectory moderate the 
degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of 
recognition?) is that the variance was strongly moderated by the trajectory. The 
variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition was higher among the 
members of Trajectory 1, who had a preference for strongly-framed learning, 
characterised by a relatively strong ability to recognise grammar instructional 




was lower among the members of Trajectories 2 and 3, who had a preference for 
weakly-framed learning, characterised by a relatively weak ability to recognise 
grammar instructional discourse (Models II and III).   
 
The answer to RQ#9: To what extent does the student’s organisation moderate the 
degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of 
recognition? is that the explained variance was strongly moderated by the 
organisation. The variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition was 
higher among the students at CU, specialising in the teaching of L2 (Model V). 
The variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition was lower among the 
students at BU which did not specialise in the teaching of L2 (Model IV). The 
students at CU (Model V) were characterised by a stronger ability to recognise 
grammar instructional discourse than the students at BU. The evidence for this 
difference was that grammar was a stronger predictor of recognition at CU (path 
coefficient = .739) than at BU (path coefficient = .494). Nevertheless, at both BU 
and CU, recognition of grammar was important. Recognition of communication 
discourse was not so important at CU, indicated by the negative correlation (path 
coefficient = -.182) between recognition and communication compared with that at 
BU (path coefficient = .495). 
 
Overall, these findings seem to confirm the soundness of Bernstein’s hypothesis 
about the structural conditions of educational organisations modulating subject 
position, social relations and discourse and therefore shaping individual 
consciousness and activity, at least in the terms in which the theory has been 
empirically operationalised in the present study. They also suggest that realisation 
or mastery is determined by the subject’s ability to recognise the rules of 
pedagogical context, which in turn is moderated by educational trajectory. I will 
come back to this issue and I will also offer a critique of the research model as a 





5.4 PEDAGOGIC IDENTITIES, THE NEED FOR A REPRESENTATIONAL 
‘GAZE’ 
 
The present section offers an assessment of (a) the development targets set by 
instructors in terms of the intended vectors of development set for their courses, 
(b) the relationship between students’ trajectories, orientations, realisation and the 
developmental goals set by communication instructors in sociologically-situated 
settings, and (c) the pedagogic identity of students in terms of the relationship 
between their trajectories, orientations, desired development vector and their 
realisation or mastery in those sociologically-situated organisation/learning 
settings. 
 
5.4.1 Intended vectors of development 
 
As we have already seen, BU and CU represent two different approaches to 
language development. The quantitative part of the study showed that recognition 
of grammar discourse and communication discourse played different roles in these 
learning settings. Arguably, the BU communication instructor’s preference for 
communicative language teaching’s weak version or preference for a top-down 
move within the zone of proximal development required on his part the setting of 
evaluation criteria that privileged communicative production (the ability to 
communicate). On the contrary, the CU communication instructor’s preference for 
communicative language teaching’s strong version or bottom-up move within the 
zone of proximal development required on her part the setting of evaluation 
criteria that privileged representational production (the ability to communicate 
abiding to the rules of grammar). In other words, in the BU communication course, 
communication was the final end of the pedagogical process; whereas in the CU 
communication course, it was only the starting point. 
 
The results articulated in the above sections find their match in the discourse of 
BU and CU communication instructors. Table 5.4 contains a selection of 
statements given either about the object of the course or the labelling of students 
over which an idea of the set vectors of development for each learning setting can 




Table 5.4 BU communication and CU communication, vectors of development 




BU communication course’s 
instructor 
CU communication course’s 
instructor 
1 I do not value formal grammar 
accuracy. I value much more the 
capacity to express ideas. I assume 
that if a native speaker can 
understand what the students are 
expressing, then it is fine.  
She is talkative, but not rigorous. She 
talks a lot but does not [speak] well, 
and in case she is actually making an 
effort, then she has not learnt [to 
speak] correctly. Speak, but 
accurately. Either she is not making 
an effort or she has not learnt [to 
speak]. 
2 They do not need to understand 
everything grammatically first in 
order to do communicative tasks. 
‘As long as I can communicate and 
people understand what I say’… [she 
seems to be saying] She does not care 
about the verb form; that is her 
policy. 
3 The written examination reflects 
communicative tasks performed in 
the classroom, such as describing 
one’s own family. Some of the 
questions are about knowledge 
acquisition (not skills) like the name 
of the letters in the alphabet. 
 
…[T]hat they communicate with me, 
participate in the activities, show 
enthusiasm for the task, regardless of 
[grammatical] correctness, and then it 
does bother me that their correctness 
does not improve. They need to try 
out [speaking] so that they also 
[produce] correctly; only 
participating in class [is not enough] 
but also [achieving] correctness. 
4  Practice is focused on learning a 
structure, or anything. I hope that 
practice helps them to do it right or 
get used to understanding what they 
need. If I make them talk, for 




verb form. So, if at the end of the 
course they use the 3
rd
 person by 
mistake, then that does not fit in with 
what we have been doing.  
5  The point is that the philosophy that 
says that only communicating is 
sufficient does not work for me. It is 
not attractive to me. Because I end up 
sounding bad. Twelve years of living 








two learning settings. In the case of the BU communication course, the instructor 
aims at developing a restricted coding socio-communicative function, whereas in 
the CU communication course, the instructor aims at developing either an 
elaborated coding socio-communicative function (e.g., communicate accurately 
about personal experiences) or a representational function (e.g., learn a 
grammatical structure). Personal communication is an excuse to achieve a 
representational function. 
 
The pedagogies they use match their course objectives, giving an idea of the link 
between communicative language teaching and the intended vectors of 
development. In BU’s case, instruction is mostly explicit (foundational or 
structural motive-activity), associated with communicative language teaching’s 
weak version; whereas in CU’s case, instruction is mostly implicit (functional 
motive-activity), associated with communicative language teaching’s strong 
version. 
 
A partial answer to PQ10 (What relationship is there between students’ 
trajectories, orientations, realisation or mastery, and the developmental targets set 
by communication instructors?) was provided by the positive match between the 
instructors’ statement about both the intended vectors of development and the 
expected pedagogic identities of students for their respective course and the 
differences that the recognition of grammar and communication instruction had in 
realisation. There was evidence to indicate that in the case of the CU 
communication course, which according to the instructor aimed at students 
achieving grammatical accuracy (an elaborated coding socio-communicative or 
representational function), the recognition of grammar instructional discourse was 
a stronger predictor of recognition than the recognition of communication. In fact, 
the recognition of communication had a negative path coefficient. In contrast, 
evidence was provided to indicate that in the case of BU communication course, 
which according to its instructor aimed at students achieving the capacity to 
communicate ideas regardless of grammatical accuracy (a restricted coding 
socio-communicative function), the recognition of grammar instruction was an 




recognition of communication had a positive path coefficient (in CU it had a 
negative path coefficient). Furthermore, there was evidence to indicate that in the 
case of the CU communication course, the intended objective of students 
achieving grammatical accuracy (an elaborated coding socio-communicative or 
representational function) set by its instructor matched communicative language 
teaching’s strong version in terms of its preference for tacit instruction. In contrast, 
evidence was provided to indicate that in the case of BU communication course, 
the intended objective of achieving in students the capacity to communicate ideas 
regardless of grammatical accuracy (a restricted coding socio-communicative 
function) set by its instructor matched communicative language teaching’s weak 
version in terms of the move from explicit to implicit instruction). 
 
5.4.2 The figured world of students by instructors 
 
The figured world of students as ascertained by instructors was extracted in 
schematic form. Figure 5.31 contains a summary of all the labelling of students by 
the BU communication course’s instructor including their relative position on the 
recognition (qualitative) axis (‘y’ axis). Figure 5.32 contains a summary of all the 
labelling of students by the CU communication course’s instructor including their 
relative position on the recognition (qualitative) axis (‘y’ axis) as well. Data on 






Figure 5.31 Realisation labelling for BU communication course  
 
[The numbers in bold print stand for participants’ identification numbers; letter ‘f’ 
refers to a female participant, letter ‘m’, to a male one. Students who did not 
participate in the study, although information on them was provided by the instructor, 
are identified by the letter ‘n’. Underneath the identification, the first number refers to 
































































 They take risks They take risks. 
They compensate for 
their acceptable but not 
brilliant communicative 
aptitudes by being 
focused and constant. 
They have communicative 
dispositions; they don’t 
need to understand 
grammatically everything 
first in order to do 
communicative tasks. 





















She compensates for 
































Passive attitude, not 
communicative, tries to do 
course tasks individually. 
Communicative 











Figure 5.32 Realisation labelling for CU communication course 
[The numbers in bold print stand for participants’ identification number; letter ‘f’ 
refers to a female participant, letter ‘m’, to a male one. Students who did not 
participate in the study, although information on them was provided by the instructor, 
are identified by the letter ‘n’. Underneath the identification, the first number refers to 









They have made an 
effort but they are 
not as intelligent as 











Attends class but 
doesn’t participate, 

















































 They have participated 
well and fulfilled the 
requirements, it’s hard to 
compare them to the girls, 
but they lag behind them. 
Talkative, involved but 
doesn’t study, lacks 
accuracy, speaks a lot but 
doesn’t speak well. 
Studious but timid, has 
writing skills (diary). 
Speaks more than 
his male peers. 
Failed last year, has done 
the minimum, but did well 
in writing the diary. 
A bit clumsy. 







Did not take the 
final examination, 
personal problems 
She is lazy. 





She sat with n3f and that 
contributed to confounding 
both. But she did not 










They are participative, 
intelligent and have 





It was clear from simple analysis of the data that students who possessed an 
elaborated coding orientation (orientations 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) attained higher 
realisation levels across learning settings.  
 
An answer to PQ10 (What relationship is there between students’ trajectories, 
orientations, realisation or mastery, and the developmental targets set by 
communication instructors?) was provided by contrasting participants’ 
orientations and the relative position students gave them in terms of having 
achieved the course’s requirements or not (realisation). The organisational or 
learning setting-tied differences in terms of the variance in recognition did not 
affect the overall effect that orientation, as a descriptor of recognition, had as a 
predictor of realisation across learning settings. In other words, orientation was a 
strong predictor of realisation regardless of learning setting. This was because 
recognition of grammar (one of the components of orientation) was an important 
predictor of recognition in both learning settings as it reflected students’ capacity 
to recognise elaborated coding instructional discourse. 
 
The analysis of students’ recognition and the ideas instructors had about students’ 
realisation offered a picture in which the demand for discipline or a systematic 
approach to learning masked the need for the recognition of elaborated forms of 
communication instruction and the production of forms of communication 
according to those requirements (e.g. attention to the instructional sequence). In 
other words, when instructors talked about students’ lack of regularity, they might 
have been expressing the need for a representational gaze to approach 
communication tasks in an orderly fashion, that is, to address in an orderly fashion 
the handling of the second set of stimuli of the dual stimulation. By ‘gaze’ I am 
referring here to a particular form of recognition of discursive practices (which 
count as authentic discourse) that takes place during the transmission of horizontal 
knowledge structures with weak grammar (see Bernstein, 2000). 
 
When BU’s communication instructor, referring to BU14, a Trajectory-2 orientation-2 
female student (BU14f [2/2]), pointed out ‘… she’s got communication aptitude but 




an informal level but could not keep up with the course requirements’ (our emphasis), 
he might have been referring to the student’s lack of recognition rules for 
communication tasks that require the analysis of hierarchies, attention to procedural 
sequences, or strategies that involve organisation of individual and collaborative work. 
In other words, the student lacked an elaborated coding orientation in combination 
with either a trajectory 1 or a pedagogic identity 1 or 2. The student seemed to be 
identified with a pedagogic identity 2 lacking the possession of recognition rules, that 
is, unable to have a code mismatch. 
 
If the labelling ‘being focused’, ‘constant’, is replaced by ‘recognition and 
realisation rules for grammar and elaborated-communication instruction’ (i.e. 
elaborated coding instructional discourse, excluding restricted coding 
communication instruction: weakly-framed communication), incorporating their 
intrinsic ‘social order rules’ such as autonomy, systematicity, self-control, 
proactivity, ability to work in teams and so on, what we encounter here is the basic 
course requirements for a representational gaze. Consequently, the space that the 
restricted coding socio-communicative function depicted in SLA occupies in 
formal communication transmission is very limited. In fact, we may be able to 
make a further distinction between instructional socio-communicative and 
regulative socio-communicative. The former is a simulacrum of spontaneous 
conversation. The latter is the actual communication on which the pedagogical 
relation is built. 
 
The active realisation of communication discourse is more of a game, a role-play 
that reflects an elaborated code (e.g., sequences are explained, objectives are 
expressed, working groups are formed, often according to a set of explicit rules) 
rather than learning that may result from spontaneous activities where one can 
hardly recognise who the instructor is. Hence, realisation of communication 
discourse has a significant and distinguishable representational imprint. What is 
invisible in real, spontaneous communicative learning settings has been made 
visible in the pedagogic stage, although instruction does not rely absolutely on 
strong framing (e.g. there is still place for students to fill up tasks with the content 




general sequences set by instructors, and there are moments of horizontality within 
the instructor-student relationship). In fact, most of the students who were not able 
to recognise weakly-communicative instruction could still achieve high levels of 
communication realisation in both learning contexts. Those who did recognise 
weakly-framed communication discourse, without recognising grammar or (to a 
lesser degree) elaborated-communication instruction, might not have been able to 
relinquish control over learning, for that is a prerequisite of conceptual instruction, 
the gradual transference of control from instructor to student (see Davydov and 
Markova, 1983). Orientation-2 and -3 students might in fact have misrecognised 
pedagogic activities as being purely informal and felt unable to put themselves in a 
subordinate position.  
 
Even if BU’s communication instructor did not consider it important for students 
to achieve grammatical accuracy, giving more value to their capacity to express 
ideas, he covertly required organised ways to tackle communication tasks. Hence, 
BU’s communication instructor – referring to a group of male students who lack 
study management skills – pointed out: ‘I have to tell them to take notes, otherwise 
they would simply not take them; they lack the initiative to recognise the need for 
taking notes …’. Note-taking, as a mediational tool that plays a role in organising 
communication activity, is nowhere near the kind of tools used in plain, informal, 
spontaneous conversation. Unless subjects are displaced in space or time, 
conversation does not rely upon mediational tools other than speech, which is the 
quintessence of spontaneous conversation. In other words, note-taking as a 
mediational tool serves a representational function. Implicit was the notion that 
students who possessed coding orientations lacking recognition of grammar and 
communication instructional discourses were not only unable to cope with the 
recognition of elaborated forms of communication instruction but were equally 
unable to organise the activity needed to tackle the communicative tasks. 
 
As BU’s communication instructor pointed out, ‘BU2 and BU12 are isolated from 
their peers, they do not participate and they do not compensate for the lack of 
those things with other abilities’ (our emphasis). He praised BU14’s 




was expressed by CU’s instructor when she pointed out that ‘CU11 … doesn’t 
have distance, but she doesn’t study, I don’t believe she studies …’ (our emphasis). 
Consequently, ‘distance’ was related to the idea of a hidden asymmetry in the 
relationship between the instructor and the student. Not having ‘distance’ from the 
instructor was valued positively by both instructors, but only if supplemented with 
other ‘abilities’, which were linked to the grammar or representational gaze. 
 
Therefore, although BU’s instructor set realisation rules that consisted apparently 
of the active realisation of informal communication and the enactment of 
accompanying or intrinsic social order rules, those active realisation rules included, 
paradoxically, active realisation of elaborated-communication procedures, which 
did not match at all spontaneous forms of communication. In fact, there was a 
clear bond between labels such as ‘discipline’, ‘constancy’ and ‘focus’ with the 
possession of recognition rules for grammar or elaborated-communication 
instruction. Those labels were used to explain the need for a representational gaze, 
a grammatical-like orientation, such as when CU’s instructor, talking about CU7 
and CUn6, qualified the students as being ‘lazy’. In fact those students did not 
possess recognition of grammar instructional discourse. What the teacher 
demanded was organisation skills similar to those needed to tackle grammatical 
tasks, with the added complexity that tasks were no longer carried out individually, 
but in many cases collectively. 
 
Thus, when confronted with the task of labelling students who actually lacked 
recognition rules for grammar instruction, communication instructors might have 
resorted to forms of labelling very similar to the ones used by grammar instructors. 
The difference is that communication instructors paradoxically requested students 
not to be afraid of making mistakes. BU’s communication instructor, referring to 
students, said: ‘[T]hey have to be able to take risks … they should not be afraid of 
making mistakes’. As his counterpart at CU asserted, first and foremost, they have 
to be ‘able to communicate with me, participating enthusiastically in the activities, 
and being able to carry out the tasks, independently of [grammar] correctness’. In 
conclusion, what both instructors demanded from students was that they engage in 




not only to analyse and reflect on the explicit contents of instruction but also on 
the means to engage with and carry out the task. For that reason, the 
model-determined acts orientation associated with spontaneous acquisition was not 
enough. 
 
It was clear that in both learning settings (BU and CU communication courses), 
instructors valued positively a reflective trial or calculated risk taking approach to 
communicative tasks by students. This approach was linked to a representational 
(elaborated coding) gaze. Thus, Trajectory-1 and elaborated coding orientation 
(orientations 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) students had an advantage over Trajectory-2 or -3, or 
restricted coding orientation (orientations 1, 2 and 3) students, for the variance in 
realisation explained in terms of recognition was higher among the members of 
Trajectory 1 and elaborated coding orientations, especially orientation-6 
(grammar) students. This finding was relevant for BU communication course’s 
instructor who apparently did not seek grammatical accuracy from students. 
Eventually, the labelling of students by the BU communication course’s instructor 
revealed that BU communication course’s students required a representational 
gaze as well. In other words, in learning settings either informed by 
communicative language teaching’s strong or weak version, the possession of a 
representational gaze (orientation 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8) enabled a segment of students to 
attain higher levels of language mastery than the rest of their peers.  
 
The answer to PQ10 (What relationship is there between students’ trajectories, 
orientations, realisation or mastery, and the developmental targets set by 
communication instructors?) is that the two different development targets set by 
BU and CU communication instructors, which correspond to communicative 
language teaching’s weak and strong versions respectively, required from students 
a representational ‘gaze’, that is, the recognition of grammar instructional 
discourse. Furthermore, by representational ‘gaze’ is meant a form of reflexive 
approach towards communication instructional tasks. Students who possessed a 
representational ‘gaze’, either because they had a trajectory linked to the 
possession of recognition rules for grammar discourse (Trajectory 1), or because 




attained higher levels of language mastery expressed bot qualitatively (as the 
figured world of students by instructors) or quantitatively (in terms of the positive 
correlation between the recognition of grammar instructional discourse and 
realisation, expressed as the instructor’s final grade; and the moderating effect of 
Trajectory 1 over the possession of recognition rules for grammar instructional 
discourse and, eventually, realisation or mastery).     
 
5.4.3 The figured world of learning, the case of the CU communication course 
 
The data on students’ desired development vectors and learning goals were 
collected from participants in the CU communication course through interviews. 
The specific data for desirable development vectors from Trajectory-1 participants 
are depicted in Table 5.5. The same data from Trajectory-2 and Trajectory-3 
participants are depicted in Table 5.6. 
 
 
Table 5.5 Desired development vector data from Trajectory-1 participants  
[‘f’ stands for female and ‘m’ stands for male in the Coded ID column] 
 
Coded ID Trajectory Orientation Data 
CU12f 1 4 I still have not learned a lot of vocabulary, or acquired the 
skill to use grammar. So, at the same time in order to 
improve these points, I would also have to practise 
properly.   
I think that is to study while enjoying. 
CU8m 1 6 Honestly, I still do not know vocabulary or grammar, so 
first I need to learn these basic matters and by acquiring 
the skill at a certain level, to have communication with 
Spanish people and learn by using [Spanish] in 
conversation. 
Well, the intention or the will to communicate what I feel. 
Somehow to be understood and at the same time, wanting 
to understand others. That is the important thing.   
CU2m 1 6 First of all, it would be to learn grammar and increase 
vocabulary. Then, practice conversation. 
First, pay good attention to grammar classes. And one has 
to learn by oneself when it comes to a language, so make 
an effort to learn vocabulary by heart and now I do not 
have many chances for conversation, so I would like to 




CU9f 1 6 Study abroad, practise while having a conversation with 
native speakers, listening to [Spanish], etc. 
Learn words and grammar, and try to understand what 
teachers teach us in class. 
CU10f 1 5 Study hard the language basics, reaching not only reading 
ability, but also dictation and conversation to improve 
skills step by step. 
Language is different from other classes like mathematics, 
because it is not enough to learn the formula, so we have 
to make an effort day by day, trying not to learn a lot at 







Table 5.6 Desired development vector data from Trajectory-2 and Trajectory-3 





Trajectory Orientation Data 
CU1m 2 6 It does not help if I only have the knowledge, so I want to 
study abroad and by talking to several people, I would 
improve the level.  
Sure, pay attention during classes, but not only talk about 
Spanish language, also talk about other topics related to 
Spanish or music of Latin American countries. Also, 
‘listening to’, including the option of studying abroad. I want 
to be interested in many things and make all efforts. 
CU11f 3 3 At the moment, I can try talking using the words I know, but 
it is so little, my vocabulary. So, I want to focus on improving 
vocabulary. 
Lately, I am a bit lazy, so I have to make an extra effort. 
CU7f 3 3 Study abroad. Speak a lot with natives. Not only attend 
classes. 
Yes, it is important. If we study without any objective, it is in 
vain, if in the future we do not have a chance to use that 
language. 
CU6f 3 3 Currently, it would be to learn words, listen to Spanish and 
practise conversation, I guess. 
Right now, I think it is vocabulary. I cannot transmit 
anything. 
CU13f 3 3 Obviously, pay attention during classes and … I want to study 
abroad if possible. I want to cross the language barrier that I 
have to talk in Spanish. 
First of all, learn daily expressions and some other to talk 
about things that I am interested in, thus self-motivation 
would increase my wish to study more. 
CU4f 3 6 I have been in Spanish classes for just two months and I don’t 
feel any closeness with this language. So, I have to do 
something on my own, every day. If I don’t go to classes, 
nothing happens. So, it is obvious that I have to go to classes 
and also I have to have the intention to ask questions or get 
involved in the activities. 
Besides Spanish language, I don’t know anything about Spain 
or its culture yet. It is important to learn the language, also 
study cultures and find areas or topics that I consider 
interesting in order to explore the language more. 
CU3f 3 3 I have to expand vocabulary to communicate and also have a 
good understanding of grammar, talk and practice to talk 
Spanish easily. 
CU5f 3 8 Go to study abroad, always use the dictionary, prepare 
yourself for the next class, and always pay attention during 




Pedagogic identities, social functions and motivation 
 
Pedagogic identities were configured as a relation between trajectory, orientation, 
students’ desired development vector, from the representational function (elaborated code) 
to the socio-communicative function (restricted code), and realisation. Figure 5.33 depicts 
participants (circle, square and triangle shapes) according to their chosen vector of 
development. Within the circle, square and triangle shapes there are, on top, the number 
identification code for the participant followed by ‘m’ if the participant is male or ‘f’ if the 
participant is female; in the middle, the instructor’s grade (realisation quantitative); and at 




















Figure 5.33 Desired development vectors and pedagogic identity of CU communication 
students [The pedagogic identity of participants is depicted by either a circle (dialectical) 
or square shape (non-dialectical) which contains, on the top, the participant’s 
identification code number followed by sex, ‘f’ for female, ‘m’ for male, in the middle, 
the instructors’ final grade, and at the bottom, the trajectory, followed by the orientation 
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Desired development vector 1 (representational-function): A group of five students 
talked about achieving language mastery through learning grammar, learning the 
vocabulary by heart and then practising. By practising, they implicitly referred to 
classroom practice (no mention was made of travelling abroad and practising their 
language skills with native speakers there). This amounted to an idea of language 
development close to the one proposed by Oller (1976) with his concept of 
grammar-based expectancies or expectancy grammar. According to this concept, 
both receptive language use (listening, reading) and productive use (speaking, 
writing) are anticipated and planned from the grammar. In other words, the 
subtextual ideology is less about the existence of two different disciplines, more or 
less independent from each other, indeed almost autonomous, than about framing 
communicative mastery within the field of linguistics (grammar). 
 
Desired development vector 2 (socio-communicative-function): A group of four 
students (CU13, CU4, CU1, CU7) preferred a different vector of development 
altogether. Whilst they acknowledged the importance of studying and attending 
class, they believed language mastery was achieved by having social contact with 
native speakers, travelling abroad and getting to know the countries and cultures 
where Spanish was spoken. This was seen as a motivational aspect as well as a 
practical one.  
 
Desired development vector 3 (mixed representational and socio-communicative 
functions): A group of four students (CU2, CU5, CU8, CU9) expressed their 
preference for a mixed path, involving studying grammar, practising in the 
classroom, travelling abroad and talking to native speakers. 
 
As already seen above, the proportion of the variance in realisation explained in 
terms of recognition tended to be high when the participants were characterised by 
a relatively strong ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse. In the case 
of pedagogic identities, those students who possessed recognition rules for 
grammar instructional discourse, that is, the ones who belonged to orientations 5, 6, 
7 and 8 and either had a Trajectory 1 (i.e. an informal trajectory) or desired a 




development vectors 2 or 3, achieved higher levels of realisation. This pedagogic 
identity, identified in Figure 5.33 with the circle shape, could be understood as 
able to produce a code switching (from elaborated to restricted and vice versa). On 
the contrary, those students who did not possess recognition rules for grammar 
instructional discourse, that is, they only had recognition rules for restricted forms 
of discourse, were not able to switch codes, even if their desired development 
vector included a representational function, for they were not able to recognise 
discourse linked to that function. Those students are identified with a square shape 
in Figure 5.33. 
 
The former group of students, able to produce a code switching, can be identified 
with a dialectical pedagogic identity whereby they are able to cope with double 
moves within the zone of proximal development. This implies that they may be 
more able to cope with situations of crisis implied in true development as they will 
have not only the appropriate motivation to deal with the frustration that precedes 
the re-organisation of psychological functions but also a representational gaze that 
enables them to approach communication in a systematic form.  
 
With the exemption made of CU11, who attained higher levels of language 
mastery (see square shape 11f in red ink in Figure 5.33), although apparently she 
did not possess recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, students can 
be classified as belonging to two distinctive pedagogic identities: dialectical and 
non-dialectical. 
 
The answer to PQ11 (What is the pedagogic identity of students in terms of the 
relationship between their learning trajectories, orientations, their desired 
development vector, and their realisation or mastery, expressed as the final grade 
given by their communication instructor?) is that the pedagogic identity is 
modulated by the capacity of students to switch codes or have a code mismatch. 
Evidence was provided to indicate that students with coding orientations that 
included the recognition of grammar instructional discourse (orientations 5, 6, 7 or 
8), who had a code mismatch either at trajectory (a restricted coding trajectory, i.e., 




representational and socio-communicative function, i.e., desired development 
vector 2 or 3) attained higher levels of realisation or language mastery. On the 
contrary, those who did not have a coding orientation that included recognition of 
grammar instructional discourse (orientations 3 or 4 in this case study) who either 
did not want or could not have a code mismatch tended to attain relatively lower 
levels of realisation or language mastery. Arguably, students belonging to the 
dialectical pedagogic identity can cope better with double moves within the zone 
of proximal development as they can target socio-communicative functions and 
have the right socio-affective motivations, but approach instructional tasks in a 
reflexive and systematic form. 
 
 
5.5 FINAL DISCUSSION 
 
5.5.1 Discussion on the results addressing the pedagogical question 
 
What communication instructors require from students is the mastery of a complex 
set of instructional rules and social order rules that can be technically rendered as 
passive realisation (recognition) of vertical instructional mediation, active 
realisation of reflective trial approaches to instructional tasks and active 
realisation of simulated horizontal intersubjective relations. All of these are 
simultaneously required. Orientation-1 and -2 students (students with a 
confounded or informal/restricted-communicative orientation) may confuse the 
requirement of simulated horizontal intersubjective relations as a call to engage in 
model-determined approaches to learning, which are characteristic of informal, 
spontaneous learning contexts that they may have encountered during their 
educational trajectory. Furthermore, it is not unlikely that they had successfully 
applied model-determined approaches in previous learning experiences. However, 
in formal communication pedagogic contexts, that assumption is a false one since 
teachers demand that students engage in communication instructional tasks in a 
reflective trial fashion, that is, taking calculated risks and paying attention to the 
correct organisation and sequence of tasks, including ways to interact with peers in 





In the case of CU communication, the instructor demands spontaneity from 
students in functional motive-activity tasks, which adds another paradox to the 
reflective trial paradox seen above. This means that students are required to draw 
on their personal experiences in order to engage with instructional tasks, even 
though the tasks are set for students to abstract higher levels of linguistic accuracy, 
relegating language’s socio-communicative function into a second place, 
especially at the time the evaluation takes place. It is worth recalling that CU’s 
communication instructor set as development target for her course the ability to 
communicate in Spanish but linguistically in an accurate way. The demand for 
both spontaneity in functional motive-activity tasks and approaching tasks in a 
reflective trial fashion seems to signal the dialectical contradiction between the 
two moves within the foreign-language learner’s zone of proximal development. 
The same can be said of the demand to ask questions in BU communication, which 
it is also accompanied by the requirement to approach structural motive-activity 
tasks in a reflective trial manner, opening a way for students to ask not only proxy 
questions but also genuine ones. This is possible because the instructor must 
weaken the framing of sequence and contents in order to give room to students to 
ask questions. The actual contradiction lies in the fact that structural 
motive-activity is not mechanical at all, as it originally seeks to create linguistic 
habits, but it does support engaging in theoretical speculation.   
 
From a more general perspective, the data seem to confirm Vygotsky’s (1987) 
view of foreign language development as a problem linked in similar ways with 
the development of conceptual systems in the native language, that is, with 
development fundamentally predicated on top-down moves (from scientific to 
everyday concepts) within the zone of proximal development. More specifically, at 
the bottom of the problem may lie what Gal’perin (1992a) discovered empirically 
about the kind of orientation that second- and third-grade schoolchildren with 
attention problems have when facing learning tasks: ‘We first tried to ascertain the 
reason for their inattentiveness and discovered that how the children were oriented 
to the general meaning of a text, to words or an arithmetic expression, was the 
cause. The children would catch this meaning and, satisfied with it, would 




recognition rules for weakly-framed communication instruction or in combination 
with recognition rules for communication instruction, may actually disregard the 
details of a given instructional task and rely heavily on a model-determined 
orientation, being prone therefore to falling into a non-productive trial-and-error 
chain. This may reflect those students’ positive attitude towards non-hierarchical 
forms of communication and their actual disregard of forms of communication that 
are hierarchical. Furthermore, I argue that their positive attitude towards 
non-hierarchical forms of communication is associated with native Spanish 
instructors, who are in fact the ones who apparently foster them. This is 
problematic for those students eventually will be evaluated by their capacity to 
have a positive attitude towards hierarchical forms of communication, i.e., 
instruction, instead. In sharp contrast, students who possess recognition rules for 
grammar instructional discourse (orientations 5, 6, 7 and 8) are able to approach 
instructional tasks in an appropriate way as they possess a representational ‘gaze’ 
that allows them to organise and systematise what apparently is a task dealing with 
simple spontaneous conversation or rudiments of structured conversation.  
 
There is evidence to suggest that students with a dialectical pedagogic identity are 
able to switch codes, from elaborated forms of discourse or representational functions 
to restricted forms of discourse or socio-communicative functions. The prerequisite 
for this pedagogic identity is the possession of recognition rules for grammar 
instructional discourse, as students’ mere wish or intention to develop language 
top-down (a desired representative development vector or formal trajectory) is not 
sufficient. Students with a dialectical pedagogic identity do not only have the 
appropriate aspirations in terms of a set of learning objectives associated with 
socio-communicative functions that help bridge the discursive gap between foreign 
language pedagogies and the actual fields of production of the Spanish language, but 
also possess a representational ‘gaze’ that allows them to systematise pedagogies and 
perhaps build-up hypotheses about the grammatical and pragmatic systems of the 
Spanish language. This also implies that the dialectical pedagogic identity is one that 
positions itself on the limits of the pedagogic institution, challenging the institutional 
frame, for students with this identity are able to appreciate (imagine perhaps) and 




discourse and therefore they should, by definition, be able to see the cracks in the 
recontextualisation process carried by the pedagogic device through the pedagogic 
discourse. In other words, the right aspirations and socio-affective dispositions lie 
outside pedagogic discourse, although they are rendered in a restricted form through 
the instructors’ regulative discourse. This form, however, contains and reflects the 
arbitrariness of the pedagogic device’s recontextualisation of actual discourses (e.g., 
knowledge). Students with a non-dialectical identity may have less chances of 
approaching instructional tasks systematically, although they may desire to enter into 
communication with foreign speakers in the target language.       
 
The data seem to support Bernstein’s ideas on the verticality of pedagogic 
discourse. The findings indicate that for foreign language development in formal 
pedagogic settings, students are required to possess a representational gaze – even 
when pedagogies are informed by communicative language teaching’s strong 
version – undervaluing approaches to discourse and activity that depend almost 
exclusively on a socio-communicative orientation, especially if this is a restricted 
or an informal one (and one in which students apparently take control over 
interaction). The evidence shows that there is not much room in pedagogic 
practice for the horizontal discourses of everyday life, although the pedagogic task 
may resemble or target the development of everyday-like situations. In other 
words, the everyday life in the foreign language classroom is part of simulacra 
whose mastery will eventually be ascertained using formal criteria. One 
experience is built upon another; one operation upon another. As Bourne (2008) 
reminds us, no matter how horizontal or weakly-framed instruction may be, 
instruction is essentially goal-directed. Curricula are staged and hierarchically 
sequenced. Superior learning stages are built on earlier experiences. In contrast to 
the horizontal discourses of everyday life, pedagogic discourse is vertical. 
 
In conclusion, the answer to Q#2: What sort of common trajectory, pedagogic 
identity and coding orientation (consciousness) enables a relatively small segment 
of students to attain higher levels of language mastery (active realisation) in 
Spanish as a foreign language learning settings informed by communicative 




higher levels of language mastery in learning settings informed by a strong version 
of communicative language teaching, as is arguably the case of the CU 
communication course. In CU’s communication course, the instructor seeks 
students achieving not only the ability to communicate orally in Spanish but also 
speech accuracy, as qualitative and quantitative data have shown. Thus, in the CU 
communication course a negative correlation between students’ possession of 
recognition rules for communication instructional discourse and realisation or 
mastery is reported. Furthermore, the data coming from the figured world of 
students and the intended development targets set by instructors also suggest that 
in CU communication, communicating in Spanish is not enough and accuracy is 
sought also. Communicating is a starting point towards achieving higher levels of 
linguistic appropriateness. A dialectical pedagogic identity is one in which 
trajectory, discourse recognition or orientation and desired development vectors 
allow students to cope well with the top-down and bottom-up moves within the 
zone of proximal development. The dialectical pedagogic identity relies on the 
possession by the student of recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse 
(i.e. orientations 5, 6, 7 and 8), which allow him or her to approach instructional 
tasks in a sort of reflective trial or calculated risk-taking fashion through which 
pedagogies are systematised, contributing perhaps to higher forms of hypothesis 
building. Students are able to switch code, from elaborated or representational to 
restricted or socio-communicative forms of discourse. Thus, a student with an 
informal trajectory, which relies on learning through model-determined acts (i.e. 
imitation), will attain higher levels of language mastery only if he or she does 
possess recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, that is, belongs to 
orientations 5, 6, 7 or 8. A student who identifies with a socio-communicative 
development vector will also attain higher levels of language mastery if he or she 
possesses recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, that is, belongs 
again to orientations 5, 6, 7 or 8. In other words, the identification with an 
informal approach either as trajectory or future projection is not problematic 
inasmuch as the student possesses a representational gaze. However, students with 
a non-dialectical pedagogic identity, who do not possess recognition rules for 
grammar instructional discourse, who arguably belong to orientations 1, 2, 3 and 4, 




a reflective trial or calculated risk-taking fashion, even if they identify with a 
representational development vector or belong to Trajectory 1, that is, to a formal 
trajectory. However, most of these students belong to Trajectory 3, that is, they 
identify with an informal trajectory. The identification with an informal trajectory 
without possessing recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse seems to 
put these students at a great disadvantage in terms of mastery attainment, 
compared with students who belong to a dialectical pedagogic identity.    
 
In the case of a learning setting informed by the weak version of the 
communicative language teaching, as is arguably the case of the BU 
communication course, although no complete data about students’ pedagogic 
identities were obtained, there are grounds to point out with a fair degree of 
confidence that students who possess recognition rules for grammar instructional 
discourse, that is, they belong to orientations 5, 6, 7 or 8, do achieve higher levels 
of language mastery. Therefore, although the possession of recognition rules for 
communication instructional discourse is positively correlated to realisation or 
mastery in a learning setting informed by the weak version of the communication 
approach, as the BU communication course is, the possession of recognition rules 
for grammar instructional discourse is far more decisive as a predictor of 
realisation. Furthermore, although the data obtained from the figured world of 
students and the development targets set by instructors confirms that BU’s 
communication instructor is concerned with having students communicating in 
Spanish regardless of their level of linguistic precision, the data on students’ 
realisation points out that even if that is the case, instruction is evaluated 
fundamentally as an elaborated, representational discourse. This suggests that the 
same findings linked to CU communication about the need for a dialectical 
pedagogic identity may also apply in the learning setting of the BU 
communication course.  
 
What does resistance consist of in the case of Spanish as a foreign language 
learning settings informed by communicative language teaching? In light of the 
findings, the answer is first and foremost the lack of an organised approach toward 




this does not seem enough if it is not accompanied by some idea of the 
socio-communicative potential of the Spanish language given either by (a) a 
trajectory in which the subject engaged in model-determined acts, that is, in real 
communication with native speakers, especially through imitation, (b) and 
orientation that includes the recognition of weakly-framed communication 
instructional discourse, as a token of the subject’s preference for horizontal 
pedagogic or social relations at large, and (c) a desired development vector in 
which socio-communicative activity is targeted, that is, the equivalent to an 
informal trajectory but addressing future learning targets. All these points can be 
summarised in the contradictory requirements of reflective trial and spontaneous 
participation. In contrast, resistance is also an informal approach, that is, 
spontaneous participation without reflective trial, without a representational gaze. 
In other words, the student who does treat the communication instructor as an 
equal, as peer or partner may have a better and useful idea of what the practices in 
the production field consist of, and also may assume leadership roles when 
carrying out instructional tasks that require a proactive attitude, compared with 
students who cannot put themselves in that position. Although this amounts to a 
good start, it does not contribute to a good learning build-up if not accompanied by 
some form of reflection on foreign language pedagogies. In fact, instructors treat 
this kind of student as participative and involved, they may even like them at a 
personal level, but lacking discipline or grammar accuracy or appropriateness. 
Thus, students who are not able to move dialectically within the zone of proximal 
development, from the reflective trial to the spontaneous participation positions, 
may be judged as resisting foreign language instruction on oral skills.  
 
There is evidence coming from CU’s grammar instructional discourse that the 
demand for spontaneity is also present in grammar courses. However, it is in 
communication courses where the contradiction between reflective trial and 
spontaneous participation is more exacerbated.    
        
5.5.2 Discussion on the results addressing the theoretical question 
 




with pedagogic relations that shape the discursive possibilities of individuals and 
structure their experiences. Bernstein’s stance differs from other theories of culture 
reproduction inasmuch as it views discourse as reproducing in its own inner logic 
the external power relations that shape it. It is implied therefore that the power 
field does not shape discursive practices from without but the structure of those 
discursive practices gives rise to the power field itself. For Bernstein, symbolic 
systems are at once realisations and regulators of the structure of social 
relationships. Codes, or speech systems, as Bernstein (1971, p. 144) calls them, 
‘create for their speakers different orders of relevance and relation. The experience 
of the speakers may then be transformed by what is made significant or relevant by 
different speech systems.’.  
 
Do we have any evidence in the present study of this co-configuration between the 
social macrostructure and pedagogic discursive practices that create for agents 
different orders of relevance and relation? The answer to this question, which is 
none other than Q1 (How do the structural conditions of university organisation 
modulate subject position, social relations and discourse and therefore shape 
individual consciousness and activity?), is that organisations and, more 
specifically, communication learning settings, strongly moderate the variance in 
students’ realisation. This is expressed in terms of variance in discourse 
recognition depending on the instructor’s setting of particular vectors of 
development and opting to a certain degree for particular legitimate instructional 
and regulative discursive forms, that is, pedagogic discourse. Pedagogic discourse 
is associated with particular requirements linked to particular pedagogic identities. 
Thus, the variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition was higher 
among CU communication students specialising in foreign language education. 
The variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition was lower among BU 
communication students not specialising in foreign language education. CU 
students were characterised by a stronger ability to recognise grammar 
instructional discourse than their counterparts at BU. The evidence for this 
difference was that grammar was a stronger predictor of recognition at CU. 
Nevertheless, at both BU and CU, recognition of grammar was important. Thus, 




is, BU and CU students with orientations 5, 6, 7 and 8, were selected by their 
respective organisation to attain higher levels of realisation or mastery, whereas 
students who did not possess recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, 
that is, students belonging to orientations 1, 2, 3 and 4 were more likely to attain 
lower levels of realisation or mastery.   
 
Recognition of communication instructional discourse was not so important at CU. 
There was evidence to indicate that there was a link between the relatively lesser 
importance of recognition of communication instructional discourse at CU with its 
communication instructor ideas of legitimate practice: Speak, but accurately ... In 
contrast, recognition of communication instructional discourse was more 
important at BU. There was also evidence to link the relatively greater importance 
of the possession of recognition rules for communication instructional discourse at 
BU with its instructor’s ideas of legitimate practice as well: I do not value formal 
grammar accuracy. I value much more the capacity to express ideas. In this case, 
the organisation selected students who possessed recognition rules for 
communication instructional discourse. However, in general, BU students were 
characterised by a relatively moderate ability to recognise both grammar and 
communication instructional discourse, compared with CU students. CU students 
were characterised by a strong ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse, 
but a moderate ability to recognise communication instructional discourse. 
   
What could then be the structural conditions that produced these differences? The 
first-year language programmes at both BU and CU had a similar subject division 
between grammar and communication, however, as the results from the first 
procedure suggest, the BU grammar course had a much more invisible-pedagogy 
pedagogic code than the CU grammar course, which might indicate that 
organisations not specialising in foreign language education might select less 
traditional forms of pedagogy to teach grammar, perhaps in search of a more 
friendly approach to teach students who just want to have a taste of Spanish. This 
also may be one reason why a less specialised way of teaching communication (e.g. 
communicative language teaching’s weak version) is selected, as the 




foundation or structural motive-activity tasks. The fact that an organisation is 
specialising in foreign language education might put more pressure on deploying 
more specialised forms of grammar and communication education. In conclusion, 
BU’s programme seems more loosely defined and lacking tasks that can bring 
about students’ development at the transition from structural to functional 
motive-activity, as can be seen from the data coming from the motive-activity 
structure of tasks. This may explain why the BU communication course seemed to 
have a weaker correlation between the recognition of grammar instructional 
discourse and realisation or mastery compared with the CU communication course, 
and a relatively stronger correlation between the recognition of communication 
instructional discourse and realisation or mastery, compared with the CU 
communication course, in which the recognition of communication instructional 
discourse was negatively correlated to realisation. As already mentioned, for BU, 
communication was the end point, the target of the pedagogic process, whereas for 
CU, communication was the starting point.        
 
Nonetheless, there was evidence to indicate that framing differentials (control) are 
as much a function of the objective set for activity as the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of a particular learning setting (structured idiosyncrasy). In other 
words, once the instructor selects a vector of development according to what he or 
she perceives is the legitimate pedagogy, the activity imposes a given framing 
according to the direction the move (bottom-up or top-down) takes within the zone 
of proximal development, subject to the recognition of the activity by students. In 
other words, there are certain correlations that are almost unavoidable. For 
example, functional motive-activity tasks require a certain degree of weakening on 
the framing of selection of classroom jobs, selection of contents, sequence and 
pace, since they require students to draw on personal experience (i.e., demand 
spontaneity). Structural motive-activity tasks, in contrast, seem to open a way for 
students to ask questions to instructors about theory, something that it is more 
difficult to achieve in foundation motive-activity tasks, as these tasks demand from 




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
…by means of what concept is it possible to think the new type of 
determination which has just been identified as the determination of the 
phenomena of a given region by the structure of that region? More 
generally, by means of what concept, or what set of concepts, is it possible 
to think the determination of the elements of a structure, and the structural 
relations between those elements, and all the effects of those relations, by 
the effectivity of that structure? And a fortiori, by means of what concept 
or set of concepts is it possible to think the determination of a subordinate 
structure by a dominant structure; In other words, how is it possible to 
define the concept of structural causality?  







In the present study I have drawn on Bernstein’s translation device research 
methodology with the purpose of formulating an external language of description 
that could empirically translate the method of the thesis. This approach is 
condensed in the two research questions that modulate the study: one theoretical, 
related to the socio-genetic assumption made in the construction of the method 
(How do the structural conditions of university organisation modulate subject 
position, social relations and discourse and therefore shape individual 
consciousness and activity?), and the other one addressing a pedagogic problem in 
the field of foreign language education at the tertiary level in Japan (What sort of 
common trajectory, pedagogic identity and coding orientation (consciousness) 
enables a relatively small segment of students to attain higher levels of language 
mastery (active realisation) in Spanish as a foreign language learning settings 
informed by communicative language teaching?), which is the problem that 
motivated the study in the first place. 
 
The method consisted of deploying a Marxian-Hegelian notion of subject whereby 
subject position could be ascertained. In order to ascertain subject position the 
whole breadth of determinations of subject had to be embraced, which can be 




culture. The method then drew on several socio-genetic theoretical corpora in order 
to produce an ad-hoc research model: Bernstein’s code theory, the 
cultural-historical tradition, especially cultural-historical activity theory, and 
Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural theory. These theories covered every single 
instance of the constitution or formatives of the subject. Bernstein’s code theory 
served as the backbone that articulated these theoretical corpora, each one of them 
addressing with their particular strengths every one of the subject formatives.  
 
The approach therefore was marked by a non-essentialist conceptualisation of 
subject in which the individual is but one moment of subject. This made it possible 
to overcome, to a certain degree, the dualism individual/society, including inherent 
forms of determinism, and look at the problem of agency from a dynamic 
perspective in which its psychological and sociological aspects could be accounted 
for, from the laws that deal with intramental processes to the laws that deal with 
historical forces. Put another way, the individual as an agent is not completely free 
to act in the world but is not completely constrained either, as he or she draws on 
cultural tools to act upon society but by doing so he or she also allows society to 
act upon him- or herself.  
 
The locus of this contradiction is discourse and the institutions that serve as 
intermediate stages, actual embodiments of the social. This implies that the 
appropriation of cultural tools through the pedagogic process must be done in such 
a manner that it is self-transparent, providing the individual real access to the 
sources of the ideological field, the fields of production of discourse. Teaching 
(and scientific research) should be all about providing the means for people to 
develop and therefore emancipate themselves (see Chaiklin, 2012). This implies, 
in turn, the adoption of an epistemology in which a real science of discourse is 
produced, that is, a cultural-historical approach towards discourse capable, in 
Althusser’s terms (Althusser and Ba1ibar, 1997), of producing ‘a real 
self-criticism’ of the present (p. 137). I believe we have to understand that, in 
Vygotsky, the importance of the theoretical concept and its introduction in the 
pedagogical process is part and parcel of that aim: creating the conditions for full 





I believe the goals of the study were accomplished, although there were numerous 
obstacles in the data gathering process. It was not easy to lose the first case study, 
concerning AU, a university specialising in Spanish-as-a-foreign-language 
education in the middle of the data gathering process, when there was no turning 
back, for the procedures concerning AU were linked to other organisations and 
case studies as well. Lack of access to student participants on the BU 
communication course also compromised a whole section about the pedagogic 
identity of students in a learning setting informed by the weak version of the 
communicative approach, which differed to a certain degree from the learning 
setting informed by the strong version of the communicative approach, CU 
communication, to which I secured access. However, most of the questions and 
issues anticipated during the research design were addressed by the collected data 
and their respective analysis. Therefore, the provisional answers offer an 
exhaustive picture of the ability of certain students to achieve higher levels of 
language mastery. I am not completely confident that all the procedural 
complexities of a mixed-research design could have been avoided by, let us say, 
adopting a less eclectic approach without sacrificing the breadth of the present 
study. I would like to believe that all the resources spent, including first and 
foremost the involvement of each and every one of the study participants, were 
profitable.      
 
I will start this final discussion by dealing first with the findings and their relation 
to the model and the external language of description, rather than listing every 
single instrument deployed. I will do this following the dialectical tradition: from 
the concepts that the study gave rise to. In other words, the model, the method and 
the methodology will be subsumed under those concepts. I will then try to project 
the study in order to offer some recommendations to practitioners in the field, 
scholars interested in the dialectical tradition and/or in Bernstein’s sociology, and 
to researchers who may feel they want to incorporate the approach and instruments 






6.2 FINAL DISCUSSION 
 
6.2.1 The problem of the social structure 
 
Instructors and SLA researchers rarely view the social structure as a critical 
determinant of pedagogic activity. There are few studies on foreign language 
education in Japan and abroad that bring this dimension into the equation, which 
constitutes, in my view, a clear avoidance of sociological issues. The same 
argument can be made about the use of sociocultural theory in SLA, which, as 
already seen, privileges an account of mind formation without ascertaining the 
social structure. The social dimension of the socio-genetic underpinnings of the 
dialectical tradition is represented by intersubjective activity alone. Institutions are 
not worth analysing, under such conceptions. 
 
The determinations imposed by the organisational structure seem to go unnoticed. 
On the one hand, perhaps, the attributes or characteristics of the structure are soon 
embodied in the particular student population of a given learning setting or 
organisation, which may constitute the living expression of such structural 
determinations, pretty much like the fetishism inherent in any symbolic 
representation, in any cultural tool and in any use of them by the subject, which 
equates in fact to the very constitution of the subject. And this presents an 
interesting aspect of the structure as the constitutive instance (in terms of laying a 
set of conditions), for its relational network is soon sublimated into the node that 
syncretically synthesises it, i.e., the instructor-student relationship. In many cases, 
these determinations cannot be altered by instructors or researchers for they are a 
complete given to them, which relativise the viability of any form of research, let 
alone of intervention research. In fact, prior to embarking on the present research, 
whilst researching language education resistance, I showed signs of limiting my 
research only to the aspects instructors could change, that is, instructional methods, 
without engaging into further analysis of the social structure: 
 
Although I started the research looking for pedagogical and curricular 
answers with the purpose of giving new guidance to my own and other 
peers’ practice, I soon realised that pedagogical and curricular approaches 




problem embedded in education politics, which calls for the use of more 
sociological research approaches, and the implementation of political 
solutions. Having asserted that, the reality is that foreign-language 
teachers have very limited means of solving problems of a political nature 
and therefore the main goal of this study is to assess which areas of the 
problem can be addressed in the short-term or medium-term by 
encouraging pedagogical and curricular tuning or change, and which ones 
presumably require a long-term political fix. (Escandón, 2004, pp. 3-4)  
 
 
Another factor that contributes to the avoidance of the sociological stance in SLA 
research in our local context is that the tertiary system in Japan does not sustain a 
bottom-up research culture. This circumstance may be the consequence of a rigid 
hierarchisation of educational organisations and a marked preference for top-down 
research. Research is left to be carried out by elite university scholars and 
researchers working for the Ministry of Education, at least the research that 
informs national educational reforms and organisational curricular change. Yet, 
studies about actual foreign language pedagogies are hard to find. More likely, 
organisations will adopt (and adapt) foreign instructional methods, but they will be 
subject to a process of strong recontextualisation through which they are watered 
down or left unrecognisable as spinoffs of their original philosophical paradigm. In 
this regard, I do not completely agree with the view that foreign language 
pedagogies are neo-colonial tools, as they are profoundly reshaped by Japanese 
institutions, and in fact are used in advancing the aims of the Japanese educational 
apparatus.  
 
As mentioned in chapters 3 and 4, most of the research on the actual pedagogy of 
Spanish as a foreign language in Japan is conducted by native speakers who are 
part-time or full-time instructors on temporary contracts with little or no say about 
any aspect of the programme they teach, except, in some cases, choosing the 
textbook for their own course. Thus, the fact that a curricular divide between 
grammar and conversation, or any other curricular scheme, is established soon 
becomes invisible or is forgotten by the presence of the students themselves. I am 
referring here to structural determinants expressed, on the one hand, as the degree 
of insulation between teaching subjects matters (e.g. grammar, conversation, 




verticality or horizontality in decision making processes linked to the designing, 
implementation and evaluation of the programme), and, on the other hand, as the 
degree of insulation between what is taught in the programme and the demands of 
the labour market; the existence of links between what is studied and prospects for 
actual practice in a society in which the target language is widely spoken, either at 
university level or not, or in local communities that use it, such as communities of 
Spanish-speaking immigrants. All these represent structural factors. They are 
called voice by Bernstein. Voice determines, through arbitrary divisions or 
classification, the composition of the students body instructors face and, 
eventually, shape interactions or framing, which Bernstein calls message.  
 
Finally, perhaps we are still under the domination of a cognitive paradigm, which 
is carried through the very same categories and notions we have borrowed from 
linguistics to analyse second and foreign language learning. As I pointed out in 
chapter 2, it is extremely difficult to counter the pulling force of the modern 
linguistic paradigm, which tends to impose the logic of the speech act under a very 
restricting notion of context, instead of the logic of communication in a broader 
sense. Bakhtin seems to do a better job of getting rid of modern linguistic 
denominations. Yet, almost every scholar or researcher working on the SLA field 
still has to use notions such as code and systems and explain their stance by using 
our modern-linguistic and cognitivist-ridden common language. 
 
Let us discuss now what we have found about the relationship between the social 
structure and the foreign-language pedagogic processes, or, put in Marxian terms, 
let us explore the relationship between the dominant and subordinate structures 
and their degrees of independence.  
 
6.2.1.1 Structured idiosyncrasy 
 
The notion of structured idiosyncrasy, although a conceptual result of the study, a 
post-factum construction, is somehow capable of revealing the tension between 
structure and discourse. What is then structured idiosyncrasy? The term came 




language of description of organisations and learning settings together with the 
participant instructors and another practitioner who helped in the process 
(Escandón, 2008a, 2008b). This consisted of translating together code theory and 
activity theory to operational units that would enable us to gather data with the aim 
of describing organisations and learning contexts in their relation to the discursive 
practices of teaching and learning Spanish.  
 
In a nutshell, what was immediately clear through that intermediate procedure was 
that (a) the organisational structure played a determinant role in setting up 
pedagogic contexts, pedagogic objects and vectors of development, including rules 
of pedagogic engagement, and (b) tasks informed by instructional methods and 
approaches had a life of their own in their relation to development vectors, 
although they both showed signs of being correlated and co-constituted.  
 
Let me make a brief departure to make clear that task is a specialised concept 
within cultural-historical activity theory, and it means something substantially 
different from an instructional task. A task can be defined as the operationalisation 
of an action. Now, one of the main resources available to instructors in the 
operationalisation of an action is the instructional task suggested in the textbook. 
However, the actual recontextualisation the instructor and the students make of the 
instructional task is but one component of the operationalisation of the task in 
terms of goal-oriented action.   
 
Going back to the notion of structured idiosyncrasy, what was discovered is that 
once instructors were positioned in a given context, especially given the particular 
division of labour that took place through the curriculum, they set certain 
development vectors and tasks informed by methods of instruction which were 
correlated to certain moves within the zone of proximal development. By the same 
token, tasks informed by instructional methods or approaches privileged certain 
moves within the zone of proximal development and had therefore a particular 
valence in terms of development vectors as well as differentials in the students’ 
state of consciousness. State of consciousness refers here to promptings to either 




linguistic habit.  
 
Thus, the notion of structured idiosyncrasy refers, on the one hand, to the 
determination imposed on discourse and therefore on development by the societal 
formation (organisation and learning setting), expressed as the degree of 
arbitrariness and form of the division of labour, and, on the other hand, the 
freedom subjects have to choose the object of activity, expressed as the subjects’ 
degree of control over instructional practices and the assertion of a given moral 
order that frames those practices. 
 
So, what is more specifically the nature of the relation between the structure of the 
educational organisation and learning setting, their fundamental characteristics, 
their fabric or footprint, so to speak, and the nature of the interaction that takes 
place among instructors and students, which produces and reproduces that 
structure at the same time, and gives way to different vectors of development? 
How can we distinguish between forms of structured idiosyncrasy? Furthermore, 
how can we provide an account of these two co-constructed notions, the macro and 
the micro level of analysis, that allow us to compare organisations and learning 
settings so that these do not become confounded variables?  
 
The tentative answer is given first by producing a description of classification and 
framing relations in which the relative strength of the boundaries and the 
principles of control within several categories are ascertained, especially in terms 
of the disciplines that form part of the study programme (i.e., the 
grammar/communication components of a study programme). Second, it is 
necessary to transform interaction into discourse. This is done by analysing the 
operationalisation of actions, that is, the tasks, in relation to motive-activity 
structure, which is a construct and projection given by the ideal set of steps 
required to achieve oral language mastery. It is an ideal set through which we can 
compare tasks and classify them. In our case, that set of steps was constituted by 
management, foundation, structural, functional and rhetorical motive-activity. The 
next step is to analyse tasks in terms of framing, that is, in terms of how control is 




code for the task. Tasks belonging to the same motive-activity structure for a 
particular learning setting can then be compared with those of another learning 
setting. In this way we learned that BU’s grammar course was far more 
progressive than CU’s grammar course; but CU’s communication course was far 
more progressive than BU’s communication course. By progressive we understand 
here that the pedagogy was less explicit (i.e., a case of relative weak framing).  
 
Overall, this seemed to respond to the differences between an organisation 
specialising in foreign language education, as is CU’s case, which may allow or 
require that grammar and communication subjects really differentiate one another, 
and an organisation not specialising in foreign language education, as in BU’s case, 
which may not allow a differentiated way to teach grammar or communication or 
can only afford a less differentiated way to teach them.  
 
The findings associated with the notion of structured idiosyncrasy allow us to 
ascertain whether a communication course falls into the weak or strong version of 
the communicative approach. Thus, it was determined that a course felt into the 
strong version of the communicative approach category if its motive-activity 
structure privileged functional motive-activity, that is, speech acts were part of 
non-verbal activity; there was a relative weakening in the selection of contents, 
that is, the instructional contents were provided to students but some personal 
information or experience was elicited from them; and there was also a relative 
weakening of the instructional sequence, that is, the instructor left enough room 
for students to modify instructional sequences. In contrast, a course fell into the 
weak version of the communicative approach if its motive-activity structure 
privileged structure motive-activity, that is, speech acts were closely monitored to 
comply with grammatical norms or grammatical structures or the objectives set in 
the tasks; the selection of contents was strongly framed, that is, students could not 
bring their own personal information or experiences into the learning process; and 
the instructor tightly controlled the instructional sequence enforcing students’ 
compliance with the aim of ensuring they used the targeted structure, focusing thus 





Let me give some more general examples that summarise the findings and 
illustrate the relationships regulated by structural idiosyncrasy. A strong division 
of labour between grammar and communication allows the communication 
instructor to target structural and functional motive-activity, whose concrete 
pedagogical rendition is through forms of discourse that necessarily have to give 
greater degrees of freedom to students. In other words, they involve, apparently, 
less control on the instructor’s part. However, if we analyse instructional tasks that 
promote structural motive-activity, aimed at producing oral linguistic habits, we 
find that the freedom given to students to rehearse dialogues or sentences opens 
the way for them to ask questions about the grammatico-pragmatical 
underpinnings of those rehearsed structures, pulling the activity back into 
foundational motive-activity. And that is precisely the sort of activity that 
dominates grammar instruction. In consequence, reactive speech is reactive in 
terms of communication activity in the foreign language but active in terms of 
communication in the native language. Now, this is really good, because students 
are finally testing their own hypotheses about the theoretical underpinnings of the 
language system in all its complexity; they are actually reflecting motu proprio, 
spontaneously, on the problem of the linguistic means needed to express their 
communicative intention, but that also may hamper development, especially if the 
activity is transformed and not taken back to the structural level, for there will not 
be continuity towards the next level on the motive-activity scale: functional 
motive-activity.  
 
What is interesting is that students do not usually formulate those questions when 
engaged in foundational motive-activity because (a) the teacher controls the class 
as a whole and (b) students are as yet unable to make sense of the theoretical 
underpinnings. It is only in the confrontation between theory and practice that they 
will be able to ask questions. The problem then is when (if ever) students will be 
pushed to the next level. Well, in the case of a curriculum that makes a strong 
division between grammar and communication, the instructor may target 
functional motive-activity, as is clearly the case of the organisation specialising in 
teaching Spanish as a foreign language. This in turn is supported by instructional 




what, together with a relative freedom to find out the best or most suitable 
instructional sequence. Unlike structural motive-activity, it involves active 
communication and therefore personal involvement and spontaneity. It demands 
from students to draw on personal, meaningful, experiences. Students may ask 
questions of the instructor about a certain grammatico-pragmatical issue and he or 
she may want to answer in a way so as not to stop the flow of the conversation, so 
as not to deviate from the object of the instructional target and the object of 
motive-activity. But I believe, based on the analysis of the data, this is going to 
happen only if there is a clear structural division between grammar and 
communication. If not, the instructor will be tempted to go back down to a 
structural or foundation motive-activity. I will return to this issue in the next 
section to discuss the socio-political implications of this conundrum.  
 
Introducing intensive metalinguistic reflection in functional motive-activity is the 
best way to kill it. As we will see later, there is evidence that confirms that a 
reflective element is always present (or at least required) in functional 
motive-activity, but if the activity changes its object, if it is transformed into 
structural or foundation motive-activity, then it will lose its development potential.  
 
The problem we face here is that for functional motive-activity to take place 
instructors depend on the students’ responsible exercise of their freedom to 
communicate. It is, in other words, a form of freedom under tutelage, a form of 
constrained freedom. This tutelage implies a certain degree of trust and acceptance 
of this temporary situation in which students are guided by instructors.  
 
In a curriculum with no clear division between grammar and communication, in 
which the communication course does not stand on its own, which does not abide 
unmercifully with the object of developing actual communication, resisting 
students will see there is room to dismiss the actual communication object. And by 
resisting students I mean students who are not willing or are afraid of putting their 
personal world, their feelings and views on the line, into the public sphere, as the 
providers of the real contents of the conversation under the instructor’s tutelage. 




development, a process of synthesis which is accompanied by catharsis. The 
tutelage is therefore the administration of this process leading inexorably to 
frustration before achieving synthesis and catharsis. I can also characterise it as a 
form of psychological regression and extreme vulnerability, for the student can no 
longer take refuge in his own semantic system, in his own language, in reason, if 
you like. That is quite a severe jump into the vacuum.  
 
Resistance in this case seems reasonable, even a positive trait. Why should a 
student want to trade what he or she is in language? The process is not minor, it is 
all about softening the boundaries between what one is in-a-known-language or 
in-one’s-own-language and what one could be in-another-foreign-language. In this 
regard, the move from structural to functional-motive activity is more demanding 
and more complex than the previous moves within the motive-activity structure. I 
believe that it could be compared to those ages in child development marked by 
acute crisis. 
 
In case of flagrant resistance, the communication instructor is too tempted to 
transform functional motive-activity into structural or foundation motive-activity, 
imposing unequivocal control over students through instructional means. In fact, I 
believe that there are grounds to understand the basic foreign language pedagogic 
process as dominated by a baseline inertia whereby the functional motive-activity 
is always being in a state of ontological jeopardy, ready to succumb to the status 
quo and the procrastinating position of considering the communication class as a 
preparation for some, rather distant, possible communication context or situation, 
as a simulacrum.  
 
This simulacrum turns communication into an abstract object without a concrete 
correlate, that is, it transforms communication into the very same object of 
grammar, understood as an abstract, universal system detached from concrete 
instances. The utterance then becomes an object of study, pretty much like an 
artefact belonging to the past is exhibited in a museum. Therefore, courses should 
not be a sort of mixer of motive-activity. It is fundamental that they set clear 




on the organisational structure, which depends in turn on the (conflicting) role 
foreign language education is given by society as a whole. Let us discuss this 
problem in more detail. 
 
6.2.1.2 Functional motive-activity as a de-homogenising process  
 
Through the findings we have learnt that the only courses that targeted functional 
motive-activity were CU’s grammar and communication courses, that is, courses 
belonging to the university specialising in foreign language education. In the case 
of the former, only one of the activities belonged to functional motive-activity 
structure. Most of them belonged to foundation and structural motive-activities. In 
the case of the latter, most of the activities did belong to functional motive-activity.  
 
Crucial to determining if the activity belonged to functional motive-activity was if 
the activity’s object was extra-linguistic, that is, if it really presented a problem 
that did not focus on producing language. These activities almost necessarily 
include a higher degree of personal involvement from students as they have to 
draw on their personal experiences and knowledge to solve the instructional tasks. 
They tend to be more chaotic and harder to control because they demand 
spontaneity. Students may also resort to using their native language to accomplish 
the tasks. This reflects the fact that students are actually determined to get to the 
end of the task, no matter what. In other words, they are immersed in the problem. 
The task (and language in which to carry it out) becomes transparent. 
 
Another crucial aspect of functional motive-activity is that students are indirectly 
required to assume personal and social positions that are gradually departing from 
the positions prescribed by the pedagogic apparatus, which are dominated by two 
logics: (a) the more-knowledgeable-instructor/less-knowledgeable-student logic 
and (b) the logic of the pedagogic power field as the homogeniser of social 
relations, whereby a false sense of mesocratic homogeneity is created.  
 
Let me give a few examples. In a communication class in which students are 




the newspapers and books they read, the pastimes they have, they are in fact taking 
up positions and making public their private and social life. Thus, if a student 
comments she reads the Asahi Shimbun newspaper, she is taking up a position 
associated with certain political views, a socio-political position. In this case, the 
newspaper in question is associated with a centre-left political stance. But even if 
the student talks about something very simple like how she likes go skiing to 
Nagano or Switzerland, or how she likes playing badminton at the university club, 
she will always be taking up a position, a socio-economic position. In conclusion, 
socio-political and socio-economic positions will start to emerge, fragmenting 
inexorably this perpetuated idea of belonging to the same world or community of 
people.  
 
I believe that this process, which may be very customary in Western societies, 
including Latin American ones, as people are more determined to publicly defend 
their positions and views, is not very well received in Japanese institutions and is 
inherently problematic. At least, it should not be taken for granted, because it may 
be resisted as it runs counter the national ideology that has created the myth that 
says that every single Japanese person belongs to the middle class, and those that 
belong to the middle class are equal among themselves.  
 
Alongside McVeigh (2000), I argue that in many Japanese (educational) 
institutions, communication is dominated by the power field in such a way as to 
avoid participants taking (immediate) positions. It is a strategy to reproduce the 
power field and the social relations linked to that power field. As McVeigh points 
out: 
 
In Japan’s bureaucratized landscape, communication lines should be 
hierarchical; institutional affiliation (school, workplace, company, 
nationality) should be clearly categorized; presentations of selves should 
be performed and displayed in standardized fashion (‘I’ –observes– 
‘me’); and individual qualities should not be personalized but modular 
(the reality, of course, is far more complicated and nuanced). But with so 
much pressure to accept these imperatives of rationalization, it is no 
wonder that the official values of the state (especially as seen in school 
education-socialization) and capital (corporations) discourage one from 




eccentric, strange), seken-shirazu (unaware of seken rules, naive), or 
‘standing out’ (medatsu). Though there is much rhetoric about the 
importance of expressing one’s individuality (kosei), in the actual daily 
practices of schooling and labor such expressions are often muted, 
especially since one is warned about the trap of adopting the 
individualism (kogin shugi) of ‘foreign’ (read non-Japanese) ways; one’s 
‘I’ should carefully monitor one’s ‘me’. (McVeigh, 2000, pp. 158-159) 
 
This is reflected, in the Japanese society at large, for instance, in the generalised 
use of uniforms, a phenomenon that McVeigh analyses in depth, and, I would add, 
in the almost complete absence of time slots in which speakers can be questioned 
about what they have said. At conferences, lectures, talks and public events, the 
structure of the communication will leave almost no time for exchanging views. 
Comments will be made after the event and positions will be taken up, but 
avoiding the possibility of direct confrontation within the communicative event 
itself. 
 
These notions are debatable because there is no perfect order and every order 
creates deviance as well. The Japanese society and institutions are not an exception 
to this rule. To say that discourse is constrained to what happens in the classroom 
or in a given, clearly limited communicative event such as the classroom lesson, is 
a form of extreme reductionism, for backchannel and aisle-talks are part and parcel 
of the pedagogic discourse as well. Perhaps the most important loci of 
communication in Japan are precisely those instances in which backchannel and 
aisle-talk take place. However, given our limited research resources and approach, 
which has highlighted classroom discourse, we have to constrain ourselves mainly 
to the discussion of classroom discourse. 
 
Thus, the most important problem we face is that functional motive-activity 
demands that students draw on a good number of experiences that leave no room 
for hiding personal and social positions in the classroom. In consequence, in a 
matter of few introductory lessons, students are required to express themselves 
about a wide range of issues such as character (How would you describe yourself 
and others? Do you like reading?), body features (Are you thin or fat? Are you in 




or a flat? Where do you live? How is your neighbourhood?), family relationships 
(Do you get along with your parents?), work (Do you have a part-time job? What 
do you work in? Does your mother work? What does she do?), etc. Even if 
students resort to creating an alter personality, that can also be considered as taking 
up a determined position, e.g. having a knack for comedy, which can be seen as 
eccentric. 
 
Industrial, market educational models, especially those deployed in teaching a 
foreign language other than English at an institution not specialising in foreign 
language education do not seem to create the appropriate conditions for the kind of 
personal exposure demanded by functional motive-activity. Functional 
motive-activity calls upon what Bernstein (2000) calls a therapeutic pedagogic 
identity; an identity capable of caring about students’ private views, feelings and 
personal development. 
 
Here the concept of self is crucial and the self is regarded as a personal 
project. It is an internally regulated construction and relatively 
independent of external consumer signifiers. It is a truly symbolic 
construction. The identity takes the form of an open narrative which 
constructs a personal time. (Bernstein, 2000, pp. 73-74) 
 
Large classrooms, the continuous change of (part-time) instructors, the 
fragmentation of the curriculum for no apparent reason (e.g. overlapping 
disciplines or subject matters), do not foster the creation of a space in which 
students can entrust their private lives to instructors and peers, go through 
turbulent periods of crisis, and develop personal projects. Part-time instructors do 
not spend enough time on campus to engage in the sort of personal talk with 
students that can create a therapeutic space, at least not in the required scale. 
Moreover, they cannot be required to engage in a time-consuming job that is not 
going to be acknowledged and rewarded as such. This is one of the main 
disadvantages pedagogic institutions that foster market pedagogic identities have. 
The market, as the main assigner of resources, is insensible to altruistic forms of 
activity unless altruism itself is commoditised. But the way market pedagogic 
identities operate, the way profits and profit margins are made, is precisely by 




conclusion, one could argue that institutions that are (a) subsumed under market 
economic structures and (b) take up market pedagogic identities that do not 
produce the structural conditions to foster the kind of identities and care needed 
for students to go through in-depth personal changes. 
 
What happened then to BU, a university not specialising in foreign language 
teaching, which did not register any functional motive-activity at all? In BU’s 
communication course only a slow build-up towards motive-activity was 
registered, but not functional-motive activity-intensive instructional tasks, as one 
would have expected. Whilst it is understandable that at the beginning of a course 
the emphasis would be placed on foundation and structural motive-activities, the 
layout of the curriculum and the way it was interpreted by the instructors, that is, 
its weak subject matter classification, was ill-prepared to target functional 
motive-activity. In contrast, with barely the same amount of time spent on foreign 
language instruction as a whole, the CU communication course fundamentally 
targeted functional motive-activity. In other words, we cannot say that BU did not 
target functional motive-activity because of lack of study time, which is usually 
one of the many excuses instructors give for the lack of results in courses that 
belong to foreign-language-other-than- English programmes. 
 
Students at BU were continuously kept in the relative comfort zone of foundation 
and structural motive-activity, in which reflection is dominant and personal views 
are left aside, as they require a rehearsal of lines contained on a script. In other 
words, foundation and structural motive-activity deal with reactive, not active 
communication. As already seen, given the programmes’ total number of hours of 
instruction, it seems rather unproductive to focus all the instruction on foundation 
and structural motive-activity.  
 
The findings also provide evidence of BU’s communication instructor enforcing 
control over instructional contents when students went on asking genuine 
questions in Spanish, keeping the activity at the structural motive-activity level. In 
fact, the instructor did not reply to the questions but enforced the instructional 




structural task. In other words, a few students were targeting functional 
motive-activity, but the instructor kept the overall tone of the activity at the 
structural motive-activity level. Furthermore, the widespread use of Japanese by 
the instructor seemed rather unnecessary and ancillary to foundation and structural 
motive-activity. 
 
We have to ask ourselves what BU’s instructor was trying to solve by targeting 
structural motive-activity and speaking in Japanese most of the time in a foreign 
language communication class. First, BU’s communication instructor was worried 
that students were not getting enough grammar to move onto more challenging 
instructional tasks, especially because students’ attendance at that institution was 
irregular. There were also clear indications of disruptive behaviour by some 
students, which was accompanied by a surge in the assertion of models of conduct 
and disciplinary action and the enforcement of instructional sequence, selection of 
classroom jobs and contents. This kind of behaviour at that organisation may have 
urged the instructor to plan a course in which students could remain in a relatively 
comfortable zone, without taking too many risks or causing too much trouble. In 
contrast, the only assertion of conduct found in CU’s communication course was 
about the carrying out of the instructional tasks, as she demanded communication 
to be spontaneous. It did not deal with a breach of classroom rules.  
 
The instructional material used by BU’s communication instructor seemed to 
support a very controlled way of presenting instructional tasks as a slow structural 
build-up towards functional motive-activity instructional tasks. I argue that this 
kind of material serves the purpose of providing instructional aids to keep students 
under control. Whilst the instructional tasks contained in the textbook may have 
eventually targeted functional motive-activity, the textbook did not represent much 
of a variation from other textbooks produced in Japan, which involuntarily aim at 
killing time in exercises, not real communicative instructional tasks. The kind of 
material deployed in communication courses in organisations not specialising in 
teaching Spanish as a foreign language seems to provide instructional control over 
students. This explains the astonishing similarity among them. They are part and 




under control, avoiding as much as possible them having to take positions on 
personal and social issues. Perhaps, on the one hand, this kind of material already 
acknowledges how unfeasible it is to foster a therapeutic pedagogic identity due to 
the aforementioned structural constraints, including the economic structure of 
educational institutions. Perhaps, on the other hand, it adapts to the communication 
style prescribed for Japanese educational institutions in general. Regardless of 
what causes this kind of reification of instructional tools and materials, the fact is 
that that kind of material is being historically reproduced and seems 
extraordinarily stable.    
 
Overall, the prospects for actual functional motive-activity in BU’s communication 
classroom were diluted. Eventually, neither the communication nor the grammar 
course targeted functional motive-activity. Therefore, students’ foreign language 
development might have been suppressed, considering that both courses were 
targeting the same kind of motive-activity: foundation and structural 
motive-activity.  
 
6.2.1.3 The need for a representational gaze 
 
In which way does the structure influence the pedagogic process? The intended 
development targets set by the instructors and the actual activity carried out 
through the pedagogic relation ends up privileging certain development vectors, as 
the results coming from the statistical model, designed to measure the correlation 
between recognition and realisation, and the moderation exerted on realisation by 
students’ foreign language trajectories and organisations, suggested. The intended 
development targets and activity operates as a selector of students who possess 
recognition rules for three different instructional discourses; grammar, 
communication and weakly-framed communication instructional discourse, that is, 
students who are able to recognise these forms of instructional discourse. In other 
words, students with a certain consciousness, who can understand the relevance of 
different discourses, are said to possess different orientations toward discourse 





These three forms of instructional discourse differ in their coding orientation, as 
they point to different orders of relevance. Grammar instructional discourse is 
characterised by elaborated forms of discourse that rely on the introduction of 
theoretical concepts. Communication instructional discourse is characterised by 
both elaborated and restricted forms of discourse, as communication instruction 
may introduce theoretical concepts to teach the pragmatic aspects of 
communication explicitly, but also may rely on implicit forms of instruction that 
are context dependent, such as imitation. Finally, weakly-framed communication 
instructional discourse is the discourse that targets some theoretical aspect of the 
grammatico-pragmatic system but weakens the framing in terms of hierarchy. 
Instead of appearing as the primary knower, the instructor seeks to facilitate the 
answer to students’ questions so as to get the whole class involved in looking for 
an answer. This kind of instructional discourse is associated mainly with native 
Spanish instructors. 
 
Trajectories, that is, students’ preferred vectors of development or leading 
activities during their prior foreign language studies, also moderate the recognition 
of the above instructional discourses. Thus, trajectories that privileged informal 
learning – dependent on model-determined acts (e.g. imitation, induction) – were 
characterised by a relatively moderate capacity to recognise grammar instructional 
discourse. In contrast, the trajectory that privileged formal learning – dependent on 
explicit instruction (e.g., deduction) – was characterised by a high capacity to 
recognise grammar instructional discourse. 
 
Recognition is correlated with realisation, that is, with the production of linguistic 
texts that are appropriate to the set of rules set by instructors, and therefore, the 
capacity to recognise discourse is a predictor of mastery. An informal trajectory 
seems to hamper the prospects of recognition of grammar instructional discourse 
by students.   
 
What constitutes a complete puzzle is the fact that in communication courses the 
capacity to recognise communication instructional discourse is not such a relevant 




discourse. In fact, the possession of recognition rules for grammar instructional 
discourse is positively correlated to realisation or mastery in communication 
learning settings informed either by the weak version of the communicative 
approach (the BU communication course) or the strong version of the 
communicative approach (the CU communication course). Furthermore, in the 
case of the latter, the recognition of communication instructional discourse is 
negatively correlated to realisation. In other words, although the learning setting 
informed by the strong version of the communicative approach is characterised by 
functional motive-activity, the course demands from students complete abstraction 
from the socio-communicative functions that are used in the course and asks for 
grammatical accuracy instead. It is like telling students, ‘Now that you have had a 
good time attempting to communicate with one another I will evaluate your 
capacity to communicate but according to a benchmark set by grammatical 
correctness’. This is not the case in the learning setting informed by the weak 
version of the communicative approach, which is characterised by structural 
motive-activity. In this case, the recognition of communication instructional 
discourse is positively correlated with realisation, but to a lesser degree than the 
recognition of grammar instructional discourse. 
 
In conclusion, communication learning settings require from students a 
representational gaze. This gaze was identified first with the ability to recognise 
grammar instructional discourse, but, as we will see, there is much more to it. 
 
6.2.2 Paradoxes of foreign language development 
 
The rationale underlying the evaluation criteria employed by BU’s communication 
instructor – I do not value formal grammar accuracy. I value much more the 
capacity to express ideas. – may be accurate in relation to grammar as a vertical 
knowledge (i.e., knowledge that is hierarchically organised) but eventually was not 
accurate in relation to the demands made on students to approach communication 
systematically – actually to study forms of communication, to approach 
communication as if ready to dissect it in an operating theatre. It is as if 




upon. Spontaneity must be controlled. This conclusion is made in light of the data 
that indicate that those students who did not possess recognition of grammar 
instructional discourse were rated as underachievers by BU’s communication 
instructor. In other words, the grammar orientation may be disguising the need for 
a systematic approach to communication instructional tasks or the communicative 
aspects of grammar instruction (e.g. production of discrete speech acts). This 
seems aligned with Cohen’s (2008) assertion about the slow pace of naturalistic 
acquisition of target-language pragmatics and the need for learners to be exposed 
from the outset to explicit information about how to perform target-language 
pragmatics. Unorganised forms of pragmatic instruction seem unproductive. Yet, 
they demand certain imagination that permits learners to overcome the pragmatic 
limitations set by the pragmatic system of their own culture.   
 
In contrast, the statement made by CU’s communication instructor – Speak, but 
accurately… – reflects the fact that she is setting hierarchical evaluation criteria 
for communication. The problem is that communication, that is, the pragmatics of 
a certain language does not have a vertical knowledge structure, yet instruction 
might be treated as a vertical construction.  
 
In light of the findings, it gives the impression that there is not much room in 
communication pedagogies for the horizontal discourses of everyday life, although 
the pedagogic tasks may resemble or target the development of everyday-like 
situations. In other words, the everyday life in the foreign language 
communication classroom is part of simulacra whose mastery will eventually be 
ascertained using formal criteria. One experience is built upon another; one 
operation upon another. As Bourne (2008) reminds us, no matter how horizontal or 
weakly-framed instruction may be (and CU communication had one of the 
weakest framing values), instruction is essentially goal-directed. Curricula are 
staged and hierarchically sequenced. Superior learning stages are built on earlier 
experiences. In contrast to the horizontal discourses of everyday life, pedagogic 
discourse is vertical. 
 




procedures and respect for hierarchy during the teaching and evaluation stages, 
students who only possess restricted coding orientations encounter serious mastery 
problems. It is argued that students who possess a restricted coding orientation do 
not deal well with hierarchical relationships, preferring to engage in horizontal 
communication schemes. In contrast, students who possess an elaborated coding 
orientation achieve higher levels of mastery because they can appreciate the 
benefits that organisation, attention to procedures and respect for hierarchy bring 
to their learning. 
 
Let me introduce here the double paradox students face in learning settings 
informed by either the weak or strong version of the communicative approach. In 
the case of the former, dominated by structural motive-activity, the instructor 
directs students to ask questions as if they were their own and approach activities 
in reflective-trial fashion, i.e., paying attention to the grammatico-pragmatic 
system. However, the questions must follow meticulously the instructional 
sequence of the instructional task. For example, students are requested to ask the 
language spoken in every single country shown on a map and answer their peers’ 
question in a specific way. Students are also required to refrain from introducing 
contents that are not contained in the instructional task. Are the questions 
formulated after being requested to make questions genuine questions? Not with 
regard to the contents of the instructional task, perhaps. However, as we have 
already seen, the relative freedom given to students to practise those structures 
opens a way for them to inquire about the theoretical underpinnings of the 
grammatico-pragmatic structure. The answer, if given by the instructor, tends to 
pull down the task into a foundation motive-activity. The instructor is unable to 
answer such a question in the target language and the fact that an answer is 
attempted implies introducing higher levels of reflection that undermine the object 
of structural motive-activity. Therefore, the activity, instead of going up the 
motive-activity structure, toward a functional motive-activity, goes down, to a 
foundation motive-activity. 
 
In the case of the latter, that is, in a communication learning setting informed by 




requested to draw on their personal experiences, act spontaneously, but approach 
the instructional task in a reflective-trial fashion, that is, systematically and paying 
attention to the grammatico-pragmatic system. However, unlike the prior case, the 
instructor gives more room for students to make changes to the instructional 
sequence. Spontaneity, nevertheless, is at the service of a representational function. 
Is that kind of spontaneity really spontaneous? Can a student be spontaneous if he 
or she is being asked to be spontaneous? The answer is no. The dialogues that 
develop under these constraints resemble the structured, ritualistic conversation 
about the weather or sports between a cab driver and a passenger. Yet, taking the 
initiative is important and eventually creating situations in which the cab 
driver-passenger dialogue can emerge is valued by the instructor. Unlike the 
former case, there are more possibilities to move up the motive-activity structure 
as the context of the framed conversation begins to be more familiar to students.  
 
Thus, structural and functional motive-activities are intermediate positions that 
tend to move in opposite directions: the former, towards foundation 
motive-activity, the latter, toward rhetorical motive-activity. 
 
6.2.3 A dialectical pedagogic identity 
   
What kind of pedagogic identity do students have that enables them to cope well 
with the aforementioned contradictory directions within the zone of proximal 
foreign language development? First of all, by pedagogic identity we understand 
here the specific relationship between the student’s trajectory, orientation and 
desired vector of development. In other words, the past, present and intended 
(future) vector of development. The tentative answer to the question is that 
students who have a bipolar, grammar, elaborated or comprehensive orientation, 
that is, orientations that have in common the possession of recognition rules for 
grammar instructional discourse, together with either the past or future preference 
for a socio-communicative vector of development, tend to cope better with both 
moves and with the contradiction that these moves present. We will say these 
students have a dialectical pedagogic identity. This implies that students who are 




fashion but also are aware that one of the purposes of the activity is to have actual 
instances of communicative engagement with native speakers (or actual producers 
of Spanish discourse), tend to do better than those who do not have a 
representational orientation, even if they desire to have a communicative 
engagement with native speakers (or actual producers of Spanish discourse). In 
conclusion, their position is that of commitment (e.g. understand the means and 
ends of communication pedagogy) and therefore they are able to develop personal 
projects and therapeutic pedagogic identities. They are able to create social 
relations that contribute to their emancipation, objectivised or articulated here as a 
personal project. 
  
Let us analyse this predicament more thoroughly. The representational function, 
being subsidiary to the socio-communicative function, contains it in condensed or 
syncretic form. In other words, theoretical conceptual development is only 
possible if the subject engages in experiential learning with and through the 
subject matter in problem-solving activity. The use of abstract categories does not 
necessarily amount to true conceptual understanding if they have not been learnt as 
part of a hierarchical system of generalisations. However, the use of actual 
theoretical concepts reflects by definition personal involvement in social relations 
or so-called experiential learning. We have to adopt here the Vygotskian view that 
concepts are socially developed, they do not reside in one’s head waiting to be 
activated, which is the view assumed by nativists. Therefore, when a student is 
able to grasp a theoretical notion, this means that he or she has gone through a 
process in which his or her everyday concepts have been reorganised through 
practical, social activity in order to understand a whole network of generalisations 
that cannot be, otherwise, spontaneously grasped. The possession of recognition 
rules for grammar instructional discourse may be a symptom of the conceptual 
synthesis attained by the subject. The social therefore is contained in the 
theoretical concept, even though it remains hidden in its condensation of 
abstractness and concreteness. And this, by the way, is the reason why Vygotsky 
focused on theoretical conceptual development in the first place. True conceptual 
development presupposes a rearrangement of experience, a reorganisation of 




with learning a foreign language, learning how to write one’s own native speech 
and defining concepts.  
 
This bring us back to the problem of the social in Vygotskian theory and why it is 
not completely true to point out that focusing on mind formation, especially on 
true conceptual development, equates to disregarding the social context, for the 
context, the social structure, is abbreviated in the theoretical notions (see chapter 
4). Yet, the sociological stance is absolutely required if we want to understand why 
true conceptual development is elusive for learners that belong to a given profile, 
whilst it is not elusive at all for students who belong to another.  
 
The present study has highlighted the difficulties that a significant segment of the 
student population has in attaining language mastery. I am not completely sure if a 
traditional SLA sociocultural approach could have been deployed to understand 
why a segment of the student population attains language mastery, whilst another 
does not. I tend to believe that a sociological approach, like the one I have 
attempted in this thesis, is better suited to address the problem, but of course, this 
is always debatable. 
 
The possession of recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse seems to 
highlight the end result of a process of synthesis whereby the everyday referents 
linked to everyday concepts in the native language have already been relativised 
by the student by engaging in practical problems. It is not absolutely necessary for 
students to go through formal instruction in a foreign language’s grammar system 
to gain conceptual consciousness of the linguistic means of their native tongue as 
long as instruction is formal, that is, more explicit than implicit. If the instruction 
were implicit, then the student would build parallel linguistic systems and 
conceptual consciousness would diminish. My informal observation of foreign 
language education in Japan and the observation carried in the present study 
indicate that the theoretical conceptual systems deployed in language instruction, 
especially in grammar classes, are very weak, compared with the actual systemic 
hierarchisation that takes place in the fields of linguistics or pragmatics. Japanese 




grammatical terms when they approach the study of English. However, even that 
instruction is not theoretically-intensive, it tends to be formal and to rely on 
different ways of contrasting the foreign with the native language. The links 
between the native and the foreign language must be analysed in explicit ways for 
the pedagogic process to have a higher value in terms of producing conceptual 
awareness or consciousness. This requires from the student a favourable attitude, 
or at least a favourable understanding of the objectives and means, toward 
instruction with higher levels of hierarchisation in terms of instructional sequence 
and instructor-student relations. This is exactly the kind of instruction that students 
with an informal orientation (i.e., informal or restricted-communicative and 
communicative orientations) seem to avoid, as they prefer horizontal 
instructor-student relations.  
 
 
6.3 PEDAGOGIC AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
6.3.1 Recommendations to practitioners 
 
The weak and strong versions of the communicative approach and the 
code-communication dilemma, which view explicit and implicit instruction as 
opposite courses, reflect the dialectical contradiction between the top-down and 
bottom-up moves within the zone of proximal development. A general assessment 
of the status of SLA (see Ellis, 2008) reveals that SLA scholars and practitioners 
alike have treated these opposite moves as if they were exclusive. In Vygotskian 
theory, the opposite directions within the zone of proximal development are rather 
seen as complementary. In fact, development depends upon this contradiction and 
therefore instruction should be based on a double move (Hedegaard, 2002; 
Hedegaard and Chaiklin, 2005) between the upper and lower reaches of the zone 
of proximal development. Yet, the attainment of foreign language mastery at 
formal tertiary educational settings in Japan seems to depend to a higher degree 
upon the possession of a representational gaze, that is, a methodical and reflective 
approach to instructional tasks. This relativises the usefulness of both informal 
instruction by instructors and informal orientations toward instructional discourse 




its objectives, plays against those students who do not have a grammar orientation 
to instructional discourse. In cases of less elaborated coding instructional discourse 
(e.g. instructional discourse marked by the weakening of hierarchy, instructional 
sequence and contents), students with an informal orientation may believe that 
communicating in the target language is enough, whereas in actual fact they are 
being evaluated by their capacity to build operation upon operation in a 
hierarchical way, that is, they are required to possess a representational gaze. Thus, 
oral language practice at beginner’s level constitutes a form of inquiry detached 
from the socio-communicative function on which the task is based, such as the 
completion of a non-verbal task (e.g. solving functional problems: making a 
reservation, giving directions, describing people, etc.). In other words, students are 
placed in situations where they are compelled to use speech primarily as a 
socio-communicative tool, yet they have to approach the task looking at its 
potential to promote or consolidate their hypotheses about the 
grammatico-pragmatic system.  
 
In light of these findings the place communication has in foreign language 
curricula in Japan should be reassessed to acknowledge the actual hierarchical 
sequence of study programmes and, particularly, learning settings specialising in 
teaching communication, whether they are informed by the strong or weak 
versions of communicative language teaching, at organisations both specialising 
and not specialising in foreign language education. The programmes of both types 
of organisations are, perhaps involuntarily, heavily based or pursue almost 
exclusively language’s representational function instead of language’s 
socio-communicative function, even in communication courses. Therefore, 
learners who have an informal approach to language learning soon lag behind their 
course peers as they are not able to understand the importance of approaching 
tasks in a reflective-trial fashion.  
 
Furthermore, many doubts arise about the viability of 
non-representational-function approaches to foreign language learning for adult 
learners. There seems to be no way out of representational-function programmes, 




communication prospects. There is evidence to suggest that instructors’ 
pedagogies should care more for those students whose trajectories and orientations 
to meaning are informal. In this regard, instructional tasks that promote the 
bottom-up move within the zone of proximal development could help those 
students with an informal orientation to instructional discourse.  
 
6.3.1.1 The bottom-up move within the zone of proximal development 
 
What is then an instructional task that promotes bottom-up moves within the zone 
of proximal development? It consists of any task that compels the student to 
organise, contrast and analyse speech production in broad theoretical units (e.g., 
agreement, aspect and modality) so as to infer its grammatico-pragmatic principles. 
The task is introduced only after the successful completion of foundation, 
structural and functional motive-activity tasks, that is, after theoretical concepts 
have been made known, a contrastive discussion has taken place whereby the 
differences between the native and foreign language linguistic means are analysed, 
speech habits have been formed through structural drills and the completion of a 
non-verbal task has been carried out. It is a form of reverse engineering in which 
the product, speech, is analysed in order to extract its formal-systemic 
underpinnings. The analysis should be done with the help of materialised forms of 
semiosis, especially graphs, schemata, drawings, pictures and written speech, and 
involve different forms of verbalisation in the native and/or foreign language as 
well (e.g. students explaining each other what the underpinning rules or principles 
consist of), which, according to Gal’perin (1969), foster internalisation. Put 
another way, it is a rather more specialised rendition of the maxim that says that to 
teach is to learn twice. This time the student is teaching him or herself, and 
teaching fellow students as well. Thus, the use of schemata and verbal 
explanations to uncover the underlying principles of certain linguistic 
constructions help students reflect on rather invisible and ephemeral forms of 
production (i.e. implicit semiotic mediation). These forms seem to be reasonably 
clear to students who possess a representational gaze and therefore, the task is to 





I argue that the representational gaze is the locus of the intended foreign language 
development target set by the instructor, if we pay attention to: (a) the historical 
construction of ideal foreign language development; (b) the object of collective 
activity; (c) the goal of individual action; and (d) the technisation of operations. In 
consequence, ontogenesis and microgenesis become confounded because the 
student is never fully aware of the object of activity until he or she achieves 
mastery. This is realised by means of actual engagement in social practice through 
the opposition between true concepts (conceptual development) and everyday 
concepts (personal or experiential involvement). Conscious awareness is always 
realised a posteriori. It is the outcome of activity (i.e. the concept) and, therefore, 
the representational gaze could be broadly and simply defined as intuition. 
   
Although it was not part of the present study, Escandón and Sanz (2011) have 
tested the efficacy of the bottom-up moves in a pedagogical application for 
teaching Spanish agreement with relative success. Escandón and Sanz’s study 
concludes that conceptualisations in the native language aimed at solving foreign 
language tasks play an important role in foreign language development. The data 
from the study also supports the idea that encouraging learners’ hypothesis-making 
in their native language, such as under forms of guided induction, helps them 
achieving oral language mastery.  
 
6.3.1.2 Explicit evaluation criteria 
 
Tightening and making more explicit the evaluation criteria, so as to have students 
with an informal orientation gradually recontextualising their approaches under 
clear rules of engagement, especially in communication courses, may also help to 
avoid them confounding communication instruction with informal learning.  
 
The findings show that communication instructors rarely indicated the form future 
assessment would take. Even though there are sections in the syllabi of the 
communication courses that deal with assessment, these provide very general and 
abstract guidelines that do not include a clear idea of what is being assessed and 




grammar course. In BU’s grammar course it was not clear if homework was 
actually part of the final assessment method or not. Regular assessments allow 
students to have a clearer idea of what the requirements imposed by the instructor 
are and to change the way they approach instructional activities. Japanese students 
tend to be very conscious of the method of assessment, and some of them demand 
very clear outlines. The problem is that in communication courses those outlines 
are difficult to explain. Imagine someone trying to explain you with words the way 
you will be assessed after taking swimming lessons before you even get into the 
water for the first time. I believe a better way is actually to show short dramatised 
video clips of students carrying out the examination tasks and being assessed, 
shortly afterwards, by instructors, not unlike the kind of assessment that one sees 
in television shows such as The X Factor or America’s Next Top Model. I am not 
advocating here the use of scenes in which students who do badly are mocked by 
judges, but I believe that the kind of judgment instructors pronounce is very close 
to the kinds made by television show judges, for their judgment deals with areas of 
non-codified practice, a mix between science and art, between attitude and skills. 
 
6.3.1.3 A clear division between grammar and communication 
 
As we have already seen, the organisation that does not specialise in foreign 
language education seems to have problems establishing a clear curricular division 
between grammar and communication. Thus, in BU, neither the grammar nor the 
communication course targeted functional motive-activity, hampering students’ 
prospects of achieving oral mastery. In contrast, the division of labour at CU 
seemed more productive, as the instructors targeted differentiated motive-activities. 
This implies that a clear distinction between motive-activities at the time of 
planning and implementing a foreign language curriculum may work better than 
courses whose motive-activities overlap.  
 
My only concern here is that the fact that CU’s instructors were tenured faculty 
may have made it easier for them to hold their ground, especially in the case of 
CU’s communication instructor, and enforce a clear distinction among 




opportunity to develop a therapeutic pedagogic identity as they have more time to 
engage in private talk with students. In the case of CU’s communication instructor, 
she also delivers a seminar on linguistics, applied linguistics and pedagogy, which 
some of those first-year students may take when in their third year. Within the 
seminar, a tutor-student relationship develops, rather than an instructor-student 
one. Overall, there are, at CU, more opportunities to foster a more inclusive 
approach toward personal development, which are the conditions required to go up 
the motive-structure ladder, as functional motive-activity requires to face periods 
of frustration. 
 
It is also worth mentioning that one way of dealing with this problem is by having 
students reflecting on the Japanese position in general. Thus, instructors may ask 
students about what Japanese do in general when they face a determined situation. 
This will encourage students to rationalise on the implicit world of the social and 
make explicit something that usually is never talked about, as it deals with 
context-tied situations such as ritualised forms of activity that escape conscious 
grasp. However, the process is still slower than expressing one’s personal position 
as in Western and Latin American societies. It requires codifying social behaviour 
in ways the anthropologist and the Japanese comedian do, but not every single 
individual is able or ready to do it. Therefore, by talking about the Japanese 
position in general students are allowed to mask their personal position and finally 
share the functional motive-activity object. Although the approach requires a slow 
reflective build-up, this may be better than instructors facing students’ silence.  
 
6.3.1.4 The need for dominant activities 
 
Introducing dominant activities or projects that link up grammar and 
communication instruction with non-pedagogic practical tasks may help students 
to reorganise instructional activity (see Robbins, 2003, pp. 81-87). For instance, 
having students conducting interviews with Spanish speakers and presenting the 
results to the class as a whole, communicating with Spanish speakers through 
video-conferencing or doing presentations about different topics to native Spanish 




communities in which Spanish discourse is produced. Robbins believes that ‘there 
is not one single dominant activity common to all college students’ and 
recommends that: ‘It is wise to organize a foreign language classroom along lines 
of trust, by allowing students to find their own dominant activity’ (p. 85). Overall, 
A.A. Leont’ev (1981) points out that the idea is going beyond communication and 
having the foreign language serving as ‘a medium which will engage the thought, 
perception and imagination of the learner’ (p. 65).        
 
Whether carrying out that kind of activities is possible at the non-specialised 
organisation remains to be seen. Under current circumstances, it requires a major 
restructuring of study programmes. But specialised organisations may not have 
such a hard time introducing them.   
 
6.3.1.5 Focusing on structural motive-activity 
 
As already seen, students seem to explicitly test their hypotheses about the 
language’s grammatico-pragmatical system when carrying out instructional 
activities that belong to structural motive-activity, not whilst engaged in 
instructional activities that belong to foundation motive-activity. This is because a 
certain degree of freedom is given to students to carry out drills and exercises, a 
freedom that they do not have at the foundation motive-activity level and which 
allows them to ask questions of the instructors. Therefore, structural 
motive-activity should be seen not only as the instance when students build up 
linguistic habits but also the time when students verbalise theory and rules.       
 
According to Gal’perin (1969, 1992c), verbalising theory or rules is a step in the 
right direction toward achieving forms of abbreviation and internalisation that 
allow students to have control of operations. The verbalising can be done more 
easily in the native language and therefore I believe grammar instructors should go 
beyond the kind of written structural drills they normally have students doing in 
class and engage in structural drills and exercises that create oral linguistic habits. 
If a foreign instructor with no command of Japanese (or the subject matter) is in 




refrain from asking questions, as they could perceive the instructor is unable to 
actually answer them. But more importantly, the introduction of structural drills in 
the communication class may compromise the actual targeting of functional 
motive-activity, which is vital to produce higher levels of technisation (i.e. actions 
become abbreviated and automatic), unless the communication instructor clearly 
divides the instructional time in two: structural motive-activity and functional 
motive-activity. I believe that mixing both is not a good idea.     
  
6.3.1.6 Caution about deploying the trajectory, orientation and identity categories 
in an essentialist fashion  
 
Constructs such as informal trajectory, orientation or identity are non-essentialist 
but relational categories. They have been established by comparing groups of 
students within particular activity systems. Although I have created an inventory to 
ascertain students who may lack a representational gaze and therefore may present 
problems in approaching instructional tasks in a reflective manner, I proceed with 
caution and try to avoid an essentialist labelling of them. It is worth remembering 
that proving that a student has an informal trajectory does not imply that he or she 
has an informal orientation. One should carefully analyse all data about the 
student: trajectory, orientation and identity (please review the theoretical rational 
below). The inventory is adjusted to the Japanese case. I recommend researchers 
and practitioners develop their own inventories, adjusted to their own pedagogic 
settings and realities, so as to not apply reified notions onto students and preserve 
the whole complexity of the problem.   
 
6.3.2 Theoretical implications 
 
6.3.2.1 The model  
 
The interface between Bernstein’s code theory, cultural-historical activity theory 
and Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural theory seemed helpful in various ways. First, it 
helped determining pedagogical contexts across organisations, enabling the 
comparison of particular forms of discourse and improving somewhat the 




description of the SLA notion of communicative language teaching was produced 
within the theoretical framework of the dialectical tradition. This language of 
description could be deployed by researchers in order to establish a basic blueprint 
of foreign language learning contexts that avoids confounding them. Second, I 
argue that it facilitated ascertaining the social positioning of the subject so as to 
explain how the position (i.e. educational trajectories; orientations) became – more 
fixed – dispositions (i.e. pedagogic identities). Yet, these pedagogic identities must 
be understood as non-essentialist constructions. Positions change depending on the 
relationship between students’ trajectories and orientations, instructional discourse, 
targeted vectors of development by instructors, and students’ desired vectors of 
development. Determining the trajectory of a student does not say much about his 
or her mastery prospects if it is not accompanied by a thorough assessment of the 
subject position, that is, the assessment must include all the aforementioned 
categories. Moreover, what applies in Japan’s tertiary foreign language education 
institutions may not be valid in another context. As already pointed out, the 
possession of recognition rules for instructional discourse is a relative measure, not 
an absolute diagnosis, as it relies on establishing relative degrees of recognition 
according to each course’s arithmetic mean. Before labelling a student as 
belonging to an informal trajectory or orientation, or a non-dialectic pedagogic 
identity, a complete assessment of all the student population in a given context 
must be carried out.     
 
Second, I argue that the adoption of A.A. Leont’ev’s (1981) views on foreign 
language development as a psychological function whose motive-action varies 
according to the general type of activity (from speech activity to communication 
activity, going through discrete speech acts and speech acts as part of non-verbal 
communication activity) permitted an analytical representation of discourse, such 
as determining particular messages (framing) according to the structural level of 
activity being focused on. Moreover, setting motive-action as the unit of analysis 
allowed the adoption of a non-naturalistic framework to study classroom 
interaction or any other pedagogical relation in its social dominion. This was a 
way to put an end to a naturalistic view of (interaction) time (e.g. framing 




according to functions. At the same time, this unit – being at the intersection 
between activity and action/operation – comprised the complexities of both 
ontogenesis and microgenesis. 
 
The ethnographic part of the study, which was based on Holland et al.’s (2001) 
notion of figured worlds, also contributed to make more explicit hidden cultural 
aspects that could not be addressed either by the deployment of Bernstein’s code 
theory or by the use of cultural-historical activity theory alone. In fact, the 
combination of figured worlds, Bernstein’s code theory and activity theory’s 
notions on the structure of activity shed a light on the rules that emerged in each of 
the organisations/learning settings being studied, contributing to describe how 
those settings were figured by instructors and students. It was stimulating to see 
how the findings that stem from the quantitative use of Bernstein’s code theory 
matched the results from the qualitative part of the study based on figured worlds, 
both expanding the analytical power of cultural-historical activity theory.  
 
I argue that the use of Bernstein’s code theory in combination with 
cultural-historical activity theory’s notions on the structure of activity and Holland 
et al.’s (2001) notion of figured world helped develop strong internal and external 
languages of description, paying respect to all the merits of the theoretical bodies 
that were chosen but giving voice to the views that stem from the participants 
themselves, constituting a truly dialectical approach to pedagogical research within 
the limitations given by restricted access to student participants (the case in BU) or 
the fact that the longitudinal case study of one organisation (AU) collapsed in the 
middle of the data collection process due to its curricular reprogramming (see 
chapter 4).  
 
6.3.2.2 Bernstein’s code theory 
 
Bernstein’s hypothesis about the structural conditions of educational organisations 
modulating subject position, social relations and discourse and therefore shaping 
individual consciousness and activity were empirically tested in the present study. 




predicated on the subject’s ability to recognise the rules of pedagogical context, 
which in turn is moderated by trajectory (i.e. social class). Thus, the individual 
consciousness, expressed as orientations, upon which mastery depends, is 
moderated by the educational trajectory of the subject.  
 
In light of the findings that seem to confirm that trajectory, as an intermediate 
category, moderates recognition and realisation, the coding orientations (O, below) 













Where r refers to the passive realisation (i.e., the possession of recognition rules 
for instructional discourses), I represents instructional discourse, R represents 
regulative discourse, ±F refers to the strength of framing, T refers to trajectory, 
and E refers to elaborated code (from restricted to elaborated). 
 
Thus active realisation or mastery is fundamentally a function of orientation 
(pedagogic consciousness). Orientation, in turn, is predicated on passive 
realisation (or recognition) of instructional and regulative discourse. The trajectory 
element of orientation reflects the dialectical relation between activity and 
knowledge, since trajectory is marked by leading activity, that is, by activity that 
reconfigures action and from which concepts in different form emerge (from 
pseudo-concepts to true or theoretical concepts) depending on how local/organic 
or universal/mechanic social relations are, representing different vectors of 
development.  
 
Concepts (knowledge) are not passive acquisition but the end result of activity. 
The empirical accounts of the present study seem to reflect that trajectories are 
dominated by the divide between school knowledge and everyday knowledge or 




according to Bernstein, are ultimately modulated by social class.      
 
6.3.2.3 Further research 
 
The study calls for at least two major follow-up studies. The first one would comprise 
the elaboration of an inventory of orientations addressing foreign language pedagogies 
at the tertiary level in places other than Japan. The aim of this would be the possibility 
of determining students’ orientations toward practice right from the outset, identifying 
those with restricted coding orientations (i.e., informal or communicative orientations). 
This could be followed up with specific plans to address those students’ lack of 
adequate conceptual development, including (a) the strengthening of, or making more 
explicit the evaluation criteria and (b) the use of tasks or, more importantly, leading 
activities that would ensure the occurrence of bottom-up moves within the zone of 
proximal development, which could help students with restricted-coding orientation to 
switch to elaborated coding orientations.  
 
The second follow-up involves the study of the hidden build-up that happens 
among students in its relation with conceptual development, within the 
internalisation framework given by Gal’perin. Such a study should pay attention to 
the way students verbalise relevant hypotheses, helping in the transition from a 
more material rendition of learning actions to one that occurs purely at an 
intellectual level, in other words, how particular forms of external speech 
modulate conceptual development. This could include the study of students who 
do collaborate in the sharing of hypotheses and those who do not. 
 
Weak framing of regulative discourse in communication courses seem to represent 
a particular form of instruction where the contradiction between implicit and 
explicit mediation is noticeable. The instructional part of discourse deals, on the 
one hand, with categorical thinking – a representational function – (e.g. the 
morphological difference between masculine or feminine adjectives), but the 
regulative part, on the other hand, calls tacitly for horizontal forms of participation 
– a socio-communicative function – (e.g. requesting students’ participation, 




participation of the class as a whole. The instructional part corresponds to visible 
mediation, whereas the regulative part corresponds to invisible mediation. This 
kind of mediation seems recurrent at foundation and structural motive-activity 
levels at both BU and CU communication courses. 
 
CU’s grammar course, on the other hand, represents an extreme example of strong 
framing of both instructional and regulative discourses. For example, students 
asked the instructor no questions at all. The instructor asserts himself as the main 
knower. However, the instructor leaves enough freedom for students to talk 
through the rules in a collaborative fashion. Students, especially in pairs, do 
interpret and comment in their own words upon the contents being taught. This 
context constitutes a clear example of how strong framing does not necessarily 
mean that some degree of control is exerted by students, especially when they 
comment upon the contents being taught and engage in hypothesis testing in a 
collaborative fashion, which constitutes a second, parallel zone of proximal 
development, especially at foundation and structural motive-activity levels.  
 
Hypothesis testing and therefore internalisation of rules seems to be, on the one 
hand, first and foremost the consequence of the dialogue established between the 
instructor and individual students or between the instructor and the class as a 
whole, and, on the second hand, on the hypothesis testing and rule sharing between 
students. In other words, internalisation may not only be a consequence of the 
instructor-student interaction but a consequence of the student-student interaction 
as well, adding complexity to the notion of pedagogic discourse. Thus, pedagogy 
can be defined as a particular form of problem solving whereby students draw on 
different kinds of resources. 
 
Students do engage in joint activity that unfolds in parallel to the instructor’s 
discourse. Thus, students may place themselves beside the instructor, shadowing 
his or her discourse with interpretations and commentaries that help them to 
orientate toward the task or acquire grammatical or pragmatic rules. This sort of 
parallel space where the shadowing of instructors’ discourse takes place represents 




naturally in a grammar class, since it is more likely that the instructor does not 
forbid the use of the native language. In a communication class, however, the 
instructor may ban the use of the native language, urging the creation of speech 
acts in the target language. Because communication instructors are so focused on 
what they expect from students (textual production in the target language) and 
disregard what is forbidden or undesirable (e.g. the muttering of a word in the 
student's native tongue) and what actually takes place in the classroom, they may 
not pay attention to the actual inter-mental build-up taking place in spontaneous or 
guided collaborative activities. This does not mean that the inter-mental build-up 
does not take place in a class where the use of the native language has been banned 
but it does in a different way. The interpreting and commenting in the native 
language in this particular case may take the form of covert chatting during class, 
or develop after the class has finished. Unfortunately, this form of hidden build-up 
may be confused with students’ engaging in disruptive practices in cases were 
learning resistance is widespread. Allowing the shadowing of teaching contents 
may help to boost a needed hidden inter-mental build-up but also it may be 
confused by students with a call to engage in disruptive (including passive) 
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Students’ language learning history and the way they study Spanish 
 
Information 
Present questionnaire is one of two questionnaires which are part of a research project 
conducted by Arturo Escandón (University of Bath, United Kingdom) on the subject of 
Students’ language learning history and the way they study Spanish. Present questionnaire 
will be followed by another questionnaire at the end of the course. The data collected in 
both questionnaires will be used to analyse how different students interact in different 
classroom settings and eventually will be part of a research paper or publication. 
 
The questionnaire form has been delivered to you by your teacher. However, your teacher 
has agreed to collect the questionnaires, put them in a specially secured envelop, seal the 
envelope in front of the students and mail the questionnaires to me, the researcher, without 
inspecting or reading them. 
 
The information and your identity will be kept confidential. No information you provide or 
your identity will be disclosed to any other party but the researcher. Furthermore, no 
identifiable personal data will be published.  
 
Thank you in advance for taking your time on this matter. Your help is appreciated and I 
hope the data collected will help to enhance language programmes in Japanese universities. 








Consent/Withdrawal from study 
 
I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that 
could lead to the identification of any individual will be disclosed in any reports on the 
project, or to any other party. No identifiable personal data will be published. The 
identifiable data will not be shared with any other organisation. 
 
I also understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in 
part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being 
penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
 














Please read the following questions carefully and write your answers as detailed as 
possible. If there is no room in the space provided after the question, you can write the 
question number at the end of the form in the space provided for comments and continue 
with your answer. You can also choose to write comments on this questionnaire at the end 
of the form. 
 
1. Can you tell me what do you, as a student, do in this class? 
 
2. What activities are conducted in this class? 
 
3. What does the Spanish language teacher make students do in this class? 
 
4. What activities do you do in collaboration with other students (if any) and which 
activities do you on your own (if any)? 
 
5. What kind of learning activities would you like to do in class that is not being done so 
far? 
 
6. Which activities done in class do you recognise as having helped you to learn? 
 
7. From your experience before taking this course, do you remember any activity or 
situation that really helped you learn a foreign language? 
 
8. From your experience before taking this course, can you tell me of a satisfactory or 
enjoyable moment you had while learning a foreign language?  
 
9. Can you compare the way you studied a foreign language before taking this course and 
the way you do it now? Which way do you think is better? 
 








APPENDIX 4B: PROFESSIONAL TRAJECTORY AND PEDAGOGIC 
ORIENTATION, AND ORGANISATIONAL CLASSIFICATION AND 
FRAMING RELATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Note: 1. Questions were originally written in English and then translated into Spanish and 
Japanese. The three renditions are contained here. The Japanese version was given to 
participants but was ignored by them, who preferred addressing the questions in Spanish. 2. 
Questions on professional trajectory and pedagogic orientation are based on Wertsch 
(1998), Bernstein (1996) and Griffin and Cole (1984); questions on classification and 
framing relations are based on Bernstein (2000); questions on the labelling of acquirers are 
based on Bernstein (1996) and Holland et al. (2001).   
 
Coding: A (classification), a (framing) 
 
(1) Personal and professional trajectory 
1.1 Can you tell me how you became a Spanish language teacher? 




(0) Course information 
0.1 What is the title of the class, what does it consist of, which days is it taught and at what 
time? 




2.1 What would you like the students to learn from this class? 
2.1 ¿Qué te gustaría que tus estudiantes aprendieran en esta clase? 
2.1 あなたの学生にその授業で何を学んで欲しいと思いますか？ 
 
(3) Pedagogic orientation 
3.1. What are the most important things language teachers have to take into account when 
teaching? 




(4) Theories or conceptions of instruction 
4.1 What is the best way for your students to learn Spanish? 




(5) Their labelling of students/ ‘figured world’ of acquirers (e.g., conscientious, 
attentive, industrious; creative, interactive, attempts to make his or her own mark) 
5.1. For you, what are the characteristics good students must have in order to do well in 
your class?  
5.1. Para ti, ¿cuáles son las características que los buenos estudiantes deben tener para que 







5.2. What must your students do in your class to succeed? 
5.2. ¿Qué es lo que tus estudiantes deben hacer en clase para que tengan buen éxito?  
5.2 好成績を収めるためにあなたの学生が授業ですべき事は何ですか？ 
 
(Dd) Teacher-teacher (horizontal) 
D. 1 What part do you play in the language programme? 




d.1 How is the communication between teachers who share the same programme? 




(Ee) Teacher-teacher (vertical) 
E.1. How does the curriculum get designed in the institution you are teaching? 
E.1 ¿Cómo se diseña el curriculum en esa universidad? 
E.1 その大学ではカリキュラムはどのように作成されていますか？ 
 
E.2. Is your performance as a teacher assessed? By whom? 
E.2. ¿Se evalúatu labor? ¿Quién la evalúa?  
E.2 あなたのお仕事は評価されていますか？誰が評価を行っていますか？ 
 
e.1. Who makes the decisions about the curriculum? Do you take part in that process? 




e.2. How is your relationship with other participants of the educational process (e.g. other 
teachers, managers)? 




e.3 Which textbooks or materials do you use in class?  
e.3 ¿Qué libros de texto u otros materiales usas en la clase? 
e.3 あなたは授業中に、どんな教科書もしくは他の教材を使っていますか？ 
 
e.4 How textbooks or materials are selected in the department? 
e.4 ¿Cómo se seleccionan los libros de texto o materiales en el departamento? 
e.4 学科の中で、教科書や教材はどのようにして選択されていますか？ 
 
(Ff) Between subjects 
F. 1. Do you feel your teaching can be situated within a determined discipline (Grammar, 
Linguistics, Communication, Pedagogy, Literature, History, etc.)? 
F.1. ¿Crees que tu labor de enseñanza puede situarse dentro de una disciplina determinada 








f.1 How do you think what your colleagues do in their classes differs from what you do? 
f.1 ¿En qué medida crees que lo que hacen tus colegas en sus clases difieren de lo que tú 





(Gg) Within a discipline  
G.1. Do you feel comfortable teaching grammatical and communication contents 
concurrently or you feel it’s better for you to stick to one discipline? 
G.1. ¿Te sientes cómodo(a) enseñando contenidos gramaticales y comunicativos a la vez o 




g.1 Do you control what you have to teach or would you rather follow a pre-determined 
programme? 





(Hh) College - communities of practice  
H.1. Do you believe the Spanish learned in your university is fundamentally different to 
what students can learn in other local associations where Spanish is used, such as 
immigrant communities, sports associations, dance clubs, etc.? 
H.1. ¿Crees que el español que se aprende en tu universidad difiere fundamentalmente del 
español que los estudiantes pueden aprender en otras asociaciones locales donde se usa el 





(Ii) College - colleges 
i.1. Does the Spanish language programme in your university prepare students to further 
learn Spanish through other institutions overseas (universities, language schools, exchange 
programmes)? 
i.1. El programa de lengua española de tu universidad prepara a los estudiantes para que 
continúen aprendiendo español en otras organizaciones extranjeras (universidades, 





(J) College - Employers 
j.1 Do you feel your course will have some impact on the students’ performance in the 
labour market? 
j.1. ¿Crees que el curso que impartes repercutirá en la forma de inserción de los 







(K) Academic - non-academic 
K.1. When your students profit from your class, where do you imagine they can use their 
acquired language skills? 
K.1.En caso de que tus estudiantes saquen partido de tu clase, ¿dónde imaginas que ellos 







APPENDIX 4C: VALIDATION OF DISCOURSE AND SOCIAL ORDER 
RULES DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Notes: 1. The teacher orders attributes or indicators written on small cards 
according to two scales. On the first one (left), the scale goes from high to low 
familiarity (or agreement) with the practices indicated. On the second one (right), 
the scale goes from high teacher control to high student control. 2. Items are coded 
F++ for strongly framed; F+ for not so strongly framed; F-- for weakly framed and 








APPENDIX 4D: STUDENTS’ TRAJECTORY AND FIGURED WORLD OF 
LEARNING INTERVIEWS, TRANSCRIPTION, CU COMMUNICATION 
 
 
Transcription English translation 
Y.U.、K.A、OK. K.A. y luego K.E.。OK。 
えー、あの、大学前に言語を勉強しましたか？ 
Researcher: Y.U., K.A. okay. K.A. and then K.E. 
Okay. Have you ever studied any other language 
before University? 
はい、英語．．． K.A.: Yes, I have studied English. 
英語。。どこで？ Researcher: English? Where? 
自宅か、学校で、です。 K.E.: At home or at school. 
そう。 Researcher: OK. 
学校で勉強しました。 K.A.: I studied at school 
おんなじ？はい。 Researcher: Same situation? OK. 
勉強するときに、楽しいことがありますか？楽しいとき
がありますか？ 
Researcher: Is there anything you enjoy while 
studying? Any moment that you enjoy? 
勉強するときですか？ K.A.: While I am learning? 
何が楽しい？ Researcher: What do you enjoy about it? 
覚えたのを実際使ったりして通じたときがたのしい。 K.A.: I enjoy when I use an expression that I have 




K.E.: Solving questions using what I have 
learned, I can feel I am learning and I enjoy a lot 
this sensation. 
OK.前のときと今と違うことがありますか？大学の前と Researcher: OK. Is there any change before and 
after university? 






K.E: I was studying before because I wanted to, 
and now I also study because I want to. But, 
when I studied English, I had some knowledge, 
but in Spanish, I really started from 0, that is why 





Researcher: This is a graph. K.A. in this graph, 
Where is your level of Spanish? Here is low and 
here high. Where is the current level? Show me 
here... where is your level? 
ゼロ。。 K.A.: Zero… 
そう？まあ、丸してください。 Researcher: Really? Then, mark it.  
ゼロと・・ですか？ Zero and …? 
ゼロは一番マイナスですね。一番下。 Zero is the lowest level. 
それは大丈夫です。真ん中。 That is the middle level. 
ええ・・・一番上が分からない。。 Researcher: Oh…. How would it be the highest 
level? 
一番上はネイティブじゃない？ K.E: Wouldn’t be this native level? 
ネイティブか・・・ K.A.: Native….. 
もちろん、多分ゼロではないでしょう。ちょっと上ぐら
い？ 
Researcher: Sure, you would not be at 0. A little 
higher? 




Researcher: OK. What would you do to reach the 





K.A.: Still I have not learned a lot of vocabulary, 
or acquired the skill to use grammar. So, at the 
same time in order to improve these points, I 
would also have to practice properly.   
ケイスケは、自分のレベルは？ Researcher: What about you, K.E.? What is your 
level? 
難しいなあ。1にしとこう。 K.E.: Very difficult… I mark 1…. 
アハハ．．． Ahaha…. 
難しいな、これ。 K.E.: It is difficult. 
はい、そう。うん、上に行くためには Researcher: Yes, it is. And in order to improve 
your level? 







vocabulary or grammar, so first I need to learn 
this basic matter and by acquiring the skill at 
certain level, to have communication with 




Researcher: OK. What is the most important 
thing about learning a new language?  





K.E. Well, the intention or the will to 
communicate what I feel….. Somehow to be 
understood and at the same time, wanting to 
understand others. That is the important thing.   
OK。ありがとうございました。これだけです。 Researcher: OK. Thanks. That is all. 
  
Y.と Y.T.。OK。他の言語を前に勉強しましたか？ Researcher: Y. y Y.T. OK. Have you studied any 
other language? 
前にですか？ないです。英語だけです。 Y.T.: Before? No. Just English. 
どこで？ Researcher: Where? 
日本です。授業だけです。 Y.T.: In Japan. Only in classes.  
高校とかで。 Y.: Like in primary. 
高校まで英語やってて。 Y.: I have studied English until primary and…. 
おんなじですね。 Researcher: Same… right? 
あの、ええと、前に勉強したときに楽しいことはありま
したか？ 
Was there anything you liked when you studied 
before? 
英語ですか？ Y.T.: English? 




English is very good. とか言われると、やって良かっ
たな、って思いましたね。 
Y.T.: I liked English pronunciation, and when I felt 
I could pronounce as I heard, I could confirm that 
I was learning how to speak. Sometimes I had 
the chance to speak in English and if I was told 
“Your English is very good”, I said to myself, “It 






Y.: I learned grammar by heart, etc., to study 
English and of course, I was happy to understand 
English, but mainly, I felt very happy to 
understand song’s lyrics, because I listen to 
foreign music. It is like my enjoyable world 
becomes bigger…. That was what I really liked. 
前勉強してたときと今の勉強は違うことがあります
か？ 
Researcher: Any change before and now 
regarding study? 
大学と高校でってことですか？ Y.T.: Comparing primary and university? 








Y.T.: Study at primary was training for entrance 
examination training and it was something 
very…. serious, studying words that we will never 
use in our daily lives. On the other hand we did 
not know idioms, expressions. But now there is a 
big difference between conversation in English 
and English for test, so we have to make again a 
new effort in English.  






Y.: I feel that I have really studied English for the 
test and trying to speak, it is very hard for me. As 
knowledge, it is not a problem, but I have not 
absorbed the practical aspect of language and I 
have to do it also at the university. 
ええ、図表を作りましょう。自分のレベルは、これはマ
イナスね、これは一番上。自分の今の・・・スペイン語 
Researcher: Now, we are going to draw the 
graph to mark your own level. Here is low and 
here is high level.  
今度は英語じゃなくてスペイン語？ Y.T.: Now, it is Spanish graph and not English? 
うん。 Researcher: That’s right. 
スペイン語のレベルは、この辺です。 Y.T.: The Spanish level is…. Around here. 
はい Researcher: Yes. 




同じ？ Researcher: Same? 
あはは。。 I see… 
あの、一番上に行くために何をしますか？ What would you do to reach the maximum level? 
まずは文法と、ボキャブラリーを増やすこと。それをや
った後に、会話をすべきだと思います。 
Y.T.: First of all, it would be to learn grammar and 





Y.: I agree. It does not help if I have only the 
knowledge, so I want to study abroad and by 
talking to several people, I would improve the 
level. 
はい。正しい勉強をするために、何をしますか？ Researcher: OK. What would you do to study 
properly? 






Y.T.: First, pay good attention to grammar 
classes. And one has to learn by oneself when it 
refers to a language, so make an effort to learn 
vocabulary by heart and now I do not have many 
chances for conversation, so I would like to study 







Y.: More and less the same. Sure, pay attention 
during classes, but not only talk about Spanish 
language, also talk about other topics related to 
Spanish or music of Latin American countries. 
Also, “listening to”,including the option of 
studying abroad. I want to have interest on many 
things and make efforts.  
はい、ありがとうございました。それだけ。 Researcher: Yes, thanks. That’s all. 
Muchas gracias.  Thank you. 
De nada. Y.T. and Y.: You are welcome. 
Ah muy bien. Están aprendiendo. Very good. You are learning. 
OK. S.、左手は A.。おんなじことですが、他の言語を
勉強しましたか？英語とか。 
Researcher: OK, S. The one on my left side (left 
hand) is A. It’s the same question, but have you 
ever study other language, like English? 
英語だけ。 S.: Only English. 
英語だけ？スペイン語は勉強しなかったですか？ Researcher: Only English? Haven’t you study 
Spanish? 
してないです。 S.: No. 
私も高校のときは英語だけ。 A.: Also in pre-school just English. 
はい、それから、前の言語を勉強するときに楽しいこと
がありましたか？ 
Researcher: And was there something you liked 
when you studied that language? 
英語ですか？ S.: English? 





S.: oh, when I can make understand the native 
speaker what I am trying to tell by using the 
words or phrases learned. That was the moment 
I enjoyed the most. Thus I knew that I was 
improving a bit at least. 
ネイティブとはどこで話しましたか？ Researcher: Where have you talked to the native 
speaker? 
学校のネイティブの人とか。 S.: With a native speaker at school. 
それは普通の授業でしたか？ Researcher: In a regular class? 









A.: I went to United States once when I was in 
high school, I couldn’t do nothing English. It is a 
good memory, but also it was hard not to be able 
to communicate. So I started to study and now 
when I was attending high school, I stayed one 
year there to study. By the end of that year, I 
could talk to several people and by so I knew that 
with language I could expand my world. This 
experience made me think that it is fun to learn 
languages. 
楽しいな、とね。。 Researcher: “Fun”, right? 





相変わらずで、ないです。 S.: More and less the same and there is no 
change. 
前の勉強？ A.: Previous study? 
英語の勉強と English study… 
スペイン語と？ A.: In comparison to the Spanish study? 
スペイン語のほうが難しいです。 A.: Spanish is more difficult. 
でも教えるシステムは同じですか？ Researcher: But, is the teaching system the 





A.: Probably a bit different. At the beginning of 
the English study, we started without having any 
contact with natives. On the other hand, now we 
have classes with native speakers and I feel it is 
much more practical. 
違うことありますか？ Researcher: Any change? 
英語とスペイン語で？ S.: Between English and Spanish? 
英語とスペイン語の、教えるシステムの違いで。教育
の方法。 
Researcher: Different teaching system between 
English and Spanish language. 
えっと、特にはないです。 S.: Well, nothing in particular 
OK。ええと自分のレベルは、これは一番下でこれが
一番上だとするとどこですか？ 
Researcher: OK. If this is the lowest and this is 
the highest level, where is your level at? 
そう、ええと。。これから一番上に行くのに自分で何を
しますか？ 




S.: More than anything, create more 
opportunities to speak with native speakers and it 
is not only to learn by heart, but dedicate to use 
them... 
はい。自分の Researcher: Yes, yours? 
今の自分のレベルから一番上に行くために何をします
か？ 





A.: At the moment, I can try to talk using the 
words I know, but it is so little my vocabulary. So, 
I want to focus on improving vocabulary.  
最後に、正しい勉強をするためには何が一番大事でし
ょうか？何でしょう 
Researcher: Finally, What is the most important 
thing to study properly? 
一番大事なのは、いきなり一番上を目指すんじゃなく
て、着実にひとつずつクリアしていくって事が大事 
S.: The most important thing is to make progress 
meeting the requirements step by step… not 
wanting to get to the highest level from the 
beginning. 
はい Researcher: Yes. 
ちょっと最近勉強をサボりがちになってしまっているの
でまじめにがんばりたいと覆います。 




Researcher: Yes, so far. Thanks a lot. 
De nada. S. and A.: You are welcome. 




Researcher: R.N. to the right. K. to the left. OK. 
The question is: Have you ever studied another 
language? 
他の言語？ Other language? 
今はスペイン語ですよね？他の言語は？ Now, you are studying Spanish, but another 
language? 
英語だけ K.: Only English. 
英語だけ？ Researcher: Only English? 




R.: And it is not that nobody has taught me, but I 
have studied a little of Italian by watching the X 
program. 
Xで。どれぐらい？ Researcher: Ah, X… How long? 
半年ぐらいでやんなくなった。ちょっとだけ。 R.: After 6 months, I quit studying. Very little. 






Researcher: So, you have seen Mr.X., right? He 
is very famous, right? 
見ました。 R.: Yes, he is. 
英語はどこで？ Researcher: Where did you learn English? 
中学、高校と。 K.: In high school and prep-school. 
中学校のときに１ヶ月アメリカ行きました。 K.: I went to United States for a month when I 
was in high school. 
海外に行ったことは？ Researcher: Have you ever been abroad? 
ないです。 R.: No 
ええと、前の英語を勉強したとき、英語とイタリア語を
勉強したときに楽しいことがありましたか？ 
Researcher: When you were studying English, 
well, English and Italian, Did you have moments 
that you enjoyed? 
楽しいこと？？ K.: Enjoyed? 
しゃべる授業は楽しかったです。文法とかじゃなくて。 K.: I enjoyed conversation classes and not 
grammar. 
しゃべる？？ Researcher: Conversation? 
Oral ... communication。 K.: Oral communication. 
ああ、Oral communication. Researcher: Oh, Oral communication. 
英文、本とか英語で書かれてる本とか新聞を読めるよ
うになるのが楽しかったです。 
R.: Also, it was fun to be able to read in English, 




Researcher: Oh, you enjoyed it. Any difference in 





K.: In prep-school, the school trained us for the 
admission test, so we only studied grammar. But 
now, we have several classes of conversation. 
私もそう思います。 R.: I agree. 




Researcher: Let’s do the graph. It is very simple. 
This side is from low and this is the plus. From 
zero to the highest level.  
スペイン語？参ったなあ。。 K.: Spanish? 
マークしてください。 Researcher: Please, mark it. 
スペイン語？ K.: Spanish? 
うん。 Researcher: Yes. 
でも、いける気がする。 K.: But, I think I am doing fine. 
強気。 Researcher: Wow. Very positive. 
はい！“ K.: Yes. 
OK Researcher: OK. 
どうしようかな。 R.: What do I have to do? 
自分の頭での、違うスケールだから。そう。 Researcher: It is inside your head, it is a different 
scale… that’s right. 
こんなに出来てないかなあ。。 R.: Maybe I haven’t gone that far. 
OK じゃあ、ここから一番上に行くためには何をします
か？自分で。 
Researcher: OK. From here to reach the highest 
level, What would you do?  
留学。ネイティブの人と、いっぱいしゃべる。授業だけ
じゃあ、 
K.: Study abroad. Speak a lot with natives. Not 
only attend classes. 
これから、一番上のレベルまで行くのに何をします
か？ 







R.: First, meet study requirements daily and then 
read the web page in Spanish, listen to music, 




Researcher: OK, OK. Last question. What is the 
most important thing to do the right study? 
勉強に？ K.: For the study? 
うん、学ぶのに。 Researcher: Yes, to study. 
興味というか、言語とその話されている国の文化につ
いて興味を持ち続けることが大切だと思います。 
R.: Interest…, meaning keep having interest in 
language and culture of those countries where 
that language is spoken. I think that is the 
important thing. 




無駄だし、自分が使える環境がないと将来的に。 objective, it is in vain, if in the future we do not 
have a chance to use that language. 
OK.それだけね。インタビュー終わり。ありがとう。
Muchas gracias. 
Researcher: OK. That is all. End of the interview. 
Thanks. Thanks a lot. 
De nada. K. and R.: You are welcome. 
Muy fácilでしょ？簡単でしょ？ Researcher: Easy, right? 
Fácil?あ、簡単。 Easy? Oh, easy. 
Excelente. Y¿ quétal las clases?授業はどうです
か？ 
Excellent. And what about the classes? What 
about the classes? 
難しい。 K.: Hard. 
M.H.、a la izquierda y M.O. a la derecha, a mi 
derecha. 
Researcher: M.H. to the left and M.O. to my right. 
前に、他の言語を勉強しましたか？ Have you ever studied another language? 
英語をしました。 M.H.: English. 
どこで？ Researcher: Where? 
イギリスに行きました。 M.H.: I went to England. 
どれぐらい？ Researcher: For how long? 
３週間。 M.H.: 3 weeks. 
３週間。へえ。あとで、多分高校でも勉強しましたか？ Researcher: 3 weeks, wow. After, I imagine you 
also studied English at prep. 
はい。 M.H.: Yes.  
学校で。 M.H.: At school. 
イギリスに行ったのはいつ？何歳でした？ Researcher: When did you go to England? How 
old were you? 
１７歳のとき。 M.H.: I was 17 years old. 
留学生として？ Researcher: As a student? 
そうです。 M.H.: Yes. 
OK。他の言語を勉強しましたか？ Researcher: OK. Have you studied another 
language? 
英語を勉強しました。 M.O.: I studied English. 
学校です。 Researcher: At school. 
留学はしなかった？ You haven’t studied abroad? 




Researcher: Very good.  Where there any 
interesting events? While studying the language, 
where there events that you enjoyed?  
英語圏に旅行行ったりすると、話せるのは楽しかった
ですけど、特にあんまりなかった。。 
M.H.: When travelling abroad, I could speak and 
that was interesting, but not much. 
英語を使えて、ゲームとかしたり、英語を話す人が日
本に来たときに話したり出来るのは楽しかった。 
M.O.: Play a game using English or when 




Researcher: Is there any difference between 
what you have studied before and what you are 





M.H.: In prep-school, we had just tests and 
written questions, but now there are more 
chances for conversation and dictation, so now, I 




M.O.: Regarding English, from children we have 
the influence and we knew up to some level, but 
starting Spanish study beginning university, I 




Researcher: OK. Let’s write something. This is 
minus and this is plus. That is the scale. Where is 
your Spanish level at? 
この辺です。 M.H.: Around here. 
アハハ Researcher: Ahaha. 
OK.一番上のポイントに行くには自分で何をします
か？ 




M.H.: Currently, it would be to learn words, listen 
to Spanish and practice conversation, I guess. 
自分のレベルはどこ？ Researcher: What is your level? 




同じぐらいね。 The same. 
では、一番上のレベルまで（行くには）何をしますか？ Researcher: Then, what would you do to reach 
the highest level? 
留学とかしたり、ネイティブとしゃべる練習、聞く練習を
したりだと思う。 
M.O.: Study abroad, practice while having a 
conversation with native speakers, listen to, etc.  
OK。あの、今スペイン語を勉強するのに一番大事なこ
とは何だと思いますか？ 
Researcher: OK. What do you think it is the most 
important thing to study Spanish? 
今は、単語かな、って思います。何にも伝わらないか
ら。 
M.H. Right now, I think it is vocabulary. I cannot 
transmit anything. 
それは難しい？覚えるの。 Researcher: Is it difficult to learn by heart? 
CD がある単語帳とかでも、CD やったら耳に入ってく
るほうが見るよりいいかなと思って聞いたりしてます。 
M.H.: There are Spanish vocabulary books that 
include a CD. I listen to these CD’s thinking that it 
is better to listen to them than watching them. 
単語とか文法をやって授業で教えてもらうことを理解し
ようと XXXについていくように。 
M.O.: Learn words and grammar, and try to 
understand what teachers teach us in class. 
はい、これですね。ありがとうございました。Muy bien. 
Excelente. ありがとう。 
Researcher: That is right. Thanks. Very good. 
Excellent. Thanks. 
M. a la izquierda y a la derecha A. Muy bien.  Researcher: M. to the left and A. to the right. Very 
good. 
質問は同じです。前に他の言語を勉強しましたか？ It is the same question. Have you ever studied 
another language before? 
英語です。 M.: English. 
どこで？ Researcher: Where? 
学校です。 M.: At school. 
同じですか？ Researcher: You too? 
はい A.: Yes. 
留学生になったことは？ Researcher: Have you ever studied abroad? 
ない。 M. and A.: No. 
OK Researcher: OK. 
ええと、そのときに学生のときに勉強するのと、今の勉
強するの違うことがありますか？ 
Is there any difference between the study you did 





M.: Though we have a normal life here in Japan, 
we have the opportunities to get in contact with 
English language, so at the beginning of English 
study at high school, it was quite easy to 
assimilate it. On the other hand, in Spanish case, 
it is something totally new and we started from 0, 
so it was hard.   
英語の ABCではないですよね。 Researcher: The English alphabet is different. 
大学では、授業のスピードが速いって言うのと、勉強
のやり方も幅広い。高校よりも幅広い。 
A.: At university, you move on faster. Also, the 
method is wider than in prep.  






A.: At prep, study was just about books, reading 
them, but now, both, English and Spanish we do 
not use books but novels. Also in Spanish, we 
study it as a whole, conversation, listening and 
writing classes. 





M.: If I understand the meaning of the English 
names of any shop or car model, I say, “ OK, I’ve 




A.: In pre-school we had some Spanish classes 
and we went to shops related to Spain, but that 
was not part of the class, and I enjoyed that a lot. 
ふーん、はいはい。OK。同じことです。これは 0、これ
は一番上のレベルですが、現在の自分のレベルは？ 
Researcher: Yes, OK. Is the same question I 
have made to the other students, 0 is the highest 
level. Where is your current level at?  
はい。では、どうしますか？ここまで自分ですることと
しては何でしょうか。 
Yes, then, what would you do to reach up to this 
point? What would you do? 
基本的なことをちゃんとこつこつやって、文章が分かる
とかじゃなくて、聞き取りも、話すようにも出来るように
M.: Strongly study language basics, reaching not 






conversation to improve step by step the skill.  
レベルは同じ？OK。じゃあ自分で何をしますか？この
上のレベルに行くのに。 
Researcher: Same level? OK. Then, What would 








A.: Unlike English, that I have been studying 
during high school and prep-school, in Spanish I 
am not good at all. So, we have tried to spend 
most of the time available with this language. 
Furthermore, not only the language, but also 
acquiring knowledge about culture of Spanish 
speaking countries. From this point of view, I also 
have to study Spanish.    
言語だけではなくて？OK Researcher: You mentioned not only the 
language. OK. 







M.: Language is different from other class like 
mathematics, because it is not only to learn the 
formula, so we have to make an effort day by 
day, trying not to learn a lot at once, in order to 





A.: Language is something that you use when 
you communicate with people, thus it requires a 
positive attitude in order to study. It is not that we 
are obliged to, but we have to try with desire. 
はい、学生の時代と現在の勉強の違うことってありま
すか？ 
Researcher: OK. Any difference between 




M.: In the English case, I felt I did it because I 
was obliged to, but Spanish is something I 




At that time I had to study English… 
最初は別に嫌いじゃなかったけど、受験とかあって、
いやになったから。 
At the beginning I did not hate it, but with the 





A.: Same situation for me. Now, I do want to do it, 
and the big difference it is that I am interested in 
it. Besides the language, as I have interest in 
other subjects, it is very interesting that 
somebody can talk to me about them. 
OK ありがとう。Muchas gracias. Muchas muchas 
gracias. Perfecto. 
Researcher: OK. Thanks. Thank you very much. 
Perfect. 
E.A. a la izquierda y a mi derecha Y.K.  Researcher: E.A. to the left and Y.K. to my right. 
前他の言語を勉強しましたか？ Have you studied other language before? 
中学校と高校で英語を 6年間。 E.A.: I’ve studied English during 6 years, in prep 
– school and high school.  
私も同じです。 Y.K.: same situation here. 
留学は？？ Researcher: Have you studied abroad? 
高校 2年生のときにオーストラリアに 2週間行ってまし
た。 
E.A.: I was 2 weeks abroad while in prep-school 
2nd grade. 
中学 2 年生のときにハワイに 3 週間短期留学しまし
た。 
Y.K.: I went to Hawaii to study there for 3 weeks 
while in prep-school 2nd grade. 
えー、ハワイ？ Researcher: What? Hawaii? 
いいな Good! 
何をしました？ What did you do there? 
大学に通ったり、あとホームステイしたりして。 Y.K.: I went to University and lived with a family. 
あ、じゃあ観光ばっかりじゃなくて。 Researcher: Oh, so it was not just for tourism. 
観光はぜんぜんしてないです。 Y.K.: I haven’t done any tourism. 
本当？OK. 勉強するのね。その時代、と今の勉強で
違うことはありますか？ 
Researcher: Really? OK. You studied. Any 
difference between those days and now 
regarding the study?  
高校のときより、周りの人のレベルが明らかに高いか
ら、ちょっとプレッシャーを感じる。 
E.A.: The level of my current classmates it is 
apparently higher than in prep-school, so I feel a 








Y.K.: It is a Foreign Language University and 
everybody comes here to learn a foreign 




Researcher: OK. Very good. Where there any 
events that you enjoyed while studying before? 
オーストラリアに行ったのは、凄い楽しかったし、良い
経験になったと思う。 
E.A.: Visit Australia, it was fun and a good 
experience. 




E.A.: I do not hesitate to talk to foreigners. Also, 







Y.K.: Speak or email foreign friends it is 
becoming easier and easier while studying. I can 
feel myself that it helps me to express my self 
more easily and that is why I enjoy.  
OK.今のレベルは、どう？どこですか？ Researcher: How is your current level? 
ここが一番上ですか？ E.A.: Is this the highest point? 
そう、ここが一番上ですね。ここが 0。まあ今はゼロで
はないと思います。少し出来る 
Researcher: Yes, this is the highest. Here is 0. I 
think your level is not 0.  
ここぐらい。 E.A.: Around here... 
同じ？ Researcher: The same? 





E.A.: Obviously, pay attention during classes and 
…… I want to study abroad if possible. I want to 
cross the language barrier that I have to talk in 
Spanish. 






Y.K.: I have been in Spanish classes just 2 
months and I don’t feel any closeness with this 
language. So, I have to do something on my own 
every day. If I don’t go to classes, nothing 
happens. So, it is obvious that I have to go to 
classes and also I have to have the intention to 
ask o start activities.  
OK.今から、いいレベルにつけるためには何をします
か？自分で。 
Researcher: OK. What would you do to get your 






E.A.: First of all, learn daily expressions and 
some other to talk about things that I am 
interested in, thus self motivation would increase 








Y.K.: Besides Spanish language, I don’t know 
anything about Spain or its culture yet. It is 
important to learn the language, also study 
cultures and find areas or topics that I consider 
interesting in order to explore more the language.  
はい、OK。それだけ。ありがとうございました。
Muchas gracias. 
Researcher: Yes, ok. That is all. Thanks. Thanks 
a lot. 
De nada. Y.K. and E.A. You are welcome. 
Muchas, muchas gracias. Perfecto Researcher: Thanks, thanks a lot. Perfect. 
これは何に使うんですか？ Y.K. What do you with this? 
私の研究です。 Researcher: It is for my research. 
前に他の言語を勉強しましたか？ Researcher: What other language did you study 
before? 
英語 K.: English. 
英語。 Researcher: English. 
はい K.: Yes. 
どこで？ Researcher: Where? 




て、そこで習いました second grade of primary school, that is where I 
learned from. 
ああ、アメリカのどこで？ Researcher: Oh, Where in United States? 
イリノイ州のスプリングフィールドっていうところで。州
都です。 
K.: Spring Field, Illinois. Capital of the state 
ああ、そうか。１年間？ Researcher: Oh, ok. One year? 
３年間。 K.: 3 years. 
すごい。 Researcher: Wow. 
そのときはぺらぺらだったんですけど・・ K.: I could talk fluently then. 
すごいね。 Researcher: Excellent. 








K.: I like the music and most of the musicians that 
I like speak Spanish. We can enjoy music when 
we share something that is very deep in our 
hearts. That is why, I thought that my way of 
thinking may be similar to the Spanish speaking 
people and I wanted to talk with these persons 




Researcher: All right. Any difference between 
study at schools and living abroad? For example, 
Any difference on how to learn Spanish? 
英語とってことですか？ K.: In comparison with English? 







K.: Concerning English, I learned grammar while 
studying in United States. (probably meaning 
“living in the United States”). On the other hand, 
for Spanish we have prepared texts and we are 
studying little by little the grammatical structure, 
verb’s conjugation, etc. So, it is very different. 
勉強するときに、楽しいイベント、楽しいことはあります
か？ 





K.: It is a language that I do not know. That is why 
I have fun studying. Well, it is not funny to learn 
words by heart but feeling that I am improving 
and beginning to understand that is what I enjoy.  




Let’s do the graph. Here is low, here is high, 
right? In this graphic scale, where is your level of 
Spanish at? 
今ですか？ K.: Now? 
うん、マークして。 Researcher: Yes, please mark it. 
マイナスって言うのは？ Researcher: Lower? 
これは、ゼロから一番上のレベル。 From 0 to the highest level. 
この辺ですかね。 K.: I would say here. 
はい、OK。今のレベルはこれですよね・一番上のレベ
ルに行くためには何をしますか？自分で。 
Researcher: OK. Your current level is here…. 





K.: I have to expand vocabulary to communicate 
and also have a good understanding of grammar, 
talk and practice to talk Spanish easily.  
どういうことですか？これでいいですか？ Is it ok this answer? 
いいですね。ええと。アメリカでは、学校・・普通の学校
に行きました？ 
Researcher: Yes, it is ok. Oh… While in the 
United States, did you go to a regular school? 
はい。普通の K.: Yes, I went to a regular school. 
アメリカ・・友達はアメリカ人？全員？ Researcher: Were all your friends Americans? 
全員 K.: All of them. 
国際学校ではないですよね？ Researcher: It was not an international school? 
じゃないです。 K.: No, it was not. 






K.: I did not understand anything at that moment, 
nothing at all. I was a small girl and I cried a lot. 
But after an hour, everybody asked me Are you 
ok? And of course I did not have a clue what 







environment, I felt it was a nice place. From that 
moment even though I could not understand the 
language, by repeating the questions and 
answers with friends, I was learning how to 
speak. 
その、サポート、友達は凄い良かったですか。 Researcher: That support from friends was 
excellent. 
はい K.: Yes. 
先生もその、、質問しましたか？このレベルは難し
い？とか。 
Researcher: Did the teachers ask you if the level 
was too high for you or something like that? 






Yes, there was one exclusive teacher for English 
teaching, telling me “This is an apple”, etc. But, 
there were only normal classes in English, so 
even though not saying it was too difficult, there 
was no option. That is why I think they did not 
ask me. 
すごいいいことですね。海外で、他の・・・英語 Researcher: Very good experience. Abroad…. 
今はレベルは大丈夫？いつも勉強していた？ How is your current level? Did you always keep 
studying? 









In prep-school I did not use any English and I 
have forgotten many things. When I was in high 
school, I went for a visit once. I could listen and 
understand more and less by that time….. Of 
course there were words that I knew but I 
understood what they meant. However, when I 
try to speak, the words did not come out and only 




Researcher: Thanks. That is all. Your childhood 
experiences are really interesting……… live 
abroad about 3 years…. Yes, thanks. 
M.さん。あの、質問は前に他の言語を勉強しました
か？ 
Researcher: Miss M. The question is, have you 
studied another language before? 
英語を。 M.: English. 
英語を。どこで？ Researcher: English… Where? 
中学、高校と、小学校と、高校の間１０ヶ月間留学した
りとか。 
M.: High school, pre-school, and I studied abroad 
while in prep. 
留学？どこへ？ Researcher: Where? 
アメリカのイリノイ州、 M.: Illinois, USA 
へえ。。１０ヶ月間。 Researcher: Wow, 10 months. 
１０ヶ月 M.: 10 months. 
どうでしたか？ Researcher: How was it? 
楽しかった。 M.: Very fun. 
英語できる？レベルとか。 Researcher: What is your level? 
TOEIC は７２０点とか。でもだんだんしゃべれなくなっ
てる。 
M.: TOEIC is 720, but I am losing the skill little by 
little. 
書くのとか読むのとか・・ Researcher: What about writing and reading? 
レポートとかいっぱい書いたりするのに、やっぱり使っ
てないと、どんどん英語を忘れちゃってて 
M.: To write a report, if I do not use it on a daily 
basis, I forget it. 
はい、 Researcher: Yes. 
今出来るかちょっと自信がない。 M.: I do not feel confident that I can do it now. 
何歳でしたか？ Researcher: How old were you? 
今ですか？ M.: Now? 
留学のとき Researcher: When you were abroad. 
１６から１７ M.: 16 to 17 years old. 
２年前ぐらいですね。 2 years ago. 
そうですね。 Researcher: Yes. 
いいですね。ええ、前の勉強のときと、今のスペイン語
の勉強と違うことがありますか？ 
Oh good. Any difference between the study you 
did before and the current one? 
スペイン語の活用？６つあったりとかして複雑で、難し
いと思う。あとは読み方とか発音の仕方とか。 
M.: Spanish conjunction. Has 6 and it is 
complicated and hard. Also how to read and 







Researcher: What about the teaching method? 
For example, between the United States and the 
current one? Same system? 
あんまり、、単位とかとらないとって言うのは違うけど、
教え方とかはおんなじ感じがします。 
M.: No… difference of credits system, but I think 




Researcher: Currently, here is lower and 0 is 
plus. What is your current level of Spanish? 
だってまだ習って２ヶ月しかたってないのに。 M.: Only two months have passed. 
そうそうそう Researcher: Yes, yes. 
ここらへんかな。 M.: Around here. 
マークしましょう。 Researcher: Please mark it. 
ここから、一番上のレベルには何をしますか？自分
で。 





M.: Go to study abroad, always use the 
dictionary, prepare yourself for next class, and 









Researcher: OK. I have another question. Was 
there any funny event when you study before? 
Any funny event? 
イベント？ M.: Event? 
劇をしたりとか、ネイティブの外国人の方とおしゃべり
したりして、通じたときはすごいうれしかったです。 
Theatre plays, when I could make understand 
speaking with native speakers. 
あの、スペイン語を学ぶために、何が一番大事なこと
でしょうか？ 
Researcher: What is the most important thing for 
you to study Spanish? 
いっぱい聞くこと。聞いて、言葉、単語の量を増やした
りとかが大事かな、と思います。 
M.: Listen to a lot of Spanish, increase 
vocabulary by listening, I think. 
OK。ありがとうございました。小さいインタビューです。
終わり。 






APPENDIX 4E: RECOGNITION ITEMS EXTRACTED FROM AU’S AND 
BU’S GRAMMAR (GRAMM) AND COMMUNICATION (COMM) CLASSES 
 
Note: Items corresponding to weakly-framed Hierarchy (regulative discourse) in 
communication classes are in bold print.  
 
Item and interaction 
transcript extract 
Questionnaire’s rendition English translation of 
rendition 
Source andcoding 
(1) La universidad está 
en la plaza de la 
Ciencia. ¿Sí o no? 
大学は科学の広場にあり
ますか。ありませんか。 
The University is in 















How did you do in the 
spot examination that 
was done last Friday? 
Did everyone already 
forget something that 
happened so long ago? 
AU’s Gramm 
Conduct F++ 






One moment, one 










A while ago I wrote on 
the board ‘everyday’ 








Please make the 












If there is a word you 
don’t understand, it is 
fine to ask me. If you 




(７) ¿Bélgica? Se dice 
ベルギ. 
Bélgica? Se dice Berugi. 
［ベルヒカ？”ベルギー”
といいます。］ 
Belgium? It’s Berugi[It’s 











ら、”Yo no como”。 
To make a negative 
sentence you place ‘no’ 
just before the verb. In 
case of using ‘yo’ [I] as 
well, it will be ‘yo no 
como’ [I don’t eat]. 
BU’s Gramm 
Hierarchy F+ 
(9) Muy bien, vamos a 
ver la palabra 
profesor. ¿Profesor 







All right. Let us see the 
word ‘profesor’ 
[teacher/professor]. 














Is there anybody who 
knows what Latin 
language is? What is 
Latin language? Who 








Let’s see, but do you 
refer to the bus stop? 
BU’s Gramm 
Hierarchy F- 
(12) Y para hacer el 
plural, como 
hacemos? Que hago 






And to make the plural, 
how do we do it? What 
do I have to do for the 
plural? For example, 







estudiante, O.K., pero 
las…  
 
Ok、でも”las… female student], O.K., 








Now I am going to ask a 
question. How would you 






















Let’s see, this one, the 
name ‘La Habana’ was 
not originally the name 
of the city. Originally, it 
referred to a place 
where something is 
carried out, and [it 
was] a normal 




(16) Bueno, en esta 
conversación está 
Maiko, tú eres Maiko, 
tú eres Carlos, de 
acuerdo y tenemos 
también un señor, tú 
eres señor y por último 
tenemos a Marta, tú 
eres Marta. Vamos a 








Well, in this conversation 
there is Maiko, you are 
Maiko, you are Carlos, 
all right, and we also 
have a gentleman, you 
are gentleman and 
finally we have Marta, 
















Is there anybody who 
wants to be in charge of 
the first picture? If there 
isn’t anybody means that 
it’s going to be Mr Iwata. 




















Can you do it with the 
person behind you? Can 
you turn back? Is it 
possible that both carry it 
out, isn’t it? Just one 
person turning back? 












What happened? You 
don’t have anyone to ask 
questions? Have you 
already questioned five 
persons? Do you want 













All right, pair up with that 
person. Please pair up. 
With anyone is fine but 
you have to pair up. 
BU’s COMM 
Selection of jobs 
F+ 








Well, let’s repeat some 















All right, now make a 
sentence to say where 
each one of you is 



























different sentence. The 
easiest one is ‘I am in 
the classroom’. That 
would have been the 
easiest for you ‘Estoy 
dentro de la clase’ [I am 
in the classroom], but 
you couldn’t use this 
sentence because I 
already used it. Use 
expressions such as 














In pairs look at this map 
of ‘Hispanoamérica’ 
(Countries where 
Spanish is spoken) and 
read the names of the 
countries were Spanish 
is spoken and their 
respective capitals, [and] 





(24) Antes hacíamos 
de singular a plural, 
ahora al reves, de 




We did it from singular to 
plural before, now we do 


















If it takes too much time 
to change the phrase 
into the third 
[grammatical] person, 
first commit exclusively 
to make questions and 
write down the answers. 
Leave one line and then 
you can think and write it 






よ。 ¿Cómo estás?  
まだ聞いてないよ。 
¿Cómo estás? 
I haven’t asked you yet. 

































que se habla arabe”って
言ったらよい。自信がな
いけど何となく・・いい？ 
There can be cases for 
which you don’t know at 
all, but there may be 
some countries where 
you have some idea that 
‘possibly [a language] is 
spoken], isn’t that true? 
In this case, you can 
start with ‘creo que’ (I 
believe)… ‘creo que se 
habla…’ (I believe [some 
language] is spoken). 
For example, Libya, 
Libya, if you know more 
or less where Libya is 
located and think that its 
language could be 
Arabic, you may say 
‘creo que se habla 
árabe’[I believe Arabic is 
spoken]. I am not sure 







It’s difficult to understand 
























the beginning try to 
translate it in this way. 
Also you have to start 
learning words like 
‘patio’ (nakaniwa) 
[garden/yard] and 
‘fuente’ (izumi) [water 
fountain]. Especially, the 
word ‘patio’ 
[garden/yard] is used 
quite frequently and 






























The most important point 
is where are located the 
countries where Spanish 
is spoken. For someone 
who studies Spanish at 
certain level, s/he must 
know them. And so, I 
think that is better to do it 
starting either from north 
or south. ‘Desde el norte 
o desde el sur’ [From 
north or south]. It’s better 
if you do it following a 
certain order. In that way 
you will remember, I 
believe, you will 



















Well, it can be done in 
this way as well. First 
you have to make the 
questions and write 
down the answers in first 
[grammatical] person. 
Then you leave one line 
so that you can change 




(31) Saca la lengua. 





Get your tongue out. 
More, more, more, [get 












Al lado de なんとか、っ
てきたらde以下のかた






‘Al lado de’ [beside, at 
the side of] something 
means that something 
comes after ‘de’ [of], ‘Al 
lado de la mesa’ [beside 
the table], ‘mesa’ means 
table and therefore the 
phrase is the chair is 
beside the table. That’s 
what it is. 
AU’s Gramm 
Evaluation F++ 
(33) No, esto aquí 
hablan inglés. En 
Trinidad y Tobago 







No, here English is 
spoken. In Trinidad 
Tobago they speak 




(34) ¿Qué hay en la 
Plaza de la Ciencia?... 
¿Qué hay?... ¿Qué hay 
en la Plaza de la 
Ciencia?... ¿Qué hay 
¿Qué hay en la plaza de 
la Ciencia?... ¿Qué 
hay?... ¿Qué hay en la 
plaza de la Ciencia?... 
¿Qué hay en la plaza de 
¿Qué hay en la plaza de 
la Ciencia?... ¿Qué 
hay?... ¿Qué hay en la 
plaza de la Ciencia?... 













la Ciencia?...(What is 
there at Ciencia Square? 
What is there? What is 
there at Ciencia Square? 








I told you that it was 









Be careful. ‘Otra vez’ 








Something is missing. 






APPENDIX 4F: RECOGNITION, TRAJECTORY, ORIENTATION AND REALISATION, PRIMARY DATA FOR BU AND CU 
 
 
Table 4F.1—Recognition, trajectory, orientation and realisation, primary data for BU and CU 
 
ID Code GEN ORG TRA ORI REA Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 
BU1 2 1 3 8 90 5 * 9 9 9 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 9 5 9 1 5 9 1 
BU2 2 1 1 2 50 5 5 5 5 9 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 
BU4 1 1 3 7 95 5 9 5 5 9 8 5 5 3 5 3 3 8 5 4 9 7 9 1 
BU5 2 1 1 3 50 2 5 8 5 7 8 7 9 4 8 6 5 6 5 5 7 4 7 1 
BU7 2 1 2 2 80 3 5 7 5 8 7 8 5 3 5 3 5 8 5 * 8 6 8 5 
BU8 2 1 1 7 95 * * 5 * 9 9 * * * * * * 9 1 * * * * * 
BU9 1 1 1 3 70 5 5 8 6 8 7 5 6 4 9 5 6 6 4 6 9 5 9 1 
BU10 2 1 3 7 95 * * 1 * 9 9 5 7 1   9 2 * 1 * * 9 9 * 
BU13 2 1 2 6 70 5 5 7 5 7 5 7 9 1 5 3 1 5 5 8 5 5 8 3 
BU16 2 1 2 6 80 5 7 9 5 9 9 1 9 1 1 1 5 5 5 9 5 9 9 1 
BU17 1 1 2 1 80 5 4 6 8 5 5 5 5 2 5 5 2 5 5 5 2 5 5 1 
BU18 2 1 3 3 50 * * 9 * * * * 5 5 * * 5 * 5 * * * * 5 
BU20 1 1 1 7 80 * 5 9 5 9 9 5 9 1 9 5 1 9 5 5 5 9 9 1 
BU21 2 1 2 2 50 5 9 5 5 4 5 5 5 3 5 4 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 
BU22 2 1 1 7 80 * * 9 * 5 9 1 5 1 * * 5 5 5 * 9 9 9 1 
BU23 1 1 1 2 80 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 
BU24 1 1 1 1 80 5 5 5 5 9 9 5 5 1 1 1 1 9 5 1 5 5 1 5 
BU28 2 1 1 7 90 * 9 9 9 9 8 9 9 5 1 7 1 * 1 5 6 9 9 5 




CU1 1 2 2 6 90 4 3 6 8 9 9 9 5 3 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 9 8 1 
CU2 1 2 1 6 85 1 1 5 9 1 9 9 9 1 5 5 1 1 5 5 9 1 9 1 
CU5 2 2 3 3 60 9 9 9 3 9 9 5 5 5 9 1 5 1 1 7 9 1 9 1 
CU6 2 2 3 6 90 1 1 9 5 9 9 1 9 1 9 5 1 9 1 1 1 9 5 1 
CU8 2 2 3 8 88 5 3 5 8 9 9 9 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 * 5 7 4 
CU9 2 2 3 3 60 5 1 9 5 5 9 9 5 5 9 1 5 5 5 5 9 5 9 1 
CU11 2 2 3 3 60 1 1 9 1 9 9 9 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 9 1 
CU12 1 2 1 6 88 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1 1 9 5 5 1 9 5 1 5 
CU13 2 2 1 6 88 5 8 7 8 5 8 6 8 2 5 3 5 7 4 5 4 7 6 2 
CU14 2 2 1 5 80 6 5 4 5 5 9 6 7 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 
CU15 2 2 3 3 90 2 5 9 9 9 9 5 5 5 5 2 5 5 5 5 9 1 9 1 
CU16 2 2 1 4 70 3 5 8 8 8 5 5 8 3 5 3 2 5 3 5 9 * 9 1 





Table 4F.1, continued 
 
ID Code Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 Q27 Q28 Q29 Q30 Q31 Q32 Q33 Q34 Q35 Q36 Q37 
BU1 9 1 5 9 1 9 1 5 9 9 9 5 9 9 * 1 1 1 
BU2 5 5 5 5 1 9 1 9 1 1 5 9 5 1 5 5 9 5 
BU4 9 2 4 7 5 9 1 6 6 8 9 7 5 8 5 5 7 4 
BU5 7 5 3 7 3 9 5 5 7 7 7 7 8 7 7 3 6 5 
BU7 5 1 5 5 1 9 5 5 8 5 6 6 8 7 5 1 5 4 




BU9 9 3 3 6 4 9 5 6 5 6 6 4 6 5 5 5 6 3 
BU10 5 5 * 9 * 9 9 * * * 9 * * * * 8 8 5 
BU13 8 5 9 9 3 9 5 5 5 5 7 5 7 5 5 3 5 5 
BU16 9 1 8 9 1 1 4 4 6 8 1 9 9 5 2 5 6 5 
BU17 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 8 5 5 5 5 5 
BU18 9 5 * * * * * 5 * 9 * 5 * * * * * * 
BU20 9 5 9 9 1 * 5 * 5 * 9 5 9 9 * 5 5 5 
BU21 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 5 5 3 5 5 5 4 5 1 5 4 
BU22 8 5 * 9 5 9 * * 5 * 9 9 * 9 * 9 * * 
BU23 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 
BU24 5 1 5 5 1 5 9 1 5 5 5 9 5 1 1 9 5 1 
BU28 9 5 * 9 1 9 * 1 6 * 9 * * * * 9 5 * 
BU29 3 1 8 9 1 9 4 4 7 9 9 7 6 9 8 5 3 5 
CU1 7 2 4 5 2 5 3 1 7 3 7 5 8 2 2 6 7 7 
CU2 9 9 5 5 1 5 1 5 9 5 9 9 5 5 9 9 9 5 
CU5 9 5 1 9 5 1 1 7 2 9 1 5 1 5 9 1 5 1 
CU6 9 1 5 9 1 1 1 1 9 5 5 9 9 5 9 9 9 5 
CU8 7 5 5 8 5 3 2 7 3 8 7 7 8 7 7 5 8 7 
CU9 9 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 9 1 9 5 5 1 9 9 1 
CU11 9 5 1 9 5 5 1 9 1 9 5 9 5 9 5 5 9 5 
CU12 5 1 9 9 1 9 1 1 9 5 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
CU13 9 5 3 7 3 3 5 7 8 5 5 5 8 6 5 7 5 4 
CU14 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 




CU16 9 5 8 9 2 2 2 8 5 9 5 9 5 9 9 2 8 1 









APPENDIX 4G: BU’S COMMUNICATION COURSE, LABELLING OF 
ACQUIRERS’ INTERVIEW DATA 
 
 




1. ‘She is able to communicate but lacks discipline and does not work much.’ 
 
2. ‘They do not require to understand grammatically everything first in order to do 
communicative task.’ 
 
3. ‘She tried to communicate with me at an informal level but could not keep up with 
the course requirements.’ 
 






The best in risk taking are AO (3/7) and KK (3/7), and RK, then we have SN (1/7) and 
MA (3/8). 
 
The ones in the middle of the chart show character and motivation. 
 
NO (1/2) is a very passive student and AT (2/2) does not have a regular attendance 
record. She is communicative but lacks discipline and does not work much. 
 
MS (1/3) has a passive attitude. She is not communicative and tries to do the course’s 
tasks individually, departing from her peers. In general the segment separated from the 
rest at the lower end lacks motivation. 
 
 
ADAPTATION TO CLT 
 
AO (3/7), KK (3/7), YA (3/8) SN (1/7) and AF have a communicative disposition. 
They are more oriented to the communication. They do not require understanding 
grammatically everything first in order to do communicative tasks. That is not the 
case of students in the middle of the chart. 
 
AT (2/2) lacks motivation. She has aptitude but lacks a sense of regularity as a college 
student. She tried to communicate with me at an informal level but could not keep 
up with the course requirements. 
 
 
FULFIL THE REQUIREMENTS 
 
SN (1/7), MA (3/8) and ED (1/7) compensate their acceptable but not brilliant 
communicative aptitudes by being focused and constant. 
 
The ones in the middle of the chart have the given of communication but they are 








The written examination reflects communicative tasks performed in the classroom, 
such as describing one’s own family. Some of the questions are about knowledge 
acquisition (not skills) like the name of the letters in the alphabet. 
 
I do not value formal/grammar accuracy. I value much more the capacity to 
express ideas. I assume that if a native speaker can understand what the students 
are expressing, then it is fine. 
 
Apart from the interaction in the classroom, I believe that students need to 
consolidate what they have learned orally by studying at home. O (3/7) did very 
well in the written exam. That was not the case of K (3/7) I think. But the examination 
combines communicative attitudes and personal study. 
 
YF (2/6) makes up what she lacks in communication with personal study. That is 
why I think she is high on the chart.  
 
 
LEARNING STYLE AND PERSONALITY 
 
Their learning style may be the result of the way they were taught but I believe there is 
also a personality factor in this. 
 
NO (1/2) and YF (3/3) they isolate from their peers, they do not participate and they 
do not make up for those things with other abilities. I believe that in this case is more a 
matter of personality rather than learning style. 
 
It is harder to say which factor is more relevant, either learning style or personality 




APPENDIX 4H: CU’S COMMUNICATION COURSE, LABELLING OF 
ACQUIRERS’ INTERVIEW DATA 
 
 




1. “Speak but accurately…” 
2. “She is talkative, but not rigorous…” 
3. “While I can communicate and be understood, fine, that is her policy” 
 
STUDENTS COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS  
 
NR excluded herself. The boys are fine, but not as much as [to place them] up here. 
This boy is studious but timid, TY. KA (3/3) is in her own world; she is very 
cold-hearted. SS had studied Spanish before. 
 
MO (1/6), NM (3/8), YS; participative, intelligent; they have benefited from the 
course. And then TM (1/5), KA (1/4), YK (3/6); they have also made an effort, but 
they are not as intelligent and have learnt not as much as the ones above. YK (3/6) 
may be more intelligent, and I put her in the first line. 
 
Then we have the students that have participated and complied. YF (2/6) is more 
talkative, and these two are more timid [YT and KH]. AS (3/3) is very talkative and 
participative, but not very rigorous. She talks a lot but does not [speak] well, and in 
case she is actually making an effort, then she has not learnt [to speak] correctly. 
Speak but accurately. Either she is not making an effort or she has not learnt [to 
speak]. 
 
IM is kind of a blunderer. I am going to put her with SA and AK. SA failed last year. 
Even after having failed, she has done sort of the minimum. KS (3/3), YM are quite 
lazy, together with RN. YM fulfills some of the requirements; she attends class, but 
does not participate actively. She can only work with SA, but does not cope with 
speaking to somebody else, so she brings a report from her psychiatrist. She wrote the 
diary and passed. [She passed] thanks to written tasks. These [students] do well in 
conversation.    
 
AS (3/3) is very participative, very nice and gets along with everybody else in the 
class; she does not create a distance, but does not study. I think she does not study and 
does not care much about it: ‘As long as I can communicate and people understand 
what I say...,’ she does not care about the verb form, that is her policy. It is 
possible I gave her before a grade higher than the one I am giving to her here. It is 
possible that she did very well in her final examination. She plays the saxophone and 
always talks about it. During the first part of the course, I used to think that she was 
very good, but then I changed my mind, and then I changed it again at the end of the 
course.   
 
The diary and the conversation...there are people who wrote very good diaries but are 
not able to talk as much or as well. Others prefer to write because they are good at 




me. AS wrote the diary well, but it was the only task she did well. 
 
It is easy to compare the boys with each other, but harder to compare them with the 
girls. YT did well writing the diary and I was astonished, but until I saw that, she 
seemed lost at sea. He goes unnoticed; he was outshined by his friends. I cannot put 
him above all the rest, but he got a very good grade; but then all of them are together 
because they wanted it like that. They did all the group and pair activities together. 
They are not as high as the girls because these girls stand out very much. 
 
Participating with a certain level of rigor 
 
MY sits next to M and I had the feeling that she was improving just like the others, but 
she was not. The fact that they sit together is very misleading. 
 
(1) That they communicate with me, participate in the activities, show enthusiasm for 
the task, regardless of [grammatical] correctness, and then (2) it does bother me that 
their correctness does not improve. They need to try out so that they also [produce] 
correctly; [it is not enough] only participating in class but also [achieving] correctness. 
 
I do not explain grammar very directly. Correctness is the result of practice. 
Knowledge comes from other classes. Talking and having all grammatical factors in 
mind is difficult. 
 
Practice is focused on learning a structure, or anything. I hope that practice help 
them to do it right or get used to understand what they need. If I make them talk, for 
instance, they know that they will need the 1
st
[grammatical] person verb form. So, if at 
the end of the course they use the 3
rd
 person by mistake, then that does not fit in what 
we have been doing.  
 
Because if I make them talk, is for them to produce [an utterance] using that 
[grammatical] person, and I let them know when they make a mistake. I say ‘who?’ If 
he tells me ‘I eats at three o’clock’, I ask ‘who eats at three?’, and he then realizes 
c[his mistake] and says ‘ah! I eat’, although I do not explain too much. But I did 
explain some things. The point is that the philosophy that says that only 
communicating is sufficient does not work for me. It is not attractive to me. Because I 
end up sounding badly. Twelve years of living in Japan and it annoys me enormously.  
 
The students notice that you communicate, but do you set high standards for 
grammar? Yes, I am doing it like this. Everybody told me through the class’ evaluation 
that it was the most difficult one. And theoretically, it is not, because we are here to 
talk. I do not ask them to fill up anything in a test. When they say that my class was 
the hardest, they mean that talking, saying something meaningful, and talking 
about it, is much more difficult. They told me that it was the most difficult [course] 
by far. Talking and having all grammatical factors in mind is difficult. 
 
The book was easy to me because it is divided into six levels and, previously, I was 
using one that was divided into three levels. The class worked out fine because the 
materials were more suitable. I thought that the textbook A. was easy. The idea I have 




APPENDIX 5A: BU’S AND CU’S DISCURSIVE AND SOCIAL ORDER RULES DESCRIPTION UPON MOTIVE-ACTIVITY, 




Table 5A.1—Summary table of discursive and social order rules description, framing values, BU and CU 
 
 BU Grammar  BU Communication  CU Grammar  CU Communication 
Variable N Mdn   N Mdn   N Mdn   N Mdn  
1. Selection of contents  8 4.00   16 4.00   21 4.00   16 4.00  
2. Selection of classroom jobs 8 3.00   16 4.00   21 4.00   16 3.00  
3. Sequence 8 4.00   16 4.00   21 4.00   16 4.00  
4. Pace 8 4.00   16 4.00   21 4.00   16 4.00  
5. Evaluation criteria 8 4.00   16 4.00   21 4.00   16 4.00  
6. Future assessment 8 1.00   16 1.00   21 1.00   16 1.00  
7. CONDUCT 8 2.00   16 3.00   21 3.00   16 1.00  
8. HIERARCHY 8 3.50   16 3.50   21 4.00   16 4.00  







Table 5A.2—Summary table of discursive and social order rules description, Management motive-activity, BU and CU 
 
 BU Grammar BU Communication CU Grammar CU Communication 
 N time % N time % N time % N time % 
 3 0:02:31 3 8 0:11:42 14 7 0:08:23  3 0:01:24 2 
Variable  Mdn   Mdn   Mdn   Mdn  
1. Selection of contents   4.00   4.00   4.00   4.00  
2. Selection of classroom jobs  4.00   4.00   4.00   4.00  
3. Sequence  4.00   4.00   4.00   4.00  
4. Pace  4.00   4.00   4.00   4.00  
5. Evaluation criteria  4.00   4.00   4.00   4.00  
6. Future assessment  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00  
7. CONDUCT  1.00   4.00   3.00   1.00  
8. HIERARCHY  4.00   4.00   4.00   4.00  
             
 
 
Table 5A.3—Summary table of discursive and social order rules description, Foundation motive-activity, BU and CU 
 
 BU Grammar BU Communication CU Grammar CU Communication 
 N time % N time % N time % N time % 
 4 1:08:46 78 5 0:39:27 48 7 0:39:06 49 3 0:05:50 7 
Variable  Mdn   Mdn   Mdn   Mdn  
1. Selection of contents   4.00   4.00   4.00   4.00  
2. Selection of classroom jobs  3.00   3.00   4.00   4.00  
3. Sequence  4.00   4.00   4.00   400  
4. Pace  4.00   4.00   4.00   4.00  
5. Evaluation criteria  4.00   4.00   4.00   4.00  
6. Future assessment  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00  
7. CONDUCT  2.00   3.00   3.00   1.00  




Table 5A.4—Summary table of discursive and social order rules description, Structural motive-activity, BU and CU 
 
 BU Grammar BU Communication CU Grammar CU Communication 
 N time % N time % N time % N time % 
 1 1:17:00 19 3 0:31:51 38 2 0:15:49 20 1 0:05:46 7 
Variable  Mdn   Mdn   Mdn   Mdn  
1. Selection of contents   3.00   4.00   4.00   4.00  
2. Selection of classroom jobs  2.00   3.00   4.00   3.00  
3. Sequence  3.00   4.00   4.00   3.00  
4. Pace  4.00   4.00   4.00   4.00  
5. Evaluation criteria  3.00   4.00   4.00   4.00  
6. Future assessment  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00  
7. CONDUCT  3.00   3.00   3.00   1.00  
8. HIERARCHY  2.00   2.00   4.00   4.00  
 
 
Table 5A.5—Summary table of discursive and social order rules description, Functional motive-activity, BU and CU 
 
 BU Grammar BU Communication CU Grammar CU Communication 
 N time % N time % N time % N time % 
 0 0:00:00 0 0 0:00:00 0 1 0:05:47 7 9 1:07:30 84 
Variable  Mdn   Mdn   Mdn   Mdn  
1. Selection of contents   --   --   3.00   3.00  
2. Selection of classroom jobs  --   --   3.00   2.00  
3. Sequence  --   --   4.00   4.00  
4. Pace  --   --   4.00   4.00  
5. Evaluation criteria  --   --   4.00   4.00  
6. Future assessment  --   --   1.00   1.00  
7. CONDUCT  --   --   1.00   1.00  





Table 5A.6.—Summary table of discursive and social order rules description, Rhetorical motive-activity, BU and CU 
 
 BU Grammar BU Communication CU Grammar CU Communication 
 N time % N time % N time % N time % 
 0 0:00:00 0 0 0:00:00 0 4 0:10:18 13 0 0:00:00 0 
Variable  Mdn   Mdn   Mdn   Mdn  
1. Selection of contents   --   --   4.00   --  
2. Selection of classroom jobs  --   --   4.00   --  
3. Sequence  --   --   4.00   --  
4. Pace  --   --   4.00   --  
5. Evaluation criteria  --   --   4.00   --  
6. Future assessment  --   --   1.00   --  
7. CONDUCT  --   --   1.00   --  









Table 5B.1—Summary table of framing values for BU Grammar and Communication upon motive-activity structure levels 
 
 BU Grammar BU Communication 
 Management Foundation Structural Functional Rhetorical Management Foundation Structural Functional Rhetorical 
 N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  
Selection of contents  3 4.00  4 4.00  1 3.00        8 4.00  5 4.00  3 4.00        
Selection of classroom jobs 3 3.00  4 3.00  1 2.00        8 4.00  5 3.00  3 3.00        
Sequence 3 4.00  4 4.00  1 3.00        8 4.00  5 4.00  3 4.00        
Pace 3 4.00  4 4.00  1 4.00        8 4.00  5 4.00  3 4.00        
Evaluation criteria 3 4.00  4 400  1 3.00        8 4.00  5 4.00  3 4.00        
Future evaluation 3 1.00  4 1.00  1 1.00        8 1.00  5 1.00  3 1.00        
CONDUCT 3 1.00  4 2.00  1 3.00        8 4.00  5 3.00  3 3.00        
HIERARCHY 3 4.00  4 3.00  1 2.00        8 4.00  5 3.00  3 2.00        
 
 















Table 5B.2— Summary table of framing values for CU Grammar and Communication upon motive-activity structure levels 
 
 CU Grammar CU Comm 
 Management Foundation Structural Functional Rhetorical Management Foundation Structural Functional Rhetorical 
 N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N Mdn  N M  
Selection of contents  7 4.00  7 4.00  2 4.00  1 3.00  4 4.00  3 4.00  3 4.00  1 4.00  9 3.00     
Selection of classroom jobs 7 4.00  7 4.00  2 4.00  1 3.00  4 4.00  3 4.00  3 4.00  1 3.00  9 2.00     
Sequence 7 4.00  7 4.00  2 4.00  1 4.00  4 4.00  3 4.00  3 4.00  1 3.00  9 4.00     
Pace 7 4.00  7 4.00  2 4.00  1 4.00  4 4.00  3 4.00  3 4.00  1 4.00  9 4.00     
Evaluation criteria 7 4.00  7 4.00  2 4.00  1 4.00  4 4.00  3 4.00  3 4.00  1 4.00  9 4.00     
Future evaluation 7 1.00  7 1.00  2 1.00  1 1.00  4 1.00  3 1.00  3 1.00  1 1.00  9 1.00     
CONDUCT 7 3.00  7 3.00  2 3.00  1 1.00  4 1.00  3 1.00  3 1.00  1 1.00  9 1.00     
HIERARCHY 7 4.00  7 4.00  2 4.00  1 4.00  4 4.00  3 4.00  3 4.00  1 4.00  9 4.00     
 
Note: Empty cells indicate no occurrences. 
 
 
